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NUMBER € 400

- ADDRESSES THE RELEVANCE OF A PHYSICAL VALUE!
- REDEFINES THE CONCEPT OF A PHYSICAL VALUE!
- EXAMINES THE MEANING OF THE TERM "VALUE"!
- QUESTIONS THE IDEA OF PRODUCTIVITY
- EXPLORES THE BOUNDARIES BETWEEN

WRR

THE NETHERLANDS SCIENTIFIC COUNCIL FOR GOVERNMENT POLICY

FORMERLY KNOWN AS "FUTURE VALUES"



THE VALUE OF NOTHING

CURATED BY JESSE VAN OOSTEN & MICHEL VAN DARTSEL
4TH SEPTEMBER — 16TH NOVEMBER 2014 (65 OPENED DAYS)

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Revaluing Culture

Erik Schrijvers, Anne-Greet Keizer & Godfried Engbersen

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- "THE CONCEPT OF VALUE IS COMING TO BE THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE MARKET ECONOMIC CONSIDERATION"

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- AKIMBO.CA - THE VALUE OF ART
- "IT IS A WELL-TIMED SHOW AS OF LATE DO HELP ADD TO OUR WORKINGS OF THE ART ALSO FINALLY SEE SO"

Amsterdam University Press

RETURN ON EXHIBITION

Revaluing Culture

The Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR) is an independent think-tank for the Dutch government. It provides the government with advice, both on request and of its own accord, from a long-term perspective. The topics are cross-sectoral and cover social issues with which the government may need to deal in the future.

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THE NETHERLANDS SCIENTIFIC COUNCIL FOR GOVERNMENT POLICY

Revaluing Culture

Erik Schrijvers, Anne-Greet Keizer & Godfried Engbersen

Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam 2015

Jonas Lund

Commissioned by the exhibition 'The Value Of Nothing'

Tent, Rotterdam, 2014

Projected Outcomes is an attempt to determine the value of the exhibition 'The Value of Nothing' by mapping the hard data of its costs and benefits. Lund updates the 'Big Data' of the exhibition manually on the artwork, such as the level of subsidy and the income generated by the exhibition, what the money is spent on and how often a given work is mentioned in the press. New data on the results of the exhibition, such as visitor numbers and media attention, are added to the work on a daily basis or erased and updated. These data about the value of an exhibition often form the basis for communications with the exhibition's financial backers. *Projected Outcomes* poses the question of the extent to which the value of an exhibition can be encapsulated in such data.

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FOREWORD

Across Europe, the search for a new legitimacy for cultural policy has been under way for quite some time. The economic crisis has hastened things along, including in the Netherlands. The Dutch government has cut proportionately more from the culture sector's budget than from those of other policy sectors. Its austerity plans sparked fierce protests when they were presented. Critics called the policy 'bereft of vision' and 'a classic example of short-term thinking'. The protests reached their climax in the 'March of Civilisation', which saw thousands of protestors, including prominent figures in the world of Dutch culture and the arts, march from Rotterdam to The Hague, the seat of government. The scale of the austerity measures, the harsh tone with which they were presented, and the fierce response from the sector itself made the international news.¹ *The Guardian* referred to 'a slashing of the culture budget' and concluded that 'the idea of the Netherlands as a place with one of the most visionary and innovative environments for the arts is under threat'.² In Belgium, Bert Anciaux, former Flemish Culture Minister, even proposed to offer to take in Dutch artists as refugees (Van der Hoeven 2012).

The speed with which the budget cuts were introduced, the size of the cuts themselves, and the tone of the debate may make the Dutch situation unique, but austerity is on the agenda in other places too, for example the United Kingdom and Flanders. In the background, a more fundamental question is being raised about the relationship between the arts and culture, government, and society, i.e.: what is the purpose of art? It is a question that has been discussed at length in other contexts too, for example in the United Kingdom (see, for example, Tusa 2000 and 2014; Holden 2006; Carey 2006, Warwick Commission on the Future of Cultural Value 2015), Germany (Haselbach et al. 2012 and Wagner 2012) and Flanders (Gielen et al. 2014).

These and other more fundamental questions have led the Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR) to consider the future of cultural policy. The result is the report *Cultuur herwaarderen*, consisting of the present essay and five contributions by experts from the Netherlands and abroad (Hasan Bakhshi, Roberta Comunian, Koen van Eijck, Robert Kloosterman and Dave O'Brien).³ We have made grateful use of their contributions in our analysis and in the recommendations that we propose later in this essay. We presented this publication to the Dutch Minister for Culture, Jet Bussemaker, on 5 March 2015. Our analysis and recommendations have become part of the public discourse and have also influenced policymaking. For example, in her policy document *Ruimte voor cultuur*, which sets out the underlying rationale for the next budget period, the Minister

has embraced the Council's key recommendations. Nevertheless, it is too soon to tell whether our analysis or recommendations will influence policymaking in the longer term as well.

In this essay, we look more closely at the aims of cultural policy and at its legitimacy. We argue that the 'cultural' element of cultural policy should be revalued. The subsidised culture sector should not be at the service of other fields of policy; it should be assessed on its own merits. That is because the culture sector is facing a variety of trends – for example changing audience tastes and sources of funding – that require a serious response. Our analysis and recommendations are based primarily on the Dutch situation, but the terms in which the discourse about cultural policy has been cast in the Netherlands and the overall direction of Dutch cultural policy in recent decades both mirror international trends. We hope that our analysis and recommendations will resonate beyond the Netherlands and offer a useful context for considering the future of cultural policy elsewhere.

1 SEARCH FOR A NEW LEGITIMACY FOR CULTURAL POLICY

The Dutch translation of *Art as Therapy* (*Kunst als therapie*) is one of the best-selling publications in the museum shop of the Rijksmuseum, which reopened amid much excitement after a major renovation in 2013 (Jongenelen 2015). The book's authors, Alain de Botton and John Armstrong, argue that art is a 'therapeutic medium' that can 'help guide, exhort and console its viewers, enabling them to become better versions of themselves' (2014: 5). But the encounter with art doesn't always run smoothly, say the two authors. They identify the cause of the problem as a deep-seated 'institutional refusal to ask the hard question: what purpose does art serve?' (idem: 4). The idea that there might be an entirely different answer to the question of art's purpose was also highlighted in the research report *Rijksmuseum Grand National Product. The economic value and impact of the new Rijksmuseum*. According to this document (Booz & Company 2013), the Rijksmuseum contributes an annual 250 million euros to the Netherlands' GDP and is good for more than 3500 jobs. In other words, 'Fine art is the finest investment'.

The question of art's purpose has a long history. The ideas touched on above reflect a complex intellectual history, driven forward by widely varying opinions concerning the functions of art (Belfiore and Bennet 2010). More recently, the question has become the object of social and political debate about government funding for the arts and culture. This has led to a search for a new legitimacy for cultural policy. Overall, that search has proceeded along two lines of enquiry: (1) a focus on the impact and value of culture, and (2) a focus on the relationship between culture and society.

The first line of enquiry coincides with the trend within government to account for policy by pointing out its impact (i.e. the positive effects) (Power 1997). The result is a seemingly endless series of social and economic impact studies studying what culture contributes (Van den Hoogen 2012), for example in the form of spending in the local economy (Frey 2008). Besides the Netherlands, this trend has been observed in the United Kingdom (O'Brien 2015), Scandinavia (Duelund 2008) and France (Menger 2010; Dubois 2014). The call for accountability is furthermore often accompanied by a gradual tightening up of the evaluation criteria. In the Netherlands, quality has been joined in recent decades by other yardsticks, for example public reach, funding-per-visit, position in the culture sector, regional dissemination of cultural activities, entrepreneurship, and education.⁴


Scientists, policymakers and representatives of the culture sector have also made efforts to define the ‘value’ of culture (Vuyk 2012; Mommaas 2012; Van Hilvoorde et al. 2012; Van den Hoogen 2012; Gielen et al. 2014; Ministerie van OCW 2013a). Usually, they try to differentiate between the intrinsic/artistic, the social, and the economic value of culture. In the Netherlands, the question of culture’s value has been on the policy agenda since the present Culture Minister’s statement in 2013: ‘I expect profound self-examination, argumentation and contributions to the public debate on the value and meaning of culture’ (Ministerie van OCW 2013a: 15).⁵

The second line of enquiry in the search for a new legitimacy for cultural policy focuses on the relationship between culture and society in general. Increasingly, it is that relationship that policymakers put forward to legitimise cultural policy: ‘Artists and cultural institutions derive their *raison d’être* not so much from the sector itself, but from their relevance to society’ (Ministerie van OCW 2013: 1). In this vision, cultural policy is a tool with which to achieve an impact or create value in other policy areas such as the economy, health care, wellbeing, and democracy. Gray (2002) refers to this as *policy attachment*, with one policy sector ‘attaching’ itself to another, often one that occupies a more prominent place in the system and has a bigger budget.

The question is whether either approach offers a way out of the current crisis of legitimacy. For a start, hard evidence for the ‘impact’ of culture is fragmented and suffers from methodological shortcomings (see e.g. Belfiore 2006; O’Brien 2014; Carnwath and Brown 2014; Gielen et al. 2014). The use of the term ‘cultural value’ is also far from unambiguous; it is said to be a property of cultural objects and activities, a framework for assessing, for describing the interactions between culture, individuals and society, and for rationalising government funding (O’Brien 2015). Finally, recognising that culture has various values and listing its positive effects does not automatically generate cultural policy targets. Culture – in all its many facets – may well achieve a certain impact, but government need not necessarily pursue that impact in its cultural policy. Focusing too much on the values and impact of culture may even prevent a re-evaluation of cultural policy because it encourages us to regard culture mainly in relation to other policy areas such as the economy, health care, wellbeing and democracy. And if the value of culture lies mainly in its impact on society and in its relationship with other policy domains, can it have any meaning or quality of its own?

THREE REASONS FOR RE-EVALUATING THE AIMS OF CULTURAL POLICY

Our argument is that the publicly-funded culture sector should not be at the service of other fields of policy; it should be assessed on its own merits. There are various reasons for re-examining the aims of cultural policy, driven by trends and developments in the Netherlands and beyond (Figure 1.1).

Figure 1.1 Influence of societal trends on the arts and culture

1. The growing importance of personal freedom has brought about changes in public taste and patterns of cultural participation. In post-war western Europe, cultural nourishment – like health care and education – came to be seen in many countries as something to which the people were entitled and that the state was obligated to provide, resulting in a sizeable national cultural infrastructure (Judt 2010). ‘Democratisation’ of the culture of the elite classes was one of the key policy principles at that time (Matarasso and Landry 1999), but for various reasons it is being questioned. People are increasingly less inclined to let government set the standard (Bauman 2000; Beck and Beck-Gersheim 2002) and are developing more heterogeneous tastes in the cultural arena, with ‘high’ and ‘low’ art forms being consumed in varying combinations (e.g. Peterson 1992).⁶ Although the high-educated and low-educated segments of the population continue to differ in their cultural consumption, those differences do not automatically line up with the distinction between ‘high’ and ‘low’ culture. While low-educated persons have not become consumers of high culture, high-educated persons do enjoy popular culture (Smithuijsen 2013), begging the question of who cultural policy is actually for (De Swaan 2012; Wallach 2006).

2. The economic context of cultural production, distribution and consumption has changed significantly. Culture (especially high culture) and the economy were long seen as occupying separate worlds or as one another’s opposites (Klamer 1996; Throsby 2010). However, the marketization of society has made market forces and market values as influential in the cultural domain as they are in other areas (Sandel 2012). Starting in the 1970s, as the definition of arts and cultural heritage came to include popular culture, commercial cultural products and activities that proved popular with the public also came under the sway of cultural policy. The ‘aesthetisation’ (Lipovetski and Serroy 2013) of the economy, in which design plays an increasingly important role in the battle for consumers’ attention, has

turned the spotlight on the ‘cultural’ aspects of the economy (Lash and Urry 1994). The interaction between these trends has led to ‘culture’ being regarded as a source of economic vitality, with many policymakers eager to stimulate what has gradually come to known as the ‘creative economy’. The European Commission (2013a), for example, has stated that the cultural and creative sectors ‘play a big role in the European economy and help generate growth and jobs’.

3. The third trend is the changing relationship between government and the culture sector. Recent decades have seen a push towards government reform and towards a different relationship between government and society. Government has been replaced by governance: the authorities have retreated, encouraged market forces and entrepreneurship in the culture sector, and turned museums and funds into independent bodies. At the same time, they have tightened their grip by adding new criteria that give them more control over funding application assessments, by reorganising the advisory system in the culture sector (Mangset 2009), and by requiring more professionalism from the boards of cultural institutions (Čopič and Srakar 2012). All these changes have been accompanied by stricter performance and accountability standards and by a heightened interest in quantifying impact and value. The relationship between government and the culture sector is still in transition, at least in the Netherlands. The new governance relationships have unleashed a chain of events in the sector that require further thought and consideration to be given to government responsibility.

OUTLINE OF ESSAY

In the present essay, we argue that the expectations set for culture and cultural policy are running high. These expectations are the result of three different perspectives on culture and cultural policy that can be traced back to the history of Dutch cultural policy (but that can also be identified elsewhere). The three perspectives are an artistic perspective, a social perspective, and an economic perspective. We can describe the principles underpinning these perspectives as ‘imagining’, ‘enriching’ and ‘earning’. We introduce the three perspectives and their related principles in Section 2 and elaborate on them in Sections 3, 4 and 5. The conclusion we reach in Section 6 is that we must lower our expectations of what culture and cultural policy are capable of achieving. Policymakers should concentrate more on the unique properties of culture and improve the culture sector’s ability to face new and existing challenges.

2 GOVERNMENT, CULTURE AND CULTURAL POLICY: THREE PERSPECTIVES

By all appearances, Dutch cultural policy has been fairly consistent from the second half of the twentieth century onwards (Van den Broek et al. 2005; Van den Hoogen 2012). But appearances can be deceptive. The very concept of what culture is, the aims of cultural policy, and the associated tasks have been reinterpreted time and again (Oosterbaan 1990). This section differentiates between three distinctive perspectives on culture and cultural policy, each one implying a different set of government aims and tasks (Table 2.1). All three perspectives have left their traces in the cultural policy of the post-war era. Although we take a largely chronological approach to each of these perspectives below, it should be noted that they evolved largely simultaneously.

Table 2.1 Policy perspectives on culture, key principles and traditional policy aims

Perspective	Key principle	Traditional policy aims
Artistic	Imagining	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Preserving cultural heritage • Supporting cultural output of excellent quality and variety
Social	Enriching	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Civilising the lower classes • Promoting the dissemination of culture and participation in culture
Economic	Earning	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Culture as a public good

ARTISTIC PERSPECTIVE: IMAGINING

In the artistic perspective, the focus is on properties such as beauty, emotion, inspiration, and coming to terms with life (Adams and Hoefnagel 2012; Gielen et al. 2014). It is controversial to think in terms of aims or usefulness within this view (Tusa 2007). The key principle can best be described by the word ‘imagining’. This viewpoint is specific to the art worlds, the network of practitioners who engage in the discourse about what art is and how it should be evaluated and experienced (Becker 1982). Imagining is thus a principle relevant mainly to artists and cultural institutions. In cultural policy, it is turned into measures that allow artists to carry out their artistic work. The criterion used to evaluate culture within this perspective is quality. One important prerequisite of quality is artistic autonomy. In the Netherlands, as in most of Europe, quality is assessed by experts who advise

or decide on awarding funding, either ‘at arm’s length’ or in closer proximity to government (Hillman-Chartrand and McCaughey 1989). Although quality is a core value in this perspective, the definition of quality is subject to change. In the course of time, criteria such as tradition, recognition and craftsmanship have been joined by originality, authenticity or innovation (Shiner 2001; Van Maanen 2006).

SOCIAL PERSPECTIVE: ENRICHING

Regardless of the foregoing, culture seldom if ever receives support on its own merits, certainly not in a democratic society. Social objectives always play a role. Post-war cultural policy largely continued the nineteenth-century mission of bringing the cultural blessings of the elite classes to the general population (Judt 2010; Pots 2006). In short, exposure to culture was thought to improve people (e.g. Nussbaum 2010). The dissemination of culture not only fosters the self-improvement – *Bildung* – of individuals and social groups, but also has blessings for society. Culture is the glue that binds societies together (Anderson 1995) and can help forge a national identity (Belfiore and Bennet 2010). Culture is also associated with more specific social aims, such as health, crime prevention and educational achievement (Marlet et al. 2007; Matarasso 1997). From the social perspective, culture embraces not only the arts and cultural heritage but also a series of institutions whose purpose is to disseminate it to the masses. Policymakers concentrate on promoting access to culture in as many different ways as possible, for example by seeing that cultural facilities are evenly distributed (both socially and geographically) and by keeping ticket and admission prices affordable.

ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE: EARNING

The final perspective is one in which cultural policy seeks legitimacy in asserting that some cultural output would not exist if government did not intervene. It may be, for example, that the market for some cultural activities is too small to sustain high-quality offerings. Government support for some cultural manifestations, for example classical music, is rationalised by pointing to the absence of productivity increases: performing a Mahler symphony requires just as many musicians today as it did a century ago (i.e. there is no increase in productivity), even though the real wages of musicians have risen enormously since then (a phenomenon known as Baumol’s Cost Disease).⁷ In both instances, the argument is a negative one: the market is failing to do something that government believes is important. That is why culture is often referred to as a public good (Matarasso and Landry 1999; see also Adams 2013).⁸ More positively formulated economic arguments in favour of cultural policy have also gained a foothold in recent decades. The emphasis is on entrepreneurship, the artist’s self-earning capacity, and more importantly on the positive externalities that culture can help achieve. In short, culture can also be a ‘good investment’. Seen from this perspective, it may be effective or legitimate to pursue a certain cultural policy (Throsby 2010: 34–37). For example, cultural

heritage, in the form of an attractive cityscape, can generate positive externalities by attracting tourists. This 'economisation' of cultural policy has brought new, economic aims to the fore, with economic development being the most important.

The following sections delve more deeply into the principles of imagining, enriching and earning. What happens when we apply these principles in practice? What policy aims do they add to the traditional set (see Table 2.1)? Is there enough evidence that culture can help achieve these aims? And in view of the changes currently taking place in the cultural field, are they sufficiently realistic?

3 IMAGINING

The artistic perspective has exerted a major influence on Dutch cultural policy and how cultural activities have evolved. Although the principle of imagining is not open to question in the current debate, it no longer offers cultural policy sufficient legitimacy on its own.

GROWTH AND EXPANSION OF CULTURAL OUTPUT

The artistic perspective is expressed in government's statutory duty to maintain and develop cultural output of outstanding quality.⁹ After the Second World War, government originally thought that funding would be a temporary necessity, intended to mend the ruptured relationship between artist and society (Ministerie van OCW 2002; Ter Braak 2007). From the 1960s onwards, that idea faded into the background and cultural facilities gradually came to be regarded as public amenities that should be paid for by the community (Ministerie van OCW 2002). The subsidised and non-subsidised culture sectors have grown in a number of different ways. There has been a quantitative increase and a broadening and refinement of content within disciplines, as well as a move towards greater diversity owing to the rise of new cultural and artistic forms.

To begin with, every discipline welcomes new generations of artists, and this may lead to confrontation.¹⁰ The newcomers introduce their own idioms or exhibit their work in new settings, but what they create usually complements rather than replaces existing artistic output. In addition, many new artistic disciplines develop; examples from the past include photography, comics, video art and performance art. They arise in part from the dialogue with traditional art forms, but are also propelled by new technology and the relatively low cost of new materials. The rapid rise of video art, for example, is closely related to the introduction of affordable flat screens (Hutter 2008).

Second, the boundary between the 'high' arts and 'low' culture is blurring. Although the various art forms still differ in terms of prestige and recognition, the gaps separating them have narrowed (Janssen 2005). There is greater recognition for what used to be considered popular culture (e.g. popular music, musicals, circuses and design) and for other new media, and they now qualify for government funding. That gives them more opportunity to continue developing as disciplines or subdisciplines, and to diversify. The growing status of popular culture manifests itself in a separate infrastructure consisting of publicly funded venues for popular music, education programmes like the Rock Academy in Tilburg, and a university chair in popular music (Van der Hoeven 2012). In around 2000, the boundaries that defined culture became even more fluid with the rise of the term 'creative indus-

try'. In some countries, the creative industry includes software development (Germany and Australia), zoos and botanical gardens (Austria), the culinary arts (Italy), cartoons and comics (Korea) or traditional crafts (United Kingdom).¹¹

Third, new technology has lowered the threshold to production, dissemination and consumption. The conditions for creating and distributing culture have become more favourable, even outside the facilities funded by government (Adams and Hoefnagel 2012). Not only has this led to more output, but the nature of that output is changing because consumers can play a more active role in creating their own cultural experience. For example, someone who enjoys listening to music can easily assemble their own playlists and share them with others. Some parts of the culture sector are experimenting with new distribution channels, but policymakers are still not as interested in digital consumption as they are in audience size or visitor numbers (Van Eijck 2015; Van den Broek 2013; Schnabel 2013b).

CONCERN ABOUT THE MATCH BETWEEN SUPPLY AND DEMAND

Nowadays, cultural output in the Netherlands is plentiful, heterogeneous and of excellent quality (Raad voor Cultuur 2014). Concerns about availability or quality have been replaced by concerns about the match between supply and demand. Since the mid-1990s, commentators – including ministers – have frequently referred to a 'divide' between the arts and the public, especially with respect to the performing arts and the visual arts (Simons 1996; Blokland 2006; Kooke 2007). They have traced the origin of this 'divide' to a combination of policy trends and changes in the subjects addressed by the arts and culture. Government policy is said to have forced artists and institutions into 'the safe haven of the supply-driven funding system' (Ministerie van OCW 1999: 4) and thus into the arms of government, at the expense of their relationship with the public (Blokland 1997; Ter Braak 2007). A further factor is that changes in the arts world have led the experts who assess funding applications to redefine the concept of quality. Increasingly, quality is now framed in terms of 'innovation', 'originality', and 'authenticity' (Blokland 1997; Shiner 2001). The innovative nature of artistic output is said to be the second reason for the 'divide' because it is difficult for the general public to engage with it (Schnabel 2013a). It is accessible only to informed visitors or audiences. In addition, the general public are less prone to listen to what the experts have to say (see Section 4).¹²

To what extent a 'divide' ever existed or still exists is unclear, but since the 1990s a succession of ministers have noted a) that the low level of public participation in the arts and culture clashes with the public nature of cultural policy (Ministerie van OCW 1999); b) that it is important for culture to be rooted in society 'so that cultural life can flourish' (Ministerie van OCW 2007: 31); c) that the culture sector has increasingly leaned towards government since the 1960s (Ministerie van OCW

2010); and d) that artists and cultural institutions derive their *raison d'être* not so much from the sector itself, but from their relevance to society (Ministerie van OCW 2013a).¹³ Such doubts expressed about the level of public support for subsidised cultural output and the tension between broadening that output and the available financial resources have led government to define new criteria alongside quality, for example relevance to society and more revenue-generating activities.

The public's growing insistence on government accountability has also pushed towards new criteria that are quantifiable (Belfiore and Bennet 2010; Van den Hoogen 2012). They often involve numbers, such as a minimum percentage of self-generated revenue, audience size, and percentage of funding reserved for target groups. This trend has been met with resistance from the culture sector, both in the Netherlands and elsewhere (e.g. Tusa 2002). According to Barbara Visser, chairwoman of the Society of Arts (founded in 2014), it is important to 'safeguard and, where necessary, fight to preserve the autonomy of the artist because in the current, market-driven climate, the danger is that everything will be measured by the same yardstick: quantifiability will rule' (Visser 2014). The British debate about cultural value shows, however, that arguments stressing the 'unquantifiable', intrinsic value of culture have become less persuasive (O'Brien 2015). Those who take up this position are often met with hostility and stand accused of mystification and elitism (Holden 2004). In the United Kingdom, in any case, the culture sector's outcry has not halted or deflected the drive to document mainly the economic impact of culture (O'Brien 2015).

THE ARTIST: FROM SUBSIDISED GENIUS TO CULTURAL ENTREPRENEUR

The artistic perspective emphasises the autonomous position of the artist. That position is underpinned by such values as individuality and authenticity, and is at odds with commercial acumen (Abbing 2002). The Dutch government long embraced the ideal of artistic autonomy by making special arrangements to support artists in the production of autonomous work.¹⁴ From the 1990s onwards, however, government policy has increasingly come to regard artists as 'cultural entrepreneurs'.¹⁵ Initially, this term implied an open, active attitude that was connected to the world beyond the artist's studio. That attitude was considered the antidote to the gap between supply and demand (Ministerie van OCW 1999: 36). A succession of policy documents and programmes gradually redefined this definition, and eventually the economic perspective came to prevail (see Section 5).

Viewing things from the artistic perspective, the question that arises is whether putting more focus on the market and society puts pressure on artists' artistic development and the quality of their artistic output. There are two schools of thought on the subject. Abbing (2002), for example, notes the changing views of the artist. The romantic notion of the self-sacrificing artist is giving way to a practice that combines the arts and entrepreneurship and offers greater security and

earnings. Van Winkel et al. (2012: 11) describe this new ‘hybrid’ artist as ‘someone who reaches a wider audience, who can switch easily between different contexts, and who can exploit their creative competency in all sorts of applied forms as well’. Incidentally, these authors see no evidence that the percentage of ‘hybrid’ artists has actually increased. The second school of thought identifies ‘multiple job holding’ as a necessary strategy for survival in a time of growing economic uncertainty (Menger 2006; 2011). The study by Van Winkel et al. (2012) also appears to point in this direction, with the authors observing that, given the choice, artists still prefer to spend more time on their own autonomous work.

CONCLUSION

Cultural output has increased and grown broader, and concerns about quality and autonomy have given way to worries about the gap between supply and demand, whether artists and institutions are relevant to society, and how much public support there is for culture and cultural policy. Cultural policy has thus come to focus on strengthening the ties between culture and society, and this shift in emphasis makes more demands on the culture sector, cultural entrepreneurs and their accountability. Although it is understandable that some in the arts and culture sector question the growing focus on quantifiable social and economic impact and value, it would be a pity for the sector not to engage in the discourse about the importance of culture to society.

After all, if artists and institutions wish to lay claim to public funding, it behoves them to articulate the pertinence of their work to a relevant audience. That is not the same as a responsibility to demonstrate (according to scientific standards) that their work has a very specific social and economic impact. Such relevance can vary considerably; it may range from beauty, inspiration and consolation to relaxation and a sense of belonging. It need not be the same for every segment of the potential audience. The culture sector has its own responsibilities and must not pass the buck to politicians or policymakers, although it is a good idea to keep a close eye on the division of roles between the two parties. It is up to artists, groups and institutions in the culture sector to articulate what they wish to express and achieve with their work, and who their target audience is. It is up to politicians to explain how these cultural manifestations correspond with the aims of government policy and why they merit public support, whether or not financial in nature.

4 ENRICHING

Another important aim of Dutch post-war cultural policy was to bring culture to the masses (Westen 1990; Van der Hoeven 2012). Underpinning this aim was the ideal of cultural enlightenment for all; the arts and culture would ‘lift the population to a higher plane of civilisation’ (Boekman 1989). Enrichment was thus initially tied to the duty to civilise the lower classes so that they would become familiar with and learn to appreciate middle-class culture and values, while simultaneously protecting that culture and those values against the pernicious influence of popular mass culture (Bevers 1990). Civilisation would also have a positive influence on people’s sense of community and would enhance and foster the formation of a national identity. The rising importance of personal freedom, however, raised growing questions about the necessity of such civilisation and enlightenment and whether it was even possible. A growing unease with the patronising nature of the policy, the blurring of the dividing line between the ‘high’ arts and ‘low’ culture, and the increasing breadth of cultural output meant that the ideal of civilisation gave way to the aim of increasing the public’s participation in cultural activities (Van der Hoeven 2012).

The goal of exposing as many people as possible to culture remained, however, and today is legitimised by pointing to the broad spectrum of assumed positive effects of cultural participation: ‘Culture unites, entertains and helps us resolve issues facing our society’ (Ministerie van OCW 2013a: 1). At a time when the public is calling increasingly for government to account for and legitimise its policy, these objectives are being refined, with the focus shifting to the quantification of social impact (Van de Hoogen 2012; Belfiore 2002; O’Brien 2015). ‘Cross-fertilisation between the arts and culture and other sectors can generate solutions for the healthcare sector, the ageing population, urban renewal, climate change and the sustainable use of the earth’s natural resources’ (Ministerie van OCW 2013a: 3).¹⁶ This trend is, once again, not confined to the Netherlands; elsewhere, it has been the subject of research and policymaking for quite some time. For example, in his influential study, Matarasso identified social impacts – personal development, social cohesion, community empowerment and self-determination, local image and identity, imagination and vision, and health and wellbeing – of participatory arts programmes as far back as 1997 (Matarasso 1997). Various literature reviews have demonstrated, however, that despite numerous attempts, evidence of the social value of culture remains unsatisfactory, as does the available evaluation methodology (Belfiore 2006; O’Brien 2014; Carnworth and Brown 2014; Gielen et al. 2014).

These trends, and the changing nature of ‘enrichment’ as a cultural policy aim, raise questions about the public. What can we say about its participation in the arts and culture? How are public tastes changing, and how should the culture sector respond?

TRENDS IN CULTURAL PARTICIPATION

At first glance, the statistics on cultural participation in the Netherlands appear reasonably stable, although there are clear differences between cultural activities (Van Eijck 2015). From 1995 to 2007, the reach of the arts was consolidated and even increased in some disciplines (Van den Broek 2013). In international terms, the Netherlands and Scandinavia have the highest participation rates in Europe (European Commission 2013b). There are also signs that recent attempts by museums and the performing arts to attract more people have been successful.¹⁷ The general picture is one of stability, but it is difficult to find a consistent trend in visitor numbers, participation in amateur arts, and artistic-cultural goods consumption. For example, the period 2005 to 2011 saw, simultaneously, a decline (in the consumption of books, CDs or works of art, participation in amateur arts, and applications for the Art Purchase Scheme), stability (in audience reach) and growth (in audience size for live performances or cinema and musea) (Van den Broek and Van Eijck 2013).¹⁸ It all depends on the object of study.

The general picture of stability is further eroded if we extrapolate the patterns of cultural consumption to the future. As in the past, a considerable percentage of Dutch citizens seldom, if ever, devote their spare time to certain forms of culture.¹⁹ Of the total population over the age of sixteen, some 30% consume ‘popular’ art forms (cabaret, film and popular music), while only 19% favour the ‘canon’ (classical music, fine art, literature, drama and dance; Van den Broek 2013: 39).²⁰ Another study that takes a broader view of cultural participation has produced higher percentages.²¹ There is reason to believe, however, that the gap between the consumption of popular and canonical art forms will increase. Canonical art forms have greater appeal for older people, whereas popular culture is one and a half times as appealing to younger people than to those over the age of forty (Van den Broek 2013). The subset that engages with traditional forms of culture is ageing, and consumption of classical concerts and opera declined from 17% in 1995 to 14% in 2007. In addition, the rise in the number of people who have attended higher education has not been matched by an increase in cultural participation (Van den Broek et al. 2009; Van Eijck 2013). High-educated persons take a greater interest in culture across the board than low-educated ones (Van den Broek et al. 2005). Migration is also changing the composition of the population, and ethnic minorities tend to consume less culture than members of the dominant culture (Van den Broek et al. 2009).²²

The foregoing is based on national statistics, but there are naturally differences between cities and regions owing to the composition of the local population and other factors. The picture is even more complex if we look more closely at individual behaviour and patterns of taste. What choices do people make nowadays, and why?

DYNAMIC TASTE PATTERNS

The blurring of the distinction between the ‘high’ arts and ‘low’ culture and the emphasis on personal freedom have both led to more dynamic taste patterns. Here, we look at three trends.

To begin with, the public are less inclined to listen to the opinions of critics and other cultural authorities about quality (Janssen 2005). People are likely to choose other sources to help them form an opinion, for example blogs (Verboord 2010; 2014). As is the case for popular art forms, quantitative data has also come to play a bigger role in how we value canonical art forms, for example bestsellers lists (Van Venrooij and Deinema 2013). At the same time, popular art forms can develop into subgenres with their own groups of experts, reviewers and audiences. People can also experience the same work of art very differently and have very different opinions about it (Van Eijck 2015). They may also have very different reasons for liking art than those cited in policy documents. Relaxation and the social dimension of cultural participation are just as important as an appreciation of beauty or sense of enrichment (Tepaske et al. 2010; Van den Broek 2013; Jensen 2014).

The second trend is the rise of the cultural omnivore (Peterson 1992; Peterson and Kern 1996), a phenomenon that researchers have studied by looking at musical preferences. Cultural omnivores – who tend to belong to higher-status social groups – may attend the opera one night and a rock concert the next. Cultural relativism has made it possible for high-educated individuals to embrace popular culture alongside the traditional (‘high’) arts. Their eclecticism is their distinguishing feature and they are proud of it (Kuipers and Van den Haak 2014). Other groups (especially low-educated ones) consume almost no culture, or have a much narrower range of preferences (univores). High-educated and low-educated groups still differ in their cultural consumption, but the differences no longer parallel the distinction between high and low culture; instead, they reflect the fact that these groups experience the same popular culture in different ways (Kuipers and Van den Haak 2014). Besides the cultural omnivore, there is also the voracious consumer, whose distinguishing feature is his gluttonous consumption of culture (Sullivan and Katz-Gerro 2007). Van Eijck and Kraaykamp (2014) observe that it is in particular younger cohorts in the Netherlands who consume culture – and mainly popular culture – at a very rapid pace, and that they engage in more activities in shorter periods of time than older consumers.

The third trend is the fading distinction between consumer and producer. ‘Prosumption’ is a growing phenomenon (Ritzer et al. 2012) related to the rise of social media and similar technologies (O’Brien 2014).²³ By choosing which acts to attend during a rock festival, for example, visitors play an active and crucial role in creating their own cultural experience. Instead of being ‘cultural consumers’, people become ‘co-producers’. This forces culture-makers and cultural institutions to allow for an audience that wants to shape its own cultural experience. However, the new technologies have also given rise to other distribution channels for cultural manifestations. These new channels allow the culture sector to increase its audience but also to experiment with other forms of consumption, such as live-streaming images of a concert to cinemas.

PROFESSIONALISING PUBLIC REACH

The trends described above have led to a more varied pattern of participation, a trend that is expected to continue. Artists, cultural institutions and policymakers must allow for a public that does not follow familiar and fixed patterns and which they cannot appeal to as a uniform mass. Cultural institutions are being forced to study the public because they are facing growing competition for revenue and for the public’s time. Policy measures, for example requiring institutions to generate a minimum percentage of their revenue themselves, are also forcing them to pay closer attention to the public. But there are other reasons why it is interesting to collect more data on the public from a broader perspective. Cultural institutions, researchers, consultants and policymakers in other countries are also at pains to learn more. In 2006, Arts Council England launched a major study to investigate ‘whether and how people in England value the arts and to help the Arts Council focus on the things that really matter to people’ (Arts Council England 2007). The opinions and preferences of non-participants were also surveyed in the study.²⁴ At the same time, there is a growing list of major studies that have broken with tradition by looking beyond the consumption of high culture to consider ‘everyday participation’, such as the British study *Understanding everyday participation. Articulating cultural value*, which also considers the significance of people’s hobbies, for example.²⁵

Sweeping, large-scale studies of this kind generate the sort of information that individual institutions can only obtain with difficulty, if at all. That much has become clear from a biennial visitor survey conducted at more than 200 Danish museums by the Danish Agency for Culture, part of the Danish Ministry of Culture (Jensen 2014). The purpose of the survey is to get to know the museums’ visitors. Who are they, and what do they think? The museums receive feedback on their own visitors and performance, but they can also compare themselves to other museums using the online database. The successive surveys have revealed which museums have succeeded in attracting more young visitors. They have also delved into why people visit museums, and they differentiate between different types of

visitors. The fact that large numbers of people see a museum visit primarily as a social event, for example, suggests that museums may want to reconsider their interior set-up and the conventions associated with a museum visit (see, for example, Idema 2014). Is there an alternative to silent museum galleries with eagle-eyed guards? The Danish study illustrates how views on cultural participation have changed. The focus is not on what people ought to know and be able to do to consume culture, but on what institutions and culture-makers must do to be 'relevant' to potential visitors or audiences.

CONCLUSION

We established in the foregoing that the aim of civilisation identified in the Netherlands' cultural policy has gradually changed to promoting the dissemination of culture and encouraging the public's interest in culture. We also noted that the public's tastes are more varied and dynamic than before. A 'floating' public is harder to get to know, but it also offers more opportunities to stimulate or boost interest in the arts and culture, for example because certain segments of the public are more open-minded about a greater variety of cultural forms, and because institutions can respond to the varying wishes and rationales of their audience segment (see also Van Eijck 2015). It is not necessary for everyone to consume the same cultural forms and to experience or perceive them in the same way. Cultural manifestations can also be made available in differing contexts, allowing a work of art to reach different audiences (Abbing 2007; Van Eijck 2015).

Many Dutch cultural institutions are busy learning about the public (Versteegh et al. 2014). At the same time, understanding taste patterns forces us to take a realistic look at what a policy of cultural participation can actually achieve. Visitors are difficult to guide, financial incentives have little effect, and government has little influence over such important factors as education and home environment (Van der Hoeven 2012). Social trends are forcing the culture sector to take on a challenging task: to study the public's dynamic taste patterns (in even greater depth). Given that task, the question is whether it makes sense to ask the culture sector to help achieve all sorts of specific social aims, for example to promote a healthy lifestyle or contribute to a sense of community in neighbourhoods. There is a risk that we are asking too much of the culture sector. There is also no convincing evidence of the positive impact of cultural participation, in part because sound methodologies for measuring that impact have yet to be developed (Belfiore 2006; O'Brien 2014; Carnath and Brown 2014; Gielen et al. 2014).

5 EARNING

The final perspective on culture and cultural policy is the economic one, with earning as the key principle. This is nothing new, but it is growing more pervasive – a development in which local policymakers are leading the way. Just a few decades ago, policy documents worldwide scarcely if ever referred to the economic aspects of culture (Throsby 2010). Culture and economics occupied separate, even conflicting, worlds (Klamer 1996; Throsby 2004). That was especially the case for sectors that depended heavily on government funding, for example the visual arts and performing arts, and that government regarded as a buffer against the encroaching leisure industry (Schuyt and Taveerne 2000). The contrast between culture and the economy is fading, however, because cultural forms have become broader and more varied, and because the subsidised culture sector has to earn more of its own income than before. The culture sector is also becoming increasingly intertwined with other segments of the economy. That is partly why the economic perspective has become a bigger factor in cultural policy, with two aims being identified: earning as a means to achieve artistic and social aims (cultural entrepreneurship) and as a means to stimulate the economy (culture as an economic policy instrument).

CULTURAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND THE ‘MATTHEW EFFECT’

Since the mid-1990s, Dutch cultural policy has increasingly focused on encouraging artists and subsidised cultural institutions to be more entrepreneurial, the purpose being to strengthen the ties between the subsidised culture sector and society and to wean institutions and artists away from their dependence on government funding (Ministerie van OCW 1999). Subsidised institutions must meet more and stricter requirements with respect to self-earned income; entrepreneurship has been added to the eligibility criteria for funding; and measures have been launched to encourage society to donate more money, such as the Gift and Inheritance Tax Act [*Geefwet*].²⁶ The basic idea is that greater ‘entrepreneurship’ will support the artistic and social aims of cultural policy. The business side of the culture sector has become much more professional in recent years, and in many cases self-generated revenue has increased (Commissie Cultuurprofijs 2008; Raad voor Cultuur 2014), but new questions have also been raised about the impact of this trend.

Traditionally, the subsidised culture sector is financed by a combination of government funding, self-earned income, and private donations (Langeberg et al. 2013). The economic crisis and austerity measures have altered the ratio between these three sources of income. Government funding has fallen, and privately run funds have reduced the size of their donations. The economic crisis has hurt sponsors and private individuals are less generous than expected, even though measures

have been introduced to encourage them to give more (Langeberg et al. 2013). Some cultural organisations have borne the brunt of these developments: they have had to let staff go, and in the worst case have even closed down. But not all institutions have been hit as hard by the austerity trend. Policy aims have differed from one sector to the next, and in some cases local government has absorbed part of the shock. By trimming the basic infrastructure for culture (the institutions that receive direct funding from the national government), government has forced more institutions to turn to the cultural funds (indirect funding). The funds, in turn, have reduced the length of their funding periods, with operational funding in many cases being converted into project funding. As a result, the financial prospects for many cultural institutions are much less certain than they were before.

It is unclear how funding for the culture sector will change in the longer term, and what the impact will be. Crowdfunding is a good example. Although it is seen as a promising way of bringing in funding (Lawton and Maron 2012), cultural projects have so far managed to pull in only small sums of money, although they are increasing (in the Netherlands, more than five million euros in 2014; Douw and Koren 2015). Some funding bodies in the culture sector are experimenting with increasing crowdfunding revenue (Amsterdamse Fonds voor de Kunst, one-off initiative), or regard crowdfunding revenue as a plus when awarding funding (Mondriaanfonds). In Sweden, part of the culture budget has been set aside to provide matching funds for crowdfunding initiatives, with private investment thus setting the bar for government spending.²⁷ Crowdfunding tells the authorities and funds how willing people are to invest in culture, but it works to the advantage of those who have a network of contacts with money to invest (Röthler and Wenzlaff 2011).²⁸ It also favours popular, appealing projects above more high-risk ones that have less clear-cut results (Nesta 2014, Bakhshi 2015). If crowdfunding becomes more common, these factors will grow more obvious, with implications for the pluralist nature and dissemination of cultural activities.

There are also striking differences between cultural institutions' 'earning capacity'. The degree to which they succeed in finding alternative sources of funding, developing new revenue models, and exploiting a broad range of different sources of income depends on how entrepreneurial the institutions' management is. But more trivial factors also play a role, for example location, type of activities offered, scale at which the institution or organisation is active, and type of visitor or audience that it attracts (Kloosterman 2014 and 2015). Large cultural institutions in favourable locations that have a reputation in a specific area of specialisation can greatly improve their financial standing because they attract large numbers of visitors, are well known, and – since they tend to be situated in cities – have a huge network of wealthy friends and donors, often organised into 'friends societies'. Medium-sized cultural institutions with broader, more local collections or activi-

ties are the ones that often have trouble keeping their head above water (e.g. Nederlandse Museumvereniging 2010; Adviescommissie Asscher-Vonk 2012). This self-reinforcing process, in which a good starting position leads to further advantages and a bad starting position produces further disadvantages, is known as the ‘Matthew effect’ (Merton 1968; Rigney 2010).²⁹ This process and the resulting lopsided growth raises questions about how government should treat high-earning subsidised institutions and institutions that are scarcely able to meet the financial requirements, if at all, and probably never will.

These financial dynamics influence the level of amenities, their dissemination and – eventually, perhaps – the type of output. The earning capacity of small and large cultural institutions is greatest when they can achieve scale advantages – generally in cities, home to large numbers of highly educated individuals who often display the traits of the cultural omnivore. The study *Gescheiden werelden* (Bovens et al. 2014), published jointly by the Council (WRR) and the Social and Cultural Planning Office (SCP), reveals that high-educated and low-educated persons have systematic and abiding taste differences that can be linked to economic, social and political differences. Greater inequality has an impact on these existing cultural differences. Kuipers and Van der Haak (2014) have noted that the increasing economic uncertainty and inequality (Kremer et al. 2014) have led to a growing cultural ‘divide’. This ‘divide’ is also manifesting itself as a divide between cities with numerous, densely packed cultural facilities and regions with only a small number of facilities.

CULTURE AS AN ECONOMIC POLICY TOOL?

In recent decades, culture in the Netherlands has become part of an economic stimulus package, especially in cities (Kloosterman 2014 and 2015). One important reason for this is the desire to retain and attract a high-educated workforce, a vital ingredient in international competitiveness (Scott 2008). This trend has led to a boom in new cultural facilities, from museums, new opera houses and repurposed industrial heritage sites to creative clusters and incubators. Combined with savvy city branding and marketing campaigns, these kinds of facilities have put a number of previously marginal cities and regions on the global map. This phenomenon is sometimes known as ‘McGuggenisation’, after the well-known example of Bilbao in Spain, which acquired a striking museum designed by ‘starchitect’ Frank Gehry with the financial support of the Guggenheim Foundation (McNeill 2000).

Politicians and policymakers expect cultural planning of this kind to have various different effects, some of which have been studied in detail (see e.g. Marlet and Poort 2011). One important argument in favour of cultural facilities is, for example, their impact on consumer spending, especially because they attract tourists who also spend money on transport, restaurants and bars, and hotels. Museums and festivals tend to have the biggest impact on spending (Van den Hoogen 2012; Bille and Schulze 2006). Strikingly, economists are very critical of economic impact

studies of this kind (Frey 2008). Cultural facilities such as theatres and concert halls also make cities more attractive places, driving up property prices (CPB 2010). The presence of cultural facilities is also frequently cited as a business location factor, but the evidence for this is unconvincing (Marlet et al. 2007). Although a strong correlation has been found between the presence of certain cultural facilities and highly educated employees (Marlet et al. 2005), the causal relationships between the two are complex (Kloosterman 2014 and 2015). In short, the precise scale of these effects is unknown. It remains difficult to isolate them from other factors, and cultural facilities differ so much from one another that it is almost impossible to draw any general conclusions in that regard (Van den Hoogen 2012; Frey 2006; Bille and Schulze 2006; O'Brien 2010). There is, it seems, no easy recipe for making cities and regions more appealing or for stimulating economic growth; it is not a question of 'add culture and stir' (Gibson and Stevenson 2004, quoted in Bille and Schulze 2006: 1070).

The transition to the twenty-first century also saw growing interest in what the culture sector could do for the economy in general, and for the creative industry in particular (Florida 2002). The term 'creative industry' was coined in Australia in the 1990s and quickly spread around the world (Flew 2012), including to the Netherlands (Ministeries van EZ and OCW 2005). While there is no international consensus on its precise definition, the arts and cultural heritage are unfailingly regarded as the creative industry's backbone (United Nations 2008; OECD 2014). In the Netherlands, the creative industry is divided into three clusters: the arts and heritage; media and entertainment; and creative commercial services (Rutten et al. 2008). Interest in the creative industry has been spurred by the idea that high-value knowledge is replacing labour and capital as the most important ingredient of economic growth. Policymakers and researchers are thus turning their attention to knowledge-intensive sectors in which creativity drives innovation and economic success.

Although the creative industry in the Netherlands has been experiencing above-average growth for some time now, recent turnover figures have led to a lowering of expectations concerning its growth potential. Its growth has also been uneven, with some sectors experiencing minimal or zero growth and ending up financially vulnerable. The media and entertainment sector generates the highest earnings but the fewest jobs (Rutten and Koops 2013), whereas the arts and heritage sector has consistently contributed 0.5% to GDP for several years (Langeberg et al. 2013). Until 2013, there was also a notable rise in creative industry jobs (an average of 2.5% per annum compared to 0.6% in the economy as a whole), but the economic crisis caused growth to level off for a number of years, and a decline has now set in (Rutten and Koops 2014). On top of this, job growth in the arts and heritage sector

has been driven largely by the mandatory registration of independent artists (introduced in 2008) and more flexible working practices in the performing arts (Rebel 2014).

Uneven and declining job growth does not mean that there are no ties between the culture sector and the creative industry. The arts and heritage are closely interwoven with other segments of the creative industry, in particular the media and entertainment industry (Nieuwenhuis and Koops 2013). This relationship has been cited as an argument against budget cuts in both the arts and public broadcasting (Rutten 2014). The subsidised heart of the culture sector overlaps with and serves as a supplier for the more commercial book, film, games and photography sales markets (see also Nesta 2014, Bakhshi 2015). It is difficult to explain how these value chains are linked, however. The route from funding or grant to what is ultimately a hit is sometimes a complex one. Artistic success is also uncertain because artistic projects do not follow a linear development plan. And even a successful artistic project may not appeal to the general public (Menger 2011). A more fundamental question is whether economic profit is the right reason to support culture. After all, if a project is financially successful, it no longer needs government support, and managing by externalities turns culture into what is largely an economic policy tool.

SUPPLY AND DEMAND ON THE LABOUR MARKET FOR CREATIVE OCCUPATIONS

The emphasis on what culture can contribute to employment and economic development has also manifested itself in an interest in the creative occupations (Ministeries van EZ and OCW 2005; KEA 2009). The creative occupations and the creative industry do not overlap entirely; the creative industry also includes many 'ordinary' occupations (Mathieu 2012; Caves 2000) and there are creative occupations who work outside the creative industry (Potts and Cunningham 2009). For example, the majority of designers work for businesses in other sectors of the economy (Nieuwenhuis and Koops 2013; Rutten and Koops 2014; see also Hearn et al. 2014). Although authors such as Florida (2002; 2010) see the creative occupations as the driving force behind regional economic growth and prosperity, the fact of the matter is that there is a huge mismatch between the number of creative graduates – at the level of both secondary and tertiary vocational education – and the actual demand for creative professionals in the labour market (Rebel 2014; Buisman et al. 2010; Coenen et al. 2010).

Of all graduates of Dutch tertiary vocational education, creative graduates have the most trouble finding work in their own fields (ROA 2014). Statistics Netherlands (CBS 2014) calculates that a total of 352,000 members of the active labour force have such a degree, but only a quarter of that number actually work as artists. Many creative graduates do not end up working in a creative occupation. There are huge

differences between creative disciplines, however, which Comunian (2015) attributes to the structure of careers in creative occupations. Someone who has just gained a degree in architecture can apply for a job with an architectural firm, whereas a visual artist is on his own, with a huge risk that he will ultimately drop out of the profession altogether.

Another noteworthy point is that creative occupations are often filled by people who have not graduated in the creative disciplines. According to Comunian (2015), that is true of 60% of the creative occupations in the United Kingdom. For the Netherlands, Urlings and Braams (2011: 10) estimate the figure at 70%, although they define the creative occupations somewhat differently. Creative education institutions therefore play only a limited role in the creative occupations, because jobs in these occupations are filled mainly by people who have not had a creative arts education (see also CBS 2011: 39). We know that creative occupations earn less than other occupations who have a similar educational level (Abbing 2002; Throsby and Zednik 2010; Schulz et al. 2013; Bille 2010). This is partly a matter of choice: the non-monetary rewards that they derive from their creative work compensates for their lower income (Throsby 1994). But there are also signs that 'bohemian graduates' working in creative occupations earn less than graduates without a degree in a creative discipline in the same jobs (Comunian et al. 2015). This income discrepancy continues for the rest of their careers (CBS 2014).

These findings make a critical analysis of creative education necessary, as well as close examination of the alignment between creative education programmes and the labour market. Dutch creative education programmes have started to focus more on entrepreneurial competencies in recent years. The specific properties of creative work and career paths in the creative occupations require a customised approach within creative education programmes (Bridgstock 2013). A somewhat older study (Coenen and Van der Velden 2009) found that two thirds of all Dutch students with tertiary vocational degrees felt well prepared for the labour market, whereas only a third of students with tertiary vocational arts degrees did. Much remains to be done in this respect, but we must bear in mind that extra investment in graduates' entrepreneurial skills is only useful if there is enough evidence that there is in fact a market – underexploited or unexploited – for their creative work (see e.g. HBO-Raad 2012).

CONCLUSION

Policymakers can take an economic approach to culture in two different ways. First of all, they can focus on entrepreneurship in the culture sector. The business side of culture has become much more professional in recent years, and many cultural facilities now generate more of their own revenue. This has given rise to questions, however, about the impact of new financial instruments such as crowd-funding, and about differences in the earning capacity of cultural institutions.

Eventually, these dynamics may have implications for the dissemination and nature of cultural activities. Less government funding and more private revenue are not communicating vessels: they are transforming the sector. Second, policymakers can tie support for the culture sector to economic development, growth and innovation targets. Sometimes they do that directly, by linking the culture sector to the creative industry, and sometimes indirectly, by developing plans for cultural facilities in the hope of attracting high-educated employees and businesses to certain cities and regions. Hard evidence for the impact of such facilities is patchy, however, and even weaker when it comes to the notion that culture makes a city or region more attractive as a business location. Third, it seems that policymakers must reconsider the popular image of the creative occupations as an economic driver, so that graduates of professional arts and other creative education programmes will have a more realistic picture of the future.

6 REVALUING CULTURE

As we saw in the foregoing, there are several different ways to look at and evaluate culture (see Table 6.1). The artistic perspective focuses on beauty and quality, often framed in such terms as originality, innovation and authenticity. The social perspective, on the other hand, concentrates on individual and collective impact, for example *Bildung*, social cohesion and national identity, as well as a series of more specific aims in such areas as educational achievement, crime prevention and health. In the economic perspective, the focus is on the earning capacity of culture, i.e. whether people are prepared to pay for it. A further focus is the positive externalities of culture (in the form of extra spending, job growth and innovation elsewhere in the economy owing to spill-over effects).

Each of these perspectives has the potential to legitimise cultural policy, although their power to persuade will differ from one political context to the next. There are thus traces of all three in the current discourse on Dutch cultural policy. That discourse is setting high – and rising – expectations for culture. In an effort to build support for culture and cultural policy, the authorities have put increasing emphasis on documenting the impact and value of culture and on reinforcing the relationship between culture and other policy domains (see Table 6.1). These two policy strategies are interlinked, with the impact and value of culture being sought in its contribution to other policy domains. Culture is expected to have a positive impact on people's wellbeing, the quality of life in towns and villages, people's health, employment and the wider economy (see also Ministerie van OCW 2013a). It is politicians and, to some extent, also the sector itself that have raised these expectations over the past few decades in order to boost support for culture and the legitimacy of cultural policy. As a result, the number of policy aims set for the culture sector has increased accordingly (see Table 6.1).

REVALUING CULTURE

It is attractive to think that culture may have multiple positive effects; it also suggests solid support for cultural policy. Nevertheless, it would be better for government to exercise restraint and refrain from emphasising these effects too much in its cultural policymaking.³⁰ Where such effects do occur, they are naturally welcome, but the hard evidence for what are often highly specific impacts is too sketchy and patchy to serve as a basis for real policy choices. In a few cases, what we know about this subject may make a valuable contribution to decision-making, but it will not provide substantiation for a general policy line. If the Dutch government chooses to go down this path, it must continue to invest in research and innovative methods for investigating what culture actually achieves. Although it is

possible to evaluate specific cultural projects or programmes (Van den Hoogen 2012), the present state of research offers little reason to assume that there will be a major breakthrough in this respect in the short term (O'Brien 2015).

Table 6.1 Perspectives on culture, key principles and increase in policy aims

Perspective	Key principle	Policy aims
Artistic	Imagining	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Preserving cultural heritage 2) Supporting cultural output of excellent quality and variety 3) Reinforcing the relationship between culture and society by focusing on additional and quantifiable criteria
Social	Enriching	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Civilising the lower classes* 2) Promoting the dissemination of culture and participation in culture 3) Contributing to solving social problems by linking culture to other policy domains
Economic	Earning	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Public good 2) Encouraging cultural entrepreneurship 3) Planning cultural facilities that reinforce urban economic development 4) Stimulating the creative industry and potential creative labour force

*Although this terminology is outmoded, 'civilisation' remains an important aim of cultural policy.

Restraint is a good idea for other reasons as well. The more the aims of cultural policy only indirectly have to do with culture, the greater the chance of policy instruments other than culture achieving the same or even better results, thus undermining the legitimacy of cultural policy in the longer term. The search for a new legitimacy for cultural policy could also lead to a succession of new aims being imposed on the culture sector, with the risk that policymakers demand too much of it. That paves the way for rising expectations, which – if unmet – may end up undermining legitimacy (Van Doorn 1980; Schuyt 1983). The quest to generate more support for cultural policy can end achieving quite the opposite.

But the most important reason to exercise restraint is that culture is valuable in and of itself, and that value cannot be defined merely in terms of social and economic impact or relationship with other policy domains. An overly instrumentalist view of cultural policy also conflicts with the legal task of central government, which is to maintain and develop cultural output of outstanding quality and variety. We argue for 'revaluing culture': cultural policy should no longer put the culture sector at the service of other policy domains, but place emphasis, first and foremost, on *developments within the culture sector itself*. Revaluing does not imply

that the culture sector can turn its back on society. On the contrary, a robust culture sector is capable of connecting with many different audiences and segments of the public. Revaluing culture also assumes that cultural policy must be recalibrated. Some of our proposals reflect what is already happening in the culture sector, albeit in embryonic form in some cases. The art of cultural policymaking lies in part in supporting the initiatives already under way in the cultural domain.

RECALIBRATING CULTURAL POLICY

A recalibration of cultural policy is not an exercise with no strings attached. It will create new issues concerning the labour market for the creative occupations, the allocation of funding, the sector's relationship with the public, the financial instruments, and the financial imbalances.³¹ Cultural policy must facilitate and encourage the culture sector in such a way that it can deal with the sociocultural, economic, and political-administrative trends outlined in this section. Each of these trends has consequences for the aims of cultural policy, after all.³²

1) Improve the match between education and the labour market

Although much is expected of the creative occupations – artistically, socially and economically – the match between supply and demand in the relevant labour market leaves much to be desired, creating difficulties for graduates and for the broader economy. A fairly large number of graduates have little prospect of finding work suited to the education that they have received. They also earn less on average than other graduates of higher education, and that discrepancy remains throughout their careers (CBS 2014).

To tackle this problem, we must begin by limiting the numbers of students enrolled in creative arts programmes, especially in those branches of study that offer little prospect of reasonably paid work (see also HBO-raad 2012). The exceptional nature of the artistic labour market must be borne in mind in this context: the unpredictability of artistic success inevitably results in a large majority who take the plunge and either quickly fail or enjoy only marginal success, and a tiny minority who manage to distinguish themselves from their rivals (Menger 2011). A certain amount of oversupply is therefore unavoidable. A closer match between education and the labour market also means that education programmes should devote systematic attention to the competencies needed for a creative career (Bridgstock 2013). It is not only important for artists to learn to *make* art; they must also learn to *make it* in the arts – or in another field, if their artistic career falters (Lena 2014). What would help, in any case, is for them to have a realistic idea of their career prospects in the labour market for the creative occupations (Comunian 2015).

2) Experiment with public opinion

Another important point is to generate public support at a time when the distinction between high and low culture is fading and people no longer turn automatically to government or experts to identify quality for them. There are various ways that government can rise to this challenge. Experts should not put themselves forward as the ‘strict’ gatekeepers of artistic conventions; they should also act as facilitators and promote the match between supply and demand: ‘The gatekeeper must become someone who opens windows and doors’ (Hewison 2014: 233). Expert opinions can also be complemented by *public opinion*, with the public at large having a say in who or what receives funding. In the Netherlands, this is already happening in the form of indirect funding by means of tax-deductible donations, but this merely enables a small, often wealthy portion of the population to decide where funding should go (Hemels 2013; Van Hilvoorde et al. 2012). It would be good to experiment with other forms of public opinion, for example allowing the public to vote on the allocation of a certain percentage of the culture budget.³³

3) Plan from the bottom up

But cultural policy encompasses much more than funding. In many cases, government – often local government – can suffice by creating supportive conditions for cultural facilities that develop from the bottom up, either in the market or thanks to voluntary initiatives. In the case of large-scale, mainstream facilities (e.g. large concert halls for rock concerts) and small-scale, niche facilities (e.g. small museums and galleries with small, dedicated collections or small concert venues for more specialised music), government can confine itself to creating the basic conditions in the form of zoning plans and transport infrastructure (Kloosterman 2014 and 2015). In addition, government can help valuable initiatives developed by patrons of the arts to survive (Schnabel 2014). Large-scale facilities are commercially viable, and government generally does not have the knowledge required to ascertain how successful the smaller ones will be. What is similar about these policy efforts is that they let society take the initiative in creating – and thus in valuing – cultural facilities, instead of steering those facilities through the funding allocation system.

4) Professionalise public research

The public is no longer as loyal to genres, institutions and events as it used to be; at the same time, it has become more important as regards the level of support for subsidised cultural institutions and organisations. Besides attracting more people, then, they will also have to improve the quality of public participation and reach new segments of the public at the same time (Van Eijck et al. 2011). These are complex challenges that require institutions and organisations to develop and apply *new research methods* and start up new research projects for measuring reach, participation and perception. Individual institutions are often too small to do this on their own, and they lack a broader perspective on the public.³⁴ Government can

ensure that the *research & development task* of the culture sector receives more attention (Nesta 2014, Bakhshi 2015; see also Commissie Asscher-Vonk 2012). Innovation in the culture sector could encompass such aspects as broadening public reach, developing new ways to generate revenue, and, in some cases, amending the mission of cultural institutions (Bakhshi and Throsby 2010). Because innovative projects are often less appealing to private funding bodies, a portion of public funding could be set aside for them on the proviso that any lessons learned will be publicly disclosed, so that the product or service can be reproduced by others in another place, preferably on a larger scale. A more highly developed financing climate is needed in this context, one that can help organisations to meet their targets during all the various phases of an idea or project.

5) Use a broader range of financial instruments

Because the level of government funding has fallen in the Netherlands in recent years, the culture sector has had to depend more on self-earned income and donations (Langeberg et al. 2013). There are other, more creative methods of financing imaginable, however, for example the possibility of attracting investors. European studies (European Commission 2013c) show that the culture sector and the creative sector are missing out on important opportunities for growth because they have only limited access to financing. On a small scale the Dutch culture sector has made use of investment instruments (see also Commissie Cultuurprofijs 2008), and some experiences have been positive. For example, microcredit increases the number of assignments awarded to artists, extends their reach, boosts their income, and improves their entrepreneurial skills – an important advantage in the longer term (Ibrahimovic and Van Teeffelen 2014). The built heritage sector gained valuable experience in pre-financing restorations from a revolving fund. Although it was thought in 2008 that the Dutch culture sector had no need for such funds (Van den Eijnden et al. 2008), the financial circumstances are now very different, and it has become important to reconsider existing and new proposals for alternative public and public-private forms of financing.

6) Avoid undesirable Matthew effects

It is difficult to say where the culture sector will acquire its funding in the longer term, and what implications that will have for cultural output. Some new funding channels, for example crowdfunding, work to the advantage of artists and institutions that have access to networks of wealthy people. For now, they appear less suited to funding projects whose outcome is uncertain. On top of this, differences in public support are already a major factor in the provision of aid to cultural institutions (Smithuijsen and Van Woersem 2013). What has also become clear is that not every institution is in a position to generate more self-earned income, for one thing owing to differences in location (Kloosterman 2014 and 2015). As a result, part of the culture sector – medium-sized institutions and those located in outlying areas in particular – do not have the resources to invest in innovation. Some

cities and institutions will be able to reproduce and improve on their success, whereas others run the risk that their position continues to deteriorate. This Matthew effect is partly the result of the way in which the culture sector is funded. Government can facilitate but not control private funding, such as grants. That may mean that it will have to reinterpret its responsibility for funding the culture sector in the longer term. Government should therefore take a critical look at the impact of new financing instruments and monitor the differences in the earning capacity of subsidised cultural institutions. This will allow it to detect financial problems at an early stage and to address the subject of fair access to financing on a system-wide level.

The above proposals are meant to safeguard the quality, diversity and breadth of cultural output in the Netherlands, both in the shorter and longer term. To some extent they reflect ideas and approaches that the sector and policymakers are already developing. What is vital, however, is a *change in perspective*. Instead of constantly asking the culture sector what it can do for society and the economy, we argue that government should focus on boosting the culture sector's ability to tackle new challenges on its own. It is only when the culture sector is capable of continuous development and innovation that it can have lasting value for Dutch society.

NOTES

- 1 From 2011 onwards, the Dutch national government cut a total of 200 million euros from the subsidised culture sector's budget, i.e. more than 21%.
- 2 Dowling, S. (2012) 'European arts cuts: Dutch dance loses out as Netherlands slashes funding', *The Guardian* 2 August 2012; Service, T. (2011) 'Dutch courage needed in face of classical music funding cuts', *The Guardian* 20 June 2011.
- 3 To download the complete publication in Dutch, including these five contributions (in Dutch), see www.wrr.nl.
- 4 Successive ministers have stressed different aspects with the criteria, but there has been a certain continuity as well: public reach, funding-per-visit, position in the culture sector (Van der Ploeg); public reach, position in the culture sector, regional dissemination of cultural activities (Van der Laan); public reach, entrepreneurship and education (Zijlstra).
- 5 A number of Dutch researchers have studied this subject for a lengthier period of time, for example Arjo Klamer in *The Value of Culture* (1996).
- 6 The composition of the public has also changed, with the proportion of both western and non-western minorities increasing mainly in the large cities.
- 7 In 1966, Baumol and Bowen proposed that labour productivity in the performing arts is static. This sector has a technological disadvantage. Throsby (2010) says that this is not a good argument for government aid because a similar disadvantage in other sectors is regarded as one of the normal conditions of production. It does, however, show how different the various segments of the culture sector are.
- 8 Public goods are goods that cannot be withheld from individuals (non-excludable) and whose use by one person does not rule out their use by another (non-rivalrous). For a critique of the idea that culture is a public good, see Van Hilvoorde et al. 2012: 26-29 and Throsby 2010: 19. According to Throsby, cultural goods and services are mixed goods because they have properties of both private and public goods.
- 9 Section 2 of the Cultural Policy (Special Purpose Funding) Act [*Wet op het specifiek cultuurbeleid*] reads: 'Our minister is charged with creating the conditions for maintaining and developing cultural manifestations and disseminating them socially and geographically or in some other manner; in this, he will be guided by considerations of quality and diversity.'
- 10 Young Dutch actors (*Aktie Tonaat*) and composers (*Aktie Notenkader*) of the 1970s protested against the establishment in order to gain more acceptance of new initiatives and more experimental groups (Van Maanen 1977).
- 11 There is no consensus on the precise definition of the creative industry (see OECD 2014).
- 12 Simons (1996) describes how the visual arts have been kidnapped by professional art experts and a Council of Europe foreign review committee concluded in 1994 that the relatively steep decline in the number of theatre-goers was related to the suppression of the 'traditional repertoire' (Blokland 1997).

- 13 The term of State Secretary Van der Laan deviates somewhat from this trend because the then government took the opposite viewpoint: '[I]t is not the culture sector's awareness of society, but society's awareness of culture that must be improved' (Ministerie van OCW 2003: 2).
- 14 Two key schemes were the Visual Artists' Scheme [*Beeldende Kunstenaars Regeling*, BKR], in which the government provided artists with an income in exchange for their services or works of art, and the Artists' Work for Income Act [*Wet werk inkomen kunstenaars*, Wwik], in which artists had the option of receiving a stipend to supplement their income for four years within a ten-year period (APE 2014).
- 15 Giep Hagoort introduced the term to the Netherlands in 1992, but it only became popular in 1999, when the then State Secretary for Culture, the economist Rick van der Ploeg, adopted it in one of his policy documents (Klamer 2011).
- 16 Dutch policy between 2003 and 2006 broke with this trend: 'In recent years, the traditional notion of cultural dissemination has increasingly come to be seen as an argument for the 'socialisation' of culture (...) That has led to an instrumentalist policy that focuses primarily on institutions. This government has decided to turn the argument around: it is not the culture sector's awareness of society, but society's awareness of culture that must be improved' (Ministerie van OCW 2003:2).
- 17 'De bezoekers komen wel', *NRC Handelsblad*, 20 November 2014. Investigation by the Dutch daily *NRC* based on an analysis of 43 annual reports of cultural institutions on 2013.
- 18 Audience reach means the number of different people who attend a performance. Because some people attend multiple performances a year, the number of discrete visits may be larger.
- 19 The SCP report *Kunstminnend Nederland?* (Van den Broek 2013) does not cover public reach of national heritage. The data come from a 2009 survey of the Dutch population aged 16 and older regarding their interest in art (receptive cultural participation, RCP).
- 20 This study does not include the consumption of cultural heritage. The figures concern the share of the population aged 16 and older that had attended or visited one of the relevant cultural manifestations at least once in the foregoing 12 months. The questionnaire covered the following artistic forms: popular music, classical music, visual arts, literature, drama, dance, cabaret and film. 'To avoid using such 'loaded', non-neutral terms like high and low, we have labelled the dimensions 'interested in canonical culture' and 'interested in popular culture'. 'Canonical culture' encompasses classical music, fine arts, literature, drama and dance. 'Popular culture' consists of cabaret, film and popular music' (Van den Broek 2013: 23).
- 21 'If we take a broader view of cultural participation – the combined reach (at least one visit in 2012) of performances, museums and libraries – then almost everyone (89% of the population aged 6 and older) can be described as a participant in culture' (Van den Broek 2014: 5).
- 22 To some extent the lower participation rate among ethnic minorities can be ascribed to their lower educational level on average. That average level of education is rising in various ethnic minority groups, whereas it has not risen very rapidly among the native Dutch since 2002. Dutch natives and ethnic minorities (minority groups) are growing more similar in this respect (Van den Broek 2009), but the differences in cultural participation still remain (as yet). For example, non-western minorities are less likely to attend performances involv-

ing the 'canon', but they do not lag behind when it comes to some forms of popular culture (film and some popular dance genres), and are in fact even more likely to attend certain other forms (electronic dance) (Van den Broek 2014).

23 Prosumption, which combines the words 'consumption' and 'production', is not a new phenomenon, but the Internet, social media and the experience economy have accelerated its rise as a trend (Ritzer et al. 2012).

24 This study later came in for criticism owing to the small sample surveyed (Gray 2008; Hewison 2014).

25 'Understanding everyday participation' is a five-year research project financed by the Arts and Humanities Research Council. It is a partnership between the universities of Manchester, Leicester, Exeter and Warwick.

26 The Gift and Inheritance Tax Act became effective on 1 January 2012 and contains a number of tax measures meant to encourage donations and allowing institutions awarded 'Anbi' status to develop more commercial activities. For an institution to qualify for 'Anbi' status, 90% of its activities must be within the domain of the arts and culture.

27 See for example <http://crowdculture.se/se/projects/enjoysweden>.

28 A survey conducted by the Dutch crowdfunding platform Voordekunst reveals, for example, that 30% of donors are personally acquainted with the project owner.

29 The Matthew effect refers to the Gospel according to St Matthew: '...for whosoever hath, to him shall be given, and he shall have more abundance: but whosoever hath not, from him shall be taken away even that he hath' (Matthew 13:12).

30 This is also what Van Hilvoorde et al. (2012) concluded in *Manifestaties van de vrijheid des geestes. Een liberale kijk op cultuur en sport*, but their conclusion is that government should concern itself largely with cultural education and heritage preservation.

31 Some of these issues have already been placed on the agenda and/or addressed in policy (Ministerie van OCW 2014b).

32 The discussion of these new tasks also covers a number of policy proposals by authors who contributed to the publication *Cultuur herwaarderen*, which provided the basis for this essay.

33 Compare recent proposals by the Amsterdamse Raad voor de Kunst, an independent body that advises Amsterdam's city council, which plans to distribute 1% of its budget by public vote and intends to install an arts panel that will consist of a permanent group of a thousand of the city's inhabitants, who will be asked to answer a series of open and closed questions about the arts and culture twice a year (Amsterdamse kunstraad 2014).

34 A survey of theatre attendance in the United Kingdom (Purple Seven 2013) revealed that the total audience for theatre is 40% smaller than the aggregate figures of individual theatres might lead one to suppose because a small core of 'super-frequent' visitors (2.5%) accounts for almost a quarter of the market share (23.5%).

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Revaluing Culture

Across Europe, policymakers regularly question the value of culture and, increasingly, seek the answer in culture's social and economic impact. As a result of this the culture sector often is expected to meet new aims. In the essay *Revaluing Culture* the Netherlands' Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR) argues that cultural policy should be first and foremost directed towards the 'culture' part of cultural policy. Only a strong culture sector is of lasting value to Dutch society, and to achieve it, policymakers must see to strengthen the resilience of the culture sector, so that it can deal with rapidly changing consumer preferences, buffer the consequences of new funding models, and rethink the relation between creative education and the labour market.

The essay is based on the first chapter of the report *Cultuur herwaarderen*. This report is edited by Erik Schrijvers, Anne-Greet Keizer and Godfried Engbersen; it features contributions by Hasan Bakhshi, Dave O'Brien, Roberta Comunian, Koen van Eijck, and Robert C. Kloosterman. The Dutch minister of Culture, Jet Bussemaker, has responded positively to this report and adjusted the policy aims accordingly in her policy plans for the coming years, *Starting points for 2017-2020*.

