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# **Ethnic minorities**

**A.  
Report to the Government**

**B.  
Towards an overall ethnic  
minorities policy**

**Preliminary study by Rinus Penninx**

To the Prime Minister  
Minister of General Affairs

The Hague, May 9, 1979

On March 1, 1978 the Scientific Council Government Policy commissioned Mr. M. J. A. Penninx to compile a comprehensive survey of government policy to date with respect to a number of ethnic minorities in the Netherlands. The Council considers the study carried out by Mr. Penninx to be of a quality and significance to deserve publication.

The nature of the survey – a description and assessment of government policy – has led the Council to attach to it a brief report to the government. Here-with we submit this report to you, together with Mr. Penninx' study. The main ideas of the report are summarized in chapter 7. The Council would appreciate an early reaction on the part of the government.

We request you to put the report for consideration on the agenda of the Council of Ministers.

Ir. Th. Quené, chairman  
Dr. P. R. Baehr, secretary.

## Contents of the Report to the Government

1. Introduction	VII
2. The problem in outline	IX
3. Anticipated developments	XII
1. Developments within the minority categories	XII
2. Developments within Dutch society of relevance for the social and cultural position of ethnic minorities	XIII
3. Conclusion	XV
4. Guidelines for future policy	XVII
1. Closing the socio-economic gap	XVII
2. Cultural equality in an open, multi-ethnic society	XIX
3. Summary	XXII
5. Main points of a minorities policy	XXIII
1. Institutional arrangements and participation	XXIII
2. Discrimination	XXV
3. Legal status	XXVI
4. Labour market situation	XXVIII
5. Some other areas of government responsibility	XXX
6. Future migration policy	XXXII
1. Immigration	XXXII
2. Return migration	XXXIII
3. Potential future developments in migration	XXXIV
4. Policy towards foreigners	XXXIV
7. Conclusions	XXXVI

## 1. INTRODUCTION

On 1 March 1978 the Scientific Council for Government Policy commissioned Mr. M. J. A. Penninx to compile a comprehensive survey of government policy to date with respect to a number of ethnic minorities in the Netherlands. The minorities covered in the survey are Moluccans, Surinamese and Antilleans, and workers from Mediterranean countries.

The Council considers the study carried out by Mr. Penninx to be of a quality and significance to deserve publication. The assemblage of data it provides has not been available hitherto. Rather than publishing the survey on its own, however, the Council decided to publish it together with this brief 'report to the Government', containing its own views regarding the subject-matter. This it felt to be required in view of the nature of the survey, which consists of a description and assessment of Government policy. Furthermore, in its second five-year session (1978–1983) the Council is unlikely to be able to produce a comprehensive study of its own concerning ethnic minorities in which Mr. Penninx's study could be incorporated. The submission of a report at this stage does however have certain limitations: analysis was not possible of certain points and policy recommendations had to be of a general nature.

The immigration into an established society of sizeable groups of people of different culture and/or race generally leads to three sets of problems:

- (i) problems of social backwardness: to what extent is the ability of the members of these groups to participate in society on equal terms restricted by their socio-economic position; these problems of social backwardness are often shared by ethnic minorities – admittedly often to a greater degree – with disadvantaged groups within society generally;
- (ii) cultural or identity problems: to what extent are these groups or their individual members prepared and able to adapt to the dominant culture, or else to preserve and experience a sense of independent identity;
- (iii) 'majority problems': to what extent is the host society prepared to develop towards a society in which people of diverse ethnic backgrounds can live together harmoniously.

In principle, these also form three separate areas for government policy formulation.

Government policy to date has to a great extent been based on the concept of temporary residence in the country. This reflected the desire to return of many of the people in the immigrant groups themselves: the Moluccans, who shared this ideal as a group; initially a great many of the Mediterranean workers (the largest category) and, although to a lesser extent, the Surinamese\*. In the case of the Netherlands, given the density of population, a fundamental consideration was that it should not become an immigration country. Although this standpoint has been modified over the years, the government has never fully abandoned the temporary nature of residence as the basis for official policy.

This has had important consequences for the nature of government policy. In the first place, the 'majority problems' referred to above have largely been excluded from the formulation of policy: where return migration is assumed there is no need for concern over the development in

\* In this report Surinamese are taken to include both Dutch persons of Surinamese descent and Surinamese nationals.

the long term of a multi-cultural or multi-racial society. In addition, the cultural or identity problems of the minority groups themselves take on a particular character when residence is thought to be only temporary; in particular, the question of cultural conflict assumes less importance. In this context it is also understandable that a concept such as the 'preservation of a separate identity' should influence policy strongly while pushing the question of cultural conflict into the background. Finally, the problems of social backwardness have for a long time also been approached from the point of view that residence would be temporary only. This has meant that official attitudes have stressed reception and support rather than a structural strengthening of the social and economic position of minorities.

Mr. Penninx's study consists of a separate examination of several large ethnic minorities in our country. In this review of the problem the Council has dealt principally with ethnic minorities as a whole, although distinctions have been made on certain points. Such an approach has been preferred not only on the pragmatic ground that in this manner the question of ethnic minorities may be examined from two sides; the Council is also particularly concerned to highlight the shared and distinctive nature of the problems faced by many members of ethnic minorities. Reference has already been made to the common or shared nature of the problems: members of ethnic minorities can be confronted with problems of social backwardness, maintaining their own cultural identity, and contact with a different kind of society. The distinctive nature of these problems lies in the fact that many persons belonging to ethnic minorities experience them cumulatively; such an accumulation does not apply in the case of members of other economically weak groups in society.

In this report the Council provides a brief sketch of the problem of ethnic minorities (Chapter 2) and of the developments to be expected in this field (Chapter 3). Several principles, underlying the policy the Council considers should be adopted, are then examined (Chapter 4), as well as the content of such policy on certain essential points (Chapter 5). Finally, consideration is given to various elements of the migration policy that the Council considers should be pursued (Chapter 6). The Council considers it particularly desirable that the Government should express its views promptly on the main ideas contained in this report; these are set out again in the final chapter (Chapter 7).

The Council is aware that on many points its observations are based on previously published reports or recommendations as well as studies carried out by individual experts. Further research will be needed on many points. It is encouraging that as a result of the recent establishment of the Advisory Committee on Research on Cultural Minorities there are now good prospects for a properly organised programme of such research. Close contact was maintained with the Advisory Committee in the preparation of this report; it is reasonable to expect that the orientation of this report and the research programme will dovetail with one another.

The Council is conscious that the formulation of policy has quickened its pace in the last few months (e.g. report on the Moluccan minority and the appointment of a minister with coordinating responsibilities). This being the case the Council has largely left to one side problems arising in this context and has concentrated its attention on several fundamental aspects of policy also of significance in the longer term.

Finally, the Council would observe that it is particularly difficult to exert influence on the problem of ethnic minorities, and that new and unforeseen developments are constantly to be expected. It is, furthermore, the sort of question in which individual attitudes and emotions are of great importance. This means that the effect of official measures should not be overestimated. The Council hopes that the publication of Mr. Penninx's survey and of this report will influence not only official policy formulation but also public attitudes towards the problem of minorities.

## 2. THE PROBLEM IN OUTLINE

The Netherlands increasingly displays the hallmarks of a multi-ethnic and multi-racial society. The ethnic minorities that form the subject of Mr. Penninx's survey comprise some 387,000 persons, consisting of over 200,000 foreigners from Mediterranean countries (principally foreign workers and their families), approximately 130,000 and 25,000 residents of Surinamese and Antillean origin respectively, and some 32,000 Moluccans. In addition, according to data from the Central Bureau of Statistics, there were nearly 200,000 people of other nationalities living in the Netherlands in 1978.

Expectations that a large proportion of these minorities, especially the migrants of Surinamese descent and foreign workers from the Mediterranean region, would return to their countries of origin after several years have turned out to be unfounded. On the contrary, not only the increased length of residence but also the sharp increase in family reunifications suggest that the presence in Dutch society of relatively large ethnic minorities is likely to be of a permanent nature.

These ethnic minorities are to some extent concentrated in the large cities forming the conurbation in the west of the country (the *Randstad*), and frequently in the old, nineteenth century urban quarters.

A cumulation of adverse socio-economic and cultural factors has resulted in the fact that, as described in Mr. Penninx's survey, many if not most members of the minorities find themselves at the bottom of the social ladder. It is apparent from the survey that up to the present official measures have made an inadequate contribution to the solution of these problems. These problems are substantial: discrimination, high unemployment among minorities, poor housing, problems of adjustment among the second generation, weak legal position, etc.

The reasons for the influx of ethnic minorities into the Netherlands differ widely, and there are considerable social and cultural differences within the various ethnic minority groups themselves. Nevertheless the survey indicates that there is a clearly shared set of problems, centred on the socially backward position of these minorities and their relationship with the other inhabitants of the country.

Members of minority groups are also confronted with a culture that is often unfamiliar. In many respects the culture of the host country differs from that to which they were accustomed at home. Examples include the relationship between men and women, family relationships, the work ethic, eating habits, the attitudes of citizens towards the authorities, etc. It is self-evident that this confrontation of ethnic minorities with their new environment can lead to great tension.

Mr. Penninx's survey concentrates on three ethnic minority groups, namely migrants of Surinamese and Antillean origin, Moluccans, and foreign workers of Mediterranean origin and members of their families. As indicated in the study, this is a limitation: other categories such as certain groups of caravan dwellers, refugees and ethnic Chinese, although much smaller numerically, are faced with corresponding problems to a greater or lesser extent.

Mr. Penninx's study and this report are concerned with the socio-economically weak members of minority groups. Within each of the described groups there are also people who have acquired a stronger position, such as the Moluccan or Surinamese *intelligentsia*, either through efforts of their own or because of more favourable opportunities for self-development.

The immigration of Surinamese was at its peak in the period preceding independence in November 1975. In 1973, net immigration in this category totalled 9,000; in 1974 15,500, and in 1975 36,500. After independence immigration took place on a limited scale, confined largely to family reunification. Recently, however, migration appears to have once more increased. In 1977, net migration totalled 1,400, and in 1978 4,700. There are also indications that this is not just a matter of family migration, but that to an increasing degree migration is directed towards finding employment or obtaining social security benefits. In 1977 there were an estimated 108,000 residents of Surinamese origin and 25,000 residents of Antillean origin. In addition to these migration figures, which are based on official population statistics, account must also be taken of Surinamese subjects present illegally in the Netherlands; their total number is unknown. The majority of Surinamese and Antillean Dutch nationals have settled in the four largest cities.

Nor do these people in any way represent a homogeneous group. Among the Surinamese for example are to be found such groupings as Creoles, Hindustanis and Javanese. The mass migration directly before Surinam gained independence concerned mainly the economically weaker groups – unlike in earlier years – which forms a further explanation for the increased scale of problems. These immigrants remain strongly oriented towards Surinam, but actual return migration has until now been slight. Racial differences with the rest of the community have helped maintain and strengthen discrimination and unequal treatment.

The total number of Moluccans who came to the Netherlands in 1951 was approximately 12,500. The number of Moluccans in the Netherlands at present is estimated at 32,000. Unlike the Surinamese and Antillean Dutch, the Moluccans are not concentrated in the big cities but live mainly in urbanised rural areas spread throughout the entire country. In 1978, 75% lived together in residential suburbs, only 3% remained in special, temporary settlements and 22% were 'scattered'. Penninx notes however that these figures have to be treated with great caution. According to a number of experts, the 'scattered' residential category in particular has increased markedly.

The problems of the Moluccan group are characterised by conflict between political ideals and cultural orientation on the one hand, and participation in Dutch society on the other.

In many respects the category of foreign workers is of extremely heterogeneous composition. According to the Ministry of Justice's data, the number of foreigners from countries of worker-recruitment (i.e. excluding Italy) totalled approximately 179,000 on 1 January 1977. According to the Central Bureau of Statistics figures, net (positive) migration totalled 9,600 in 1977 and 13,500 in 1978. Allowing for some 5,000 to 6,000 births a year, there were approximately 207,000 persons from these countries in the Netherlands as of 1 January 1979. Those belonging to this category include Greeks, Yugoslavs, Portuguese, Spaniards, Turks, Moroccans and Tunisians. The Turks, with some 85,000 residents, form the largest category. The Moroccans follow with approximately 48,000. The main factors prompting foreign workers to come are economic in nature. Relatively few foreigners return to their country of origin. In the case of Spaniards, Greeks and Yugoslavs, however, emigration has exceeded immigration in recent years; this is most pronounced in the case of the Spanish (2,620 and 820 persons respectively in 1977).

Although there is still a clear preponderance of men, the number of women and children is increasing rapidly as a result of family reunification. This may be seen for example from the following figures: although the number of foreign workers remained virtually constant in 1975 and 1976 (101,300 and 100,700 respectively) the total number of foreign residents from countries of recruitment rose in those years from 169,000 to 179,000.

The following figures indicate that the number of foreign workers with a permanent work permit has increased sharply in the last few years:

1975		1976		1977	
permanent	temporary	permanent	temporary	permanent	temporary
46,200	54,700	61,400	38,400	77,000	28,300

On the basis of these three factors – i.e. reduced rate of return to countries of origin, increasing family reunification, and an increase in the number of permanent work permits – it may be concluded that the widespread belief that ethnic minorities, especially those from Mediterranean countries, will stay in the Netherlands only temporarily, is incorrect. (A more detailed discussion of this point is contained in Mr. Penninx's survey.) The problems of this group are centred on the stress resulting from efforts to obtain employment (if necessary of an unpleasant nature) and to participate in Dutch society on the one hand, and the desire to preserve their own culture and to return to their country of origin on the other.

The above data, drawn partly from Penninx's survey, have led to a closer examination of the problems with which the socio-economically weak members of ethnic minorities, in particular, are confronted in Dutch society.

The problems faced by the various groups may be summarised as follows:

- (i) For the Surinamese and Antilleans the problems centre on unequal opportunities and discriminatory treatment in the Netherlands, contributory factors to these problems being racial differences and a strong cultural orientation towards Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles, which, however, does not result in any appreciable return migration.
- (ii) For the Moluccans, the problems are characterised by conflict between political ideals and cultural orientation on the one hand and participation in Dutch society on the other.
- (iii) For the Mediterranean workers a conflict exists between the desire for work and to participate in Dutch society on the one hand, and the desire to preserve their own culture and to return to their country of origin on the other.

An important element common to all groups with regard to these problems is their social and economic deprivation as evidenced in relatively low levels of education and training and lack of skills. Moreover the various groups possess scarcely any economic power.

### 3. ANTICIPATED DEVELOPMENTS

#### 3.1. *Developments within the minority categories*

Even if there were to be no further waves of immigration (see Chapter 6), a considerable growth must still be anticipated on the basis of current regulations. Thus the possibility of family reunification exists for Surinamese and Antilleans and certain groups of foreign workers (on certain conditions); it is to be expected that present family reunification will continue for some time and would even accelerate if housing obstacles were to be removed. The immigration of Antilleans continues and is even growing to some extent, and could – although at a lower absolute level – develop into a repetition of the developments that occurred upon Surinamese independence. The actual rate of return migration of the three categories of immigrants has until now been low. Political developments and economic prospects in the countries of origin, and the increased level of family reunification in the Netherlands, make any relatively sharp increase in return migration figures improbable.

The numerical growth of immigrants living in the Netherlands is determined by both fertility rates and the age structure of migrant families. Migrant families from the Mediterranean and from Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles exhibit relatively high fertility levels. Furthermore, there is a disproportionately high number of young people, especially among Mediterranean workers. The population effects of these factors will of course affect future generations as well.

Without intensified intervention on the part of the government authorities, the prospects for closing the social and economic gap and for participation on an equal footing in Dutch society are not favourable. Experience from past efforts to create equal opportunities for the lower socio-economic groups in the Netherlands indicates how slow and laborious the process of emancipation can be. The starting point for many people from the minority groups under discussion is particularly poor. Elementary education is often lacking, with scarcely any prospect of its being acquired. In particular, women and somewhat older children coming to the Netherlands when families are reunified find themselves very awkwardly placed in this respect. Children's academic performance at school is strongly influenced by the home environment. Many parents – and especially the mother, as the one principally concerned with upbringing – can do little if anything to help their school-age children. For boys and girls to participate successfully in present-day Dutch education they must have an attitude of independence and motivation towards self-development. Such attitudes can only develop in a family and upbringing situation in which the wife enjoys a position of equal status with the husband and where the issue of authority between parents and children has diminished to the point that the parents do not perceive their children's education as a threat because it exceeds their own. Among a proportion of the minorities, however, family relationships are strongly hierarchical in nature.

All in all it must therefore be expected that the disadvantages experienced by many members of minority groups currently living in the Netherlands will have effects in coming generations. By disadvantage is understood disadvantage in terms of Dutch culture, that is being relatively poorly placed to acquire things to which value is attached by the indigenous Dutch community (education, income, housing, status, power, quality of work, and so on). Many still think in terms of their own culture and will, at least initially, no doubt experience less acutely the difficulties encountered in participating in Dutch society on equal terms. This changes however with the succeeding

generation, which will be more strongly oriented towards Dutch society and at the same time estranged from its original culture.

A major factor in the problems of underprivilege is the tendency to live closely grouped together. The urge to live within the context of one's own group will be stronger not only the more one feels culturally alien in Dutch society – meaning inability to understand and speak the language, and the existence of different attitudes and customs – but also the weaker one's social and socio-economic position in that society. Group solidarity not only makes it possible to maintain one's own attitudes and customs to a certain extent, to associate with persons from one's own region and country, and to enjoy social status, but is also a source of social and economic help, for example in the field of housing. The tendency towards concentration will also be greater if little necessity is perceived to adjust to the new society because one intends to return to one's country of origin within a few years. One will also be more dependent on group solidarity to the degree that the host society offers fewer socio-economic opportunities and is more threatening in cultural respects, or is perceived to be threatening. The concentration phenomenon is particularly apparent among socially weak members of ethnic minorities confronted by many of these factors in conjunction.

Once concentration has occurred, it can become a self-reinforcing process, due also to the reactions of the indigenous population, thus frequently resulting in an increase in cultural and socio-economic problems. If people isolate themselves as a group, this acts as an impediment to the development of contacts with and optimal participation in the host society. Cultural differences can then become accentuated among both the minority and the majority, which can in turn provide fertile ground for the development of unfavourable images of one another and even hostility. And this in turn acts as a further inhibiting factor on participation in the host society on the one hand, and on the opportunities offered to the ethnic minorities by that society on the other. To make use of those opportunities nonetheless can even entail the breaking of ties with the group. As a result the group may even come to be deprived of its 'pioneers'.

A backward position and cultural isolation are mutually reinforcing factors and processes the effects of which can persist over long periods. In such a situation there can be scarcely any question of positive cultural experience and development. This places the second generation in a very difficult position, since it is more exposed to the influence of the recipient society, especially through education. Growing up in two worlds having different social status and divergent attitudes, and which display little understanding for one another and are indeed sometimes hostile towards each other, but which also both lay a claim on loyalty, confronts this generation with great problems of identity, and this can lead to a certain lack of standards of conduct. The upbringing of these children also creates substantial problems for the parents. Not only are they unable to give their children much support, but they also often perceive their children's orientation towards the host society as a great threat towards their own attitudes, customs and positions. Substantial generational conflict will often ensue.

### *3.2. Developments within Dutch society of relevance for the social and cultural position of ethnic minorities*

There are also trends within Dutch society that exert a negative influence on the elimination of the social gap experienced by (members of) ethnic minority groups and the achievement of cultural equality.

a) The attributes of the majority group against which the backwardness of minority groups is measured, are not stable but change over a period of time. Thus for example the level of education of the indigenous population shifts upwards. Even if – to stay with this example – the average level of education

of the minority groups were to rise, this would still not necessarily result in greater equality in the short term.

b) There are powerful factors present in Dutch society promoting inequality.

(i) The indigenous population's striving towards self-development, as expressed not only in higher levels of education but also in greater fastidiousness about the type of work performed, can mean that despite increased social mobility among certain members of ethnic minority groups the gap in relation to the Dutch majority is maintained. A continual normative adjustment of this kind with respect to stimulating or unpleasant types of work, and the allocation to weaker groups of less stimulating jobs in certain sectors of the labour market, may also be observed in relation to socio-economically weaker indigenous groups and to women.

(ii) The potential for allocated market segments to arise, as may be demonstrated in the case of the labour market, also exists in other sectors, such as education and housing. The anticipated continuing shift in living aspirations and the resultant movement of Dutch people away from the cities and the associated decline of the inner cities\*, also mean that a geographical separation arises based on socio-economic position. Such a geographical separation already exists within the big cities where (with the exception of the Moluccans) most members of minority groups live. This concentration of the economically weaker members of minority groups in the relatively cheap, old town quarters, resulting in part from development in the housing market, has repercussions in the sphere of education. Concentration patterns of this kind in the labour sector, housing and education tend moreover to be self-reinforcing: the work, residential areas and schools in question become less desirable in the eyes of the rest of the community, which then seeks work and accommodation elsewhere.

(iii) In a period of economic stagnation, social selection processes tend to become more rigorous, while at the same time support for weaker members of the community – which is all the more required at such times – suffers. These sharpened social selection processes operate to the disadvantage of ethnic minorities, and can moreover assume a discriminatory nature (systematic bias in the case of equal qualifications). This is all the more marked where there is physical separation, which is conducive to the development of preconceptions. The likelihood of such a process occurring further increased where the minorities have little political or social power (see point c below).

This is not to say that discriminatory processes would not arise in more favourable economic circumstances. Processes of this kind play a role at such times as well, although sometimes in a more concealed fashion. Nor may one assume discrimination to be limited to particular social levels or areas: in principle discrimination may be expected wherever members of minority groups appear as competitors.

Where the majority of members of the ethnic minorities under discussion are in a weak socio-economic position, competitive relationships will however tend to arise particularly with those members of the rest of the community who are themselves already in a weak position. And it is they who are particularly exposed to cultural differences, for it is the weakest groups who are most confronted with ethnic minorities on the job, in the neighbourhood and at school.

c) In the Council's report 'The next twenty-five years', it was suggested that Dutch democracy would develop further towards a political system in which decision-making is determined more by competing interests than by general political ideologies.

If this should be correct it means that the position of categories which are poorly organised in political, social and economic respects will be extremely

\* Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR): The next twenty-five years. The Hague, 1978, p. 122; English version available.

difficult. This will apply all the more to those categories not participating in vital sectors of social life. When such positions of power prove unattainable, apathy or the exercise of power outside the recognized channels is to be expected.

d) The evolution of the Netherlands into an industrialised, urbanised society has led to a greater degree of openness in both structural and cultural respects. In a number of cases the former cultural diversity has declined. This applies for example to cultural differences that stemmed from social inequality or that existed between urban and rural areas. Cultural diversity based on differing philosophies of life has also declined. It may be expected that these developments will continue for the time being.

The more open structure resulting from the decline in horizontal, vertical and geographical stratification leads to intensified cultural communication and dynamism. As a result a greater awareness of other groups has arisen in Dutch society. In this situation the identity of ethnic minorities will not remain unaffected. For at the same time a far-reaching division of labour has taken place, giving rise to a myriad of organisations having separate functions. This means that everyone unavoidably comes into contact with all sorts of institutions: with respect to employment, social security, education, housing, the media, the health service, social work etc. In the course of all these contacts, members of ethnic minority groups become confronted with the attitudes of the rest of the population. Even where it is sought to preserve a separate culture, such participation will – depending on its intensity – have an influence on that culture.

e) With the reduction of cultural and social divisions a new pattern is emerging in which, among other things, the individual and individual freedom of choice are accorded a central place.

Developments are occurring such as the democratisation of a great many institutions, women's liberation and the emancipation of other groups, increased emphasis on self-development, an ideology based on equality, small families, horizontal family relationships, and the like.

These trends, which are not yet over, are reflected among other ways in official policy and legislation, which in turn perpetuate them.

Groups within the indigenous population with divergent attitudes and values on such matters who manage to hold out against pressures to conform are regarded as old-fashioned and can in consequence come into conflict with majority norms.

Equally, the continued trend towards individualism conflicts with the group-directed orientation and related behavioural norms (sometimes also based on religion) of certain minority groups. The woman's position, the relationship between husband and wife and parents and children, hierarchical relationships and the associated attitudes towards authority, already form sources of conflict. It is to be expected that a strong pressure towards conformity will be exerted by society, with which one unavoidably comes into contact in many ways.

An additional factor is that the emergence of the welfare state has undoubtedly contributed towards the process of individualism mentioned above. Ethnic minorities too participate in the welfare state. Group orientation, which was extremely functional in the country of origin with its lower level of public care, can lose its rationale in the new situation.

### 3.3. Conclusion

There has been an increase in ethnic and racial diversity in Dutch society. It must be expected that this greater diversity will be a permanent feature of our society. Various factors and processes interact with one another in such a way that a society in which ethnic minorities will remain among the weakest groups for a long period is distinctly possible. As a result of developments both within the minorities and within Dutch society they are subject to strong tendencies making for perpetuation of their position of underprivilege and cultural isolation. At the same time, however, they will be exposed to a good deal of contact with the surrounding society. Their

participation in an industrial, dynamic and open society from a position of relatively powerless disadvantage and isolation means that minorities will be subject to greater normative influences from society than they are able to exercise.

The process of adjustment will stretch over a long period and will be coupled with conflict within the ethnic minority groups themselves, including conflict between generations, as well as between the minorities and the rest of the community, especially the socio-economically weaker groups.

#### 4. GUIDELINES FOR FUTURE POLICY

Official policy in the past was strongly influenced by the belief that immigrants intended to remain in the Netherlands only temporarily. This assumption was not only consistent with the objective that the Netherlands should not become an immigration country, but many migrants themselves anticipated temporary residence. The policy based on this assumption was directed towards 'integration with the preservation of separate identity'. As indicated in Mr. Penninx's survey, this meant in practice that immigrants received only limited support from the authorities with regard to their participation in Dutch society, while the preservation of a separate identity was largely regarded as something forming part of welfare policy.

In this situation, the probable consequences of which were outlined in Chapter 3, a number of fundamental questions connected with the evolution towards a multi-ethnic society were not taken up.

Although the government has shown itself to be increasingly aware of these questions in recent years, the Council considers that policy formulation on this subject continues to take insufficient account of the nature of the problems at issue.

##### 4.1. *Closing the socio-economic gap*

With regard to policy towards ethnic minorities, the Council considers it desirable that the government should proceed on the assumption that residence in the Netherlands could be permanent.

Acceptance of this principle – which also accords with what is actually taking place – would mean the simultaneous acceptance that racial and ethnic diversity in the Netherlands has increased permanently.

Seen in this light the current social position of the minorities and the developments that may be expected must be regarded as unacceptable (see Chapter 3). The idea of a society stratified according to ethnic origin would in itself conflict with the egalitarian ideal of equal rights, duties and obligations enshrined in Dutch culture. Such an idea would be equally at variance with the expectations frequently held by the immigrants themselves with regard to their participation in Dutch society, especially the longer the period of residence.

Systematic socio-economic deprivation and an associated sense of isolation can moreover lead to a strengthening of ethnic or group solidarity, which could in turn become directed against the society at large. The resultant conflict can inflict lasting damage on both the majority and minorities.

In the Council's view, a positive acceptance of the multi-ethnic nature of Dutch society would, in the first place, render necessary an intensified effort to eliminate the under-privilege from which the minorities suffer in many areas.

The position occupied in Dutch society by the ethnic minorities exposes certain features of our society. As suggested in Chapter 3, various factors are at work in Dutch society with respect to the allocation of scarce goods which tend to promote social inequality. These selection mechanisms – which work against minorities generally and the ethnic minorities in particular – lead to the formation of deprived groups among the rest of the community as well. The Council has drawn attention to these processes in its earlier reports 'Maken wij er werk van?' ('Do we make work our business?')<sup>\*</sup> and 'Over sociale ongelijkheid' ('On social inequality').

<sup>\*</sup> English version available.

A policy directed increasingly towards eliminating the under-privileged position of ethnic minorities will therefore, in the Council's opinion, need above all to tackle those factors in Dutch society that promote inequality. This could well mean that the improvement of opportunities for ethnic minorities in relative and even absolute terms entails a reduction in opportunities for other groups in society. It is for this reason that the policy guidelines outlined above have such far-reaching implications. The realization of equal opportunities and scope for ethnic minorities in relation to employment, education, income, housing, power and the like may require sacrifices on the part of other members of Dutch society so that the problems are not passed on to the weakest groups in the native population.

Dutch culture and structure will thus be increasingly at issue. An important element will be an active policy aimed at combatting and especially preventing discrimination. Ways must also be found of promoting contact and understanding more directly among the various groups within the population. Although many areas of the public sector can contribute to this objective, special significance must be attached to the influence that education can have, provided that education concerns itself more with these matters.

The provision of opportunities for self-development for minorities frequently means interference with the scope for self-development of the majority. This applies in many areas. Improving the position of ethnic minorities on the labour market will for example place at issue the willingness of Dutch people to perform uncongenial work, the freedom of employers to select employees and the acceptance of competition from minority groups for higher status and better-paid positions.

While official policies aimed at eliminating the under-privilege of ethnic minorities will need to be focussed primarily on certain features of Dutch society, they will also need in a direct sense to offer ample opportunities to members of ethnic minority groups to reduce the socio-economic gap. It is of great importance that such facilities should not be cut back at a time of economic recession. If anything the reverse should apply, since members of minority groups are harder hit by a recession.

Increased opportunities are equally desired by many members of the ethnic minorities themselves. They too regard as problems such factors as being inadequately equipped to take part properly in Dutch society, unemployment, their backward position in the Netherlands and possible uncertainty about their being permitted to remain in the country.

Making use of the facilities and opportunities provided does however confront many with a dilemma, especially first generation immigrants. Drawing on opportunities to obtain a position with better long-term prospects can square uneasily with the desire to return home. No immigrant can be expected to relinquish his intention of returning to his country of origin solely on the grounds that the statistics indicate that, despite these intentions, most immigrants remain in the Netherlands for a considerable period.

The policy advocated by the Council would in no way impede remigration. It would, on the contrary, view positively the provision of greater opportunities for individual migrants to return to their own countries. The Council considers that in practice remigration will need to be supported officially. The point at issue, however, is that the possibility of permanent residence by minority groups should be taken as a basis for official policy and should determine the nature of the facilities offered as long as immigrants wish to remain in the Netherlands. The possibility of individual returnmigration should not be used as an alibi for evading a policy that would improve the minorities' opportunities to participate in Dutch society. Equally the desire to return must not be used as a weapon to encourage remigration.

It is for these reasons that the Council considers it of great importance that the authorities should seek, in consultation with ethnic minority

organisations representing their interests, to ensure that immigrants – men, women and children – do in fact make use of the facilities provided for them. Women's threshold for making use of such facilities is likely to be particularly high; this will require extra attention from all concerned.

An active policy to combat social backwardness should, in the Council's view, also be seen as a necessary condition both for the minorities' desire to preserve their own culture in an atmosphere of freedom, and for the majority's ideal of equality in a multicultural society. The positive enjoyment and development of a separate culture in freedom only become possible if a number of basic living requirements are adequately met. This is also of importance for the tolerance of minority cultures by cultural majority, as the image formed by the majority of a minority and its culture proves to be related to the social status of the bearers of that culture.

#### *4.2. Cultural equality in an open, multi-ethnic society*

In cultural terms, the immigration of recent decades has led to greater diversity within Dutch society. This implies a process of adjustment not only for the migrant, with his different language, religion, attitudes and customs, but also for the host society. A multiplicity of languages and different faiths, values and norms require a re-orientation on the part of the government, as well as other institutions and the individual Dutch citizen.

A re-orientation by minorities and the majority is more necessary when it is assumed that the immigrants' stay in the Netherlands will be permanent or long-term rather than brief. The process of adjustment required of the immigrant is more far-reaching than that required of the host society. He must learn to cope in many areas that will be unfamiliar to him and to conform with new rules, often in circumstances in which the emotional support of his own group is lacking. The unfamiliar environment frequently fails to understand him and is often, despite the best of intentions, unequipped to understand him; but at the same time it exerts power over him, the more so the weaker his social and legal position.

In the past, cultural problems were approached with the objective of 'preservation of a separate identity' in mind. This notion was prompted by the desire of migrants to return to the country of origin. This objective not only justified a passive policy with regard to the socio-economic gap but was also conducive to the cultural isolation of ethnic groups – an isolation sometimes sought by members of the group themselves.

There could scarcely be any question of positive cultural development in such a situation, while fundamental questions concerning the functioning of an open, multi-cultural society – including the culture of the host society – did not need to be raised, let alone answered.

The Council's recommendation that official policy should in principle be based on the assumption of potentially permanent residence, and that it should accordingly be more concerned with the elimination of under-privilege suffered by ethnic minorities, has implications for the policy to be pursued on cultural matters. Intensified participation by minorities in Dutch society is incompatible with cultural isolation. The Council wishes to emphasize that just as minorities and the majority need to respect one another's attitudes, both have to recognize that an optimal participation in society by minorities will necessitate cultural change on both sides. A situation in which minorities and the majority regard their own attitudes as being beyond discussion would entail an outlook such as that outlined in Chapter 3, namely a distinct prospect of cultural isolation, loss of identity and socio-economic deprivation on the part of the minorities.

This approach diverges from the outlook underlying previous policy. The objective 'preservation of cultural identity' tends to promote a static outlook as far as ethnic minority cultures are concerned. Such an outlook fails to recognize the flexibility and adaptability of those cultures towards social

change; it also fails to do justice to the diversity of cultural orientation existing within the three minority categories.

The culture in the countries of origin is no more homogeneous or static than that in Dutch society; immigrants' attitudes depend also on the social and socio-economic position that they occupied in their own country (urban/rural etc.). Furthermore, the extent to which individuals were exposed to cultural change in their own country varies considerably within the minority groups.

A static outlook as described above overlooks not only the dynamic element inherent in the act of migrating to the Netherlands, but also the normative change resulting from domicile in the recipient country, even when the individual is strongly screened off from cultural influences by his own group. It is not just a matter of being involuntarily subjected to normative influences as a result of the contacts which occur, even in these circumstances, with the institutions of Dutch society. In addition, as postulated in Chapter 3, certain cultural elements which had their *raison d'être* in the country of origin (for example a much lower level of public welfare) lose it in the new environment. Such developments similarly call for fresh attitudes.

In what way is it possible to translate into policy the approach outlined above, with its central tenets that minorities and the majority should respect one another's cultures, while at the same time always having to be prepared to submit their own attitudes to scrutiny for the sake of the other party?

It is reasonable to insist that minorities respect the Dutch legal system, provided that it also contains safeguards for a multi-cultural society. But although legislative guarantees may have been created for a plurality of opinions, social and human attitudes, philosophies of life and religions, this need not always amount to a great deal in practice. Such guarantees are, for example, of little use if one cannot afford to build a mosque. In principle, the constitutionally guaranteed liberties rule out enforced assimilation; occasionally other objectives of equal significance for society are even required to take second place to guaranteed liberties. The guaranteed liberties also mean that the government must implement any positive cultural policies with restraint. At the same time, however, it has to be recognized that the organization of these freedoms is also influenced by such matters as social objectives (insistence for example on sound education), so that normative influence is nonetheless exercised. In this way, despite formal guarantees safeguarding cultural plurality, the Dutch legal system and governmental administration still reflect the dominant culture, thereby exerting a powerful normative influence. This applies equally to all the public and private institutions with which minorities come into contact.

In the Council's view, a good deal of adjustment towards the situation of a multi-ethnic society is both possible and necessary with regard to legislation and implementary regulations and practice, as well as among public and private institutions, without the cultural attainments of Dutch society being threatened: such adjustments are in fact in line with the constitutional rights mentioned above.

Provisions for such matters as religious worship, education in the immigrants' own language, adapted services (e.g. maternity care by women doctors) do not present the host society with insuperable problems, while they are of great significance to the minorities. By offering instruction in the immigrants' own language alongside education in Dutch, for example, access to their own culture is maintained. Such provisions do, however, require a certain degree of geographical concentration on the part of members of minority groups. Moreover, where a certain degree of concentration exists, facilities arise 'spontaneously', for example in relation to special eating habits. Concentration of this kind should not however reach the point where contact with other community groups becomes restricted.

There are, however, also more problematical areas from a cultural point of view, or ones where the facilities sought by minorities can actually militate against backwardness being overcome.

The approach outlined above concerning the relationship in the cultural sphere between the majority and minorities means that no general policy guidelines can be laid down.

Solutions for these problems must not be drawn up by the host society alone but should be arrived at through a process of communication with the minorities themselves, who must be provided with adequate opportunity for such a dialogue. With good minority participation in policy formulation the nature and scope of cultural reorientation not only become the subject of decision-making by those affected, but at the same time demands may be made concerning various aspects of Dutch society. A cultural policy of this kind naturally extends well beyond the sphere of welfare policy.

It is not to be expected that such participatory processes will take place without conflict; that would be to underestimate the problems at issue. The various cultures coming into confrontation with one another display some attitudes and behaviour that are not easily reconcilable, and that are regarded by both sides as fundamental achievements. Thus, for example, very important aspects of our western culture, such as individual liberty and equality, will be contested by another culture, sometimes militantly. In those cases of confrontation where no practical compromise is possible there remains no choice but to defend the achievements of our culture against dissenting assertions. Conversely, other cultures will contain aspects that are scarcely, if at all, reconcilable with western culture. It is clear that in practice the majority viewpoint will prevail. The basic preparedness to adopt an open attitude means, however, that the majority must act with restraint and not exploit its power unnecessarily. All things considered such confrontations need not necessarily be regarded as disadvantageous for society. A confrontation with other cultures can indicate how far tolerance, which is rated so highly in our views on society, really extends.

The active promotion of democratic minority group participatory organisations as advocated by the Council must not, of course, become a reason for Dutch organisations to close their doors to members of ethnic minorities or fail to represent their interests energetically. The Council considers, on the contrary, that the accessibility of, and more positive attitudes among, Dutch organisations and institutions are of great importance, and that these should be promoted where possible. In this connexion the Council proposes in Chapter 5 that, among other things, immigrants of non-Dutch nationality should be permitted to vote, under certain conditions. This would mean that they would be able to influence not only policies of direct relevance to them, but also social development in general. But certainly so long as the minorities do not perceive their interests to be safeguarded by Dutch institutions, every reason exists for there to be special representative bodies. It is to be hoped that this would have a stimulating effect on Dutch organisations.

There are also other grounds for justifying policies that are not directed towards the maintenance of cultural identity, but which set out to turn to advantage the capacity of cultures for change, among other things by encouraging democratic participation.

Policies based on egalitarianism entail a recognition of the desirability of social emancipation of the groupings in question. The process of emancipation is of a collective as well as individual nature. The struggle for equal rights and recognition of minority attitudes tends to promote a sense of mutual solidarity. Once this is acknowledged by the authorities it means that one must also accept an inherent element of unpredictability, and that developments will sometimes have to be accepted that would at first sight appear to slow down the bridging of the socio-economic gap. This is not, however, something to shy away from: it stimulates a creative orientation towards and communication with society as a whole, from which both sides

can benefit. The much-vaunted diversity of Dutch culture would be encouraged as well.

Once the pace and nature of cultural reorientation become subject to decision-making by those concerned, the group can come to play an important role with regard to the integration of individual immigrants into society and the motivation to make use of the facilities provided within the framework of the policies advocated here. Such organisations can fulfil an important function by helping individuals find their bearings in society and by interpreting the dominant culture, thereby helping prevent isolation and disorientation. This is not to suggest that many members of ethnic minority groups would not be able to find their own way in Dutch society, or that they have not already done so. The object of the Council's proposals is to facilitate this process without members of minorities having to cut themselves off from their own group and culture.

#### 4.3. *Summary*

With regard to further policy developments concerning ethnic minorities, the Council considers that the greatest attention should be given to reducing the social backwardness that prevents participation in society on equal terms, especially in socio-economic and cultural respects. This priority means not only that facilities have to be provided for the minorities, but also that there is a special need for an active policy designed to combat those factors responsible for inequalities. This includes an energetic campaign to prevent and eliminate discrimination and, in certain areas, additional support for minorities.

The question of a separate identity should, the Council believes, be considered in the light of a plural society in which the majority and minorities approach one another in a spirit of openness. In the dialogue between them it will be necessary to take account of those essential cultural assets that are regarded as inviolate, and those cultural elements in respect of which greater mutual tolerance is possible. This means that adjustments to both minority and majority cultures will be at issue. For the further development of an open society of this kind it is also of importance that minority groups be given the opportunity to exert influence on policy of direct relevance to them, as well as on the evolution of society generally and on Dutch institutions.

The general aim of the policy here described is to achieve participation by minorities in Dutch society on equal terms. This means that access to, communication with and acceptance in Dutch society should be possible for the minorities now present in the Netherlands. There can be no place for discrimination in such a society, in which ethnic minorities would enjoy the same opportunities, rights and obligations as the indigenous population, without essential cultural values being unjustifiably rejected or neglected.

The Council's approach towards the problem of minorities differs from those contained in the two potential policy strategies singled out by Penninx. A number of concepts which the Council believes to be of fundamental importance are not included in these strategies, which are directed towards emancipation through the individual and through the group respectively: for example the belief that not only minorities' cultures but also the culture and structure of the recipient society should form the focus of attention, and that both the majority and minorities should be drawn into the decision-making process.

Finally, it will be evident from this chapter that the Council rejects several other basic policy options, particularly acceptance of the social and cultural isolation of the minorities, enforced complete assimilation and compulsory repatriation.

## 5. MAIN POINTS OF A MINORITIES POLICY

Previous chapters have expounded the importance of a policy based on participation in society on equal terms by minorities. Equalization in practice will need to form the touchstone for government action relating to those minority groups remaining in the Netherlands for longer periods. The attainment of equal participation by minorities will entail the elimination of under-privilege in such fields as the labour market, housing, education (in the widest sense) and health, as well as in the sphere of legal rights – the latter being in many ways a precondition for the remainder. An active official policy will be required in these sectors, while in more general terms the public authorities and institutions must regard themselves as having equal responsibility for members of minority groups as for the rest of the society.

### 5.1. *Institutional arrangements and participation*

As is apparent from Mr. Penninx's study, policy towards ethnic minorities has been of a piecemeal nature in the past: policy formulation is spread over a number of ministries, which has meant inadequate coordination of individual aspects of policy. It is not the Council's intention to examine overall future policy formulation and its organisation in this report. It would not, however, expect the government to display any reluctance to act if it should emerge – as in some respects at least, it undoubtedly will – that existing institutional arrangements are unable to fulfill certain functions required under the new policy on minorities. Where there is a need for new institutional structures, they should be set up in close interaction with the establishment of policy guidelines relating to the problem of ethnic minorities. While institutional structures exist for the implementation of government policy, they also influence policy formulation. This is particularly true of the development of effective structures for horizontal and vertical coordination.

The Council has noted the government's recent decision to appoint a minister with coordinating responsibilities for minority affairs. Although the precise functions to be performed by this coordinating minister remain to be spelled out, the Council assumes that the appointment will lead not only to organisational improvement but also to fresh initiatives. The Council welcomes the decision to vest this responsibility in the Minister for Home Affairs, since this serves to indicate that it is not simply a matter of social and cultural problems but of other policy aspects as well. The fact that the Minister for Home Affairs has primary responsibility for coordinating relations between the central government, provinces and local councils is therefore only one of the considerations the Council would regard as relevant for his appointment as coordinating minister.

The implementation of the minorities policy could impose a heavier burden on local authorities. Where they are inadequately equipped, the government will need to provide them with the necessary staff and finance. Proper coordination of the various branches of administration is also necessary at lower levels of government. In this respect special attention need to be paid to the municipalities where substantial numbers of minority group members live. Consideration could be given to the establishment of a 'minorities' position within the local council administrative structure, while it would be desirable for a particular alderman to exercise special responsibility for the coordination of minority affairs. Mutual administrative coordination between local authorities and the central government is of equal importance. As Penninx's study indicates, too much is at present left to lower levels of government, in the absence of a national

minorities policy, to find solutions to problems that may occur in similar form elsewhere.

As far as possible the policies to be adopted should be worked out in consultation with the groups concerned. This means that the dialogue should not be exclusively channelled through welfare organisations. Because of their often marginal social position and the cultural problems, it is vital that members of the minority groups themselves be able to exercise influence on the formulation and implementation of policies affecting their position. The government should accordingly react promptly to any efforts by minority groups to organise themselves into fully-fledged discussion partners, and should be prepared to lend active support to such efforts. Reference might also be made in this connexion to the potential benefits that could be derived from a democratisation of government-subsidized welfare organisations, which formed the subject of a recent report by the Van der Burg Commission. In more general terms, the Council has argued in its report 'On Social Inequality' for the democratisation of association and foundations with functions in the public sector.

The Council is aware that such developments could lead to tension. The government will need to act flexibly; the declining dependence of minorities will mean that the welfare institutions concerned will assume less importance, while among the minority groups themselves there may be painful processes of organisation and sub-division.

In the light of the above, the Council wishes to record its support for the government's recently revealed intention of setting up a national advisory body for Moluccan affairs consisting entirely of Moluccans. The establishment of this new body need not necessarily lead to the abolition of already existing consultative arrangements considered to function satisfactorily by those concerned.

Great difficulties will need to be overcome before similar arrangements can be made for other minority groups seeking means of direct participation and consultation.

Initiatives from within these groups will need to be promoted vigorously while ensuring that there is a certain degree of representativeness of attitudes and interests. In addition, members of minority groups must be encouraged to participate on a large scale in Dutch organisations and to voice their particular interests in them; the one must not be allowed to exclude the other.

The particular characteristics of the ethnic minority problem make it particularly desirable that the minorities be provided with the most direct access possible to the organs of policy administration.

Political links between members of minority groups and the organs of policy administration often scarcely exist, and any extension of voting rights to certain groups of residents of other than Dutch nationality could only be expected to bear fruit after a long gestation period. The success of an active official policy will, however, greatly depend on the extent to which the minority groups regard such a policy as legitimate. Being a policy directed towards a process of mutual accommodation, it must rest on widespread social acceptance. This in turn presupposes that the minorities enjoy a secure position in relation to Dutch society. It is to be expected that as a result of the experience of being able to exert influence on their own situation, the minorities will be stimulated to make greater use of the Dutch language, to get to know their own rights, to know their way about relevant bodies and specialist organisations, and to make those in authority measure up to their responsibilities.

Although the impetus for the evolution of a general policy will have to come primarily from the central government, much will have to be done at local level as well. This is a reason for devoting special attention to the accessibility of policy formulation at local level. In the case of minority groups lacking strong internal cohesion, means of participation will need to be found which are directed more towards integration. At this stage it may

simply be noted that even now – i.e. without the right to vote having been extended to foreigners – the Municipalities Act provides scope for foreigners to participate actively in intra-municipal territorial decentralisation (neighbourhood councils, sub-municipal authorities and so on).

In the case of other minority groups with a greater sense of group identity, the process of participation will have to be got under way by involving the minorities' own organisations to a greater extent. An attempt to bring about greater involvement in municipal policy formulation could be made with the aid of 'functional commissions'. Efforts could also be made to establish links with existing or future centres, e.g. for foreign workers. These centres could not only act as a 'cultural' home but could also offer facilities specially directed towards the minorities in question, such as language courses, social and legal counseling, and so on.

## 5.2. *Discrimination*

A number of anti-discrimination provisions are contained both in international conventions to which the Netherlands is a party and in domestic legislation.

The Council considers the sole penalization of discriminatory conduct (see Article 137 c–e and 429 *ter* and *quater* of the Penal Code) to be inadequate. For the prevention of discrimination to be confined to the judicial sphere means that the social dimension of the problem is given inadequate expression. The legal system frequently acts only once the victims of discrimination have declared their grievances. It would seem realistic to assume that they are by no means always aware of the scope for judicial action or that they may even be totally unaware of the discrimination being exercised against them. Where they are aware of these matters, the effort involved in taking legal action – especially from the point of view of those who are confronted with discriminatory behaviour on a virtually daily basis – will often outweigh the mostly slender subjective benefits that can be obtained by means of such action.

Legislative provisions cannot aspire to change individual discriminatory attitudes. In principle, however, prejudice can be controlled by legislation in that it can be prevented from manifesting itself in the form of socially unacceptable behaviour. A basic precondition for the effectiveness of such legal provisions is, however, that they should enjoy widespread community support and that the government should play a stimulating role in this respect. Experience especially in the United States and Great Britain demonstrates that anti-discrimination legislation and the legal judgments based on it can be successful if they are supported by public opinion in general and, more specifically, by public and private organisations. On the ground of the socially unacceptable nature of discriminatory behaviour towards members of ethnic minority groups, the Council would call for purposive official policies designed to prevent and limit discrimination.

The measures advocated by the Council will above all need to include the setting up of a national body like those in Great Britain and the United States with the task of actively combatting discrimination. The Council's approach is consistent with the initiatives stemming from the Second Chamber of Parliament in this area. For such a body to operate as efficiently as possible it would seem desirable for it to be linked up with the machinery of government, but that where government action is concerned it should adopt an independent position.

A body of this kind would be able independently to initiate various activities. In the first place there is a need for publicity and information activities directed towards both the ethnic minority groups and Dutch society as a whole. Furthermore, it is desirable for there to be a single channel for complaints about discriminatory treatment. This needs to be followed up by advice to enterprises and institutions that are closely involved with minority groups, and by mediation and guidance in concrete cases of discrimination, leading if necessary to legal proceedings. In addition it would need to be investigated whether the national body in

question should in such cases be able to obtain an injunction or prohibition from an administrative tribunal or civil court, perhaps enforceable by means of a fine. There is also a need for research, not only to prevent discrimination in practice but also to obtain greater insight into the subject.

Finally, there is scope for organising more positive activities, such as the stimulation and guidance of developments that promote social participation by minorities, and advising government bodies and other organisations in these respects.

By creating an institutional facility of this kind a central address would be established where complaints about discrimination could be lodged and catalogued. With the aid of research, some of which it could conduct at its own initiative, a body of this kind could, through the promotion of public discussion, make an active contribution towards the prevention of discrimination, especially where discrimination occurs systematically in enterprises, institutions or government bodies. In both Great Britain and the United States the existence of independent bodies of this kind has made a contribution towards combatting discrimination.

### *5.3. Legal status*

The implementation of active official policies on the problems of ethnic minorities can be made much more difficult by the fact that members of these groups can have a strongly backward position in a legal sense as well. This is the case if they do not possess Dutch nationality. Most persons of Surinamese or Antillean descent are unaffected since they are generally Dutch nationals. For the Moluccans who do not possess Dutch nationality, provision has been made in the Facilities Act, under which their legal status is very similar to that of Dutch nationals. The arguments set out below are therefore primarily of relevance to foreign workers of Mediterranean origin. The legal position of these foreigners remains strongly influenced by the presumed temporary nature of their residence in the country. Although the improvement of their legal position will not in itself eliminate their social backwardness, it is a necessary precondition for elimination thereof. For this reason legislative measures need to be introduced that aim as far as possible to place foreigners on equal footing with Dutch nationals, in both a more general and a constitutional sense.

In the first instance it should be noted in this context that for relatively long periods of time the foreigners in question frequently have no assurance of their right to remain in the Netherlands permanently. The Council believes it to be desirable that foreigners should know after a relatively short period whether or not they will be permitted to take up permanent residence in the Netherlands. This period should at least be shorter than it is under the present arrangement according to which a permanent residence permit may be issued when the Netherlands has been the applicant's principal country of residence for five years. Once a positive decision had been reached it should in principle no longer be possible for a person to be expelled from the country, even if he lacked adequate means of support. In this context it is significant to note that the Netherlands has obtained a fairly strong legal status for immigrants of Dutch origin in a number of emigration agreements. Under these agreements the recipient countries have undertaken not to expel immigrants and to recognize the right to permanent residence after the elapse of periods of residence ranging from two to five years.

In the second place it should be observed that many provisions are contained in current legislation that are either explicitly or implicitly weighted against persons not possessing Dutch citizenship. The Council considers amendment of the present state of affairs to be essential to the extent that this differential treatment of foreigners – based often on the assumption that they will remain in the Netherlands only temporarily – is inconsistent with the objective of participation on equal terms.

Apart from the amendment of provisions with discriminatory effects in particular pieces of legislation, there are two other avenues for improving the legal status of immigrant.

The first such possibility concerns granting Dutch nationality. Extended residence in the Netherlands can result in a growing desire among certain foreigners to acquire Dutch nationality. This applies all the more strongly to children born or brought up in the Netherlands. From the point of view of society as a whole it is also desirable that as few people as possible who intend living in the Netherlands permanently should remain classified as foreigners.

The Council wonders whether nationality legislation and naturalisation procedures conform sufficiently in this respect to the policies which it considers are needed for dealing with the minorities problem. Thus only the grandchildren of immigrants qualify automatically for Dutch citizenship. In this context it is also important that the authorities take adequate steps to draw the attention of those immigrants eligible for Dutch nationality, as discussed above, to the possibilities of naturalisation.

On the other hand there would also be disadvantages in extending Dutch citizenship too quickly, e.g. the possibility of dual nationality.

With regard to the latter point, the Council would draw attention to the scope for achieving a substantial measure of equality with Dutch citizens under the law in general without Dutch nationality being granted.

In the case of laws or administrative regulations that draw a clear distinction between Dutch citizens and foreigners, or that impose conditions with which it may reasonably be said the two groups are not equally able to comply, the Council would urge the government to consider the introduction of measures analogous to the regulations introduced recently with regard to the position of the Moluccans in the Netherlands. In accordance with the above recommendation, the Council considers that in principle the application of a special-treatment law of this kind should be extended to those having taken up permanent residence in the Netherlands. It could not, however, be expected that the principle of treating foreigners as though they were Dutch citizens be extended to all legal provisions. Where exceptions were required under a special-treatment law, the Council would favour the introduction of a so-called 'negative list', so that any discriminatory treatment of non-national residents that was considered desirable would need to be specifically justified in the legislative process. Even in those cases where differential treatment would not be incompatible with the objective of participation on equal terms in Dutch society, it will need to be examined whether and how this can be expressed in such a way as to minimise any resultant inequality with Dutch nationals. The prevention of discrimination against foreigners resulting from unjustified inequality of treatment by government bodies in administrative practice, or resulting from unequal opportunities for foreigners to benefit from the rights extended to them, is something that must be tied in with the prevention of social discrimination in general.

The Council would support the possibility of full political participation for members of ethnic minority groups permanently resident in the Netherlands but without Dutch nationality. In the light of the problems outlined earlier it is the Council's view that persons forming such a substantive part of Dutch society should not continue to be denied such a fundamental right as the right to vote. Granting the right to vote to such persons is suggested not only by the necessity of policies that look ahead to a situation in which there is every likelihood of an increased level of expectations, thereby providing those concerned with the chance of lending force to their aspirations by legal means; but granting the right to vote can also be an indirect instrument for improving prospects. As voters, foreigners become of interest to the political parties, so that it may be expected their problems will enter more

into political discussion and will also receive more attention in practice from the authorities.

With reference to the proposal submitted for a constitutional amendment extending the right to vote to non-Dutch nationals, it should be observed that in the longer term the problems at issue would not be adequately served by limiting the right to vote to representative bodies at local level. As a first step towards the political participation of such groups, however, such a limitation in the rights actually extended might be desirable.

The question of extending suffrage to foreigners cannot be regarded in isolation from their general legal status in the Netherlands. It should be noted that with regard to political participation by members of ethnic minority groupings, current legislation on foreigners contains provisions for limiting the political activities of foreigners. In the light of the wider aspects of the minorities issue the Council would question the extent to which the continuation of this situation is desirable, even for those foreigners who have only a temporary residence permit.

#### *5.4. Labour market situation*

The under-privilege experienced by ethnic minorities manifests itself clearly in the labour market. Members of minority groups are often located on the lowest rungs of the social and economic ladder: they perform low-prestige and low-paid work, working conditions are poor and unemployment is high and persistent, especially among younger people. While this may be a generally accurate observation, one should also be aware of the differences that exist both between minority groups and within these groups themselves. An example of inter-group differences is the estimated higher rate of unemployment among Surinamese and Moluccans compared with foreign workers in general while an example of intra-group differences is the greater incidence of unskilled labour among Turks and Moroccans than, for example, among Yugoslavs.

The ethnic minority groups are not the only ones in a socio-economically weak position; the same applies to certain indigenous groups. In its report 'On Social Inequality', the Council drew attention inter alia to the strong influence that the performance of certain types of work has on one's position on the social ladder. In particular, the Council argued for a redistribution of job features (such as wages, p. 58 ff.). In this context eliminating the disadvantages suffered by ethnic minorities will involve removing the differences between the ethnic minorities on the one hand and the rest of the community on the other with regard to the distribution of such job features.

In its report 'Do we make work our business' the Council drew attention to the increasing degree of competition among employees and the more rigorous selection procedures applied by employers, especially at times of rising unemployment. The evidence indicates that it is particularly those groups which have fewer opportunities, including ethnic minorities, who tend to be penalized in such circumstances. An indication of this is provided by the relatively high unemployment levels referred to in the survey.

The Council would once again draw attention to the need for policies addressed to the problems at issue, meaning in this case policies directed towards the participation by ethnic minorities in the labour market on equal terms. This will have to involve making use of the key role played in labour market placements by the local employment offices. Such a policy will also sometimes need to differentiate between separate ethnic minorities because the position occupied by each of these groups in society can differ. It is, for example, not inconceivable that a policy aimed at bridging the socio-economic gap in the case of foreign workers could lead to greater social tensions and resistance among the Dutch community than a policy aimed at promoting the social mobility of other ethnic groups. For it is probable that, in the eyes of the majority, the presence of foreign workers

finds its very justification in the lower social position such workers have hitherto occupied in the labour market. The government will need to take account of the fact that the various positions minorities may occupy could call for policies differentiated according to type and intensity. Thus, in the above example, particular care might be needed to prevent the development of inaccurate images concerning a particular ethnic minority category.

The Council wishes to draw attention to the fact that a policy directed towards the elimination of backwardness and towards participation on equal terms by ethnic minorities can have significant implications for the labour market. Such a policy can in fact mean that many activities hitherto performed by members of ethnic minority groups will no longer be carried out. This is because the Dutch working population has withdrawn increasingly from functions of low social standing and has moved upwards to the better paid and more attractive jobs. This process has in turn created permanent room for the foreign labour-force that filled the resultant gap. The fact that these minorities currently perform tasks that the Dutch themselves would not accept must not lead to the prevention or delay of the emancipation process for minorities.

The Council does, however, consider that a policy aimed at integrating ethnic minorities should be coupled with a detailed approach to developments in the labour market and with a policy directed towards the removal of quantitative and qualitative discrepancies in the labour market. In the absence of such a link-up, the policies advocated by the Council could result in a reduction in the amount of labour available for low-prestige work, while the demand for labour to carry out these functions remains sustained. This will therefore mean that the scope for exerting influence on the indigenous population to occupy lowly-valued functions will need to be assessed on the basis of sectoral and regional structural research. Consideration could be given to making these functions more attractive by improving pay, thereby reflecting shortages in the labour market more accurately; such changes would however need to be considered most carefully in relation to the negative effects on employment that could result. At the same time thought needs to be given to structural improvement of the other features, both intrinsic and extrinsic, associated with particular jobs.

In drawing up a policy framework, attention will have to be paid not only to the relationship between participation in the labour market on equal terms by ethnic minorities and employment policy generally, but also to the relationship between employment policy and immigration and between immigration and integration.

The relationship between employment policy and immigration is something of a vicious circle. The employment of ethnic minorities has helped maintain the existing wage and production structure, and this has had a stigmatising effect. The existing production structure and the associated demand for labour have in turn had a suction effect on the recruitment and immigration of ethnic minorities. It is therefore important that, apart from persuading the indigenous population to perform lowly-valued functions, efforts should be made to restructure industry and services in such a way that the need to attract more ethnic minorities, especially foreign workers, is reduced. Only then can the vicious circle be broken.

In addition, the elimination of under-privilege and immigration are not independent variables, but can be marked by mutual tension. In the first place a successful policy aimed at eliminating under-privilege can exert a pull on new immigrants and thus make the implementation of a restrictive immigration policy more difficult. On the other hand, the lack of a restrictive policy at a time of high immigration levels can obstruct the actual assimilation of ethnic minorities. The implementation of a restrictive policy, for example by means of a system limiting the granting of permits as laid down in the Foreign Workers Act, can affect assimilation adversely, in this specific case because the mobility of foreign workers becomes limited.

Participation in the labour market on equal terms must of course leave unchanged the way in which members of ethnic minority groups give expression to their position in the economic and social system. Cultural differences can not only influence eating habits, the use of leisure time, housing preferences and the like, but can also affect the type of work one wishes to perform (e.g. self-employed or salaried; whether in a large or a small business; in industry, services or horticulture).

#### *5.5. Some other areas of governmental responsibility*

Apart from the labour market, the under-privileged situation of minorities manifests itself in certain other areas within the ambit of government policy. Examples include education, housing and health.

Despite the realisation that education, for both children and adults, and both formal and informal, is an important precondition for improving the social and economic position of ethnic minorities over the longer term, immigrants lag behind in the degree to which they participate in the education system, and in educational attainment. For the children of Surinamese, Antilleans and foreign workers these factors are, among other things, influenced by the fact that education in the country of origin generally takes a different form.

Nor does it help to overcome these gaps that Dutch education often fails to link up with these children's experiences in the mother-country and in their home environment.

Accommodation is poor, especially for Dutch persons of Surinamese and Antillean origin and for foreign workers. They frequently live in big cities where there is still a distinct shortage of housing, while their problems are accentuated by specific factors such as discrimination and uncertainty about their duration of residence. Part of the seriousness of the accommodation problem lies in the importance of adequate housing for family reunification and thus complete participation in Dutch society.

The health situation suffers from the often poor accommodation and the type of work frequently carried out by members of minority groups. The increase in drug problems among young people may be regarded as a particular symptom of these more general social and economic problems. It is not possible to examine in this report the possible policy measures that could be applied in each of these sectors. But, by way of illustration, consideration could be given to a policy specifically designed to stimulate education, under which attention would also be paid to improving teacher training, and to policies aimed at improving the position of minorities on the housing market (e.g. allocation procedures, subsidies), under which some of the newer dwellings could for example be made available to foreign workers. Although the Council does not wish to examine in detail the sorts of policies required, it would urge that an active policy be pursued in respect of these remaining areas of governmental responsibility as well. In this regard it must be borne in mind that the effectiveness of policies depends not only on the proper formulation of objectives but also on the provision of resources geared to these objectives. There are at present instances where official measures fail to reach minorities or where measures are insufficiently flexible for minorities to be able to make use of them. More attention needs to be paid to the identification and analysis of factors that impede the participation of minorities on equal terms.

Integration is often complicated by problems of communication stemming from cultural and language differences. The Council would therefore ask that special attention be given to language instruction, for adults as well as children. The Council considers that enough is known for more shape to be given to policy in the area of language instruction. This means that adequate facilities should exist to enable a knowledge of Dutch to be acquired as quickly as possible. This would help prevent a significant number of problems from arising, particularly in the case of Mediterranean workers and their families. The provision of opportunities to foreign workers for language study in their free time is too voluntary in nature. Foreign

workers often perform heavy labour; shift-work is common, etc. Extra efforts are needed to help these groups learn Dutch well. Serious consideration needs to be given to granting foreign workers paid leave in order to acquire an adequate knowledge of Dutch.

Thought needs also to be devoted to the provision of orientation courses to familiarise recently-arrived immigrants with basic characteristics of the host society. Similar arrangements are equally required for the wives of foreign workers, in order to overcome their isolation. Such isolation is increased by the reduced frequency of family contacts resulting from the move to the Netherlands and by the social segregation in which the women of various minorities tend to find themselves. The establishment of educational facilities for female immigrants is also of relevance for their ability to reinforce the education their children receive.

Traditional family and authority patterns and shyness of strange surroundings can act as impediments to women making use of these facilities. The facilities need to be geared to overcoming these handicaps.

## 6. FUTURE MIGRATION POLICY

### 6.1. *Immigration*

Until now, policy on the admission of foreigners had been strongly influenced by the consideration that the Netherlands cannot and must not become a country of immigration. Experience indicates however that for a diversity of reasons exceptions have been made to this rule. For a long time – at least formally – it was assumed that the immigrants would remain only temporarily in the Netherlands, and that at any event the Netherlands would not become an immigration country in the long term. Mr. Penninx's study has demonstrated that in most cases there is no question of a short period of residence. The vast majority of the ethnic minorities now present in the Netherlands are likely to remain permanently. Furthermore, it may be noted that in the case of minority groups studied by Mr. Penninx there was usually no question of a conscious decision having been made to admit these groups to the Netherlands for a long period or permanently. This applies particularly to foreign workers of Mediterranean origin: admission originally intended to be temporary has in practice usually meant acceptance of (semi) permanent residence of those concerned, and often of their families as well.

The actual course of events indicates that the scope of migration policy must be broadened: it cannot be a policy directed towards the temporary admission of, for example, citizens from Dutch territories or foreign workers, but must be a migration policy that takes full account of the policy implications in the long run. Policy formulation on the admission of new groups – an important political issue – will need to try and take account of the full import and consequences of such immigration. In carrying out existing national and international commitments, and especially upon entering into new commitments, the factors for and against will need to be weighed carefully.

The Council considers that the restrictive migration policy should be tightened further. The main justification for this lies in the need for the policies on ethnic minorities as outlined in the previous chapter to succeed. The encouragement of participation on equal terms by the ethnic minorities in Dutch society will demand great and costly efforts. Large new waves of immigrants would cause these to assume incalculable proportions. An important element of the policies advocated – namely improvement of minorities' position in the labour market (see Section 5.4) – could not be carried out if there were an influx of new labour reserves. A relatively large proletariat would then gradually develop, consisting to a large extent of members of minority groups; it would also include the second generation which, despite having in the meantime acquired a 'Dutch level of aspirations', would not be able to improve its position. Such a situation would be undesirable. Active policies aimed at equal participation by ethnic minorities therefore presuppose a restrictive immigration policy. A second justification for a restrictive immigration policy lies in the desire to limit the growth of the national population.

The National Commission on Population Matters has fully spelled out the justification for the desirability of such a policy in its report 'Bevolking en Welzijn in Nederland' ('Population and Welfare in the Netherlands', The Hague 1977; see especially pp. 160–166). In the National Commission's view, priority should be given to ending natural population growth as quickly as possible. For the near future, alternative B of the Central Bureau of Statistics' projections is 'virtually optimal'; according to this alternative the Netherlands will have some 14.3 million inhabitants in the year 2000. In this

time-scale the influx of migrants would need to be of negligible influence in both the short and medium term. The National Commission therefore called for a restrictive immigration policy. The government has since then announced a policy of this nature in its statement of policy upon taking office.

A third justification lies in the judgement that in the long term the implications of 'guest work' will in all probability be negative rather than positive for the countries of origin themselves. This was also cited in the government's statement of policy as a reason for a restrictive immigration policy.

In a number of respects the scope for a restrictive immigration policy is limited in practice. On the basis of the approach which has been selected and which seeks to bring about participation in Dutch society on equal terms, immigration for family reunification purposes must be accepted. Such immigration occurs at present particularly from Surinam and the Mediterranean countries where foreign workers are recruited. The scope for influencing immigration from the Antilles is limited. It might be considered however, whether anticipatory policies might not be implemented that increased the attractiveness of remaining in the Netherlands Antilles.

The category where there is the greatest chance of influencing migration levels through policy measures is that of foreign workers who come to the Netherlands for economic reasons.

The numbers now recruited are very small, but conditions in the labour market can change quite rapidly, bringing recruitment on a fairly large scale back into prospect.

In the Council's opinion, however, policy should not be modified in response to such a situation. The importance of tightening the restrictive immigration policy has been discussed above. In addition, experience indicates that in practice it is difficult to admit migrants for only a short stay. All things considered, the importance of a restrictive immigration policy will need to take priority over meeting the demand for certain types of labour in the short term. This calls for a restructuring of the Dutch labour market in such a way that demand for labour should correspond more closely to the indigenous labour supply in qualitative terms as well. In this context reference was made in Section 4 of Chapter 5 to increasing the attractiveness of low-prestige jobs, raising pay for unattractive types of work, and restructuring industry and services in such a manner that the need to recruit further foreign labour is reduced.

The Council is aware that it is opting for a policy the realization of which is particularly difficult and will take considerable time. But in the approach adopted here, which is based on eliminating the backwardness of ethnic minorities, there is no room for policies under which foreign workers are recruited to perform jobs that the Dutch are no longer prepared to undertake.

Finally, it is also important to increase the attractiveness of remaining in or returning to the country of origin. The Netherlands will therefore, also have to make its contribution towards improving the international division of labour.

## **6.2. *Return migration***

In this report the Council has proceeded from the assumption that account will be taken of the possibility that ethnic minorities will remain in the Netherlands over the longer term. In this way the ambivalence can be eliminated of policies directed on the one hand to integration into Dutch society and on the other to departure after temporary residence. Acceptance of the permanent nature of residence in the Netherlands as the foundation for policy does not of course mean that the possibility of return migration to

the country of origin should be ruled out. As discussed in Section 1 of Chapter 4, this must, on the contrary, be evaluated positively.

There is even justification for the encouragement of such migration. This must not, however, develop into an excuse for inadequate efforts to accept into Dutch society those who are remaining or wish to remain permanently in the Netherlands. A comparison should be drawn with the policy on emigration of Dutch nationals. The question of whether or not to return should be primarily a decision for the persons concerned. The government's role is then to provide facilities to assist those who have made their decision.

### *6.3. Potential future developments in migration*

It is important to bear in mind possible future developments in migration. The Council has previously drawn attention to these in its report 'Buitenlandse invloeden op Nederland: Internationale migratie' ('Foreign influences on the Netherlands: International migration'). We must be prepared for future migration from the Antilles. In addition, the enlargement of the European Communities by Greece, Spain and Portugal, and association with Turkey, is a factor of significance in the long term. Although transitional arrangements will be made with regard to the free movement of labour, free movement from these countries will become possible in the second half of the eighties. It is difficult to assess at this stage whether the factors responsible for the present movement of labour to this country will still apply then; presumably they will be strongest in the case of Turkey. The next category consists of Dutch passport-holders who might wish to make use of their right to settle in the Netherlands should certain political problems arise. One of the largest groups of Dutch passport-holders are the 40,000 Dutch nationals in South Africa. The number of South Africans who speak Afrikaans is much larger again, totalling 2.1 million; many are of Dutch descent. It is not to be ruled out that in the event of political difficulties many of those in this category would turn to the Netherlands. The Council considers it important that the government should continually keep abreast of potential new migration movements, to prevent its being caught unprepared.

### *6.4. Policy towards foreigners*

In the above the Council has underlined the importance of participation on equal terms by ethnic minorities in Dutch society. In this regard it considered it necessary for immigration to be restricted.

As far as policy towards foreigners is concerned this means that the Council considers a tightening of the restrictive admission policy to be necessary with respect to those foreigners who have no ties with the Netherlands and persons living here, or have not yet developed them, and whose admission – unless expressly of a temporary nature – is not based on humanitarian considerations or international obligations. Nor may such policies involve any reduction in the admission of political refugees.

As a basic principle for future policy towards foreigners, the nature and length of residence in the Netherlands should be clearly established at the moment of admission. The possibility of persistent large-scale 'backdoor immigration' must be prevented, so that situations do not arise in which it is difficult for the authorities to remove the foreigners in question from Dutch society.

It will be necessary to examine how the relevant legislative regulations and administrative practice based on them can be made more consistent with the principle referred to above. If greater clarity were to be provided

concerning the tightening of the admission regulations for foreigners, and if these regulations were to be applied properly, this would mean, in the Council's view, not only that the policy objectives underlying the admission of foreigners would find clearer expression, but that the foreigners' legal position would become more secure.

## 7. Conclusions

In this report the Council has drawn attention to the need for a modified and more active policy towards ethnic minorities.

The review has been confined to a few main themes. Many of the points raised in this report and in Mr. Penninx's survey will need to be worked out in greater detail. In general, this will need to be done, and can be done, by the government authorities and institutions directly concerned.

In the interests of a clear and definite policy, the Council considers it desirable that the government should first indicate where it stands with regard to the principal ideas underlying this report; doing so would enable the problems to be tackled more purposively. At the least, the Council considers that the government should make clear its views on the following main points in this report:

1. The material submitted indicates the belief that ethnic minorities stay only temporarily in the Netherlands to be incorrect. Policy will in future need to be based on the possibility of permanent residence in the Netherlands. This means that the fact must be accepted that ethnic and racial diversity in the Netherlands has increased permanently. Society as a whole (i.e. including the 'majority') will have to come to terms with this changed situation (Chapter 2).

2. In the absence of intensified policies, the problems already being experienced may be expected to become more acute. As the result of developments both among the minorities and within the indigenous Dutch society, there are powerful forces at work tending to perpetuate the social backwardness and cultural isolation of the ethnic minorities. For this reason there is a distinct possibility of a society in which the ethnic minorities will be among the weakest groups for a long period (Chapter 3).

3. The policy approach advocated centres on participation by ethnic minorities in Dutch society on equal terms. This means that the minorities present in the Netherlands should have the possibility of access to, communication with and acceptance in Dutch society. There would be no place for discrimination in such a society and the ethnic minorities would have the same opportunities, rights and obligations as the indigenous population, without there being any question of basic cultural values being unjustifiably rejected or neglected (Chapter 4).

4. The weak position occupied by ethnic minorities in Dutch society cannot be viewed in isolation from those factors that promote inequality in Dutch society itself. In the first instance, therefore, the encouragement of participation on equal terms by minorities requires those factors tending to promote inequality in Dutch society to be dealt with. This is also necessary in order to prevent the improvement of opportunities for ethnic minorities about a reduction in opportunities for indigenous minorities. At the same time it is important that opportunities be offered to ethnic groupings in a direct sense to help overcome backwardness (Chapter 4).

5. The question of separate identity needs to be considered in the light of a plural society, in which the majority and minorities are receptive towards one another's views and take account of the essential cultural values of each other's cultures, while at the same time acknowledging that active participation in society by minorities will require a change in attitudes on both sides. For the further development of an open society of this kind it is also of importance that minority groups be given the opportunity to exert influence on policy of direct relevance to them, as well as on the evolution of society generally (Chapter 4).

6. An active minorities policy will need to be directed towards the encouragement of dialogue and democratic participation, as well as eliminating discriminatory treatment and improving the legal status of

minorities. This will, among other things, require institutional facilities and new legislation. In addition policy measures must be concentrated on the labour market, housing, education (in the broadest sense), and health care (Chapter 5).

7. It will also no longer be possible to frame migration policy on the assumption that immigrants intend staying in the Netherlands only temporarily. Account will have to be taken of the possible permanence of their residence; for this reason it will be necessary to take full account of the long term policy implications when migrants are admitted. Active policies designed to promote the participation of minorities on equal terms will necessitate a tightening of the restrictive immigration policy; immigration for purposes of family reunification will, however, have to be accepted.

It will be necessary to remain fully abreast of potential new migratory movements.

As a basic principle for future policy towards foreigners, the nature and length of residence in the Netherlands should be clearly established at the moment of admission (Chapter 6).

# **Towards an overall ethnic minorities policy?**

**Outline of the social position in the Netherlands of Moluccans, Surinamese and Antillean Dutch nationals and Mediterranean workers, and a survey of official Dutch policy.**

**Preliminary study by Rinus Penninx.**

## CONTENTS

	Biz.		Biz.
<b>Chapter 1. Introduction and terms of reference</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>3.2.1. The legal status of persons of Antillean and Surinamese origin in the Netherlands</b>	<b>69</b>
1.1. Introduction	5	3.2.2. Employment	70
1.2. Terms of reference of the survey	6	3.2.3. Housing	74
1.3. Limitations	6	3.2.4. Education	77
1.4. Sources	7	3.2.5. Social and cultural work	78
1.5. Layout of the report	7	3.3. Administrative organization of policy	80
1.6. Acknowledgements	8	3.4. Conclusions with reference to current policy	82
<b>Chapter 2. The Moluccans: their social position in the Netherlands and official policy</b>	<b>9</b>	Bibliography	86
2.0. Background statistical data	9	<b>Chapter 4. Foreign workers of Mediterranean origin and their families</b>	<b>92</b>
2.1. Outline of the problems, main issues and official policy	10	4.0. Background statistical data	92
2.1.1. Previous history and arrival of the Moluccans in the Netherlands	11	4.1. Migration from Mediterranean countries: main issues and official policy	97
2.1.2. The Moluccans as a group and policy up to 1970	14	4.1.1. Labour migration in the Netherlands: background and development	97
2.1.3. The second generation and developments after 1970	20	4.1.2. Conditions in the countries of origin	100
2.1.4. The Moluccans as a group and post-1970 policy	25	4.1.3. Temporary or permanent immigration	104
2.2. A more detailed examination of several aspects of the Moluccans' social position in the Netherlands and current official policy	29	4.1.4. The position of Mediterranean workers in the Netherlands and official Dutch policy	107
2.2.1. Status and Legal position	29	4.1.4.1. Individual immigrants and the degree and nature of their adjustment	107
2.2.2. Employment	31	4.1.4.2. The immigrant group and the institutions established by it	112
2.2.3. Housing	33	4.1.4.3. Individuals in the host society and their preparedness to accept newcomers	115
2.2.4. Education	34	4.1.4.4. The host society and the institutions set up by it to deal with the immigrants	116
2.2.5. Social/cultural policy	36	4.2. A more detailed examination of various aspects of the social position of foreign workers in the Netherlands and official policy	124
2.3. Administrative structure	38	4.2.1. Foreign workers' legal status in the Netherlands	124
2.4. Conclusions with reference to current policy	40	4.2.2. Employment	129
Bibliography	43	4.2.3. Housing	133
<b>Chapter 3. Residents of Surinamese and Antillean origin in the Netherlands: their social position and government policy</b>	<b>47</b>	4.2.4. Education	136
3.0. Background statistical data	47	4.2.5. Health	140
3.1. Development of migration from Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles: main issues and official policy	49	4.2.6. (Group-specific) welfare work for foreign workers	142
3.1.1. Background to and development of Surinamese and Antillean migration to the Netherlands	49	4.3. Administrative policy structure	148
3.1.1.1. Migration from Surinam to the Netherlands	49	4.4. Conclusions with reference to current policy	149
3.1.1.2. Migration from the Netherlands Antilles to the Netherlands	52	Bibliography	152
3.1.2. Residents of Surinamese and Antillean origin in the Netherlands and official policy	54	<b>Chapter 5. Conclusions and recommendations</b>	<b>160</b>
3.2. A more detailed examination of several aspects of the social position of Surinamese and Antillean Dutch and official policy	69	— Characteristics of post-war policy towards ethnic minorities	160
		— Relevant factors for a new minorities policy	164
		Bibliography	170

### 1.1. Introduction

In the Netherlands the period following the Second World War has seen waves of both emigration and immigration on a considerable scale. The emigration waves occurred principally in the two decades after 1945. Immigration, and its wave-like character, were determined by political relationships and circumstances during the decolonisation process (persons repatriating from the Netherlands East Indies, Moluccans, Dutch nationals of Surinamese or Antillean origin) or by developments in the Dutch labour market (in the case of foreign workers). The result of these developments has been that on the one hand there are some 600,000 Dutch nationals temporarily resident or permanently settled abroad, while on the other hand large groups of immigrants of non-Dutch origin are resident or have settled in the Netherlands.

This study is particularly concerned with this second category of persons of foreign origin in the Netherlands. Total immigration since 1945 exceeds total emigration. Repatriates from the former Netherlands East Indies numbered some 300,000 alone on arrival in the Netherlands. Recent estimates put the number of immigrants of Surinamese and Antillean origin living in the Netherlands at 155,000–160,000. Members of the former Royal Netherlands Indies Army (KNIL) of Moluccan origin who came to the Netherlands form, together with their descendents, a group of about 32,000 people. Immigration from the colonies (including former colonies) alone totals approximately half a million.

In addition, the number of foreigners living in the Netherlands grew rapidly in the post-war years, especially after 1960. On 1 January 1977 over 362,000 foreigners were legally resident in the Netherlands, of whom about half (180,000) were from the so-called 'recruitment' countries. Since then this category of Mediterranean workers and their families has grown to approximately 200,000. A second important category consists of workers from EEC countries, who make up nearly 115,000 of the 362,000.

These figures give us useful information, but the implications for Dutch society and the individual citizen are even more significant. In recent decades the indigenous Dutchman has been confronted with a series of fellow human-beings of differing culture or race, or both. Fellow citizens of the Kingdom of the Netherlands of very different racial and cultural origin and foreign workers from various Mediterranean countries have begun to appear at the workplace or in the area where he lives. He may have come across refugees from many countries, or have had to get used to the phenomenon of adopted Vietnamese or Korean children in his neighbourhood. He may have taken advantage of the presence of foreigners by eating cheaply and well at restaurants serving dishes prepared by Chinese, Italian, Moroccan or Surinamese chefs. The occasional Dutchman may even have had his shoes polished in Amsterdam by an unemployed guest-worker who had taken up the old trade he had plied in Istanbul or Ankara. Without doubt Dutch society has become more 'colourful' and diversified in recent decades as a result of the immigration of countless small and large groups of foreign nationals. There are strong indications that this is not a temporary phenomenon.

The number of fellow-citizens of differing cultural or racial background, or both, in the Netherlands is likely to grow rather than fall in the coming years. The majority of foreigners currently residing in the Netherlands or having settled down there will continue to form part of Dutch society in the future. And this raises the fundamental question of the form that Dutch society should take in the future, the place that foreigners will, or will have to,

occupy in it, and of the way in which the government can or should guide the development of a multi-cultural and multi-racial society.

## **1.2. Terms of reference of the survey**

The immigration and temporary or permanent residence of each of the above-mentioned categories has taken a different course. A multiplicity of factors may be cited to explain the fact that, as a result, the present-day social position and associated problems differ for each of the categories. A number of categories, including Moluccans, Dutch nationals of Surinamese and Antillean origin and Mediterranean workers, have been designated as minorities and are, to a certain extent, regarded as problem groups for whom the government is required to implement special policies. Other categories, such as repatriates, were the subject of governmental attention and policy for only relatively brief periods, and subsequently ceased to exist as problem groups. Other categories again, such as immigrants from EEC member-states, were never the subject of concern or policy, at least not as minorities or on the basis of their social position.

This study was commissioned to examine the question of minorities from the angle of government policy. The object of the study was 'to make an inventory of government policy to date with respect to a number of ethnic minorities in the Netherlands on various levels and in various areas of policy'.

The inventory has been compiled proceeding on the basis that government policy to date can only be properly analysed if set against the background of the social position of the groups forming the object of government policy. For this reason, the description of government policy in each of the chapters is preceded by an outline of the social position of the category in question, based on research and literature.

This account of government policy has, furthermore, been written from a particular viewpoint, the frame of reference being the long-term views of the Scientific Council for Government Policy (W.R.R.) with respect to social questions. In this context the future of minority groups in the Netherlands and future policy form central questions.

This approach leads to a number of central questions concerning Dutch society in the future: is it not inevitably, rather than as a deliberate act of choice, turning into a society in which a large segment consists of groups of foreign cultural and/or ethnic origin; what consequences will this have for Dutch society and its members? What form should such a multi-racial or multi-cultural society take? What role should the government play in this context, and what means does it have at its disposal to exert influence on the developments now under way?

This study cannot provide clear, unequivocal answers to all these questions. The survey does aim to indicate particular problem areas in government policy, with reference both to the content of policy and to the organisational arrangements for its implementation. It should provide a foundation for further study and must accordingly be regarded as a preliminary study.

## **1.3. Limitations**

The object of this study was a practical one, namely to compile an inventory of government policy. The brief period of seven months in which the material had to be collected and the report written up imposed a number of limitations. The most important of these are as follows.

In the first place I have been able to devote very little attention in this survey to the body of theory which is growing up concerning the formation of minorities, or to more general theoretical insights into the process whereby new immigrant groups are assimilated into a new society. Such theoretical work has only been included in the survey if based upon

empirical data collected in the Netherlands. This limitation stemmed directly from the terms of reference of the work to be undertaken, which was primarily directed towards assembling material on the administration and policies of the Dutch authorities.

Accordingly, in collecting and arranging the material I have not bound myself to any preconceived theoretical model with its own precise definitions of such concepts as minority, minority group formation, integration or separate identity, to name but a few contentious issues. The guiding principle has been that of official policy: which immigration groupings are classed as minorities under official policy? What does the government understand by integration and cultural identity as expressed in terms of policy? And so on.

Furthermore, within the minority groups that merit particular official attention and intervention, I have been forced to confine myself to the three largest groups: the Moluccans, the Surinamese and Antillean Dutch nationals; and Mediterranean workers and their families. Reference could only be made to other groups in a few cases as relevant.

#### **1.4. Sources**

This survey is principally based on written sources, for the description of both the social position of minority groups and policy to date. I have tried to work through all the relevant literature and to do it justice, but there can be no question of my having been exhaustive.

The exclusive reliance on existing literature also contains inherent dangers: the underlying assumption that the literature accurately reflects those aspects of importance for a description of a minority's social position and the implementation of government policy, and that an adequate picture of reality can be arrived at in this way, need not always hold. I found this to be a particular problem in writing the chapter about the Moluccans and, to a lesser extent, that on Surinamese and Antillean migrants; my knowledge of both groups is derived only from the literature and not from my own field-work or from any long and systematic experience.

In the light of these considerations I submitted the initial draft of chapters 2, 3 and 4 for comment to a number of people who did have such long experience, either from having conducted research among the group in question or from their official position. The written comments and discussions (sometimes long and intensive) that followed frequently gave me a significantly different slant on the existing literature and provided me with new and supplementary information. I am very grateful to my critics for the trouble they have taken to study my voluminous texts in detail and to submit comments on them.

Their names are given at the end of this chapter.

#### **1.5. Layout of the report**

The report takes the line of proceeding from the specific to the general. A separate outline is given in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 of the social position of each of the three minority groups and of the official policies conducted towards each of these groups. The basic layout of each of these chapters is the same. In the first section, an outline is provided of the historical background and sequence of migration, together with an account of the social position of the category in question; the broad outlines of official policy to date are then examined in this context. Official policy is examined in detail in the second section, split up into specific policy areas. Section three deals with the institutional framework for the implementation of policies. Finally, in section four, conclusions are drawn on the basis of broadly similar questions.

In Chapter 5, an attempt has been made to link up the accounts of the separate categories with one another, and to draw conclusions and provide recommendations for further research. The recommendations are of a general nature and indicate in particular those areas that would be suitable for follow-up research by the Scientific Council for Government Policy.

## 1.6. Acknowledgements

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## CHAPTER 2. THE MOLUCCANS: THEIR SOCIAL POSITION IN THE NETHERLANDS AND OFFICIAL POLICY

### 2.0. Background statistical data

There are no reliable current data on the Moluccan community in the Netherlands. During the initial period of their stay in the Netherlands the Ambonese Welfare Office (Commissariaat Ambonezenzorg, CAZ) had at its disposal a fairly constant flow of data. Since the abolition of the CAZ in 1970 both research workers and the government authorities have relied on estimates. These estimates are usually based on the last CAZ data for the nineteen-sixties. Sometimes these outdated figures are used without adjustment, while sometimes estimates of the current situation are arrived at by extrapolation. The figures given below must therefore be treated with great caution. In particular, a number of experts consider that the data on the dispersed living patterns and nationality no longer correspond to reality; residential patterns are thought to have become markedly more dispersed, while the acquisition of Dutch citizenship is similarly thought to have increased in recent years, partly for the extra protection it affords on visits to the Moluccan Islands.

Numbers		Source
1951	approx. 12,500 of which 3,578 ex-KNIL (army) members	(Ambonezen in Ned. 1959, pp. 14–15)
1959	approx. 18,600	(Ambonezen in Ned. 1959, p. 13)
1968	25,456	(v. Amersfoort 1971, p. 37)
1978	approx. 32,000	(De Problematiek 1978, p. 25)

Housing		Source	
1959	— Camps — Elsewhere	18,593 unknown	(Ambonezen in Nederland 1959, pp. 15–17)
1969	— Camps — Residential areas — Elsewhere — Unknown	4,723 (18.6%) 14,665 (55.6%) 5,769 (22.6%) 299 ( 1.2%)	(v. Amersfoort 1971, p. 41)
1968	Total	24,456	
1978	— Residential areas — Camps — Scattered	75% 3% 22%	(De Problematiek 1978, p. 25)

Nationality		Source	
1978	— Stateless — Dutch — Indonesian	60% 30% 10%	(De Problematiek 1978, p. 25)

Religious affinity		Source	
		v. Amersfoort 1971, pp. 10–21	De Problematiek 1978, p. 25
Moluccan Evangelical Church		75%	68%
'Other Protestant denominations'		20%	25%
Catholic		5%	5%
Islamic		2%	2%

- 
- 1978      — 60–70% are in one way or another committed to the RMS (South Moluccan Republic) cause;  
                  of which: — the majority adhere to the Manusama party  
                               — 15–20% adhere to the Tamaela party  
                  — 10% Republic of Indonesia.
- 

Source: De Problematiek 1978, p. 25

## 2.1. Outline of the problems, main issues and official policy

Problems connected with the Moluccans living in the Netherlands have accumulated to a greater degree during the last 27 years than in the case of any other foreign community in the Netherlands. In the last few years, these tensions appear to have found expression in the form of actions by small groups of young Moluccans of increasing frequency and severity. The extensive publicity accompanying these spectacular actions, the fierce reactions and the fear of a spiralling process of deteriorating relationships between the indigenous population and foreigners in general and the Moluccans in particular, resulted in the Moluccans' problems emerging from their relative obscurity and forced the government to review its policies critically and to make the nature of its policies clear to the public.

The statement in the relationship between the Dutch authorities and (a large part of) the Moluccan community in the Netherlands goes back a very long way; it may be dated to the time when the authorities realized that their residence in the Netherlands 'would be longer than originally thought' (Decree establishing the Verwey-Jonker Committee, 24.9.1957). From that moment onwards a fundamental conflict of interests became clear: a large proportion of the Moluccan community did not and still does not see its future lying in the Netherlands but in a politically independent or at least internally autonomous Republic of the South Moluccas (RMS) and attempts to obtain support for or recognition of that goal from the Dutch authorities.

On the other hand, this ideal has not been and is not recognized by the Dutch government. As long as the Moluccan community remains in the Netherlands, the Dutch government requires that they 'respect the fundamental values and norms of the society at large and remain prepared to maintain an open dialogue with the society in which they reside'. In doing so the government recognizes that the Moluccans have the right 'to preserve a separate identity, as this finds expression in separate customs and habits, adherence to a separate faith and the use of their own language'. (For several recent Moluccan viewpoints see: Beekman-Eggink in TMW, 1972 (the Manusama party), Pax Christi 1977 (Mantouw), Maluku Selatan 1977; for the considerations underlying official Dutch policy see De Problematiek, 1978; reactions to this government memorandum are contained in the Moluccan counter-memorandum of 1978 and the memorandum submitted by the Badan Persatuan in 1978.)

In the course of time it has become considerably more difficult to keep this fundamental conflict of attitudes within manageable bounds and to maintain a dialogue, while finding room within the respective viewpoints for common ground and possible joint action. A great many factors have played a role in this respect: the government's policy judgements have often been quickly rendered out of date; this in turn contributed further to the political and social sense of frustration of the Moluccan community; group ties – which already constituted a significant cultural element – were strengthened by the common past and the shared problems faced in the Netherlands; and the growing mistrust of the government and its policies provided fruitful soil for a steadily growing group solidarity in political terms, at least as far as outward behaviour and attitudes were concerned. A growing socio-psychological problem has stood in the presentation and implementation of whatever government policies were adopted: in the eyes of those for whom these policies (which are principally directed towards

improving participation in Dutch society) were intended, each action by the authorities is viewed with suspicion for its 'assimilation objectives' and is therefore criticized for being in conflict with their aspirations (see for example Tomasowa 1972). They regard the government's passivity with respect to their political objectives as yet another example of the series of disloyal acts committed by the Netherlands towards a people which has served the Netherlands faithfully over the centuries and towards whom the Netherlands continues to have a substantial debt of honour, on moral if not legal grounds.

A relationship of this kind, characterised by suspicion and mistrust, between the Dutch authorities and the Moluccan community has existed virtually from the moment the Moluccans first came to the Netherlands. The Verwey-Jonker Committee's report of 1959 drew attention to the problem and attempted, by listening to all parties and cautiously recording their viewpoints, to formulate an acceptable alternative to the untenable conditions it encountered (especially in the housing sphere). The committee's work proved to be extremely difficult and it recorded to its regret that it had been able to speak only with the leaders of various community groups. Twelve years later Van Amersfoort (1971) appears to assess the situation even more gloomily. He notes that the sensitivities and frustrations of the Moluccans are great, and as regards policy can do no more than to recommend: 'It may be best to make a start simply by tackling the daily problems that both sides regard as problematical, and to see how it goes.'

In view of these problems of historical origin confronting policy towards the Moluccans in the Netherlands it would seem appropriate at this stage to examine the history of the Moluccans in the Netherlands and the history of policy towards them in greater detail.

#### *2.1.1. Previous history and arrival of the Moluccans in the Netherlands*

Written history about the Moluccans in general and the historical relationship between the Dutch and the Moluccans in particular has until now been in comparatively short supply and inadequately documented. Some of it contains a more or less clear message for the present day; in particular the 'Door de Eeuwen Trouw' (Faithful through the Centuries) Foundation and historians affiliated to it (see among others De Graaf 1977) leave little doubt about the moral obligations towards the Moluccan people that they believe the Dutch authorities to have inherited historically. Others by contrast strike a different note (e.g. Van Kaam, 1977), accusing such historiography of promoting myths.

The following subjects are of particular relevance in the history of the decolonisation of the Netherlands East Indies: the attitude of the Dutch authorities towards the right of self-determination of the peoples of Indonesia and the activities of the authorities towards the realisation of that right; the proclamation of the Republik Maluku Selatan (South Moluccan Republic, RMS) and the Netherlands reaction to this; and finally the demobilisation of the KNIL (Royal Netherlands Indies Army) and the arrival of the Moluccans in the Netherlands. In examining each of these subjects briefly, the standpoints of the Dutch authorities and the representatives of the Moluccan community in the Netherlands will be considered successively.

The subject of the right to self-determination has been exhaustively examined by the Commissie van Overleg Molukkers-Nederlanders (the Köbben-Mantouw Dutch-Moluccan Consultative Committee), which was set up in 1976 to contribute towards the improvement of relations between the Dutch and the Moluccans.

The first subject chosen for examination was the efforts of the Dutch government to grant self-determination to the various people in the Netherlands East Indies in the course of the negotiations concerning the transfer of sovereignty. The negotiations over the right to self-determination at the Round Table Conference (RTC) in The Hague in 1949 were taken as the

starting point. The mixed Committee reached the conclusion 'that the Dutch government, out of conviction, tried persistently and consistently to do all it could to realize the right of self-determination for the various regions'. At the same time the battle had in fact already been lost at the RTC, so that the Dutch government had to content itself with the arrangement contained in article 2 of the Transitional Agreement.\* The Committee interpreted this subtly: 'These conclusions can promote respect and possible understanding on both sides. On the one hand, the Moluccans will have to recognize that the Dutch Government did its utmost to secure the right to self-determination at the time, on the other hand, the Committee considers that the Dutch Government and the Dutch people need to realize and to recognize that, right up to the present day, part of the explanation for the South Moluccans' struggle for self-determination lies in the Dutch government's own efforts to champion the right of self-determination for the regions of Indonesia' (Round Table Conference 1978, 3).

While the Consultative Committee was able to reach a joint position concerning the attitude of the Dutch government towards the right to self-determination at the RTC in 1949, the Committee fell apart when it was engaged in studying developments after the RTC and the proclamation of the RMS. It is to be hoped that the material collected will nevertheless be made available.

There remains a fundamental difference of opinion over the application of the principle of self-determination in relation to the proclamation of the RMS. Briefly summarised the following developments took place after the transfer of sovereignty in 1949: in contrast to the agreement reached at the RTC, a strong movement arose within the federal United States of Indonesia after the transfer of sovereignty for a unitary Indonesian state to be set up. The member state of East Indonesia, of which the Moluccas formed part, joined in although it was one of the last states to do so. Before the member state of East Indonesia had commenced negotiations on accession to the unitary state, and before the latter was proclaimed on 17 August 1950, the daerah (district) administration of the South Moluccas proclaimed the South Moluccan Republic on 25 April 1950. The RUSI regarded the RMS as a separatist movement. The UNCI refrained from intervening despite requests on the part of the Dutch government, while the latter could not and did not wish to recognize or support the RMS since that would have been in conflict with the RTC agreements, particularly article 2; the South Moluccas were not a member state in their own right but formed part of the state of East Indonesia, so that only internal self-determination was applicable in their case. The latter could only be brought about with the support of the RUSI and the UNCI, which they refused to give.

The recent government memorandum shows that the attitude of the Dutch government has remained unchanged: it can recognize neither the legitimacy of the proclamation of the RMS nor the right to self-determination of the South Moluccas. 'As far as the Dutch government is concerned the objective of an RMS can be no more than a political conviction, for which due respect should be shown, and that concerns only the Moluccans as individuals...' (De Problematiek 1978, p. 34). This position was attacked by both the Cabinet of the South Moluccan government-in-exile and the Badan Persatuan (BP) in their counter-memoranda. The RMS leaders maintain that the legitimacy of the proclamation of the RMS is not something to be judged by politicians, and

\* Article 2, paragraph 2 of the RTC Transitional Agreement laid down that member states which did not accept the final constitution would be enabled to negotiate a special relationship with the Republic of the United States of Indonesia (RUSI) and the Kingdom of the Netherlands (right of external self-determination). In addition, the possibility was provided for under para. 1 of the same article that, subject to the recommendation of the UN supervisory commission (United Nations Commission for Indonesia – UNCI) or another UN organ and to the RUSI's carrying out the necessary steps in concurrence with that recommendation, the regions of Indonesia should be able to acquire the status of member states (internal self-determination) through a referendum. Since the South Moluccas formed a part of the member state of East Indonesia, only the right of internal self-determination applied. No cooperation was forthcoming from the RUSI and the UNCI for the realization of these objectives.

base their case on a statement delivered by the Netherlands Society for International Law of 24 June 1950 in which the proclamation was held to be legitimate. In addition the BP memorandum refers to the judgments delivered by the Court of Appeal in Amsterdam on 8 February 1951 and by the District Court on 2 November 1950, which both confirmed the legitimacy of the proclamation (see the annexes to the BP's memorandum of 1978).

Both the RMS government and the BP claim further that the Dutch government's refusal to recognize the Moluccan's right to self-determination is based on unwillingness and expediency. Thus in its reply to the government memorandum the BP expresses its 'serious doubts as to whether it (i.e. the Dutch government) has indeed done all it could in the circumstances' (BP memorandum 1978, p. 13). The Dutch attitude is all the more incomprehensible, according to the BP, when it is considered that the Netherlands, for whatever reasons, set such store by a federal state system and the right to self-determination in the period leading up to the transfer of sovereignty.

There is more agreement concerning the arrival of the Moluccan KNIL soldiers and their families in the Netherlands, although not on all points. Annex I of the government memorandum gives the official version of the turbulent history between November 1949 and April 1951, the date on which the Moluccans came to the Netherlands. The essence of the problem lies in the fact that the demobilization of the KNIL army, or at least of the last remains of it, which were concentrated in Java before discharge, did not take place as the Dutch government had planned and as had been agreed with the United States of Indonesia. The gradual return of ex-KNIL soldiers born in the South Moluccas to their place of birth for demobilization became problematical after the South Moluccans attempted to detach themselves from the state of East Indonesia and proclaimed the RMS in April 1950 in response to the rapid transformation that was taking place of the federal state into a unitary state. Indonesia did not consent to the discharge of KNIL soldiers to areas in the South Moluccas or in New Guinea that it had not yet occupied in the course of bringing the 'rebellious' South Moluccan Republic back under control. A number of the ex-KNIL soldiers originating from the South Moluccas did not, however, wish to be demobilised anywhere except in unoccupied territories in the South Moluccas or New Guinea. Demobilisation in areas occupied by Indonesia had become impossible after judgments by the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court delivered in proceedings instituted by leaders of these ex-KNIL soldiers in January and March 1951. According to the Dutch government, there remained no alternative under these circumstances but to bring to the Netherlands these remaining ex-KNIL soldiers, who had already (in July 1950) temporarily acquired the status of members of the Royal Netherlands Army when the officially agreed date for demobilisation had passed.

For the Dutch government the transfer to the Netherlands was indeed a last ditch solution: the Minister of Justice, Van Maarseveen, described it as 'the worst possible solution'. The government considered demobilization in Indonesian territory to have been perfectly feasible and still adheres to this view: 'Although the Dutch Government had argued during these legal proceedings that ex-KNIL soldiers about to be demobilised and their families were in no real danger – a belief later confirmed by the lack of any reprisals against former KNIL members of Ambonese origin who remained voluntarily in Java or elsewhere in Indonesia – it resigned itself to the legal judgments, even though, in the government's view, these judgments showed evidence of a faulty appreciation of the facts' (De Problematiek 1978).

Van Amersfoort (1971, pp. 8–14) has looked into the psychological aspects of the situation and events.

He notes that after the proclamation of the RMS and the military actions in the South Moluccas there was increasing tension between the ex-KNIL soldiers of Moluccan origin stationed on Java and the Javanese community.

He draws particular attention to the difficult choices and reorientation with which these ex-KNIL members were faced after the transfer of power to the RUSI and the proclamation of the RMS: 'In the midst of the uncertainties and violence of the revolutionary period the past acquired an extra sense of dependability and security. Furthermore the proclamation of the RMS on Ambon provided the opportunity of identifying with a political ideal. The maintenance of Dutch authority had not only collapsed as an ideal but had become little short of suspect in a decolonising world. To identify with Indonesian nationalism, which had until recently been fought as rebellion and terrorism, was too great a tour de force, at least for these 4,000 men. The RMS now offered a new ideal based on the right of ethnic self-determination, while in addition being hostile towards Indonesian nationalism. In this way something did then survive of former orientations. It was along these lines that a realignment of attitudes took place.'

One thing seems clear in all these events: neither the Dutch government nor the Ambonese, left over after the transfer of power, wished or sought the transfer of the Moluccans to the Netherlands. But no agreement could be reached on alternative solutions and since time was short it was eventually decided to ship them to the Netherlands. F. A. Apponno leaves no doubt about the matter: 'No Cabinet minister in The Hague can maintain that we came to the Netherlands *voluntarily*. Our wishes were not taken into account. We had asked for Ceram (which was not yet occupied) or, if that was not possible, New Guinea. The idea of the Netherlands never entered our heads!' (Maluku Selatan 1977, pp. 21–25; Siahaya 1972, pp. 171–178). The migration which nobody wanted took place in April 1951 and provided an unsure foundation for what later proved to be 'lengthy residence' in the Netherlands.

#### 2.1.2. *The Moluccans as a group and policy up to 1970*

According to Van Amersfoort's analysis (1974, pp. 17–82), the functioning of a group of newcomers in a society and the nature of such a group's integration in that society is determined by the interplay of four sets of factors:

1. the immigrant group and the institutions established by it;
2. individual immigrants and the degree and nature of their adjustment;
3. the host society and the institutions set up by it to deal with the immigrants; in particular, government policy;
4. individuals in the host society and their preparedness to accept newcomers.

These factors, and the way in which they interact, are discussed below by way of background for a proper understanding of developments.

##### 1. *The immigrant group and the institutions established by it*

It should be noted in the first place that in many respects the group of ex-KNIL soldiers and their families formed a comparatively homogeneous group. As will be apparent from the preceding section, this was a group that had already been living in isolation in camps in Java for some time in anticipation of demobilization; they had collectively refused for a long time to demobilize on Dutch conditions and they had come to the Netherlands as a group and against their own wishes. Moreover they were all professional soldiers, generally from the lower ranks. 'Both factors increased social cohesion' (Van Amersfoort 1974, p. 132). In addition the majority of the group were closely related culturally and belonged to the communal Ambonese Adat circle (for a description of the most important cultural features of the Moluccans and changes in them during the period in the Netherlands see Cooley 1962; Wittermans 1955; Van Amersfoort 1971, pp. 23–30).

The fact that the majority of the group was or became adherents of the RMS, which was neither recognized nor supported by the Dutch government, further strengthened the group's outward solidarity. Ellemers

(1978) cites as further factors contributing to the Moluccan community's resistance towards integration the lack of knowledge of and affiliation with the Dutch language and culture. These characteristics already existed when the group arrived in the Netherlands; the situation in which the group found itself in the Netherlands and the policy pursued by the authorities confirmed these tendencies. Group identification and the isolation of the group were undoubtedly promoted by the residential pattern of generally very isolated camps, in which military authority relationships persisted for years (Ambonezen in Nederland 1959, pp. 94–95), while the institutions developed for establishing contact with the outside world were closely grafted onto the situation that had obtained in the tangsis (barracks). The open residential area recommended by the Verwey Committee in 1959 subsequently proved to be more of a continuation of the camp situation than to be genuinely 'open'. In these circumstances, hierarchical relationships and effective social control – both important group-integrative elements in Moluccan culture – had more impact than would have been possible in different situations.

The fact that the Moluccan group displayed great solidarity in its outward dealings, especially in relation to the Dutch authorities, does not however mean that there are no internal divisions or rivalries. The Moluccan culture may be summed up as being based on loyalty principles that vary from situation to situation. The groups towards which the individual is required to display loyalty form as it were concentric circles: the family, the extended family, the village, the *pela*-tie between villages, the island group and the Moluccan group as a whole comprise in that order of importance the units with which the individual identifies himself in the case of competition or conflict. Conflicts within the smallest unit are temporarily set aside when conflict with an outsider demands outward solidarity (cf. Van Amersfoort 1971 and 1973). The dealings with the Dutch authorities, which many of the ex-KNIL members experienced as traumatic, converted the authorities into an adversary of the group as a whole.

Apart from the common characteristics and shared experience of the group there are, however, also clear differences within the group: the contrast in political and religious respects between the Moluccans from the central islands and those from the south-east islands has always been and still remains an important factor. Religious differences also play a significant role: the divisions between Catholics, Protestants and Muslims have precipitated countless conflicts within the camps and residential areas. Even within the largest group, the Protestants, a continuing process of fragmentation and mergers may be observed. A comparable process of fission and fusion is to be seen at the level of political organisation and promotion of political interests, generally following the course of upsurge and decline in the nationalist movement.

## *2. Individual immigrants and the degree and nature of their adjustment*

There is no doubt that the individual migrant's process of adjustment, certainly in circumstances described above, is strongly influenced by the characteristics of the migrant group as a whole (Van Amersfoort 1974, p. 122 ff.). During the first phase of residence in the Netherlands there was scarcely any personal interaction with Dutch society. Such contacts as there were that went beyond the isolated unit of the camps were generally channelled through the camp supervisors, camp counsellors, camp elders or informal leaders. The poor knowledge of Dutch formed, and still forms, a barrier towards individual contacts with Dutch people, while at the same time reinforcing the institutional system of mediation; it appears that it is not until the second generation that this language barrier is largely overcome (see below).

The majority of the Moluccans regarded their stay in the Netherlands as temporary. With this in mind there was little reason for them to make an effort to learn the Dutch language or to seek to develop extensive contacts with Dutch people. Both the report on the Ambonese in the Netherlands (1959, pp. 94–100) and Van Amersfoort (1974, p. 122 ff.) consider the

individual adjustment of the elder generation to have been 'slight' or 'low', although such a judgment can only be made cautiously and with qualification. Both report that the language barrier inhibits strong cognitive adjustment, and that this difficulty is accentuated by the relative lack of contact with the Dutch community. In this respect Van Amersfoort cites the generally low level of education among the older Moluccans as an important factor. Both reports arrive at very cautious judgments concerning the normative adjustment of the older Moluccans; but here too one may believe the adjustment to have been slight.

*3. The host society and the institutions set up by it to deal with the immigrants, with special reference to government policy*

As noted above, the transfer to the Netherlands of the ex-KNIL members and their families was a 'solution' resorted to by the authorities in the absence of alternatives for dealing with the demobilization of the last remnants of the KNIL. It was, however, no more than a temporary solution, and the group's residence in the Netherlands was intended to be temporary. The temporary nature of their stay was probably endorsed by Dutch society as a whole as well: interestingly, Van Amersfoort records that when the Dutch government decided to demobilize the last remnants of the KNIL in the Netherlands, the trade unions sought assurances 'that these ex-soldiers would not appear as competitors in the labour market' (1974, p. 129). And the assurance was given. It is to be hoped that in the near future historical research and the publication of hitherto inaccessible documents will provide an answer to the question of how the government had envisaged that repatriation to the Moluccas or another destination (New Guinea?) would take place. (This is a question with which Van Amersfoort has been concerned – 1974, p. 108).

But to return to the policy actually pursued at the time: the ex-KNIL members were shipped to the Netherlands to be demobilized there. It is important to try and reconstruct this episode, since the discharge from military service proved later to be one of the major sources of Moluccan frustration. As mentioned in passing above, the ex-KNIL soldiers were initially given 'temporary' status as soldiers in the Royal Netherlands Army. Van Amersfoort reports that this measure, which was enforced by the prevailing circumstances, was seen by a number of ex-KNIL soldiers as a promotion (1971, pp. 10–11). Van Amersfoort concludes on the basis of his research in 1969 that 'in itself the transfer to the Netherlands was not unattractive for many of the soldiers. They may not have had particularly firm ideas as to what their stay in the Netherlands would entail, but at least they saw the prospect as a bright one' (1971, p. 11). For this reason their immediate discharge from military service on arrival in the Netherlands was a heavy blow for them.

The brief reference to this subject in the recent government memorandum leaves the question open as to how far all the soldiers could have been aware of their impending discharge: 'On arrival in the Netherlands in March, April and May 1951 they were immediately demilitarized. The first groups to leave with their families had not been informed that they were to become civilians, although from the wording of the order of 2 February they might have seen this as a serious possibility. Pre-departure briefing remained inadequate later on as well, but the majority nevertheless proceeded to the Netherlands, although they were aware of the demilitarization from their colleagues' (De Problematiek 1978, p. 11).

The recent government memorandum observes that the discharge immediately upon arrival was a policy error not on legal grounds but for social and psychological reasons; but after 27 years it was not something that could be reversed (De Problematiek 1978, p. 21): 'The discharge from military service made a great impression on the Moluccan soldiers, since they had not anticipated it immediately, although they had reason to have known better. They felt they had been roughly brushed aside by the Dutch authorities. Being reduced to a state of complete dependence and deprived

of the status from which they had derived their self-respect in their surroundings, their resentment and frustration became directed towards the Dutch administration. It may be taken as extremely probable that their discharge greatly enhanced their identification with the RMS. This would appear to be corroborated by subsequent events.'

The ex-KNIL members have consistently contested their military discharge. They did this in the form of legal suits and proceedings against the State of the Netherlands and, when this did not help, by means of passive opposition to the authorities: some of the ex-soldiers refused to cooperate in the self-support arrangement introduced later; some have refused to the present day to pay rent on the accommodation provided for them. In the first decade of the Moluccans' stay in the Netherlands this resistance was particularly channelled through the Committee for the Legal Rights of Ambonese Military and Naval Ranks (CRAMS), which had at that time a great many members.

'The expectation that the Netherlands would be only an intermediate station for the Moluccans on their way to a final destination' (De Problematiek 1978, p. 12) was clearly expressed in official policy during the first phase from 1951 to 1957 (for accounts of that policy see De Problematiek 1978, pp. 12–20; Van Praag 1971, pp. 21–46; Kapsenberg 1973, pp. 11–12; Metekohy 1977, pp. 47–51).

The Moluccans were housed in some 50 camps, mainly former camps of the Dienst Uitvoering Werken (Public Works Service), that had been provisionally equipped for habitation; later the number of encampments reached 70.

Initially the state provided all basic living requirements: accommodation, food, clothing and pocket money. At first, efforts were made to prevent the Moluccans taking employment (De Problematiek 1978, p. 12).

Complete maintenance by the Dutch state did not, however, last for long: Van Amersfoort (1971, p. 16) reports that as from 1951 the Moluccans were formally placed under the same regulations as repatriates and that, if they obtained employment, they were required to pay 60% of their earnings as a contribution towards the maintenance provided by the authorities. This regulation was not, however, applied in the case of the Moluccans until 1953, because the authorities did not encourage the Moluccans to seek employment. In 1953 the authorities reached the conclusion that 'there was no further objection to the temporary absorption of the Moluccans into the labour force, provided that it was unlikely seriously to disrupt the Dutch labour market' (De Problematiek 1978, p. 12), and in 1954 the authorities began to apply the 60% requirement in the case of the Moluccans; shortly afterwards, in 1956, 'complete self-support was introduced; this meant that where necessary the government provided benefits based on family size as a supplement to earnings' (Van Amersfoort 1971, p. 16).

Both measures were fiercely resisted on the Moluccan side. In the case of the introduction of the partial selfsupport arrangement one of the factors behind the resistance was the reduction in income, but when complete self-support was brought in, the ex-KNIL members felt that a number of principles and psychological issues were at stake: 'In the eyes of the ex-KNIL members, acceptance of this regulation would have meant that they were accepting their military discharge. Another factor of psychological importance will have been that acceptance meant giving up the fiction of short-term residence' (Van Amersfoort 1971, p. 16). The Verwey-Jonker Committee reported that by 1959 the number of people who refused to work or to look for work as a matter of principle 'had gradually dwindled to about one hundred persons' (Ambonezen in Nederland 1959, p. 48).

Although most writers regard the establishment of the Verwey-Jonker Committee in 1957 as the first significant turning-point in official policy, the introduction of the self-support regulation could at least be regarded as fore-shadowing new policies. While it is true that officially it was still maintained that 'policy should remain directed towards return to the country of origin' (1954 budget, quoted in De Problematiek 1978, p. 13), the introduction of the self-support regulation meant that access to the Dutch

labour market had not only been officially opened up but that it had even been imposed on the Moluccans. In this sense the setting up of the Committee in 1957 must be seen as an initial if officially unstated acceptance of the fact 'that there was no longer any question of the majority of the Moluccans returning to their country of origin in the near future' (De Problematiek 1978, pp. 13–14).

The unstated finds expression in the Committee's terms of reference, in which the possibility of return was not taken into consideration and the Commission was only asked to 'advise on the manner in which the social problems that would arise if the Ambonese were to remain in the Netherlands could be handled' (Ambonezen in Nederland 1959, p. 7).

During the period 1954–1959 policy was unmistakably ambivalent. On the one hand policies remained officially directed towards return, while on the other hand contacts were built up and compulsory measures implemented which, at least in the labour market, promoted integration. This is acknowledged in the recent government memorandum (De Problematiek 1978, p. 15). The Moluccans' criticism of this ambiguity and their suspicion with regard to the motives of the Dutch authorities in this period are therefore understandable. It needs also to be borne in mind that at the time when the Dutch government was announcing and implementing these policy reversals, the nationalist movement reached one of its high points among the Moluccans. Developments within Indonesia led to a flourishing of hopes that the unitary state would collapse, thereby reopening the possibility of returning. All this strengthened resistance towards Dutch policy. The Verwey-Jonker Committee's report (1959) was based on the assumption that the Moluccans would remain in the Netherlands for some time to come, and when the Minister for Social Welfare accepted the report in its entirety this amounted to the first open confirmation of this basic underlying principle. The Committee's advice has exercised a decisive influence on policy adopted up to the present time towards the Moluccans in the Netherlands: it might be characterised as 'integration with the preservation of a separate identity' even before that maxim became current. Summarising its major recommendations the Committee came up with a formula along the following lines:

1. 'It would not be wise to interfere too greatly with the separate communal life of the Ambonese. Their own aspirations for the future should also be respected as far as possible.' The stress placed on separate identity is amplified in the following points:

- the group's sense of independent responsibility in religious and social matters should be strengthened; the group should itself handle a number of social tasks 'in a manner customary in the Netherlands'.
- the stimulation of greater economic and social differentiation within the group context in the residential areas.

2. The recommendations pay considerably more attention to integration in a number of institutional spheres, although frequently retaining elements of a separate identity:

- as an intermediate form between the camps and scattered residential patterns the Commission recommends – by way of experiment – open residential areas;
- the principle of self-support should be extended; stability in the employment sphere should be promoted;
- public payments and subsidies to churches and organisations representing Ambonese interests should be gradually eliminated; 'young Ambonese should be encouraged instead of prevented from joining the existing churches in the Netherlands; in the interest of a more current form of Christianity gaining acceptance in the Ambonese churches in the Netherlands, better theological training of ministers will be needed' (Ambonezen in Nederland 1959, pp. 107–111).

The implementation of the Committee's policy recommendations in subsequent years was by no means a straightforward matter. The implementation of the new policy remained in the hands of the Ambonese

Welfare office (CAZ), which had carried out official policy with a considerable degree of autonomy since the Moluccans first arrived in the Netherlands. To some extent the sluggishness of policy formation and implementation may also be attributed to the resistance of the Moluccan community towards the policies decided upon and to the bad relationship between the CAZ and the Moluccans (Van Amersfoort 1971, pp. 14–18). On the other hand it is equally evident that the Dutch authorities acted with anything but resolution: it was not until 1964 that a benefit replacing pensions for ex-KNIL members, as recommended by the Committee, came into effect. The transition from camps to residential areas proceeded slowly and Van Amersfoort notes that official support in this respect must be regarded as inadequate. In 1968 nearly 5,000 Moluccans were still living in camps.

1 January 1970, the date on which the CAZ was abolished, may conveniently be taken as the date marking the end of the first period. The date is however arbitrary: if one were to take the changing nature of the problems connected with the Moluccans as one's point of reference, then the mid-sixties could be taken as a fresh startingpoint, when the second generation of Moluccans came to the fore, or alternatively 1966, which saw the first instances of radical action by this generation (the setting on fire of the Indonesian Embassy in The Hague).

If the policies adopted are taken as the starting point, then 1967 could be taken as the turning point, when part of the CAZ's policy responsibilities were transferred to the Ambonese Division (later Moluccan Welfare Division) of the Ministry of Cultural Affairs, Recreation and Social Work. Whatever date is taken, it is important to realize that a second turning point in official policy became evident in the second half of the sixties. Van Praag terms this the transition from strongly interventionist policy to weakly interventionist policy.

During these later phases, responsibilities were shared with or transferred to local authorities and subsidised private bodies at local level (Van Praag 1971, pp. 21–46).

#### *4. Individuals in the host society and their preparedness to accept newcomers*

It will be apparent from the above that individual Dutch persons and their preparedness to accept the newcomers played a comparatively minor role in the earliest phase of the Moluccans' stay in the Netherlands. Van Kraam (pp. 153–156) recalls that at least part of the Dutch press 'welcomed' the Moluccans on their arrival in the Netherlands, but notes at the same time that this welcome may have been prompted by the still fresh frustrations bound up with decolonisation and by feelings of hostility towards the Republic of Indonesia; but over time, and as the political situation in the former Dutch colony changed, sympathy for the Moluccans and their political objectives faded. And as noted earlier, the trade unions, at least, were geared up to resisting the group's arrival.

But because the Moluccans lived in isolated camps after arrival and displayed little need for outside contacts, few problems arose in the early days. The Moluccans were fortunately absorbed into the labour force at a time of flourishing economic growth, and in consequence they did not come to be regarded as competitors. In 1959 it was still possible for the Verwey-Jonker Committee to record that 'the Committee found little evidence of conflicts with or discrimination against the Ambonese' (Ambonezen in Nederland 1959, p. 104). But at the same time the Committee warned against excessive optimism in this regard, basing its warning on the fact that it was apparent from several small surveys that the images the Dutch and the Ambonese had formed of one another 'were still in the initial stages'. It appeared that the image formed by the Dutch of the Ambonese was to a large extent based on prejudice and stereotypes, while the Ambonese were unaware of this negative evaluation. And precisely because of these indications the Commission warned that the new form of housing in

open residential areas was by no means free from dangers, and that those dangers would be all the greater if the Ambonese as a group were to be stigmatised as a low social status group as a result of unequal opportunities in society.

The Moluccan leaders did, however, encounter a good deal of support in the Netherlands for their political objectives. In particular they received direct support from Calvinist circles, of which the most concrete expression is the 'Door de Eeuwen Trouw' Foundation.

But the 'debt of honour theory' also found wider support. This support did not, however, ever reach such a scale as to deflect the Dutch government from the position it had adopted earlier with regard to recognition of the Moluccans' right of self-determination and recognition of the RMS.

### 2.1.3. *The second generation and developments after 1970*

Köbben (1976, p. 9) observes that «next to no» research has been conducted on Moluccans, meaning especially fieldwork in the camps and residential areas. His synopsis on field research projects lists only four items, including the work of the Verwey-Jonker Committee; the others were Wittermans in 1962, Mariën in 1968 and Van Amersfoort in 1969. Two of these were financially supported by the Dutch authorities, namely Verwey-Jonker and Van Amersfoort.

The lack of field research and systematically assembled data (a need already clearly noted in 1959: Ambonezen in Nederland 1959, p. 110) appears to have exacted its toll in the nineteen-seventies in particular, when the new problems of the second generation Moluccans came to overshadow those of the older generation. Work was admittedly done by a number of students, who generally had contact of brief duration with members of the Moluccan community (see inter alia Graafsma 1971; Schoof 1973; Van Wijk 1974; Bos 1977) or by Moluccan students who attempt to provide insight into aspects of their own society (inter alia Rinsampessy 1975 and Hendrik 1975), but they scarcely lend themselves to generalisation. In addition, since the abolition of the CAZ in 1970 there have been no reliable statistics on even the most elementary aspects of the Moluccan community as a whole.

It is not particularly surprising that, given this paucity of data, the literature after 1970 should be very one-sided and often extremely speculative. It is one-sided in the sense that it is almost entirely confined to an examination of the striking problem of criminality, usually in the context of the problems of the second generation and political radicalism, and speculative because little new field data has become available and the increasingly out of date material has to be continually reinterpreted. The value of this literature for policy purposes would seem very slight.

Nevertheless an attempt is made below to summarise this literature on the basis of the most frequently recurring themes: the second generation, the revival of the nationalist movement, and criminality.

#### *The second generation: a sociological comparison between the young and old*

Van Amersfoort's general characterisation of the difference between the older and the second generation is as follows (1971, p. 64): 'The position of the younger generation – by which, as previously indicated, is meant persons under 25 years old – differs in many respects from that of the older generation. Their personal life history is different and they lack direct ties with life in the Moluccas. Accordingly there is a much stronger need for them to gear themselves best as possible to a future in the Dutch environment. To the extent that they are oriented towards Dutch society this is related to big-city consumption patterns and not to the Protestant Netherlands or the House of Orange, that still provide the older generation with a certain emotional frame of reference. In their case the positive function exercised by the camp scarcely exists any more. At any event, the

negative aspects of poor accommodation and isolated location are felt much more acutely. They have never personally experienced the strong need for reintegration and the tremendous and disruptive transition that were such characteristic features for the older generation'.

This fundamental difference in orientation leads to distinct and intense generational conflict within the Moluccan community. According to Van Amersfoort traditional attitudes towards leadership are no longer acceptable to the younger members. Fundamental cultural institutions such as the *pela ties* (an alliance between two or more villages, including among other things obligatory exogamy) are no longer experienced by the younger generation as something positive, but only as a duty or even burden. In short there exists a deep gulf between the old and the young generation and 'communication is decidedly lacking' (Van Amersfoort 1971A, p. 66).

But to what extent is this younger generation really oriented towards Dutch society? 'The younger generation, being better educated and speaking better Dutch, lacks many of the older generation's inhibitions. But this only really proves to be the case in individual situations once the ice has been broken – by the other party. For once again, they themselves do not feel quite up to taking the initiative. This may well be because contact with Dutch persons is already so limited as a result of the isolated situations in which they live. Moreover, there is nothing they can learn from the older generation on this score. The result is palpable uncertainty. Identification with the symbols of the older generation, especially if they are not directly related to the RMS, is almost without any real significance for young people. Instead they turn to more modern symbols – hip clothing, the Black Panthers, soul music – which, to use the in-word, have nothing to do with their own culture and identity but which nevertheless provide a certain sense of communication with the outside world'.

'The sandwich position in which the Ambonese youth find themselves results in their coming into frequent conflict with both their own group and with the Dutch. Even so, many manage to avoid outright conflict because these two worlds are relatively separated from one another. It is possible to linger in one world or the other in succession without coming into particular conflict with either. This double existence moreover provides young people with the opportunity of verbally rationalising virtually any form of behaviour. Violations of their own culture are defended as modern behaviour; violations of Dutch culture, irrespective of the form they take, are justified by reference to their own culture' (Van Amersfoort 1971, p. 69).

These rather extensive quotations are based on fieldwork conducted in 1968/69. They are in a strongly generalised form, and a more differentiated approach would be needed for the various groups within Moluccan youth. And ten years later the situation described appears to have changed in a number of respects: identification with the Black Panthers has been replaced with the Palestinians; the younger people are beginning to develop musical forms of their own, and so on. In political respects, the process of fragmentation has been particularly marked in the youth movement, which in turn confirms the continued decline in the importance and power of hierarchical structures within the Moluccan group. But there is also a striking increase in the number of young people who, for whatever reasons, have adopted a wait-and-see, passive or even uninterested attitude (see also: Rinsampessy 1978).

A very important factor in recent years has been the changed social context in which young Moluccans have to make their way. Many young Moluccans have completed their education in the last ten years and are experiencing increasing difficulty in obtaining employment. The extent of unemployment among young Moluccans is not precisely known, but experts consider it to be much higher than for young Dutch people as a whole. Even the first group of young Moluccans to have completed higher vocational training in the last five years has made little or no progress in finding positions. Partly because of their being members of a minority group, they found themselves at a disadvantage on the labour market at a time of greatly increased competition.

The young Moluccans have experienced a decline in their sense of security in society, which has undoubtedly contributed to the emergence of new problems: particularly in recent years there has been a sharp increase in the number of young Moluccans taking drugs. Another section of the young Moluccans has rallied to the political cause of the RMS, using new weapons and strategies.\* It is revealing that among this group of activists there should be a large number with secondary or a higher level of education.

In general terms, however, the central tenet of Van Amersfoort's somewhat dated observations holds good: the intermediate position of the young Moluccans as he described it would seem to be an unchanging factor that needs to be taken into account by anybody writing on the Moluccan problem at a later date. Whether one analyses Moluccan youth in terms of (social) psychology (Graafsma 1971) or enculturation and socialization-sociology (Schoof 1973, Van Wijk 1974), the picture that emerges is one of a new generation suffering from identity problems and of young people poised between two cultures who select elements from both worlds but have difficulty in integrating them. Investigators differ in their assessment as to how these cultural elements are interwoven. Schoof comes to the conclusion that young people have in particular 'internalized the rational elements of Western culture', but that the strong emotional ties with their community and their guilt feelings of not 'being a good Moluccan' lead them to 'support the RMS-ideal in an exaggerated manner'. Van Amersfoort, by contrast, concludes that Moluccan youth scores relatively well as regards 'aesthetic or normative adjustment', but that 'there can be no question of a cognitive reorientation' (Van Amersfoort 1974, pp. 122–126). Both assessments appear to me to be formulated too absolutely; it is not impossible that in both cases their conclusions were influenced by the (albeit implicit) expectations they brought to their work.

*The second generation: the nationalist movement among the old and young*

Wittermans and Gist (1962) provide an early account of the nationalist movement among Moluccans in the Netherlands. In their description of the nationalist movement of the older generation they cite the loss of status of ex-KNIL soldiers upon arrival in the Netherlands, their enforced idleness in the camps, and later the imposed self-support arrangement, as highly important factors contributing to the growth of the nationalist movement. In 1962, however, they noted that the movement was beginning to ebb and that there were clear signs of the movement disintegrating. This observation is however qualified: according to these writers the Moluccans saw themselves confronted with the task of acquiring a new status in an unfamiliar environment. This would entail competing with others and fighting for their place in Dutch society; 'possible recurrence of unrest and the emergence of new movements would seem to depend mainly on the degree to which institutional integration offers a satisfactory solution of their central problem.' And to a large extent the Moluccans' prospects depend on conditions on the labour market. If opportunities in that sector should prove inadequate, Wittermans and Gist predict in 1962, the reaction could well take the form of 'a revivalist movement along familiar nationalist lines'. In retrospect, the qualifications with which these writers hedged their conclusions about the disintegration of the nationalist movement would appear justified, but not, it would seem to me, for the reasons they forecast, for the great upsurge of the RMS nationalist movement is concentrated in the period 1963–1970, during which time the Moluccans more or less closed ranks in a political sense by the establishment of umbrella organisations such as the Badan Persatuan (the unity movement of the Moluccan people set up between 1963 and 1967), which linked the various youth

\* Tete Siahaya's book 'Mena Muria' gives a good account of a small group of political activists. It is a pity that the substance of this document has not yet been object of a content analysis.

organisations (1967). At any event, Wittermans and Gist already at this stage take a stand in the controversy concerning the origins of the revival of the nationalist movement and the rise of political radicalism: do these spring primarily from social or from political frustration?

In this respect Mariën (1971) follows the earlier writers in that he draws a comparison between the national movement of the old and young generations in an attempt to identify the causes of the revival. He contends that there are clear differences between both the objectives and the ideology of the nationalist movement among the old and young generations, and especially as to the means with which the objectives are pursued.

The older generation was concerned with three objectives: (1) recognition and restoration of their military rights; (2) recognition of the RMS; and (3) return to the Moluccas. According to Mariën the ideology of the older generation contained four important elements: (1) group ties based on the Moluccan race and Moluccan adat (law and custom); (2) the glorious history they had in common; (3) their religion, which also played an important role in the propagation of the RMS, and (4) their enmity towards Indonesia.

According to Mariën, the middle generation, who were involved in their parents' struggle while young and joined together in active youth organisations at that stage, was of decisive importance for the rise of the new nationalist movement.

The objectives and priorities differ: (1) recognition of the RMS; (2) genuine respect for the identity of the Moluccan community as a minority group. And the ideology contains different elements: (1) solidarity among the South Moluccans on the grounds of the injustice perpetrated against them; (2) the tribulation of the South Moluccan people, partly subjugated to Indonesia and partly in exile; (3) from this follows the mission of the younger generation to struggle for liberty and the reconstruction of their country (by analogy with the Jewish people); (4) the enemies are oppressive Indonesia and the Netherlands, which set out 'to destroy Moluccan identity'.

These objectives and ideology are marked by continuity but also quite clearly by new elements. Mariën notes considerable adjustments with regard to the means employed: while the older generation demonstrated in the form of a military exercise or drill, the actions of the younger generation are no different from those of other dissenting youth groups and the language used, apart from a few symbols and abbreviations, is Dutch.

Why, the writer asks after drawing this comparison, should there be such frequent and violent 'expressions of discontent' among the Moluccans, especially after 1966? To some extent these are actions of a more or less political complexion, but for the greater part they consist of 'far from mild encounters between Moluccan and Dutch young people, who had no connexion with any political ideal'; he recorded at least 34 such encounters between May 1967 and February 1970. Mariën then cites a number of factors which in his view contribute to the repeated outbursts of violence by young Moluccans:

1. sources of discontent within the Moluccan community: alienation between parents and children, and restrictions on freedom of marriage stemming among other things from the *pela* obligations, leading to very late marriage among men and women and to these unmarried children living in their parents' dwellings, which are small enough as they are;

2. discontent resulting from the failure to achieve social emancipation: according to Mariën there are many indications that young Moluccans generally relate positively to Dutch society and that discontent sets in where there are insufficient opportunities. In this regard two factors play an important part: language difficulties and the resultant problems in education; prejudice and discrimination on the part of Dutch society in general, and especially on the labour market;

3. finally, Mariën considers that it should be borne in mind that the age structure of the Moluccan community is highly unusual with a large generation of persons mostly born in the Netherlands who left educational establishments in 1966.

According to Mariën it is the middle generation that makes use of the discontent of the youngest generation in order to awaken their political ideals; but one is nevertheless forced to conclude 'that the youth movement is not primarily a nationalist struggle, but a movement for social emancipation of a relatively deprived group, which can achieve identity only by reference to a nationalist-oriented symbol, namely the RMS' (Mariën 1971, p. 74). Moreover, the group's history and the military environment from which they come gives these young people a certain predisposition to violence, which accounts for the violent nature of their actions. Based on the above Mariën reaches the conclusion that it may be expected 'that as integration proceeds, the radicalism of the youth movement will decline' (1971, p. 76). Thus Mariën, like Wittermans and Gist, would appear to ascribe the causes to the social frustration of the younger generation.

#### *Criminality: of social or political origin?*

In the preceding section we strayed into the murky waters of interpretation and explanation of such phenomena as radicalism and criminality. This subject has been extensively elaborated upon in the nineteen seventies; but until now the discussion has proved unproductive. On the one hand, the discussion has been strongly influenced by writers approaching the subject with preconceived attitudes, which in turn colour the policy recommendations based on their 'research'. On the other hand the combination of extremely summary data (there has been virtually no field-research) with an as yet poorly developed body of theory in this field, has led to extremely meagre results. A short review of the results will serve to demonstrate this:

1. The Crisis Situations Research Group of the Institute of Sociology in Amsterdam (1970) strongly emphasizes the political frustrations of the old and young Moluccan generations in its explanation of the high level of criminality among young Moluccans.

2. Wagenfeld (1971) similarly refers to the disillusionment within the group brought about by 'the dictates of reality and the aspirations of the RMS ideal coming into conflict' as the primary cause, but also emphasizes the young Moluccans' marginal position: they fit into neither Dutch nor Moluccan society; and they attempt to disguise the ensuing ambivalence and uncertainty by acting in a more decisive manner.

3. Buikhuizen and Timmermans (1971), who empirically established the high level of criminality among Moluccan youths in Groningen, attributed the criminality particularly to the RMS ideology; the latter promotes internal group cohesion and obstructs contact with and integration into Dutch society, which in turn leads to the mutual formation of stereotyped images, which is conducive to criminality. They accordingly conclude that the group's political aspirations must form the starting point for tackling the problem: the Moluccans should be presented with the choice either of returning to Indonesia or of remaining in the Netherlands, accepting citizenship and becoming integrated into Dutch society.

4. Schoof (1973) appears to fall in line with the explanatory model of Mariën described earlier, in that he sees the Moluccans' political ideals as a type of substitute or instrument: 'The zeal for legitimisation is the most important cause of activism and aggression' and 'the quest for the RMS ideal is for them primarily a means to provide them with a secure sense of their own identity'. The causes are thus not attributed to the lack of social opportunities (Mariën) but are seen as lying mainly in the psychological field.

5. Graafsma (1971) attempts to integrate a psychological and a sociological approach; she begins by noting that the type of upbringing tends to promote aggressive, masculine behaviour and that the threatened loss of historical links is a source of personal and social tension. Contact with the surrounding environment is made more difficult by these two factors, in combination with the Moluccan community's low status as a minority group. Because of the threatened loss of these historical links she

recommends that the Dutch authorities should take the Moluccans' political and historical outlook seriously and that they should 'work together closely with South Moluccan bodies in order to give expression to these historical ties as quickly as possible'.

6. Cachet (1977) believes he has found an explanation for criminality and political radicalism by pointing out that the actions of these young people may be perceived 'as examples of what Merton terms innovation'; the position and weapons of the older and young Moluccans differ completely: 'In practical terms this means that young people have retained their associations with the Moluccan community because they pursue the traditional ideals, while at the same time they are able to develop ties with groups in Dutch society because they present themselves as an emancipation or liberation movement at a time when sympathy and interest have begun to develop in the Netherlands for such movements.'

7. Van Praag (1975) approaches the problem from yet another angle. After rejecting as incomplete the explanations put forward up to that time, he observes that the greatest sources of misery have been the Dutch authorities and the camps they created for the Moluccans. This leads him to call for the dispersal of the Moluccans throughout Dutch society or for mixed Moluccan/Dutch residential areas.

Each of the writers introduces elements that have very probably played, and continue to play, a role. In my view no single explanation can suffice: political aspirations cannot be rationalised away with a theory of unequal opportunities. And on the other hand it is undeniably true that social frustrations provide a significant breeding-ground for political radicalism and criminality. It would therefore not appear fruitful to tackle the problem in terms of an explanation concentrating almost exclusively on social or alternatively political factors. Social and political factors are in constant interaction, and the main question must be how this interaction occurs. In policy terms, this means that policies need to be implemented concurrently in both areas.

#### *2.1.4. The Moluccans as a group and post-1970 policy*

The altered situation within the Moluccan community and its position in Dutch society since 1970 is described below in terms of the same framework put forward by Van Amersfoort that was used for describing the period 1951–1970.

##### *1. The immigrant group and the institutions established by it*

In a number of respects the present-day Moluccan community in the Netherlands is much less homogeneous than it was on arrival or during the first period of its stay in the country. A first significant difference is that between the Moluccans living dispersed throughout the country and that part of the Moluccan group living in a group context in camps and residential areas. Little is known of those dispersed throughout the community, but experts consider that this group must nowadays be considerably larger than the estimated 22% referred to in the recent government paper. Van Amersfoort mentions the same figure on the basis of CRM-data dating from 1968 (Van Amersfoort 1971, p. 41) since which time the dispersal process has undoubtedly continued. Van Praag (1975) has suggested that those who find accommodation outside the camps and residential areas form a distinctive group: according to the CRM figures from 1968 the number of young people among those living dispersed throughout the community is very high, while the number who had become naturalised as Dutch citizens stood at 44%, compared with only 8% of those living in camps and residential areas. There is also said to be a considerable number of mixed marriages among those living in a dispersed fashion.

On the basis of such data he expresses the view that the reorientation of the Moluccan group as a whole may have progressed further than would seem to be the case.

The fact is, however, that the Moluccan groups living in concentrated patterns determine the image of the group as a whole, and policy is almost exclusively directed towards them. But within these groups there is less homogeneity than there used to be as well: there is a much greater degree of variation in types and levels of education in the second and third generations than there was among the first. Culturally, the second and third generations have unquestionably grown away from the older generation, and younger people no longer experience binding elements of Moluccan culture in the same way.

The same applies to the group's political aspirations, as described earlier. After the revival of the nationalist movement in the middle of the nineteen sixties and the rallying of political forces into the Badan Persatuan, with youth organisations being linked through the umbrella organisation SPPRMS, a process of fragmentation and splinter group formation took place in the seventies, especially among youth organisations. Rinsampessy (1978) distinguishes four current strands within Moluccan political life and that of Moluccan youth organisations:

1. Groups striving for an independent South Moluccan Republic on the basis of the proclamation of the RMS in 1950.

The most important of these is the Badan Persatuan, led by Rev. Metiary. Rinsampessy describes the BP as 'strongly hierarchical'.

The BP continues to hold that the Dutch Government, in particular, is responsible for fulfilling the rights of the Moluccan people. More recently the BP has also decided to pursue different paths in pleading its case internationally, in that it has sought to establish contact with other oppressed minorities (the 'Fourth World Problem') in order to strengthen its case.

The Free Moluccan Youth Movement is the youth organisation of the BP and its political aspirations run parallel with those of the BP. According to Rinsampessy, the 'harsh actions' of recent years were mainly carried out by youths from this group. The umbrella youth organisation SPPRMS is similarly linked to the BP according to Rinsampessy, but takes a more independent and tolerant view of persons with different persuasions.

The BP and its youth organisation are the most important pillars of the Cabinet of the South Moluccan Government in exile led by Mr. Manusama.

A second group which also takes the proclamation of the RMS as its starting-point is the Tamaela group.\* This group supports a 'revolutionary socialist republic, but the import of this rechristening, apart from the change in name, is not yet very clear' (Rinsampessy 1978, p. 5). The group has attempted to interest the United Nations in its cause in recent years and international contacts have been established, with the African state of Benin among others.

2. Secondly there are groups who take oppression in Indonesia, and thus also on the South Moluccan Islands, as their starting-point in the struggle for liberation. These groups believe that the goal of an independent RMS needs to be pursued by unleashing a revolutionary struggle in the South Moluccas, possibly in conjunction with other oppressed peoples in Indonesia.

The South Moluccan Liberation Front and several off-shoots of the Free Moluccan Youth Movement may be regarded as belonging to this group.

3. A small group, including the Gerakan Pattimura, has moved away from the RMS as a starting-point and goal in its own right. Central to this group's concern is the struggle against oppression in the South Moluccas and Indonesia generally. This oppression must be eliminated by the united struggle of the oppressed peoples. These youths contend that the form independence takes in the Moluccas is something to be determined by the Moluccans on the spot.

4. 'The fourth and possibly largest category consists of the many young people who do not belong to any political group and who regard existing groups with great scepticism. This is not to say that they are uninterested;

• The leader of this group, Tamaela, died in 1978.

they simply do not wish to be bothered by politics for the time being' (Rinsampessy 1978, p. 5).

Although the Moluccans now form a less homogeneous group in many respects, their outward image nevertheless continues to be strongly influenced by established organisations such as the BP and the Cabinet of the South Moluccan Government in exile, and by the public attitudes and stands adopted by these bodies.

It would not, however, be right to stress only the divisive processes observable at present within the Moluccan community. One could also point to group-integrative factors. Social control is particularly something to be reckoned with in the large camps and residential areas; and in some cases it can be very strict. Other factors that can contribute to a strengthening of internal group cohesion include the attitude of Dutch society in general and official policy in particular.

## *2. Individual immigrants and the degree and nature of their adjustment*

It is very difficult to form a general impression on this question. General agreement exists that, in relation to the older generation, young people react differently on a whole range of matters and are better equipped to participate in Dutch society. Language problems have diminished greatly, the isolation of the camps has almost totally disappeared, and contacts with members of Dutch society have increased greatly, if only as a result of education. But evaluations of the degree and nature of their adjustment, especially that of the second and third generations, tend to vary; thus we saw that Van Amersfoort considered younger people had adjusted to a certain extent at an aesthetic level but that cognitive adjustment was far from complete. Schoof, on the other hand, suggested that they had internalised the rational elements of Western culture and felt only emotional ties with their own group. While Van Amersfoort emphasizes the ambivalent, intermediate position occupied by young people, Van Praag speculates that young people may have reoriented themselves towards Dutch society to a larger extent than is apparent. In part, it seems to me, the conflicting nature of these assessments is due to the writers' differing approaches. Their prime concern is to compare the old and young generations. From a policy viewpoint, however, it would seem more relevant at this stage to examine whether and to what extent Moluccan young people are more or less equally equipped to function in Dutch society in comparison with other young people in the Netherlands. For the time being the answer to this question must be in the negative.

## *3. The host society and the institutions set up by it to deal with the immigrants, with special reference to official policy*

As noted above the CAZ was dismantled at the end of the sixties, with its executive functions being transferred to other bodies. In large measure this amounted to the displacement of the central government's responsibilities onto the local authorities in the municipalities where the camps and residential areas were located. It was the intention that the services to be provided to members of the Moluccan community should as far as possible be handled by recognized bodies that provided similar services to non-Moluccans (including welfare organisations such as private health organisations (Kruisverenigingen) and home-nursing associations, family assistance, social work and also the employment exchanges), while responsibility for housing and the maintenance of public order came to reside with the local authorities, as is the case generally in the Netherlands. A separate branch for Moluccans continued to exist within the Ministry of CRM only in the field of social/cultural work, but here too the main executive burden was transferred to the local level, with the local authorities being assigned an important role in organising matters in this area. The Ministry largely confined itself to outlining general policies and subsidizing institutes

in the field (De Problematiek 1979, pp. 13–20). The recent government memorandum indicates that the transition was not without its difficulties.

The local authorities were unable to cope with the tasks assigned to them; they lacked familiarity with and insight into the Moluccan group and its problems. In 1969, the Minister for CRM formulated the objectives of official policy as being the elimination of social and cultural obstacles to participation in Dutch society while providing opportunities as desired to maintain a separate identity. According to the recent government paper, these objectives have not been attained (De Problematiek 1978, p. 17). Not until the last few years has the central government once again taken a few limited steps to inject more money and manpower into certain spheres in an effort to overcome the under-privilege of the Moluccan community. That aspect of policy will be considered in detail in section 2. As may be heard in Moluccan circles and from their sympathisers, there has been little change in the political aspect of the Moluccan problem: the attitude of the Dutch government towards the legitimacy and recognition of the RMS remains unaltered. Nevertheless, the actions by young Moluccan radicals have made the Dutch authorities realize that until then their attitude towards the Moluccans' political aspirations had been one of 'benign neglect' (De Problematiek 1978, p. 24) and that this could scarcely be maintained.

In a discussion between the Dutch Prime Minister and representatives of the RMS government in exile arising out of the occupation of the Indonesian Ambassador's residence in 1970, the Dutch side undertook to try and initiate a dialogue between South Moluccan representatives and Indonesia concerning the way in which Moluccans who wished to do so might be able to take their place in Indonesian society. This attempt did not, however, come to much. The contacts between the Dutch authorities and the Indonesian government did succeed in opening up more opportunities for Moluccans to visit the South Moluccas, and the interest of Moluccans in the Netherlands in doing so is being encouraged on the Dutch side; but it has not so far resulted in a direct dialogue, partly because of Indonesia's uncooperative attitude.

In their counter-memoranda, both the BP and the Cabinet of the South Moluccan government in exile have bitterly attacked the outcome of the intention to start the dialogue with Indonesia. Both documents note that when Manusama requested the Dutch government in 1971 to promote a dialogue between a number of trusted Moluccan representatives and representatives of the Indonesian government, he had in mind direct discussions between the two sides. According to the counter-memoranda, the present activity of the Joint Committee, which consists only of Dutch and Indonesian representatives, bears no relation to the dialogue sought by Manusama. The promotion of contacts between Moluccans in the Netherlands and Moluccans in the Moluccas by organizing orientation visits was equally far removed from his intentions. The counter-memorandum (1978, p. 12) regards the passage in the government paper stating that 'these contacts will also help the Moluccan community to assess the realism of the aspirations cherished in Moluccan circles in the Netherlands' as questionable and perplexing.

The Dutch government has taken a clear stand on Moluccan political aspirations. Suggestions can be heard – also in non-Moluccan circles – that a more flexible attitude should be adopted. The argument goes that, even without the Dutch government's switching directly to recognition of the RMS, and without the need for outright political confrontation with Indonesia, the Dutch authorities could still do more than just to respect the political convictions of individual Moluccans. Baudet (1977, pp. 82–88) makes a number of suggestions: he points out that recognition of the right to self-determination is not the same thing as recognition of the RMS, and argues in favour of the former; the Dutch government could provide Moluccan leaders with financial support and other facilities to enable them to draw attention to their cause by peaceful means at an international level; he similarly argues for a critical re-examination of the Dutch attitude towards Indonesia. In addition, a one-day seminar organised by Pax Christi

Nederland called for tripartite consultations as sought earlier by Manusama; such consultations would need to be properly prepared by enabling the three sections of the Moluccan people – those in the South Moluccas, those in the Netherlands, and those dispersed throughout Indonesia – to come together for a month with financial assistance from the Dutch government and with guaranteed freedom of expression (Mogelijkheden 1977, p. 13).

As far as the return of Moluccans to Indonesia is concerned, the Dutch authorities consider that it should not actively encourage this option, but that it should only make available material facilities to those who have reached this decision by themselves. Return to Indonesia has recently become more difficult, because Indonesia insists on a written undertaking from those returning that they will not engage in 'politically undesirable activities'.

#### *4. Individuals in the host society and their preparedness to accept newcomers*

No research data exist on this subject. Nevertheless nearly all writers assume there to have been a deterioration in the relationship and understanding between the indigenous and immigrant group; this is based on the clear increase in conflict between Dutch and Moluccan youth, on analyses of newspaper reporting on the Moluccans, on protests against the establishment of new residential areas for Moluccans, etc. It is also assumed that the taking of hostages has contributed to a deterioration in the understanding between the groups, although there is little discussion of the extent to which this is so.

On the other hand, these actions and the publicity they received may have produced more understanding for the forgotten problem among many people.

The establishment of the National Committee for South Moluccans (LAC) in 1976 may be an indication of this.

Part of Moluccan political activity has become directed towards appealing to such new concepts as 'Fourth World Problems', anti-fascism and exploitation in Indonesia and 'liberation movement', and this has undoubtedly engaged the attention and interest of Dutch groups other than adherents of the 'debt-of-honour' school.

## **2.2. A more detailed examination of several aspects of the Moluccans' social position in the Netherlands and current official policy**

The general outlines and underlying premises of current official Dutch policy were discussed above. In this section I should like to proceed from the general to the particular and to examine the form taken by general policies in particular areas (such as legal status, employment, housing, education and social/cultural welfare) and the effects of those policies.

### *2.2.1. Status and Legal position*

Under the RTC agreement it was provided for that indigenous KNIL soldiers would be able to obtain Indonesian citizenship after the demobilization of the KNIL, and that Indonesia would be responsible for the payment of pensions and other financial provisions to former KNIL personnel (De Problematiek 1978, p. 22). Despite the fact that the circumstances of the Moluccans who came to the Netherlands were totally different from what had been envisaged at the RTC, the Dutch government honoured these arrangements for a long time. Consequently, the Moluccans were initially registered in the Netherlands as Indonesian citizens, although the greater part of the Moluccans never applied for such citizenship.

On 1 August 1958 the new nationality legislation came into effect in Indonesia, which provided for the loss of citizenship in the absence of registration within five years. Later this period was extended, but the number of registrations among Moluccans living in the Netherlands

remained low. It was not until 1968 that the Dutch local authorities were instructed to register as stateless in parish registers those Moluccans who sought neither Indonesian nor Dutch nationality (Moll, 1977).

A similar process occurred with regard to the pensions of ex-KNIL members. Upon discharge from military service on arrival in the Netherlands, the Moluccans were referred to the Indonesian authorities with regard to their entitlements to pension payments. 'The Dutch attitude became less self-evident when it emerged in 1955 that Indonesia was not responding to several hundred applications for pensions and other benefits to be made payable ...' (De Problematiek 1978, p. 22). This meant that the ex-KNIL soldiers received no pensions. This became the subject of a recommendation by the Verwey-Jonker Committee in 1959. The Committee considered it desirable for some form of assistance to be devised for retired soldiers, by analogy with the regulations existing in the case of Dutch ex-KNIL members; such a regulation would not need to be retrospective, since the Dutch authorities had met the full cost of the Moluccans' stay in the Netherlands.

A substitute-pension regulation of this kind came into effect on 1 January 1964. When the so-called 'Facilities Act' entered into force in 1977, this provision was converted into an equal payment in line with the Act determining the status of Royal Netherlands Indies Army personnel in Indonesia (De Problematiek 1978, p. 22).

In its recent memorandum the Dutch government notes that while policy in relation to pension payments may have been correct in a strict legal sense, it was psychologically unfair and discriminated against Moluccan ex-KNIL members in relation to Dutch ex-KNIL members. It is therefore the government's intention to introduce further legislation under which pensions lost during the period May 1956 (inception of the self-support arrangement) to January 1964 (when the substitute-pension regulation came into force) would be made good to those qualifying for pensions (De Problematiek 1978, p. 23).

In comparison with other foreigners in the Netherlands not possessing Dutch citizenship, the legal status of the Moluccans in the Netherlands may be described as good: those Moluccans classified as stateless citizens in the Netherlands have the same rights and obligations as Dutch citizens with the exception of the right to vote or stand for election and compulsory military service. The Facilities Act that entered into force on 1 January 1977 (*Wet betreffende etc.*, 1976) confirms this officially: although they do not possess Dutch citizenship they are to be 'treated as Dutch citizens'. A draft bill has been submitted for a constitutional amendment enabling non-Dutch citizens living in the Netherlands to vote or stand for election in local council elections, and this could narrow the existing gap with Dutch citizens still further. Until such an amendment is brought in, the authorities see scope under article 61 of the Municipalities Act for stateless Moluccans to be given the opportunity to express their views at the local level. Initiatives in this direction have, however, been left to the local authorities themselves (De Problematiek 1978, pp. 52-54).

A particular problem among the pro-RMS oriented Moluccans in the Netherlands is the fact that they feel entitled to establish their own functioning forces of law and order, set up on military lines. Dutch policy towards this maintenance of order within the Moluccan community was initially fairly tolerant and for a long time a blind eye was turned to these forces. In the recent government paper, however, the authorities make it perfectly clear that 'under the Dutch legal system the exercise of public authority in Moluccan residential areas and within the Moluccan community must be a matter for the Dutch authorities alone' (De Problematiek 1978, p. 50). The government also implicitly recognises that this task has been neglected by the police in the past, and that greater efforts will have to be made and more staff appointed and facilities set up if public order is to be maintained efficiently. Various outsiders (including Baudet 1977) have suggested that particular attention should be paid to improving quality and to specialised training.

### 2.2.2. *Employment*

After the authorities abandoned the principle in 1954 that Moluccans were not permitted to enter the labour-force, the actual finding of work for Moluccans proved to be by no means straightforward. In general they possessed no training outside their former profession as soldiers. A proposal by the Dutch authorities to the Moluccans in 1952 that they might be able to carry out their old profession in a civil guard fell through as a result of the demands made at the time by the embittered Moluccan leaders (De Problematiek 1978, p. 21).

This left only non-military paid employment.

Even before the self-support arrangement was introduced in 1956, when the Moluccans became obliged to find employment, many of them had gravitated towards seasonal work in agriculture and horticulture, where they generally worked for piece-rates in groups under one or more leaders (Ambonezen in Nederland 1959, pp. 50–52).

But breadwinners needed to find something offering more continuity. For this reason the authorities established a fairly comprehensive vocational retraining programme aimed at providing the Moluccans with greater opportunities on the labour market. The Verwey-Jonker Committee reported in 1959 that the retraining scheme was beginning to be wound up. Up to that point 540 Moluccans had successfully completed retraining courses and 190 people had been trained in government workshops. Over a hundred people were still completing courses at that time.

After the introduction of the self-support arrangement the CAZ camp supervisors had to add the role of employment agents to their duties, but the Verwey-Jonker Committee notes that the greater part of job procurement was conducted through the Moluccans' own networks and especially through informal intermediaries within the group.

Nevertheless, the entry of the Moluccans into the labour market proved to be a slow and difficult business. The Verwey-Jonker Committee cites the following causes:

1. communication problems with the Moluccans; many spoke little or no Dutch; they sought work through informal channels;
2. lack of familiarity of Dutch employers with the knowledge, qualities and also culture of the Moluccans; in such situations the typical 'Ambonese foreman' emerged;
3. the distance between the camps and industrial workplaces was often a great handicap or even prohibitive.

Furthermore there was a group of ex-KNIL soldiers who refused to work on grounds of principle.

As a result, the situation outlined by the Committee in its report in 1959 was far from rosy: 25% of the single and married men had no work and there were only a few hundred women in employment. But above all the Committee expressed concern about the rate of unemployment among young people: this was said to be over 36% among boys and more than 53% among girls, although, the report observed, these young people nearly all had some form of further education or training so that it was not a matter of a lack of skills.

The Committee consequently recommended that additional research be conducted into this phenomenon (Ambonezen in Nederland 1959, p. 42 ff.). The Committee also noted that half of these young people were not doing the kind of work for which they had been trained; many were working as untrained or unskilled labourers.

Looking at the position of the Moluccans on the labour market some ten years later (Van Amersfoort 1971, pp. 52–56) in the light of their initial difficulties, Van Amersfoort concludes the situation to be good. Although CRM figures indicate the situation in camps to be less satisfactory than that in residential areas, the percentage of those seeking work is relatively low: 1.9%. The table in which this figure is contained, however, also refers to two other categories, the interpretation of which is unclear to me (and which is

not given by Van Amersfoort): (1) not working, with earnings (receiving benefits or payments): 3.7% and (2) not working, without earnings: 1.3%.

Nijland (1970) confirms this favourable impression in his study of five camps and ten residential areas: in 1968 he found a rate of unemployment among heads of households of 7% in camps and 2.7% in residential areas.

The figures were less favourable however for single and young people: 10% unemployed in camps and 2.3% in residential areas, although he indicates that some of these young people did a certain amount of casual work.

This marked improvement in the Moluccans' position on the labour market appears to have occurred without direct intervention by the authorities; there appear to have been neither any research nor any specific official efforts during this period. The major factor appears to have been the generally favourable state of the Dutch economy and the labour market, although the generally improved siting of new residential areas in relation to industry probably contributed to the higher rate of employment as well.

In addition to the high rate of participation by Moluccans in the labour force at the end of the sixties, both writers consider the Moluccans to have adjusted well to the process of production. They continue, however, to occupy a modest place in the occupational structure: 50% of the men are engaged in manual work and according to Nijland it may be assumed that for the greater part they perform unskilled work.

Very little is known about the post-1968 period, either with regard to the position occupied by the Moluccans on the labour market, or with regard to government policies in this field. There can be no question of there having been any specific policies during this period either. There is a lack of statistical data for the period, and such as there is, is confined to a few rough estimates in the recent government memorandum (De Problematiek 1978, p. 47). What is known is that the Moluccans' position on the labour market has worsened considerably: 'The exact percentage unemployed among the Moluccans is not known. The impression exists at the Ministry of CRM, which recently assembled a few statistics on the rate of unemployment among Moluccans, that the percentage is two to three times as high as the average for the areas where they live ... This impression is confirmed by the Ministry of Social Affairs.' The rate of unemployment among young Moluccans, including many school-leavers, is a particular source of concern. The memorandum suggests a number of probable reasons for unemployment among young people:

1. reduced availability of work in the regions where the Moluccans live;
2. lower mobility as a result of group ties and restraints;
3. longer than average length of schooling, meaning entry into the labour force at a higher age, making it more expensive to employ these young people;
4. language handicaps in administrative occupations;
5. relatively many young Moluccans fail to complete their education with a diploma;
6. the attitude of the Dutch community, including employers, to Moluccans has become less favourable as a result of the actions carried out by young Moluccans.

These represent a number of guesses at the causes; the weight to be attached to them can hardly be determined without research.

According to its memorandum, the government considers something needs to be done about the unfavourable position of young Moluccans on the labour market: 'It needs to be considered whether the gap could be reduced by specific measures so that young Moluccans would have the same chances of obtaining work as comparable young Dutch people. In addition consideration could be given to the appointment of special advisors – preferably Moluccan – at a number of local employment exchanges at which high numbers of young Moluccans are registered (...). It will also need to be examined whether there are financial barriers to engaging Moluccan personnel, especially with regard to school-leavers. If this should prove to be the case it must be made possible to provide assistance where necessary.

And as the largest employer, the government will itself need to display the necessary willingness to engage Moluccan labour.' Obstacles should be removed (De Problematiek 1978, pp. 47–48). These intentions have not as yet been put into practical effect.

### 2.2.3. *Housing*

The housing policies of the Dutch authorities in the early years of the Moluccans' stay in the Netherlands were examined in detail earlier. For reasons that have already been discussed, the Verwey-Jonker Committee recommended in 1959 that the Moluccans, who had until that time been living in poorly-equipped and over-crowded camps, should be re-housed in open residential areas. The implementation of this recommendation took a long time and, some twenty years later, has not been completed: around 1000 Moluccans are still living in two remaining camps. As reasons for the slow implementation the government paper cites in the first place the lack of cooperation on the Moluccan side, at times even taking the form of outright resistance; but it is also noted that there were budgetary reasons for slowing down the building programme and, finally, that increasing reluctance was encountered among the local authorities in question, especially during the seventies, to provide land for Moluccan residential areas (De Problematiek 1978, pp. 14–15).

In terms of their accommodation in the residential areas as such, it must be concluded that the Moluccans are by no means badly off compared with comparable Dutch groups and especially other non-indigenous groups in the Netherlands. But when Van Amersfoort evaluates the Moluccans' position on the housing market in terms of acceptance he reaches an unfavourable verdict 'because the fact of being housed in these residential areas has unquestionably slowed down the process of acceptance (Van Amersfoort 1974, p. 129).

Others, including recently the government paper, have meanwhile emphasized that the density of population in the residential areas has become a serious problem. The same observation had been made earlier, especially by research workers looking into the educational attainment of Moluccan children who concluded that the lack of a separate and quiet place to study must be an important factor in explaining why these children were lagging behind in education.

The still relatively high proportion of children and the fact that, according to official estimates, some 10,000 Moluccans have reached or will shortly reach marrying age, confront the Dutch authorities with the problem of what sort of housing policies to adopt in the near future. The government has ruled out expansion of existing residential areas: the dangers of large estates and the strong sense of group solidarity and isolation that go with them have proved all too apparent in the past. After consideration of the pros and cons, the establishment of new residential areas has been similarly ruled out. This represents a clear break with past policy, although the effects will not make themselves felt in the short term: 'The change in policy suggested here must lead to the Moluccans and other groups of citizens being placed on an equal footing with regard to housing policy. This will have to occur gradually, since the transition would otherwise be too abrupt for the Moluccans living in residential areas. The new policy should therefore not exclude the possibility of small groups of Moluccans who wish to do so being given the opportunity of finding closely-grouped accommodation in the same suburb or part of town.' In giving substance to its future policies the government will seriously take into account the recommendations of the committee concerned with the re-housing of the present occupants of the Lunetten camp in Vught (De Problematiek 1978, pp. 42–43).

The memorandum notes that the local authorities will not be able to implement this policy adjustment unaided. For this reason, the paper considers that the central government will have to step in as well.

The paper suggests the following three practical measures towards solving the problem:

1. transfer of government-owned homes to local authorities and housing corporations (over 75% of the dwellings occupied by Moluccans are government-owned) in order to 'provide a certain degree of scope at local level for measures to be implemented that would encourage the dilution of the Moluccan population urgently required in certain residential areas';
2. possible acceleration of the subsidized building programme for Moluccans in growth-centres and expanding towns;
3. extension of the so-called preferential housing regulation, so that Moluccans could benefit from the regulation reserving 10% of all houses built with government subsidies for certain designated groups.

#### *2.2.4. Education*

In comparison with other areas, a special situation obtains in the sphere of education of Moluccan children and young people: it is an area of policy in which there has been relatively little conflict between the Dutch authorities and the Moluccan community. In the light of its policy directed towards repatriation, the Dutch authorities initially offered the Moluccan community the opportunity of educating their children in a manner that fitted in with education in Indonesia, using Indonesian as the medium of instruction, if desired. 'This idea was immediately abandoned when it met resistance from Ambonese parents, who wanted to make the opportunity while in the Netherlands of giving their children a Western education, if possible together with Dutch children' (Ambonezen in Nederland 1959, p. 30). Research workers also stress the motivation of Moluccan parents to give their children as much education as possible (i.e. education within the Dutch school-system). Van Amersfoort describes this motivation as follows: 'The parents are most certainly interested in education, attaching great – indeed, exaggerated – prestige to it. It is easy to find instances of parents giving children extravagant rewards for what are, objectively speaking, no more than ordinary achievements at school. The insight of parents into the value and system of secondary education is, however, not great.' Bos (1977) endorses this view but at the same time emphasizes that the parents, while they may be motivated, are not really equipped to help their children in their education.

Right from the beginning, therefore, the Moluccan children received Dutch education, and the rate of participation among them has always been very high, although in general the secondary education preferences differed from those of Dutch children.

The Verwey-Jonker Committee's report (Ambonezen in Nederland 1959, pp. 30–41) characterised the education situation in 1959 as follows: the majority of school-age children are educated outside the camps (1945), but a large minority receive primary education in camp schools (1526). As early as 1959 consideration was being given to dismantling these schools, and the report observed that 'in general this is in line with the wishes of the Ambonese parents, since they realize that their children would learn Dutch better by mixing with Dutch children'. According to the Committee the children are generally able to follow the instruction well. Although two disadvantages are cited: (1) their Dutch is not as good, because Malay is generally spoken at home; (2) they learn little at home that reinforces what is dealt with at school. 'They are able to compensate for these handicaps to some extent by their diligence', the report states.

'Nearly all Ambonese children receive secondary education' the Committee notes. When a comparison is made between Moluccans and Dutch people aged between 12 and 20 receiving day-time education, the Moluccans come out on top: 52% of Ambonese boys compared with 32.5% of Dutch boys, and 50% of Ambonese girls against 28.3% of Dutch. It is however noted that, to a much greater extent than among young Dutch people, such education among young Moluccans takes the form of advanced elementary education (ULO) or basic vocational and industrial

training: 93% for boys and 95% for Moluccan girls against 62% and 75% for Dutch boys and girls. And as far as results are concerned, it is noted that Moluccan children do better at domestic science and lower technical schools than they do at ULOs, which the Committee explains in terms of language deficiencies and the lack of support at home for their education.

Nevertheless, young people's motivation is great: 'The desire for education manifests itself in the tendency for one diploma after another to be obtained. Underlying this is once again the struggle to 'get ahead' and to make use of every opportunity offered during their stay in the Netherlands. It is also probable that after young people obtain a diploma (of a relatively low level) they tend to be disappointed – especially if they are older than others with similar diplomas – at being unable to obtain as high positions and pay as they had imagined, and that they then decide they had better get a further diploma.' It would seem therefore that not only the parents but also the students themselves lack insight into the value attached to various sorts of education and their usefulness in society. Apart from the provision of pre-school and primary education in the large camps that were located at a distance from existing Dutch schools, the Dutch authorities did not really implement any specific policies with regard to the education of Moluccan children. Secondary education was, it is true, encouraged in the form of scholarships for promising children; like nearly all facilities, this system was administered by the CAZ.

Subsequent research served only to confirm in broad terms what the Verwey-Jonker Committee had noted in 1959: at the end of the sixties Van Amersfoort (1971, pp. 43–44) continues to cite the environmental factor and language handicaps as the major obstacles towards good results at school. In 1969, Cornelisse-Koksma recorded in detail these language deficiencies and their effects on the results achieved by Moluccan school-children.

As regards choice of schools, it was likewise found that there had been no fundamental changes in ten years: the rate of participation of young Moluccans in secondary education continued to be appreciably higher than that of young Dutch people, but Van Amersfoort does not consider this to be a reason for optimism: 'The results obtained are more modest than might at first glance be expected from this table. Many Moluccan children are forced to work for a longer time to obtain the same final result. Because of the value attached to school education they are prepared to do this. But it does not mean, as one might expect at first sight, that they also proceed to higher education in greater numbers' (Van Amersfoort 1971, p. 45). Only 2% of young Moluccans proceed to higher levels of general (i.e. academic) secondary education, compared with 19.2% of Dutch boys and 16.0% of Dutch girls. The situation in the seventies does not appear to have changed, although there is a lack of systematic data and research. The research done by Van Wijk (1974) and Bos (1977) confirms the tendencies outlined above.

One of the consequences of the general failure of Moluccan students to proceed from higher secondary schooling to higher levels of education is the absence of middle and upper echelons, which has been a feature of the Moluccan community from the start. Both Van Amersfoort and the government paper regard the strengthening of such echelons as being of great importance for the emancipation of the Moluccan community as a whole.

The recent government paper indicates that the Dutch authorities are conscious of the educational problems of Moluccan youth. In 1964, Mr. Kuhuwaal was appointed to coordinate the education of Moluccan children. There was, however, a limited amount one man could do; he was principally concerned with putting together supplementary practice-material to help improve the learning of Dutch. Later, remedial teachers were also appointed; in 1972 there were 16 in the Netherlands (Beekman-Eggink 1972, p. 198). Attention was also paid to language courses for adults and, later, to language instruction at pre-school level. In 1978, the number of 'extra teachers' had risen to between 25 and 30 for 35 schools' (De Problematiek 1978, p. 46).

The government outlined its future policy intentions in its memorandum of February 1978:

- additional staff will be appointed for nursery school education;
- consideration will be given to providing facilities for Moluccan children in certain nursery schools;
- nursery school staff and other teachers will be enabled to receive in-service training for language programmes;
- parents will be encouraged to follow Dutch language courses arranged through the primary schools;
- the policies adopted and their effects will be evaluated and recommendations made for future policy (this was to have been done by Mr. Kuhuwaël; his sudden death in the summer of 1978 makes it likely that the implementation of this proposal will be considerably delayed);
- on the basis of an experiment being conducted in the province of Drenthe, consideration will be given to strengthening school counseling and advisory services, so as to enable these services to help strengthen the ties between Moluccan families and schools;
- further measures concerning language instruction and the derivation of support from one's own culture (bi-cultural education) are being considered.

It is to be hoped that these intentions will be rapidly implemented, for education offers the best means of improving the Moluccans' social position in the long term. In my view the young Moluccans' thirst for education and the parents' motivation for their children to learn may be regarded as evidence of willingness to orientate themselves towards Dutch society. This opens up opportunities for cooperation with the Moluccan community. It is similarly of crucial importance that young people be given chances and opportunities the moment they leave school. The enforced unemployment into which a very large proportion of Moluccan school-leavers lapse at present is conducive to great frustration, which can in turn become politically channelled or lead to such symptoms of demoralization as drug abuse.

#### 2.2.5. *Social/cultural policy*

As the government memorandum observes, this is one of the most contentious policy areas between the Dutch authorities and the Moluccan community: 'this policy is particularly directed towards encouraging Moluccans to play a full part in Dutch society, whereas many Moluccans feel – some strongly, and some less strongly – that they do not want emancipation in Dutch society, and therefore perceive the social and cultural policies directed towards them as a threat' (De Problematiek 1978, p. 17).

On the Moluccan side, however, it is claimed that they do favour emancipation, but as Moluccans. What they do resist is straightforward adoption of Dutch values and concepts.

Accordingly, many Moluccans regard the preservation and development of their own identity as being of central importance (see, among others, Metekohy 1977).

Until social and cultural policy became the explicit responsibility of the Ambonese (later Moluccan) Division at the Ministry of CRM, these policies had formed an integral part of the overall responsibilities of the CAZ for the Ambonese. As early as 1959, the Verwey-Jonker Committee had advised that efforts should be directed towards increasing the degree of responsibility the Moluccans themselves had in religious and social matters. But from the first phase up to the mid-sixties there was practically no social and cultural welfare policy in the present sense of the term.

Social and cultural welfare policy was not formulated by the Minister for CRM until 1969, and this formulation has really remained the central tenet of policy until the recent government paper: the principal objective consisted of 'the removal of social and cultural obstacles to participation in Dutch society, with the explicit subsidiary objective that Moluccan residents

should if they desired retain the freedom and material ability to preserve their own cultural identity'. The Minister of CRM laid down three guiding principles for the attainment of these objectives:

1. the normal welfare facilities within Dutch society should also be available to the Moluccans;
2. policy will have to be given practical expression primarily at local level, either by means of welfare institutions for or run by Moluccans, or in conjunction with existing Dutch institutions;
3. the local authorities will need to play an active role, so that a better response than hitherto can be made to the particular needs and problems of the local Moluccan communities (De Problematiek 1978, pp. 16–17).

In sum, a group-oriented approach was to be confined to specific activities, and welfare policy was to be decentralised as far as possible.

The slogan of 'integration with preservation of a separate identity' was adopted for this policy. Statements by policy makers after 1969 simply repeat the underlying principles referred to above; at the most one might say that the accent shifted slightly towards insertion: 'On the assumption that the great majority of Ambonese will be remaining in the Netherlands for some time to come, policy is aimed at helping the Ambonese as a group to fit into Dutch society in reasonable measure while at the same time retaining their own character and attitudes' (Ebbeling 1970, p. 205). And: it is the aim of policy (through community work) 'to achieve proper adjustment towards and a certain degree of absorption into this society. This means that policy is directed towards letting the Moluccans assume as much responsibility as possible for their social and cultural development within Dutch society, while respecting their own cultural patterns' (Kapsenberg 1973, pp. 11–12).

The decentralization concept was worked out in more detail in the government memorandum of May 1974 on welfare policy obstacles, while the idea of getting away from the approach of directing welfare policy to specific categories or groups was discussed in more detail in the paper 'Details of community development policy' of December 1975, which argues for special approaches towards ethnic or cultural minorities in the suburban or neighbourhood context and calls for the general welfare institutions to be strengthened so as to enable them to fulfil their responsibilities towards minority groups.

None of this has been much welcomed by the Moluccan community; the policies implemented by the Ministry of CRM have been seen as an attempt to deprive Moluccans of their own identity and to force them to assimilate into Dutch society (see for example Metekohy 1977 and Tomasowa 1972). Implementing these policies has proved very difficult because, as noted in the government memorandum, 'where nothing can be imposed but only offered, social and cultural work depends on the willingness of those groups to establish contact with society at large' (De Problematiek 1978, p.40).

Consequently, social and cultural work has until now consisted almost exclusively of subsidies to 38 Moluccan welfare foundations. Formally the Ministry has laid down a number of criteria for the form these institutions should take and for their activities (see De Subsidiëring 1971), but it is questionable how strictly these can be controlled in practice. The government memorandum notes that the application of these criteria is complicated by the 'lack of sufficiently trained personnel within their own ranks; and sometimes by the lack of interest displayed by others in the local community in the Moluccans' problems and so forth (De Problematiek 1978, p. 41). Apart from these 38 bodies subsidies were also given to ICCAN (Inter-Church Liaison Committee for the Ambonese in the Netherlands, located in Driebergen), which among other things provides training and counselling for officials in the Moluccan welfare organisations. Subsidization of ICCAN will however cease on 1 January 1979.

In addition to subsidising these institutions, the Ministry of CRM has provided financial support in recent years for a number of projects and experiments, especially where there was no active welfare organisation.

This has made social and cultural policy somewhat less static and less tied to the existence of private initiatives in the form of a welfare foundation.

The memorandum of February 1978 considers 'that the policies adopted to date deserve to be pursued'; it sheds little new light on social and cultural welfare policy.

The government takes the line that contacts between Dutch society and the Moluccan community should be promoted more actively, but has only felt able to undertake an examination of how this might be realized and encouraged at local level. An important aspect in this regard, according to the government, consists of efforts to promote participation and consultation with the Moluccan community at local level (see legal position). In addition, the Ministry of CRM has itself attempted to give shape to the process of consultation and participation: on 26 February 1976 the Minister established the Moluccan Welfare Advisory Body (consisting of representatives of Moluccan organisations) in order to advise him on the formulation and implementation of welfare policy.

### **2.3 Administrative structure**

Over the years the organisational structure for implementing policy with regard to the Moluccans in the Netherlands has undergone a good deal of change. In part these changes reflected policy adjustments, although usually with a certain time-lag.

Up to 1970 (or 1967, if one takes account of the establishment of the Moluccan division within the Ministry of CRM) the organisational set-up was fairly straightforward: the responsibility for the implementation of policy rested with the Ambonese Welfare Office (CAZ), which reported directly to the Minister for Social Welfare (later CRM), had its own budget and enjoyed a large measure of independence in implementing policy. In retrospect (De Problematiek 1978, pp. 19–20) the government realized that, given the changes in policy, the CAZ's period of sole responsibility lasted far too long: 'The CAZ has exercised a number of functions and responsibilities in relation to the Moluccans that would normally be undertaken by other services run at local, provincial or central government level. This emphasized the special nature of the Moluccan community unnecessarily, so that the usual administrative bodies were faced with the temptation of side-stepping their responsibilities towards Moluccan residents in favour of the CAZ.' In practice not all that much changed when 'all the remaining functions of the CAZ' were transferred in 1970 to the Moluccan division of the Ministry of CRM. The functions were greatly diminished in scope, but they remained in the hands of a single department.

In December 1974, the Inter-ministerial Liaison Group for Moluccan Affairs was established (Overzicht interne adviesorganen 1977, D9). This was an internal coordinating and advisory organ. Given its composition, the establishment of this coordinating body would seem to have been particularly motivated by the increasing level of political activity and radicalism among Moluccans. It is revealing that the Ministries of Social Affairs and of Education and Science are not represented, while the Ministries of Justice (responsible for criminal investigations and actionable offences), Home Affairs (maintenance of public order and crime prevention), Foreign Affairs (relations with Indonesia), General Affairs (general political responsibilities) and CRM (welfare policy) are. No reference is made to this group in the government's memorandum of February 1978, and nothing is known of its activities.

The Moluccans were first given a means of expressing their views in relation to (welfare) policy when the Moluccan Welfare Advisory Body was established in February 1976. This body advises the Minister of CRM on Moluccan welfare policy. The composition of the Advisory Body is representative, including eight members of the BP, three members who represent the south-east Moluccans, and so forth.

Also in 1976 the Mixed South-Moluccan-Dutch Consultative Committee was established, for a limited period. The fortunes of this body have already been examined.

The government memorandum of February 1978 announces a number of changes to the present policy planning and implementation structure. The main objective of this new structure was to reduce the concentration of functions vested in the Moluccan Welfare division of the Ministry of CRM and to delegate them to other appropriate departments (De Problematiek 1978, p. 55). This will make it necessary for policy coordination to be broadened and intensified. According to the memorandum, the result will be that the present advisory bodies will also need to be examined afresh and reorganised.

The government memorandum suggests that the new executive and consultative structure might take the following form:

1. The government is contemplating the establishment of an *inter-ministerial committee* at official level for policy coordination. It would be responsible to the Minister for Home Affairs and would contain representatives from the following ministries: Foreign Affairs, Justice, Home Affairs, Finance, Education and Science, Housing and Physical Planning, Social Affairs, Cultural Affairs, Recreation and Social Work, and Health and Environmental Protection.

2. The existing '*platform*' *committee* (a consultative body of local authorities where there are Moluccan camps or residential areas) will be closely consulted by the government in formulating and implementing policy.

3. Consultation with Moluccans at national level will be re-examined: the Moluccan Welfare Advisory Body 'will in future have its area of activity gradually reduced to social and cultural policy', because the Ministry of CRM will be shedding a number of functions. Apart from that the government was considering the 'establishment of a permanent advisory and consultative body, consisting of Moluccan and Dutch experts in the various areas of policy on which this body would be required to advise' (De Problematiek 1978, p. 58). The government would seek to arrange the broadest representation possible on the Committee, both on the Moluccan and on the Dutch side. Consideration was being given to making the Moluccan Welfare Advisory Body a sub-committee of this permanent consultative and advisory body.

Since the publication of the government's memorandum there have been a number of developments. The official inter-ministerial Committee referred to in the memorandum was established several months after that paper appeared, and is known as the Inter-ministerial Committee for Coordination of Policy on Moluccan Affairs (ICOM). It is chaired by the Ministry of Home Affairs. The structure and way in which it operates follow exactly the same lines as the previously established Inter-ministerial Committee for Coordination of Policy on Immigrants from Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles (ICBM). The ICOM consists solely of civil servants. It can set up working groups on particular subjects, which in turn advise the ICOM. Several such working groups have already taken up their work.

The government memorandum's proposals for a new advisory and consultative body under which the existing Advisory Body might be subsumed were subject to a great deal of criticism, especially on the Moluccan front. The Moluccans consider that a permanent advisory and consultative body should consist entirely of Moluccan representatives. From a motion during the Parliamentary debate, it appears the Parliament shares this view; the collapse of the temporary, mixed Köbben-Mantouw committee not long before the debate took place no doubt contributed to this outcome. The government has since promised that a consultative body will be set up consisting solely of Moluccan representatives.

Finally reference should be made to the Advisory Committee on Research into Cultural Minorities (ACOM) appointed by the Minister for CRM in May 1978. The main function of this external advisory body is to advise the Minister for CRM on 'plans for a program of research into the position of cultural minorities in Dutch society'.

The committee is required to draw up and allocate research projects, and to coordinate the research work commissioned by the Ministry for CRM with

similar research conducted independently of the CRM (Decree establishing committee of 17 March 1978). The committee's functions are thus primarily of a technical nature and are not directly concerned with policy preparation or implementation, although the research results are meant to be usable for policy formulation and implementation. The Moluccan community is only one of the subjects with which ACOM, a committee of seven social scientists, is concerned.

#### **2.4. Conclusions with reference to current policy**

The historical background to policy has been examined in sufficient detail above. The conclusions below are confined to some generalised observations on the government's policy intentions, the policies currently being applied, and organisational aspects of policy implementation. These conclusions have been placed in a long-term context; the policies of the Dutch authorities are examined in the light of the social position of the Moluccans in the Netherlands and developments in this area as outlined earlier, based on the assumption that a large majority of Moluccans will remain in the Netherlands for a long time (or for good).

##### *Policy intentions: the government memorandum*

For at least a great part of the Moluccan community in the Netherlands, the process of minority group formation as defined by Van Amersfoort (1974, p. 37) has not come to a halt in recent years. The political actions carried out by young Moluccan radicals have helped prompt the authorities to re-examine and reformulate their policies towards the Moluccan group in the Netherlands. This was done in the memorandum 'The problem of the Moluccan minority in the Netherlands' of February 1978. In terms of substance, the basic premises and policy intentions contained in the memorandum may be divided into those relating to the political aspirations of the Moluccans in the Netherlands and those relating to their social position there.

With regard to the attitude of the Dutch authorities towards the political aspirations of a section of the Moluccan community there has been no discernible change: recognition of the right to self-determination of the South Moluccan people and of the RMS are rejected; the government cannot go beyond respecting the political ideals of individual Moluccans.

Assistance or support for the political aspirations of a section of the Moluccan group is also rejected. These underlying principles have been quite clearly and explicitly formulated. The essential basis of government policy appears to be inspired not only by considerations of legal correctness and legitimacy but also by the expectation that to respond to political wishes and demands would only result in those demands becoming steadily more acute and far-reaching, thereby possibly leading to further escalation of the problem.

The conclusion reached by the mixed Dutch-Moluccan Consultative Committee that 'the Dutch government and the Dutch people need to realize and to recognize that, right up to the present day, part of the explanation for the struggle of the South Moluccans for self-determination lies in the Dutch government's own efforts to champion the right of self-determination for the regions of Indonesia' scarcely comes through at all in the recent memorandum.

The one element of policy capable of being interpreted in that sense – the promotion of a dialogue with Indonesia and with Moluccans living in the Moluccas – never assumed the nature of a political dialogue as envisaged by the Moluccan leaders.

Current activities within this framework consisting of orientation visits to the South Moluccan islands and to Indonesia are based on the assumption that a direct, large-scale flow of information concerning political and economic realities in the South Moluccas will have an enlightening effect in helping individual Moluccans in the Netherlands to reach realistic conclusions about what the future holds for them.

With regard to those aspects of policy concerned with the position of the Moluccans in the Netherlands, the authorities operate on the implicit assumption that the vast majority will be remaining in the Netherlands for a considerable length of time and that integration will need to go a good deal further than it has hitherto.

In general, past policy is seen in a reasonably objective light. It is recognized that a number of mistakes were made, and the consequences of these mistakes are faced up to honestly. At the same time the memorandum notes a number of mechanisms and processes which have evolved over the years among the Moluccan community and which render the implementation of policies more difficult. The aim of the policy measures considered by the government in the memorandum is to eliminate the group's social under-privilege in a number of areas. A more detailed examination of the measures proposed or considered in the memorandum indicates that it is clearly the intention to promote integration or at least reduce isolation in a number of vital areas. With regard to legal status, the objective of integration and participation is pursued by holding out the prospect of voting rights at local level in the long term, while in the short term these objectives are to be realized by the encouragement of municipal advisory committees.

With regard to housing it is clear that isolation must be reduced by not building any further Moluccan residential areas or extending the ones in existence, but instead encouraging individual, dispersed housing or housing in small groups or mixed residential areas. And in the field of employment, education and health, a policy directed towards eliminating underprivilege is proposed within the general Dutch institutional frameworks and systems.

From the memorandum it would appear that the preservation of a separate identity is to be largely confined to social and cultural policy, although here too the government emphasizes that more attention must be paid in welfare work to promoting contacts between indigenous Dutch and the Moluccans.

Looking at the objective of eliminating underprivilege and at the instruments used, the memorandum recognizes that official efforts have not gone far enough, especially in the fields of education and employment. In the light of the fact that the majority of the Moluccan community is likely to remain a permanent part of Dutch society, there would seem an urgent need for far-reaching measures in the fields of education and employment. Looking to the future, a greater investment of government effort would seem essential, especially at a time social selection processes are operating more strongly than usual to the disadvantage of weak (minority) groups.

#### *Organizational aspects of policy implementation*

Policy adjustments have been accompanied by a number of changes in the organizational framework. Up to 1970, the implementation of policy was the monopoly of the Ambonese Welfare Office (CAZ), which came under the Ministry of Social Welfare. After 1970, the Moluccan division of that Ministry took over most of the remaining functions of the CAZ; in general, other ministries did not have any special responsibilities for the Moluccan community, and the need for coordination was not felt.

It was not until 1974 that a limited degree of coordination took shape, in the form of the Inter-ministerial Liaison Group for Moluccan Affairs, which was set up largely in response to the actions carried out by young Moluccan radicals. The Ministries of Social Affairs and of Education and Science were not, however, represented in the Liaison Group. The recent government memorandum leaves no doubt that it is the intention to move towards a well-coordinated policy directed by the Ministry of Home Affairs, with each ministry assuming responsibility for functions falling within its area. By means of intensive coordination based on the policy guidelines set out in the memorandum, it is hoped to arrive at consistent policies.

The Inter-ministerial Committee for Coordination of Policy on Moluccan Affairs was established in the spring of 1978. The extent which this new

coordinating structure can lead to improved and more efficient administration remains to be seen.

In the initial phase, the need for proper coordination of policy administration at various levels (national, regional and local) was less relevant, because all activities, even at the local level, were administered centrally by the CAZ. In the course of time, especially with the transition from camps to residential areas and eventually with the abolition of the CAZ, more and more functions were taken over by local institutions and bodies. The recent memorandum notes that this by no means always took place smoothly and that the administration of policy at local level often leaves something to be desired. However, the government memorandum argues in favour of decentralization and greater participation by the local authorities in policy planning at the local level, while consideration is given to providing the local authorities with more facilities.

#### *Data, research and policy*

During the last decade, it has become increasingly difficult to obtain systematically collected data and research as a scientific basis for policy. With the abolition of the CAZ and the transition to a policy administered almost exclusively through the welfare sector, the flow of data, which had until that stage been kept reasonably up to date, came to a stop. After the mid-sixties it also became more and more difficult to carry out field-work among Moluccans, and the climate for conducting research steadily deteriorated. The result is that, at the present time, crude estimates have to make do even on the most vital points. A great many of the measures proposed by the government in its policy memorandum accordingly lack factual foundation.

The measures designed to reduce unemployment among Moluccans, which is said to be two to three times as high as the national average, may be taken as a good example.

#### *Participation in policy formulation*

Participation in policy formulation has only got under way recently and with difficulty. The Advisory Body's area of competence became confined to social and cultural policy, while the Mixed South Moluccan-Dutch Consultative Committee was set up temporarily with a limited frame of reference that did not extend directly to policy advice; it came to assume something more of the functions of a general advisory body in the course of its existence because it was drawn into a number of topical issues by the government. The collapse of the mixed committee prevented it from evolving into a permanent advisory body as it might have done.

As was apparent from its memorandum and its defence of it during the debate in the Lower House of Parliament, the government strongly advocated the concept of a mixed Moluccan-Dutch advisory consultative body. After the Parliamentary debate, however, it dropped this idea, and a completely Moluccan body will be instituted for general policy advice. The composition of this committee will however once again raise the questions as to how the increasingly internally divided Moluccans in the Netherlands should best be represented.

But although participation by the Moluccan community at a national level is still in its infancy and a number of obstacles will have to be surmounted before the new general advisory body will be able to function, it is fair to say that the Moluccan group has embarked on the path towards participation.

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# CHAPTER 3. RESIDENTS OF SURINAMESE AND ANTILLEAN ORIGIN IN THE NETHERLANDS: THEIR SOCIAL POSITION AND GOVERNMENT POLICY

## 3.0. Background statistical data

When Surinam became independent on 25 November 1975, persons born in Surinam or of Surinamese origin and who were at the time settled in the Netherlands, received Dutch citizenship unless they chose deliberately to become Surinamese citizens. Few opted for the latter: the vast majority of persons of Surinamese origin living in the Netherlands accordingly possess Dutch nationality. This group will subsequently be referred to as Surinamese Dutch.

Pursuant to the Charter for the Kingdom of the Netherlands of 1954, the inhabitants of the Netherlands Antilles have Dutch citizenship. The same applied to Surinamese until 25 November 1975.

Because Surinamese and Antillean Dutch possess Dutch nationality, they have not been subject to systematic registration in the way that foreigners in the Netherlands are registered. Scarcely any statistical data exist on the Surinamese and Antillean Dutch as a group. Even for such a basic statistic as the absolute numbers there exist only calculations and estimates based on indirect statistical material.

The basic source for virtually all calculations and estimates consists of the statistics on migration between the Netherlands and Surinam/Netherlands Antilles. This is shown in the table below in the form of annual net migration figures. In a number of years, the various sources produce slightly different results, but these divergences do not have a significant effect on the totals.

**Table 3.1. Net migration between the Netherlands and Surinam/Netherlands Antilles 1951–1978**

Year	Net immigration to Neths. from Surinam 1.	Net immigration to Neths. from Neths. Antilles 2.	Total (1 + 2) 3.
1951–1955			113*)
1956–1960			571*)
1961–1965			2,197*)
1966	2,301	1,319	3,620
1967	2,425	815	3,240
1968	2,988	657	3,645
1969	4,370	1,132	5,502
1970	5,558	1,277	6,835
1971	7,466	707	8,173
1972	6,313	1,185	7,498
1973	9,035	1,440	10,475
1974	15,674	1,473	17,147
1975	36,537	2,458	38,995
1976	621	2,131	2,752
1977	1,368	2,469	3,837
1978**)	1,777	1,064	2,841

\*) Annual average during that period.

\*\*\*) First 7 months of 1978 only.

Sources: Buitenlandse Migratie  
(Foreign Migration) 1974, p. 13;  
Rapport Werkgroep Migratie  
1976, p. 115;  
Migratie en Begeleiding  
(Migration and Assistance) 1976,  
No. 9, p. 22;  
Statistical Office of the Ministry  
of CRM.

Calculations and estimates of the number of Surinamese and Antillean Dutch residing in the Netherlands are based on these migration statistics, combined with census results in the Netherlands. The latter figures are taken as the starting point, to which the net migration figures in subsequent years are then added.

**Table 3.2. Calculations and estimates of the number of residents of Surinamese and Antillean origin in the Netherlands, 1960–1978**

Year	Residents of Surinamese origin *)	Residents of Antillean origin *)	Total *) (1 + 2)	Source
1.	2.	3.		
1960			12,700	1960 Census Report of the Working Group on Migration of the National Committee on the Population question 1976, p. 18
1964			18,000**)	
1968			30,000**)	
1970	28,985	13,630	42,615	1970 Census Supplementary letter to memorandum of 1978, Information Paper No. 11, p. 122
1971	36,521	14,370	50,891	
1972	42,870	15,578	58,448	
1973	51,881	17,181	69,062	
1974	67,617	18,755	86,372	
1975	104,154	21,221	125,375	
1976	104,775	23,352	128,127	
1977	108,143	25,821	133,964	

\*) Excluding births and deaths.

\*\*\*) Excluding births.

It will be apparent that no account has been taken of births and deaths within the group in the method of calculation shown above, since no systematic data are available. Furthermore, calculations or estimates of the birth factor run into problems of definition: do both parents need to be of Surinamese origin for the child to be classified as belonging to that category, or does one parent suffice, etc.

Consequently, the results of such calculations differ from case to case, and the estimates diverge widely. The Working Group on Migration of the Muntendam Committee arrived at a total of 122,000 Surinamese and Antillean Dutch in 1976; this did take account of mortality (7.5 per thousand a year) but children born in the Netherlands were not included (Report of the Working Group on Migration, 1976, p. 18). The Inter-ministerial Committee for the Coordination of Policy on Immigrants from Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles (ICBM) estimated the number of Dutch Surinamese – 'that is, persons born of Surinamese parents, whether in Surinam or elsewhere' (Positie van Migranten 1977, p. 98) – at between 130,000 and 135,000 in 1977. In 1978 the ICBM put the number of Antilleans currently in the Netherlands at 23,000 (Aanvullende brief op de Nota 1978, p. 121). It is not clear what yardsticks were used in arriving at this latter estimate; the difference of nearly 3,000 with the accumulated migration balances shown in the previous table is striking.

If the latter estimate of the ICBM is retained, a figure is reached of between 153,000 and 158,000 Dutch nationals of Surinamese and Antillean origin.

In all probability several thousand 'illegal' persons of Surinamese nationality will have been added to that total since November 1975, being people who visited the Netherlands after independence and who have not yet obtained a residence permit. Taking all these uncertainties into account, and with due caution, a total of 160,000 may be regarded as realistic.

#### *Concentration in cities*

The greater part of the immigrants from Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles settled and remain in the four cities in the west of the Netherlands.

The data shown below are estimates made by the Working Group on Migration (1976, p. 123).

**Table 3.3**

	Number of residents of Surinamese and Antillean origin as of 1.1.1975	Numbers of migrants of Surinamese and Antillean origin taking up residence during 1972–1974
Amsterdam	25,000	9,800
Rotterdam	13,000	5,400
The Hague	12,500	7,100
Utrecht	4,500	1,500
Total in 4 cities	55,000	23,800
Total in the Netherlands	81,500	35,300

### **3.1. Development of migration from Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles: main issues and official policy**

The complexion of the migratory flow under consideration was and continues to be strongly influenced by the migrants from Surinam; in numerical terms the scale of migration from Surinam between 1969 and 1975 pushed the group of Antillean Dutch into the background. This is reflected in research and the literature. Antillean emigration to the Netherlands has only been the subject of separate investigation in a few cases (Van Amersfoort 1973 and Koot 1977).

Within the Surinamese Dutch category there is a comparable lack of attention in the literature to non-Creole groups. This is attributable to the fact that until 1970 the majority of Surinamese emigrants were Creoles.

Up to that point Hindustani, Javanese and other ethnic groups in Surinam displayed a much lower propensity to migrate.

It is recognized that the literature is relatively one-sided, and it will be attempted to make allowance for this in the remainder of this chapter.

#### **3.1.1. Background to and development of Surinamese and Antillean migration to the Netherlands**

##### **3.1.1.1. Migration from Surinam to the Netherlands**

According to all researchers the history of Surinamese migration to the Netherlands is closely bound up with the colonial traditions of the elite (Van Amersfoort 1968, p. 11; Bovenkerk 1975, p. 6; Biervliet 1974, p. 552, etc.). Before the Second World War, this migration consisted, apart from the administrative elite returning home on leave or permanently, particularly of students whose parents had managed over time to work their way up in the professions, as officials in the colonial civil service, or in other ways. Some pursued studies and training not available in Surinam, while in other cases their parents decided in favour of education in the Netherlands because a Dutch diploma carried more weight, even though similar education was available in Surinam.

This flow of migration assumed larger proportions after the Second World War. Van Amersfoort gives two reasons. In the first place there was a compensation effect after the War on the part of migrants who had been forced to postpone travel to the Netherlands during the War. In the second place, rising living standards in Surinam made it financially possible for a broad middle stratum of society to send their children to the Netherlands for education (Van Amersfoort 1973). The scale therefore changed, but the nature of the migration initially remained the same.

An important event, especially for later periods, was the entry into force of the Charter for the Kingdom of the Netherlands of 1954, under which

Surinamese and Antilleans received de jure Dutch citizenship ('citizens of the Dutch realm') and there were no formal obstacles to their migrating to the Netherlands and settling there.

According to the writers mentioned earlier in this section, a gradual change in the nature of the migration took place in the second half of the fifties. 'The largest part of the migrants consist of Surinamese from the middle strata, but labouring migrants are beginning to make up part of the flow' (Biervliet 1974, p. 553). Bayer, Van Amersfoort and Biervliet all report that between 1956 and 1963 the recruitment campaigns of Dutch enterprises also played a role in the changing composition of the migratory flow. None of these writers, however, indicates the scale or significance of these campaigns in any further detail. On the other hand there is general agreement that industry's experience with these recruitment campaigns 'was less favourable' (Van Amersfoort 1968, p. 15) or 'not particularly favourable' (Biervliet 1974, p. 553), as was fully emphasized in the publicity. 'Large scale repetitions' of these campaigns did not take place.

The total number of Surinamese to have come to the Netherlands under these circumstances was no more than a few hundred.

In the present report it is only possible to examine the causes of Surinamese migration to the Netherlands briefly. It is important to note that from the mid-sixties onwards economic circumstances and prospects in Surinam were not favourable. The gloomy outlook and the restricted scale of the Surinamese economy and society led many to think that they might be able to do better elsewhere. These, in brief, are the most significant push-factors mentioned by researchers (Van Amersfoort 1974, p. 145 ff.; Bovenkerk 1975, p. 16 ff.).

Factors specific to Surinam increase the propensity to migrate: during the course of this century a massive exodus has taken place from the countryside to the town, and research workers regard the migration to the Netherlands as an extension of this migration. The exodus to the Netherlands is further facilitated by such practical factors and circumstances as the increased regularity and cheapness of transport to the Netherlands and the minimization of formal obstacles as a result of the Charter for the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

In addition there are a number of pull-factors in Dutch society: superior educational opportunities, a larger labour market with greater opportunities for advancement, and social security form the most significant elements.

However, this is rather a static list of factors and it by no means explains everything; these are necessary rather than sufficient conditions for migration. More insight is certainly obtained if migration is also analysed as a process with its own momentum. There turns out to be something of a chain reaction, with the initial pioneers blazing a trail for further migrants. Many factors play a role in this regard; of significance is the impression aroused by emigrants among those who remain behind and the information conveyed by migrants to those at home. In 1968 Van Amersfoort suggested that 'the favourable image that the Surinamese have traditionally built up of life in the great world of Western Europe' has been of great importance for the propensity to migrate. And this image is maintained and even strengthened by the emigrants, for they do not wish to gain a reputation at home as failed migrants, and in that sense edit the information they pass on. But it is above all in a practical sense that the early migrants form a 'chain' by means of which subsequent migrants are able to make the jump to the Netherlands more easily: the Surinamese in the Netherlands provide the initial reception for newly-arrived relatives and acquaintances, arrange (temporary) accommodation for them and may even arrange employment. And, perhaps even more importantly, they use their earnings in the Netherlands to finance the journey to the Netherlands of an increasing number of relatives and acquaintances. According to Zielhuis (1973, 1, p. 25), in 20% of all cases in 1972/1973 the cost of coming to the Netherlands was borne by friends or relatives in the Netherlands. During that same period 75% of migrants had family members or close relatives in the Netherlands who arranged their initial reception. In nearly all cases this

involved meeting the newcomer on arrival and arranging accommodation, and in a not insignificant number of cases the already established migrant would also provide the 'general means of subsistence' and would arrange work (Zielhuis 1973, 1, p. 31). This process of chain-migration has been the main cause of Surinamese migrants becoming so strongly concentrated in certain cities and town-quarters. (For the factors in the Dutch situation that have contributed to this concentration see 3.2.3). This chain-process reaches such lengths that The Hague had come to be known as a settlement-town for Hindustani Surinamese and Amsterdam and Rotterdam for Creole Surinamese (Van Amersfoort 1970, p. 113; Biervliet 1974, p. 552).

Finally we need to take note of an external, political factor which cannot be regarded so much as a cause of migration but rather as a factor that led to a rapid acceleration of migration in the seventies. This is the negotiations between the Netherlands and Surinam concerning independence and the persistent discussion in the Netherlands since 1971 about imposing restrictions on immigration. In the mood of panic and political commotion in Surinam prior to independence, in which the ethnic divisions in Surinam gained increasing prominence, many Hindustani and Javanese Surinamese, in particular, decided to go to the Netherlands out of fear of Creole domination after independence. It is generally accepted that many made a premature exit because not all Surinamese considered their prospects in an independent Surinam to be hopeful, and because of the threat that the Netherlands would halt immigration. Bovenkerk characterises the mood of panic in the Netherlands at the rising tide of immigration, and the call for a halt to immigration, together with the massive migration that took place in response, as a classic example of a self-fulfilling prophecy (Bovenkerk 1975, pp. 69-71).

And the facts bear this out: net immigration rose from an average 6,000 during 1970-1972 to 9,000 in 1973 and to peaks of 15,500 and even 36,500 in 1974 and 1975 respectively. By the time Surinam became independent a good third of the Surinamese population had settled in the Netherlands.

The situation changed greatly after Surinam became independent in November 1975. Persons living in Surinam at the time independence was obtained acquired Surinamese nationality and became 'foreigners' under Dutch law. Although in a formal sense migration from Surinam to the Netherlands remains perfectly possible, the flow of migrants has dried up almost completely. The number of return-migrants to Surinam was higher in 1976 than in preceding years (2160 in 1974, 3023 in 1975 and 5143 in 1976), but this reverse flow is still compensated for by a continuation of immigration on a limited scale. This immigration is assumed to be mainly family migration (i.e. family reunification in the Netherlands).

This brings us to a controversial aspect of policy relating to the Surinamese Dutch, and one that is likely to remain controversial, namely return to Surinam. Policy considerations will be examined later; at this stage what is known about return-migration will be outlined briefly.

Studies on repatriation have thrown light on a number of different aspects. A number of studies (Emid-Danoesastro 1965; Sedoc-Dahlberg 1971) have sought to indicate the pre-requisites for return of Surinamese students in the Netherlands. Depending on how the question was posed and how it was qualified, there turned out to be definite desire to return. And it is not only students who profess a desire to return; this is indicated by soundings taken by Verwey-Burke (1971) and Bureau Lagendijk (1974).

It is important to know that a large part of the Surinamese Dutch community is preoccupied with the possibility of returning, irrespective of time scale and conditions. But it is equally as important to know the actual extent of return, what sort of people return, and the capacity of Surinamese society to absorb them. Bovenkerk has attempted to answer this complex of questions. In absolute terms, actual return to Surinam has been growing; but if repatriation levels are related back to the number of Surinamese living in the Netherlands, the percentage 'return probability' is on the decline: before 1967, the percentage returning exceeded 12; from 1967 to 1972 this

percentage dropped steadily to around 7; and for the years 1973–1976 he calculated the following percentages (Bovenkerk 1978, p. 3):

1973: 5.1  
1974: 4.1  
1975: 3.5  
1976: 5.1

With respect to the figure for 1976 it may be noted that its magnitude was influenced by the repatriation of a number of migrants who left Surinam in panic in 1975.

Given the factors determining migration outlined above, a return flow of migrants to Surinam is not to be expected in the short term. The circumstances and outlook of the Surinamese economy and society have remained fundamentally unchanged. Bovenkerk examines the scope for return in terms of the absorptive capacity of the Surinamese labour market, and his conclusions are not encouraging: 'There is still a great demand for high-level specialists (economists, teachers, engineers and doctors) and at middle-level (accountants, graduates from institutes of technology and senior technical schools, social workers and nurses), but there is a considerable surplus of semi-skilled and unskilled labour.' Bovenkerk also notes that employers in Surinam have little information about the supply of labour among Surinamese Dutch wishing to return, and vice versa. And, according to Bovenkerk, Surinamese employers have a clear preference for local labour when there is a choice between locals and Surinamese from the Netherlands (Bovenkerk 1973, pp. 44–45). In brief, the prospects for a successful return are not auspicious.

What sort of people do then return to Surinam? It is universally accepted that the majority of students and Surinamese who have completed their studies in the Netherlands remain there, and there is talk of a brain-drain. Yet it is precisely this category for which meaningful work is available in Surinam. And of the largest group of those to have returned, namely those who never studied in the Netherlands, it is 'revealing that there are very few successful migrants among them (...). The great majority of them can only be regarded as failed emigrants. Some were unable to find employment or were dismissed; others returned on account of problems with their spouse; some returned home because of psychological pressures; others (Creoles) returned home to obtain ritual healing for illness connected with the ethnic Creole religion; and yet others returned because they felt threatened by the indigenous Dutch population, etc.' (Bovenkerk 1976, p. 93).

The contrast between the professed desire to return and its actual realization is so marked that Bovenkerk classified the former as an 'ideology': one is expected to profess the 'return ideology', at least verbally. According to Bovenkerk this is not a new phenomenon: 'the idea has flourished since the emergence of nationalism among Surinamese students in the Netherlands (during the fifties). What is new is that the return ideology is spreading among the lower strata as well in response to the rapidly deteriorating situation of the Surinamese minority in the Netherlands' (Bovenkerk 1974, p. 560).

#### 3.1.1.2. Migration from the Netherlands Antilles to the Netherlands

The history of the Netherlands Antilles and of migration from that area is wholly different from that of Surinam. Van Amersfoort (1973, pp. 178–190) stresses in the first place the totally different economic history of the two areas; the Netherlands Antilles were less of a plantation economy and much more a trading centre. In consequence the Antilles' orientation has always been much wider, focussed less on the Netherlands and more on the United States and Latin America. Koot describes the situation in the Antilles at the beginning of the century as deplorable: 'an extremely unstable economy, great poverty among the majority of the population and emigration on a comparatively large scale' (including to Cuba and Surinam; Koot 1977,

p. 49). After the establishment of the oil industry after 1915 on both Curaçao and Aruba, the situation was transformed: a shortage of labour developed and both islands became powerful centres of attraction for foreign labour. The two islands consistently recorded immigration surpluses during the period 1929 to 1949, and in 1947 over 28% of the inhabitants of Curaçao were non-Antilleans, while in Aruba the figure even exceeded 43% (Koot 1977, pp. 11–12). 1953 saw an important turning-point for the worse in the two largest islands with their one-sided economies: the oil industry embarked on a large-scale automatising and rationalisation of the production process.

During the next decade the number of foreigners on the islands declined sharply and unemployment rose. According to Koot unemployment had already reached 21% by 1960, of which 75% were in the 15–30 year-old category.

Emigration from the two islands with the Netherlands as the major destination (a significant proportion emigrated within the American continent) got under way in the early nineteen-sixties, but received an important boost in 1964–1966 in the form of recruitment campaigns on the islands by Dutch enterprises. According to Koot's figures (1977, p. 17), nearly 2,000 workers were recruited by Dutch companies during the period 1962–1971, of which some 1250 were recruited between 1964 and 1966. Van Amersfoort puts the figures higher: he claims that 2,500 workers and 500 nurses were recruited between 1964 and 1973; the reason for the discrepancy between the figures is not clear (Van Amersfoort 1973). But it is clear that, in comparison with Surinam, Dutch recruitment in the Antilles played a much more important role.

This was particularly the case because, unlike Surinam, the Antilles had no tradition of emigration to the Netherlands. The number of students from the Antilles in the Netherlands must have been very low before the Second World War, and according to Van Amersfoort student-emigration did not get under way until after 1950. According to his estimates there were some 350 university students and approximately 1350 other students from the Antilles in the Netherlands in the early nineteen-seventies.

Taking into account the fact that the figures for 1964–1966 were strongly influenced by recruitment, an examination of net migration between the Netherlands and the Netherlands Antilles during the period 1960–1978 reveals a slow but unmistakable increase in migration, with net immigration levels of over 2,000 being reached in the last three years.

These developments suggest that a similar process of chain-migration got under way. The estimate made by the Dutch authorities of 23,000 Antilleans in 1978 means that 10% of the Antillean population is living in the Netherlands. One can do no more than to speculate about the future pattern of this migration. The Muntendam Committee's prognosis tends to be rather optimistic: 'Given the limited size of the Antillean population and the lesser extent to which this community is oriented towards the Netherlands, it may be assumed that the flow of migration that could develop upon independence will be of only limited proportions in comparison with Surinam' (Bevolking en Welzijn 1977, p. 75).

The report on which this is based assumes 'that irrespective of the manner in which the political relationship between the Netherlands and the Netherlands Antilles may change, migration regulations will be introduced in the not too distant future' (Rapport Werkgroep Migratie 1976, p. 120). Both views appear to me to be relatively unsubstantiated and open to question.

The statistics on migratory movements between the Netherlands and the Netherlands Antilles indicate (following the same methods employed earlier for the Surinamese) that the return percentage of the Antilleans is higher than that of the Surinamese, although still modest in itself. The Ministry of CRM's statistics for 1976 recorded a total of 23,352 residents of Antillean origin in the Netherlands in that year, and a repatriation level of 1707. The return percentage thus stands at a little over seven.

Van Amersfoort (1973) had observed before then that return was more marked among Antilleans than among the Surinamese, which he attributed

largely to the higher standard of living in the Antilles. The experience with other categories of immigrants (Mediterranean workers and Surinamese) suggests rather that migration from the Antilles may be somewhat less 'mature' (in the sense of selective migration according to age and family situation), but that as migration persists the return-percentage falls quickly. Whether the Antilleans will continue then to be attracted by the relatively high average living standards obtaining in the Antilles will depend on the extent to which those returning are afforded opportunities of sharing in that prosperity.

### 3.1.2. *Residents of Surinamese and Antillean origin in the Netherlands and official policy*

In this section, as before, I shall seek to describe the four factors that determine the extent and nature of integration, and thereby ultimately the position of migrants in the new society (Van Amersfoort 1974, pp. 17–82). The factors will, however, be discussed in a different order from that in the previous chapter, in the interests of building up as clear a picture as possible.

#### 1. *Individual immigrants and the degree and nature of their adjustment*

Reference was made above to the fact that the composition of post-war migration from Surinam changed distinctly. '... the elite character has disappeared, not because fewer people from the upper layers of Surinamese society are emigrating than they did some fifteen years ago, but because this number is overshadowed by emigrants from both the middle and lower classes' (Bovenkerk 1975, p. 81). Although little statistical material has been regularly published on the composition of the migration flow, the latter has nevertheless been relatively well documented by research for the early nineteen-seventies (Bovenkerk 1975 and 1976; Zielhuis 1971 and 1973; Lamur 1973).

1. There is a selection according to *geographical origin* in Surinam: 95% of the emigrants come from Paramaribo and the Surinam district. This is not so surprising since some three-quarters of the Surinamese population lives in this area.

2. From the migration statistics for the period 1962 to 1972, there is a clearly discernible decline in the selective nature of emigration with regard to age and sex. Lamur's figures indicate a relative increase in the number of dependents and that more and more children and elderly people are coming to the Netherlands. The same may be noted from the CBS migration statistics (Buitenlandse Migratie 1974, p. 12).

Taken overall, there occurred a clear increase in relative terms of the following categories in the period 1962–1972: (1) children aged between 0 and 14 years (girls as well as boys); (2) women aged between 20 and 29; (3) men and women over 65.

There is a clear decline in relative terms among: (1) men in all age-groups between 15 and 65 years; (2) women in the age-groups between 30 and 65.

The shift in these percentages applies almost exclusively to Surinamese migration; as will be shown later on, Antillean migration remains strongly selective in these respects.

The Working Group on Migration (1976, p. 118) has depicted the age distribution of male migrants between 1972 and 1974 in a graph and compared it with the age distribution for men in Surinam.

There are still clear differences between the two, especially the over-representation of men in the age-group 15–30 and the under-representation of children, but nevertheless it is clearly evident that the migration is of a varied nature.

With regard to the ratio between men and women in Surinamese and Antillean migration to the Netherlands as a whole, it may be noted that from 1968 to 1974 the number of female immigrants slightly exceeded the number of male immigrants (Werkgroep Migratie 1976, p. 115). It may be

assumed that these tendencies persisted beyond that date, and, in line with Bovenkerk, it must be concluded that 'with regard to both sex and age (...) the migrant flow has become more and more representative of the Surinamese population as a whole' (Bovenkerk 1975, p. 81).

3. As far as *ethnic origin* is concerned, Van Amersfoort (1968) traces a direct link to the emancipation process within Surinamese society. The light-coloured Creoles (and smaller groups such as Jews and Chinese) were the earliest in this respect, and they were the first to come to the Netherlands. After the Second World War, however, the Hindustanis and other Creoles also became increasingly emancipated, and began to migrate in increasing numbers. Nevertheless, Hindustani migration for example, formed only a fraction of the whole up to 1967, when it is taken into account that the Hindostanis are the largest ethnic group in Surinam; up to that time there were more than four times as many Creole as Hindustani migrants to the Netherlands (Bovenkerk 1975, p. 78). According to Zielhuis (1973, 1, p. 9) these relationships had already changed substantially by 1972:

	Migration from Surinam to the Netherlands in 1972	Ethnic breakdown of Surinamese population: 1972 Surinamese Census
Creoles	53%	31%
Hindustanis	27%	37%
Indonesians	5%	15%
Others	15%	17%

Hindustani migrants were probably over-represented in the total migration wave up to November 1975, but no statistics are available.

4. Bovenkerk believes one may conclude on the basis of Lamur's and Zielhuis' figures that with respect to *education, occupation and income*, the emigrants may not be as diversified as Surinamese society as a whole, but that there is nonetheless a high degree of diversity among them (Bovenkerk 1975, pp. 80–81).

Koot outlines a totally different picture for Antillean migration to the Netherlands (Koot 1977, p. 17 ff.): there is a clear over-representation of men in migration to the Netherlands in the sixties, the turning point not being reached until 1967 in the case of Curaçao and as late as 1972 in Aruba. As far as age is concerned, there is a marked over-representation of the 18–24 year-old category: 59% for Curaçao during 1962–1972; and nearly 63% for Aruba during 1969–1972. The migration turns out to be 'immature' in other respects as well: only a small percentage are married, and the great majority of migrants migrate by themselves.

At the same time, however, there have been trends towards change over a number of years, which point to a ripening of the migration process.

In general, it may be said that Surinamese migration exhibits diversity, while in the case of Antillean migration the picture is largely dominated by the upper strata (students) and the lower strata (unskilled and untrained workers).

What may one say about the position of these immigrants in Dutch society, the extent and nature of their integration and their preparedness to do so? To answer these questions we must rely on studies carried out among the Surinamese and Antillean Dutch in the Netherlands: Bayer 1965, Van Amersfoort 1968, 1970, 1973A, 1973B, 1974, Sedoc-Dahlberg 1970 and Biervliet 1975.

'The course taken by the adjustment process of the individual Surinamese migrant depends on his initial circumstances', writes Van Amersfoort (1974, p. 149). He goes on to distinguish three significant variables: (1) educational and professional status; (2) length of residence; (3) ethnic background. Combinations of these three factors amount to a great deal of diversity in themselves. He then examines these variables for students on the one hand and persons gainfully employed on the other.

While the students have to come to terms with a number of problems in the initial stages after their arrival, their previous education and the

relatively sheltered and free environment in which they live afford a reasonable guarantee of adjustment after the early days. 'The striking fact about the adjustment process in what is after all a comparatively sheltered category is its strong and apparently inescapable character' (Van Amersfoort 1974, p. 159). This applies according to Van Amersfoort not only to cognitive adjustment but in most cases in an imperceptible way also to adjustment of a normative and aesthetic kind. This frequently becomes apparent only after graduation, when a decision has to be made whether or not to return. It is then, according to Van Amersfoort, that the strongest feelings of ambivalence become apparent, particularly since nationalism and hence return receive strong verbal support within student circles, and pressure is also exerted from Surinam for students to return once they have completed their studies.

Sedoc-Dahlberg has attempted to differentiate the adjustment pattern of Surinamese students somewhat more and to identify explanatory factors for the differences in the adjustment patterns of Surinamese students in the Netherlands.

The factors that turned out to be most strongly correlated with the nature of adjustment in the Netherlands and the question of whether or not students wished to return to Surinam were:

1. the respondent's political orientation; left-wing students turned out to be much more strongly oriented towards Surinam, to have adjusted less fully to the Netherlands and to be more anxious to return;
2. students with parents in the Netherlands exhibited a strong tendency to adjust, were not greatly oriented towards Surinam and displayed little willingness to return.

It is revealing that, on the basis of this research, not one of the factors that are typically related to the situation in the Netherlands (push-factors such as discrimination or housing conditions) proved to be significant. This concurs, moreover, with Bovenkerk's conclusions concerning his research into return migration (1976, p. 92): 'None of the push-factors in the Netherlands – the threatened legal position of the Surinamese there, the difficulty in obtaining accommodation, the problems posed by obtaining and holding on to suitable employment, the difficulties in succeeding in the Dutch school system and the extent to which one feels discriminated against there, or a combination of them – none of these factors really distinguishes those who return from those who do not.' And according to Bovenkerk's study this applies not only to students but also to those in employment.

In analysing the adjustment of those in employment Van Amersfoort (1973) distinguishes between white-collar migrants and (manual) workers. In his view the former come to the Netherlands particularly because of the opportunities for social advancement; they experience considerable problems in the early stages of their stay in the Netherlands (such as finding proper accommodation and adjusting to working patterns). Most however succeed reasonably well once they survive the initial difficulties.

Things are a good deal more difficult for the workers: they are less well prepared and less familiar with the Netherlands and with Dutch culture. The move to the Netherlands is often a shock. According to Van Amersfoort their process of adjustment is often much more awkward. They have virtually no scope for social advancement, while their expectations are often pitched very high.

Van Amersfoort considers the Surinamese woman to be confronted with fewer problems of adjustment in the Netherlands than Surinamese men; the expectations of Surinamese and Dutch women correspond to a greater degree than those of men. This general outline applies principally to the Creole element of the Surinamese community in the Netherlands. According to Van Amersfoort's accounts (1970 and 1973), migrants of Hindustani origin have greater difficulty adjusting in the Netherlands. The cultural differences of this ethnic group with the Netherlands are greater. The emotional world of the Hindustani faith, the countless customs and habits from their original motherland, carefully maintained during their long period of residence in Surinam, and the strong emphasis placed on family ties as an

indissoluble factor, form just a few of the elements that differ fundamentally both from the culture of other ethnic groups in Surinam and from Dutch culture. On the other hand they, more clearly than any other ethnic group of Surinamese origin in the Netherlands, possess a fixed frame of reference within their own culture.

In general, the impression conveyed by Bayer (1965) and Van Amersfoort (1968) is not excessively gloomy.

But the nature and scale of the problems changed after 1972, when employment opportunities shrank rapidly as a result of the continuing economic crisis, and migration from Surinam began to assume massive proportions. Biervliet's account of the emergence of the new 'hossel' subculture among unemployed young Surinamese in Dutch cities, with its elements of drug-taking, crime, and violence, depicts the totally marginal situation and lack of adjustment of a reasonably large group of young people who are afforded few or no opportunities in Dutch society. According to Biervliet (1975, p. 919) lapsing into this type of behaviour is particularly characteristic of untrained young men from the lowest income groups in Surinam after an initial period of trying to find work or schooling. Repudiating both Surinamese and Dutch society, they develop their own code of behaviour characterised by aggressiveness, harshness and the rejection of anything classed as 'White behaviour'. As Biervliet rightly notes, it is a small, non-representative group when taken in the context of the Surinamese community in the Netherlands as a whole. But that such a group should have evolved at all may be taken as an indication of a sharp increase in the problems faced by the Surinamese in the Netherlands.

On the basis of several recent memoranda the ICBM would appear to be fully aware of the greatly increased scale of the problems surrounding young Surinamese in particular. The sharp increase in drug-taking among young Surinamese was the subject of an advisory paper by the ICBM's working group on drugs which was submitted to the Minister for CRM (Problematisch drug gebruik 1977). The subculture of the 'Surinamese junkie' – the group described earlier by Biervliet – is outlined as follows: 'the subculture is based particularly on peer-group solidarity and on the recognition and rejection of cultural elements stemming from Surinam. Visual elements or recognition symbols play a part, such as dress, hair-style, idiom, 'tough' behaviour, manner of drug-taking etc. Being shut out of white society increases their sense of black consciousness and the search for identification with other negro cultures. Soul music from the negro ghettos in the U.S. and reggae music from Jamaica express values to which they respond strongly.

In terms of political ideology, certain groups seek a sense of group consciousness and identity in the struggle for emancipation by the American negro and/or in the Third World's struggle for independence in relation to the great powers. For most young people, however, political consciousness and mobilization is a difficult or excessively difficult process that fails in the short term to produce satisfying results for those involved. Reality shows that in such a dead-end situation it is easier to turn to drugs.

Anyone ending up in this subculture is required to accept the prevailing values and norms. The prospects for earning a livelihood within this subculture range from irregular work to protracted unemployment, including hawking, selling Surinamese food during festivities, card playing, gambling, prostitution, pimping, drug-trafficking, pick-pocketing and shop-lifting.

As a way of life it may be characterised by the attempt to turn material and immaterial things to pecuniary account and to use them to one's own advantage – a sort of business instinct known in the sub-culture as 'hosselen'. Mutual relationships need also to be seen in this light, in which prestige, money and drugs – each in relation to the other – play a dominant role' (Problematisch druggebruik 1977, p. 10).

According to the memorandum, the numbers of young Surinamese taking dangerous drugs have risen rapidly in recent years: Surinamese drug-takers were estimated to form about 20% of the total number of drug-takers in the

Netherlands in 1977. This would amount to some 2,000 young Surinamese addicts concentrated in a few cities.

The memorandum concludes that genuinely effective assistance to these young people can only be extended if that assistance is able to change the circumstances giving rise to drug-taking. And this in turn involves the provision of reasonable opportunities for proper accommodation, work and training.

The latter brings us back to the set of problems which effect not only drug-users but the entire group of young people (and to a large extent adults as well).

The recent memorandum 'Young Surinamese migrants' (1978) by the ICBM's Study group refers clearly to the inadequacy of current policy: 'The existing regulations dealing with under-privilege in the fields of education, employment, general and vocational training prove inadequate in scope for reducing the problems faced by young Surinamese in these areas. Many of these measures fail to reach these young immigrants or are insufficiently flexible to enable the immigrants to benefit from them. A number of special measures specifically directed towards the Surinamese group have been found necessary. But in general they were too often too limited in scope, were implemented too late or were threatened with abolition or having their financial support cut' (Nota jeugdige Surinaamse migranten 1978, p. 52). The memorandum follows this up with a series of recommendations for change.

But if we view the question of Surinamese and Antillean migration to the Netherlands from a greater distance and compare it with, say, the difficulties initially faced by Moluccans or Mediterranean workers, it should be noted that in a number of ways the individual Surinamese or Antillean is better equipped on arrival to adjust to the new society. The knowledge of Dutch – at least among a large section of the group – is superior, and the legal status of Surinamese and Antillean Dutch is better than that of the Moluccans or Mediterraneans.

Whether these initial advantages can in fact be exploited depends, however, to a large extent on the opportunities provided by Dutch society; and in this regard many of the Surinamese and Antillean Dutch arrived at a time (after 1972) when it has been increasingly difficult for society to be forthcoming.

## *2. The immigrant group and the institutions established by it*

The principal characteristics of the migrant community have been outlined in the previous section. It is, however, important to note once more that in comparison with say the Moluccan community, the term immigrant group has much less meaning in the case of the Surinamese and Antilleans.

The current body of migrants of Surinamese origin in the Netherlands is extremely heterogeneous, with respect both to age and to duration of residence. Furthermore there are other factors of a dividing nature among the Surinamese, such as differences in ethnic origin and religion. One can scarcely if at all speak of a group in the sociological sense of the word.

This is mirrored almost exactly in the institutions the Surinamese have established. The Creole element has its own clubs and return bodies. Much the same applies in the case of the Hindustanis, although there is more emphasis on cultural and religious organizations. The members of these clubs and associations form more or less loose collections of networks, and these organizations rarely have many members or supporters. Ethnic distinctions are also reflected to a certain extent in the Surinamese Welfare Foundations, although there has been cooperation and consultation for a number of years now, including the 'national platform'. This was partly brought about by the advantage seen in solidarity in dealing with the Dutch authorities and especially with sources of subsidization.

One of the striking features about Surinamese organizations in the Netherlands according to Van Amersfoort is the extent to which they are

tied to personalities, which in turn tends to make them unstable and to have a limited range (Van Amersfoort 1974, p. 159 ff). All sorts of activities depend heavily on certain leading figures for getting off the ground and being kept going. This is true of both the Hindustani and the Creole group (Van Amersfoort 1970 and 1974).

There has been an enormous increase in the number of Surinamese organizations in the Netherlands in recent years, of which a striking number are concerned with return (for a survey of Surinamese organizations of various kinds see Jansen 1976, p. 323).

To date the broadest common denominator linking Surinamese organizations would appear to be resistance towards official Dutch policy, which the Surinamese representatives claim is too much concerned with integration; pays too little attention and provides too few facilities for remigration; fails to permit the Surinamese in the Netherlands to participate sufficiently in policy formulation and does too little to reduce the under-privilege of Surinamese in the Netherlands (see for example: *Alternatieve Meerjarennota* 1977; Hendriks 1977, Roseval 1976, Span'noe, recent volumes). These views are however subject to a certain degree of criticism (see 3.2.5).

### *3. Individuals in the host society and their preparedness to accept newcomers*

There are indications that there has been a good deal of change in the Netherlands since 1970 with regard to the attitude and behaviour of individual Dutch persons towards immigrants, and that the extent to which Dutch people are prepared to accept immigrants into society and to accept them has diminished.

There have, of course, always been voices of protest in the Netherlands warning against the dangers of immigrants of differing ethnic and cultural background for 'everything that Dutch society stands for, including the historically-evolved culture and the intellectual heritage as expressed in the prevailing values and norms' (Bruyn: 'The right to apartheid; an introduction to the problems in the Netherlands, 1965). And while there may have been few who argued outright in favour of an apartheid-system, there were many more who had argued for some time for putting a stop to or severely restricting immigration and for encouraging repatriation (see for example the journal 'Tal en Last'). Such voices were not however taken seriously by general public opinion before the nineteen-seventies, and even less did they strike a responsive chord in Dutch political circles.

But when the sharp increase in immigration from Surinam began to coincide with the economic recession in the Netherlands, the call for a halt to the recruitment of foreign workers and the 'regulation' of Surinamese migration began to be widely echoed in the press and in the political arena. Bovenkerk provides a good summary of the change in attitude among ministers and other politicians towards Surinamese migration to the Netherlands:

September 1971: two members of a parliamentary delegation returning from Surinam, Van Lier and Mommersteeg, raise the possibility of a halt to immigration for the first time.

November 1971: Parliament votes in favour of the appointment of an official committee drawn from the three sections of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to provide recommendations on migration, especially the desirability of restricting migration.

April 1972: The Minister for CRM, Engels, informs a Dutch press conference that the introduction of a visa requirement for citizens from other parts of the Kingdom has top priority.

December 1972: Minister Van Agt states in an interview that the Constitution should be altered so as to enable immigration to be stopped.

The possibility of restricting admission had by then been taken up extensively and for some time by the press.

Biervliet et al. (1975, p. 337 ff.) write that two distinctly opposed viewpoints crystallised from 1971/72 onwards. 'The first of these wants to call a halt to immigration or at least to exclude certain categories of immigrants (such as those without work or accommodation or persons with a criminal record), as well as encouraging return migration. The second viewpoint accepts immigration as it is now – until independence – and supports the introduction of emancipatory measures in order to combat the formation of a black sub-proletariat (...). Both views (...) were thoroughly discussed in the Biesheuvel Cabinet, as a result of which two committees were appointed which, working in camera, were to work up the respective viewpoints into policy proposals; this would then enable a political decision to be made later. The Mok Committee was appointed, consisting largely of lawyers, which was required to draw up admission regulations.'

At the same time the Hendriks Committee was appointed to make recommendations concerning reception policy. The reports of the two committees were never made public (Biervliet et al. 1975, pp. 337–338).

When the Den Uyl Cabinet subsequently came down in favour of following the second line of policy and refrained from unilaterally abrogating the Charter of the Kingdom of the Netherlands there remained a strong political element in favour of restrictions on admission and the encouragement of return of which Drees jr. was the most outspoken proponent (Democratic Socialist (D.S.'70)).

On the one hand, the public discussion among politicians as to whether or not migration should be restricted will have reflected what was being thought and felt in broad layers of Dutch society; on the other hand, it may be assumed that the public utterances by a number of politicians against further Surinamese migration to the Netherlands will have contributed towards a more negative attitude among the Dutch public as a whole towards Surinamese and Antillean migration. While it is not possible to be clear about the nature of this interaction, the result is virtually beyond doubt.

Biervliet et al. (1975, p. 338) report the fact that 'in response to a question in a NIPO survey in 1972, no less than two-thirds of the Dutch population replied that they supported an admissions scheme along the lines of the limitations imposed on Dutch settlement in Surinam'.

Other surveys of the attitudes of Dutch people towards foreigners in general and Surinamese in particular, and records of discriminatory behaviour by the Dutch towards members of these groups, point to a deterioration in the climate for immigrants during the seventies. Unfortunately the surveys rarely if ever permit proper comparison, so that comparisons must be based on interpretations and impressions.

Surveys conducted in 1968 and 1969 still convey a reasonably favourable image of the relationship between the indigenous community and foreigners in the Netherlands. Bovenkerk summarizes the results of the attitudinal survey carried out by the Netherlands Centre for Marketing Analyses in 1968 as follows:

'Our own group is described more favourably than foreign groups. Our attitude towards foreign groups is one of condescending friendliness. We attribute scarcely any unfavourable attributes to racial groups. (...) Our attitudes towards long-haired persons and Turks tend, however, to be negative' (Bovenkerk 1972, p. 8). Bagley conducted research into racial prejudice in the Netherlands at the same time and reached similar conclusions: on the basis of his prejudice-indicator the Dutch proved to be less racist than the English. There did, however, turn out to be considerably more hostility towards Moroccans than towards Surinamese (Bagley 1973, pp. 188–207).

Bovenkerk and Bovenkerk-Teerink (1972) wondered whether, and to what extent, prejudice and stereotyped attitudes were reflected in the Dutch daily press (1963–1970), and they too confirm that, in comparison with other groups, the Surinamese and Antilleans do not come off too badly. 'Reporting in Dutch daily newspapers on the criminality of ethnic minorities is discriminatory. This is clearly the case where Turks and Moroccans are concerned: their crimes appear with disproportionate frequency in the

papers, and disproportionately often on the front pages. The fact that a Turk or Moroccan was involved appears disproportionately often in the headlines to these articles. Crimes by Surinamese and Antilleans also appear disproportionately often in the newspapers, but articles on their crimes do not appear on the front-pages more often than articles on crimes by Dutch people. The well-known complaint that when Surinamese and Antilleans are involved in a crime their national origins often appear in the headline, proves to be unfounded (Bovenkerk and Bovenkerk-Teerink 1972, V–VI).

In 1972, the Inter-Church Broadcasting Association (IKOR) televised a series of programmes on ethnic minorities in the Netherlands. This was accompanied by a survey into the attitude of the 'average Dutchman' towards these ethnic minorities, which sought at the same time to determine the effect of the series on the 'average viewer'. The conclusions reached by the survey are interesting on both counts: 'Without wishing (or being able) systematically to describe the existing pattern of the attitudes and opinions held by Dutch persons towards these minority groups or the extent to which they are prejudiced, there is every reason to believe that substantial sections of the Dutch community entertain illfounded images of these ethnic minorities. These images cover a wide number of aspects of the individual and group-related life-styles of members of minority groups. An important cause of prejudice and its perpetuation appears to be the perceived economic threat that the minority groups pose for the Dutch as competitors at this time of weak economic activity' (Houdingen van Nederlanders, 1972, p. 30).

Turks and South Moluccans score the most negatively on the 'social distance scale' in this survey, but are closely followed by Surinamese. In response to the question as to whether foreign workers should remain in the Netherlands or should leave, 51% replied that they should leave while 10% had no opinion. The main explanation given related to employment. The same question in relation to Surinamese produced a negative response among 35% of those questioned, while 18% had no opinion. This is one conclusion resulting from the survey.

A second conclusion to emerge from the survey is of particular interest to those concerned with providing the Dutch public with information on ethnic minorities: 'Persons who watched one or more of the IKOR programmes generally turned out to be people with a subtler approach towards minority groups than those who did not watch any of the programmes. They do, however, constitute only a small part of the Dutch public and should *on no account* be regarded as being particularly tolerant of minority groups in an absolute sense (...). This profile of the viewing-public, when taken in conjunction with its composition according to age and education (relatively old, and relatively many viewers of ULO (advanced elementary education level) could provide an explanation for the *recorded* increase in intolerance towards minority groups among viewers at the conclusions of the series. At least in so far as the latter is expressed in opinions and attitudes.

Non-viewers generally displayed less change during the time that the series was on, and certainly did not demonstrate the consistent hardening of attitudes apparent among viewers' (Houdingen van Nederlanders, 1972, p. 31). The programmes therefore had the opposite effect from what the producers had intended.

An attitudinal survey which Panorama commissioned the Dutch Foundation for Statistics to conduct among Dutch informants on Surinamese on the eve of Surinam's independence in November 1975 confirms the negative tendency noted in the IKOR survey. The social distance scale applied in that survey yields discouraging results. The conclusions state that 'taken as a whole, the replies form a negative picture', and the survey also revealed how little the 'average Dutchman' knows about the Surinamese and their country of origin. (Nederland en de Surinamers 1975, pp. 4–8). It might be possible to investigate whether there is a link between this lack of knowledge and the IKOR survey's conclusion that

exposure to additional information led to greater intolerance, as well as investigating the nature of that link.

Luning's comparative research into the attitudes of uniformed Amsterdam police and Amsterdam Public Transport staff provides a first step in that direction. The main object of her research was to establish the extent to which direct contact with Surinamese (in their capacity as policemen) influenced the attitudes of officers of the law. Luning detected no significant difference of attitude towards Surinamese among police officers in a district where there were many Surinamese and one where there were few (Bijlmer and North Amsterdam). Furthermore, she detected no significant differences of attitude between the uniformed Amsterdam police and Amsterdam Public Transport Staff. But while this indicated that the uniformed police were no more prejudiced towards the Surinamese than a comparable occupational group in the Amsterdam community, it also revealed that prejudice within both groups was 'shockingly' strong. 'Some of the results give pause for thought. Twelve of the 66 policemen interviewed and seven of the 22 Transport staff exhibited extreme hostility towards Surinamese and some voiced opinions that were unmistakably racist. But these figures are not so important in this context. Among others as well I would suddenly come across stereotyped thinking and rationalisations at variance with the generally 'tolerant' attitudes they expressed. On the basis of my research, I can no longer subscribe to the tenor of Bagley's research that prejudice towards coloured people is of little account in the Netherlands; I certainly did encounter such prejudice' (Luning, 1976, p. 72; see also Bovenkerk, 1978, pp. 136-165).

Attitudinal surveys such as those referred to above must of course be treated with caution, for the debate continues within the social sciences as to what such surveys really measure and especially what relationship there is between an attitude (in this instance an attitude measured in accordance with verbal behaviour) and actual behaviour. Less research has been conducted in the Netherlands on this latter point, i.e. discriminatory behaviour in practice.

In 1968 Bagley carried out a number of situation tests in the Netherlands in which a Surinamese, a Yugoslav and a Dutchman, who were selected for their similarity in all but outward physical respects, were made to apply for a vacancy for an accountant. The Surinamese was discriminated against in only 18% of the cases, but the Yugoslav in 32% of the cases, both in relation to the white Dutchman. The number of observations does not, however, justify the use of percentages, since the survey consists of 22 relevant observations from a total of 40 tests. Similar tests (60 in all) were carried out with respect to obtaining accommodation. In this instance, the percentage of cases in which the Surinamese was discriminated against was somewhat higher, but still below the percentage for the Yugoslav, who was discriminated against to much the same extent as in the job application (Bagley 1973, pp. 208-218).

One cannot be very definite about the conclusions to be drawn from all this, for the number of tests on which the findings are based is very small; but it would seem clear that discrimination existed by 1968.

The research carried out by Bovenkerk (1977, pp. 58-75), who conducted a much greater number of comparable tests with applications for job vacancies in Amsterdam in 1976, provides us with surer ground.

In 162 tests in which a white Dutchman and a Surinamese applied for the same position he found no evidence of discrimination in 74% of cases; in 22% of the cases the Surinamese was discriminated against, and in 4% the Dutchman. A notable difference from Bagley's research is that the 'white foreigner' (a Spaniard) was less discriminated against than the Surinamese: in 116 tests the percentages were 79, 15 and 4 respectively. It should be noted however that what was being measured was discrimination 'in the first instance', since the applications were not pursued after the initial contact had been made.

He therefore concludes that racial discrimination does exist in the Netherlands, but his technically well-constructed research did not throw up

any clear explanation for the nature of this discrimination. There turned out to be no significant difference between the degree to which discrimination occurred on racial grounds (the Surinamese) or according to ethnic origin (the Spaniard); discrimination was not therefore based exclusively on race or skin colour. Nor can it be explained exclusively in terms of cultural attitudes, since in that case discrimination would need to occur (in equal measure) at all times (including times of shortage of certain types of labour) and at all levels of the labour market, and this is not the case. On average, there was even discrimination in favour of the Surinamese and foreigners in higher-grade occupations (office staff); and in occupations where demand exceeded supply there was considerably less discrimination against them than in occupations where the labour market was 'quiet' or where there was a large availability of labour.

The latter point, in particular, strikes me as an important finding, for members of minority groups with little training and in the lowest occupational groups stand the greatest chance of being discriminated against at times when work is scarce.

#### *4. The host society and the institutions set up by it to deal with the immigrants, with special reference to official policy*

During the nineteen-sixties migration from Surinam and the Antilles was still on a fairly limited scale and was not regarded as posing particular problems. Little official attention was specifically directed towards Surinamese and Antillean Dutch in the Netherlands. There was a 'migrant groups' department within the Ministry of CRM, which formed part of the Division Community Work for specific groups, and which was concerned with social and cultural work for Antilleans and Surinamese in the Netherlands

As expressed in 1969, policy remained based on the underlying principle that 'the assimilation of groups is primarily a local matter', and therefore 'attention needs to be devoted to this question within the framework of the local advisory and consultative bodies' (Explanatory Memorandum, CRM Budget 1969). In practice this amounted to the fact that, in line with what happened in the case of other minority groups the Ministry of CRM would wait for private initiatives, which it might then subsidize, usually in conjunction with the local authorities. Such initiatives came fairly late on and initially occurred in the big cities: Rotterdam (1965, Foundation for the Social Interests of Surinamese), Amsterdam (1976, Welsuria), The Hague (1969, Foundation for Surinamese) and Utrecht (1969, Welsuru).

According to the Advisory Committee on Surinamese and Antillean migration (1972, p. 35), there were in 1972 five institutions working on behalf of the Surinamese, with a total staff of 19, and five working on behalf of the Antilleans, with a total staff of eight. In October 1966, the Advisory Committee for Liaison and Consultation with respect to Assistance for Surinamese in the Netherlands was established; this was an external advisory body under the chairmanship of an official from the Ministry of CRM designed to provide policy recommendations to that Ministry. It was this advisory committee (as well as other bodies) which began increasingly to call for more official support to deal with the under-privilege of Surinamese and Antilleans that was apparent in certain areas (including unemployment, initial reception and accommodation). At the end of the sixties more strongly interventionist policies were being called for not only by researchers (Bayer 1965, Van Amersfoort 1968, Roseval 1970) but also within official circles.

In 1972, the mixed committee of senior officials from Surinam, the Netherlands Antilles and the Netherlands that had been appointed in response to the motion proposed by the M. P. Th. van Lier, reached the conclusion that official policy was not adequate. 'Dutch society is inadequately equipped to deal with an unplanned and unregulated influx of foreigners differing in some way or another from the average Dutchman.

And precisely because these differences are characterised in the case of Surinamese and Antillean citizens by a complex of factors such as skin-colour, previous training, language knowledge and behavioural patterns, they are more exposed to the consequences of these differences than are others. In practice, the general development of policy on migration from Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles has been marked by a lack of facilities geared to their needs, especially in the social area' (Rapport van de Adviescommissie 1972, p. 31).

The officials make this latter observation forcefully: the report notes that recommendations had been made some time before by the Advisory Committee for Liaison and Consultation with regard to measures in the labour market and improved reception and accommodation, but that they had not as yet been taken up.

Only in the area of social welfare did the committee note signs of any activity, but here too the official response had been tardy: 'Welfare work in the true sense for Surinamese and Antilleans is still in the early stages. The initial facilities were only provided when unmistakable problems had already arisen' (p. 34). It is fair to describe policy up to that time as passive and reactive.

The civil service advisory committee submitted its critical report in November 1972, but it fell into a political vacuum: the Cabinet had tendered its resignation and left the matter for its successor. The formation of a new government took a long time, and once Den Uyl's new Cabinet had tackled the most urgent matters and was ready to deal with the minorities' problem, it was confronted by the oil-crisis. In the meantime, the Hendriks Committee had worked out new arrangements for the reception and further assistance of migrants from the West, but this report was waiting to be looked at by the Cabinet as well.

Meanwhile the problems had been accumulating as a result of the growing stream of migrants from Surinam, for whose reception and subsequent assistance no comprehensive measures had as yet been introduced. The municipal authorities in the largest cities, who were forced to deal with the bulk of the new migrants, had been overloaded for some time and complained vociferously.

In 1974 the Den Uyl Cabinet took a number of basic political decisions: policy became based on the premise that there should be no restriction of migration prior to Surinam's gaining independence, and that comprehensive policy measures needed to be implemented as soon as possible to deal with the reception and further assistance of citizens of the Netherlands Kingdom. Such a plan had in fact already been drawn up by the Hendriks Committee. This implied that activity would need to be considerably stepped up at official level, and that a totally new administrative structure would be required for handling the policies proposed. The shape these policies would take was not immediately apparent to the outsider, because the Hendriks Committee report was not made public.

The most visible aspect of the new policies was the new organisational structure for both formulation and implementation of policy: in June 1974, the Minister for CRM appointed the Inter-ministerial Committee for Policy Coordination with respect to Citizens of the Kingdom of the Netherlands (ICBR: after Surinam became independent 'Citizens of the Netherlands Kingdom' was changed to 'Migrants from Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles' and the initials changed to ICBM). A non-civil servant with extensive administrative experience was appointed as chairman of the committee, but for the rest the committee consisted of senior officials drawn from all the ministries concerned with Surinamese and Netherlands Antilleans: the Ministries of CRM, Education and Science, Social Affairs, Justice, Home Affairs, Housing and Physical Planning, Finance and the 'cabinet' for Antillean-Dutch affairs. The functions of this committee, which advises the minister with coordinating responsibilities (the Minister of CRM), shed light on its importance and the main lines of the policies that were to be adopted later on:

1. the coordination of the various ministries' activities with regard to Surinamese and Antilleans living in the Netherlands; the identification of problems in the housing, employment and living spheres of these migrants and the submission of proposals for resolving them;
2. to promote the formulation and realization of multiyear plans;
3. to submit proposals concerning the remigration of citizens of the Kingdom of the Netherlands thereby promoting development of Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles (Overzicht interne adviesorganen, 1977, N26).

The ICBM is empowered to appoint working groups to deal with specific aspects with a view to advising the ICBM. By the end of 1975 working groups had already been appointed under the aegis of the ICBM for (1) Education, (2) Training, job adjustment and vocational training, (3) General Policy, (4) Remigration.

Later the following were added: (5) Religious Guidance, (6) Drugs, (7) Housing, (8) Position of the Surinamese in the Netherlands. (The principal sources for the above and for what follows are: Lower House of Parliament, Migration of and Assistance for Citizens of the Kingdom of the Netherlands 13 254, nos. 1–24, 1974–1977 (reports of discussions between administrators and the special parliamentary committee for migration of and assistance for Surinamese and Netherlands Antilleans, hereafter referred to as TK 13 254, ...); and 'Surinamese and Antillean Migration to the Netherlands', ICBM background paper, hereafter referred to as Information paper no. ...).

The ICBM's first task was the reception and housing of the growing inflow of migrants from Surinam: a 'dispersed settlement policy.' The earliest formulation of this new policy is to be found in an annex submitted to the special parliamentary committee (TK 13 245, no. 1, p. 7): 'Policy is directed towards settling citizens from the overseas territories in a responsible manner, including dispersal on the basis of the migrants' own free choice. 'Dispersal' is taken to mean dispersed settlement not only over the country as a whole, but also within the conurbation of western Holland and within the towns, in close collaboration with the municipalities and private bodies. In realizing these objectives an optimal compromise will need to be struck between the wishes and possibilities of the migrant, housing opportunities, the availability of employment, education, and community help.'

In autumn 1974, at the ICBM's recommendation, the Central Office for the Implementation of Settlement Policy for Citizens of the Kingdom of the Netherlands (CB) was appointed temporarily (until 1980) within the Ministry of CRM, taking up office on 1 January 1975.

The CB's prime concern is the immediate reception of Surinamese migrants in reception centres, so that they may later be offered permanent accommodation, taking account of the policy objectives mentioned above. A further task laid down for the CB consists of re-housing citizens from the overseas territories already living in the Netherlands who wish to move. Finally, the CB was expected to assume temporary responsibility for follow-up care and assistance for those it had helped to find housing or who were still in the CB's reception centres.

The CB is clearly equipped to act purposefully: it is given its own open budget and has many powers. It has established three centres for the initial reception in the Netherlands, from where the migrants are accommodated temporarily in pensions found by the CB and under contract to it. Arrangements are then made for permanent accommodation. Initially on a voluntary basis, the Ministry of Housing and Physical Planning attempted to persuade municipalities and housing corporations to provide housing for citizens from the territories. First, municipalities of over 25,000 inhabitants were approached, the guiding principle being 'grouped deconcentration'. The major factor behind the general concept of dispersal was the need to relieve pressure on the big cities in the western conurbation. When there was insufficient response to the appeal for voluntary cooperation, the 5% regulation (which had been used for settling repatriates from Indonesia) was made applicable; under this regulation 5% of all Housing Act dwellings

constructed with government subsidies must be reserved for citizens from the territories (Zomerdijs 1974, 1976 and 1977).

Apart from these specific measures in the field of housing, measures were also introduced in other areas. In order to improve opportunities for recently-arrived immigrants, the scope of a number of existing measures was extended to them, including the 1971 migration regulation and the 30% wage bill regulation of 1973. At the same time fresh initiatives were taken, specifically directed towards the new group: ten special employment mediators were to be appointed, testing and training centres were to be established and training was to be encouraged within companies. Consideration was given to special measures in the field of education: the allocation of additional staff to schools with many Surinamese and Antillean children, the subsidization of the Bijlmer project run by the Counselling and Assistance Centre in Amsterdam, etc. (TK 13 254, no. 1, pp. 7–12).

It may therefore be observed that the intention and resolve to tackle the problems clearly existed, but they came late. The report of the meeting of the special parliamentary committee of 12 November 1975 states: 'The Minister explained that the enormous growth in the number of immigrants from Surinam, as well as the large number of registrations with the Central Office for the Implementation of Settlement Policy (CB), had produced considerable problems for reception and assistance. In contrast to the expectations held at the beginning of the year, the number of immigrants arriving in 1975 will total around 40,000 (as against 20,000 in 1974). In recent weeks some 50% of the immigrants have registered with the CB (compared with 20% at the beginning of the year). There are at present 6,500 people in the reception centres. By the end of the year sufficient reception capacity will be required for an estimated 9,000–10,000 people. It does not need to be demonstrated that it is becoming steadily more difficult to find new accommodation' (TK 13 254, no. 8, p. 1). At that time the CB had contracted 90 reception centres. An interview with De Vos (Chairman of the ICBM) and Breddels (Director of the CB) in De Nederlandse Gemeente indicated clearly that there was little question any longer of properly planned activity: 'According to Mr. De Vos, everything else has been overshadowed by the overwhelming inflow of citizens from Dutch territories, including the good intentions of community assistance and guidance and the efforts to prevent settlement in municipalities where there was insufficient work. Three times as many arrived as had been anticipated. Moreover, too many came at once. As a result the dispersal scheme is in a fix' (....). 'According to Messrs. De Vos and Breddels, any municipalities where building is under way may be regarded as candidates for the settlement of citizens from the territories.

The state of the labour market and whether the municipality numbers over or under 25,000 inhabitants is no longer relevant (Zomerdijs 1975, p. 561). By November 1975 the CB had arranged accommodation for 2,000 migrants outside the four largest municipalities; 13,500 people were still waiting for arrangements to be made. The inflow of migrants came to a halt at the end of 1975, when the final state of affairs was that there were 94 reception centres accommodating some 7,500 people. The CB had 15,000 outstanding applications for accommodation (TK 13 254, no. 9). In the report on 1975 and policy intentions for 1976 (TK 13 254, no. 9; Information paper no. 6), the policy objectives for 1975 were reviewed and reaffirmed for 1976:

1. the host society must acquire insight into the immigrants' life-style and background. Municipal bodies and local organizations coming into contact with what is for them an unfamiliar group need to be informed on the subject;
2. immigrants should be informed on Dutch society, since it is new to them;
3. immigrants should be given the same opportunities as the indigenous population to enable them to lead a decent existence and to develop their capabilities in a balanced manner;
4. possibilities for remigration should be investigated and promoted.

It is fair to say that during 1975 the authorities were preoccupied with the practical problems of immediate reception and accommodation. A number

of important original objectives were pushed into the background, such as 'grouped deconcentration' and the aim of settling citizens from the territories only in localities where employment, educational facilities and other basic facilities were available. In consequence, the policy intentions for 1976 tend to be more concerned with bridging the gap and gradually providing supplementary facilities.

In March 1977 the Minister for CRM, in his capacity as Minister with coordinating responsibilities, submitted a policy document to the Lower House of Parliament entitled 'The Position of Immigrants from Surinam in the Netherlands and medium term policy'. There had been pressure for such a document for some time, but its realization had been delayed for a long time because the ICBM had been overloaded with practical activities. The underlying principles for long-term policy as formulated in the paper do not contain any new elements; only the formulation differs in places.

1. 'Government policy is based on the assumption that a large number of Dutch citizens from Surinam have settled here permanently.'

2. 'Some are considering returning to Surinam. In the case of those expressing such a desire the government will, in consultation with the Surinamese government, endeavour to provide facilities so that any possible existing obstacles may be eliminated or forestalled.'

3. Those remaining should be accepted into Dutch society; 'by such acceptance is meant the process whereby immigrants are provided with the opportunity, on the basis of their own abilities and aspirations, to establish a place for themselves in society and to function in it in an acceptable manner along with other groups'; they should enjoy the same scope for social development as Dutch residents.

4. A programme of social welfare activities in the narrow sense will not suffice to achieve this objective; the preconditions that will need to be fulfilled in order to place the Surinamese on equal footing in Dutch society can only be created by the 'combined efforts of numerous departments, local authorities and private organizations.'

5. In this regard the government had in mind drawing the municipalities into administration and adopting an approach under which general public service organizations would be involved in the provision of assistance as far as possible; 'In order to achieve the prescribed policy objectives attention will be particularly paid to the local circumstances with which the Surinamese are confronted. It will be necessary for the former overseas citizens to be fully accepted as local residents.'

'The primary responsibility for their welfare rests with the local authorities and bodies. It is less easy to judge from the central government level than it is at the local level, where officials are closer to the public, whether particular residents are similarly placed and receive the same treatment as others. Local authorities will in future be asked to a greater extent than hitherto to indicate, in consultation with the relevant organizations in society, which measures need to be introduced at the local level in order to achieve the policy objectives laid down.' And on the choice between group-oriented and general approaches: 'Some bodies originally managed by both immigrants and non-immigrants have gradually become the exclusive province of residents of Surinamese origin. This has placed the authorities which subsidise such bodies in a dilemma. On the one hand, they take the view that existing bodies of a non-group or general nature must be able to carry out their functions for all members of the public. Furthermore there are no grounds for considering the Surinamese residents to form an exclusive community standing in need of separate facilities. On the other hand it is recognized that, given the existence of the vacuum referred to earlier, the existing Surinamese welfare bodies are required and will remain necessary for some time. The government considers that the extent to which the interests of Surinamese Dutch persons can be taken care of by general bodies should be considered case by case according to local conditions' (Positie van Migranten, Informatieblad no. 9, pp. 89-91).

In her 'Supplementary letter to the memorandum' (Informatieblad no. 11, July 1978), the Minister for CRM – in response particularly to the criticism

from the Welfare Bodies of the memorandum of 1977 (for that criticism see 3.5.5) – returned specifically to the question of whether the problems of the Surinamese and Antillean Dutch should be approached in a group-specific or general manner. The position adopted earlier is explained in the letter: 'The functions performed by the welfare bodies for the Surinamese in drawing attention to their problems, mediating on their behalf and attending to the group's interests will remain useful and necessary as long as the situation has not yet been reached where residents of Surinamese origin are automatically treated as fully equal fellow citizens.' With regard to the provision of social services and to social and cultural activities, she continues to express a preference for these functions to be handled by existing (specialist) organizations, which should accordingly be provided with the necessary expertise to carry out these tasks for members of minority groups. But the matter must be treated with caution: 'For the present we will seek to encourage local collaboration where possible and only take decisions about the granting of subsidies once the general and group-specific bodies and the local authorities have reached an effective and workable understanding'. Thus the government does not have in mind any particular time limit with regard to the possible transfer of functions to general bodies.

A few remarks are in order concerning Dutch remigration policy. Reference was made earlier to the fact that in recent years there has been pressure not only in Dutch society generally (especially among the original proponents of migration restrictions) but also among Surinamese migrants in the Netherlands for an on-going remigration policy. Official policy documents continue to state that policy must be based on the possibility of remigration for those who wish to return, and that the Dutch authorities must extend assistance in this regard, despite the fact that since 1974 the authorities have clearly assumed that the majority of migrants will wish to settle permanently in the Netherlands.

Almost immediately after Surinam became independent, the Interministerial Consultative Committee for Remigration to Surinam (the Van Dam Committee) was appointed in January 1976 by the Minister for Development Cooperation, to whom remigration policy had been delegated. The Committee was charged with the preparation of official and ministerial consultations with Surinam on remigration. Dutch policy was based on the premise that an effective remigration policy was possible only in close collaboration with the Surinamese government.

Surinamese Dutch people who wish to return to Surinam independently and not as part of a remigration plan are free to do so: 'Under the agreement concerning the assignment of nationality, the two governments agreed on the unconditional right of permanent residence in Surinam and the adoption of Surinamese citizenship for any persons born in Surinam or whose parents were born there, the arrangement to remain effective for a ten year period from 25 November 1975' (Bovenkerk 1978, p. 3). Official Dutch policy was, however, based on the premise that return migration could and should be encouraged within the framework of the development of Surinam.

During 1976 talks were held on several occasions between Dutch and Surinamese delegations concerning a remigration agreement, but the talks made rather heavy going and the atmosphere was uncomfortable. Bovenkerk suggests that the Surinamese authorities were rather suspicious of the Dutch wish to facilitate remigration for anybody expressing that desire. Although the frequently-quoted appeal made by Prime Minister Arron in May 1974 to Surinamese in Amsterdam to return to Surinam and to help in the country's development aroused the impression that everybody was welcome to return to Surinam, the real interests of the Surinamese authorities were somewhat different (Bovenkerk 1974, p. 560; Drees 1974; Bovenkerk 1978, p. 1): Surinam was only interested in selective remigration, especially of those 'whose training and experience fitted in with the country's developmental needs' (Bovenkerk 1978, p. 11).

For all this, an official remigration agreement was concluded in 1976, summarized as follows by Bovenkerk: 'The line has been adopted that 'all

persons of Surinamese origin are welcome in Surinam'; in addition the agreement has in mind 'an acceleration of the developmental process and effective development cooperation geared to those objectives', so as to give remigration policy the maximum chance of succeeding; an analysis is to be carried out into the basic problems underlying remigration policy; the elderly will be permitted to return while retaining their social security rights; the Netherlands will do its bit to help recruit qualified personnel among potential remigrants; remigrants will receive assistance from the Netherlands; the Netherlands will undertake to ensure that those returning will be properly retrained; there will be information activities and the implementation and extension of the agreement will be handled at both official and ministerial levels.'

There was initially a good deal of enthusiasm for the agreement among the Surinamese Dutch, but little has happened since the agreement was concluded: it has yet to be worked out in detail and implemented.

### **3.2. A more detailed examination of several aspects of the social position of Surinamese and Antillean Dutch and official policy**

The general lines and underlying premises of current Dutch policy have been discussed above. This section sets out to examine the manner in which general policies have been given expression in various fields; where possible, the effects of the policies pursued will be indicated.

#### **3.2.1. *The legal status of persons of Antillean and Surinamese origin in the Netherlands***

When the Charter of the Kingdom of the Netherlands entered into force in 1954, the legal position of Surinamese and Antillean migrants in the Netherlands was laid down clearly and properly. From the moment the Charter took effect they became Dutch citizens with all the rights and obligations connected with that citizenship, provided that they were resident in the Netherlands. This continues to apply in the case of the Antilleans.

The legal status of immigrants born in Surinam (and especially of those who wanted or still wish to migrate to the Netherlands after Surinam gained independence) became somewhat more complicated after 25 November 1975. In the first place there is the Agreement concerning the assignment of nationality, and secondly there is the Agreement concerning the residence and settlement of each other's subjects (for a detailed discussion see: Groenendijk and Swart 1975; Swart 1978, pp. 409–414; Span'noe, vol. 4. nos. 6–7; Ahmad-Ali 1978).

With regard to the former agreement, it is sufficient to note that the basic principle of the allocation of nationality was that those whose country of residence was the Netherlands or who were based there obtained Dutch nationality, while those whose actual country of residence or base was Surinam obtained Surinamese nationality. Thus the Surinamese living in the Netherlands became Dutch nationals unless they explicitly stated that they did not desire this. As mentioned earlier, anybody born in Surinam or whose parents were born there retains the right for a ten-year period from 25 November 1975 to settle permanently in Surinam and to adopt Surinamese citizenship.

For those to whom Surinamese nationality was allocated the second agreement came into force on the same day of independence this meant that they were no longer free to come to and settle in the Netherlands, as the Surinamese authorities had sought all along (Groenendijk and Swart 1975, p. 941), but were subject to admission regulations and residence permits. In the case of those allocated Surinamese nationality, this means that 'permission' to stay in the Netherlands is to be granted if they possess means of subsistence and have suitable accommodation. Such permission is extended for such length of time as the means of subsistence may be expected to last (Art. 2; this account is based on Swart's analysis, 1978,

pp. 410–413). The following provisions apply to Surinamese wishing to work or study in the Netherlands:

1. A residence permit must be granted to those who intend taking up salaried employment, provided that the person in question has found employment and has suitable accommodation. A work permit may not be refused if employment has been found, but the article does not convey any right to spend a given period of time seeking employment (Art. 3).
2. In the case of Surinamese subjects wishing to become self-employed in the Netherlands, a residence permit is granted if they have suitable accommodation and can demonstrate that they comply with the requirements under Dutch law with regard to self-employment (Art. 4).
3. Residence permits are also to be granted to the immediate family of those who have been granted a residence permit on the basis of the preceding articles, provided that suitable accommodation is available for them (Art. 5).
4. Finally residence permits are to be granted to persons wishing to pursue education or vocational training in the Netherlands if they are able to show that they have been accepted by an educational establishment or that they can obtain a vocational training position (Art. 6).

Residence permits as provided for under Articles 2–6 may only be refused on two grounds: firstly, if the required information is not submitted or is incomplete; and secondly, if a person constitutes a threat to public order or national security. Finally it should be noted that the agreement runs for only five years (from 25 November 1975) and that there is no express provision for the agreement to be extended (Swart 1978, pp. 409–411).

Groenendijk and Swart describe the agreement as relatively flexible on paper: 'The elimination of the common good as a ground for rejection renders the legal residential status of the foreigners covered by the draft agreement largely comparable with that of foreigners to whom the provisions governing free movement of individuals within the European Community apply, and of foreigners whose preferential treatment derives from the Treaty of the Benelux Economic Union.'

'Even though the agreement (...) does not meet all the Surinamese wishes and although its period of validity is strikingly brief, it nevertheless provides Surinamese citizens with ample scope for settling in the Netherlands and grants them a relatively strong legal status' (Swart and Groenendijk 1975, p. 950). They do however add that the flexibility with which the provisions of the agreement are applied by the Dutch authorities will be of great importance. And, according to the Surinamese welfare organisations, it is precisely such flexible implementation of the agreement that has been lacking from the start. 'In general it may be said that the Aliens office display a tendency towards treating foreigners harshly,' according to Span'noe (1977, nos. 6–7). In July 1978, the National Federation of Welfare Organisations for Surinamese submitted a memorandum (reprinted in Span'noe 1978, no. 4) to the Standing Parliamentary Committee for Justice in order to complain about the way in which the provisions of the agreement were being interpreted or ignored by the responsible officials. The scale of the problems noted in the memorandum is not, however, known. What is known is that the number of foreigners of Surinamese nationality expelled in 1976 was small: a total of 16 people, of whom 13 had invalid papers.

### 3.2.2. *Employment*

A survey conducted by Bayer (1965) in the first half of the nineteen-sixties provides a picture of successful absorption of Surinamese workers into the labour system: the Surinamese workers he studied were highly motivated to learn something in the Netherlands and, since they set about doing so in practice, were relatively highly-trained. In contrast to popular opinion, they generally turned out to be doing work in line with their qualifications and proved to have fitted in well with the Dutch labour system. Such problems as there are, Bayer seemingly wishes to emphasize, lie rather in the distorted

image the Dutch (including employers) have of the Surinamese, and the lack of proper assistance.

On the latter point Van Amersfoort, in his article of 1969 written specially for employers, is in complete agreement with Bayer.

Van Amersfoort also noted distorted – and in many cases negative – images of the Surinamese in a small survey he conducted among employers in Amsterdam who had, or used to have, Surinamese on their staff. And yet the major impression the researcher himself formed from the survey was that 'in general the Surinamese fits fairly smoothly into the job situation' (Van Amersfoort 1969, p. 238).

This would, at any event, appear to demonstrate that the individual Surinamese is capable of adjusting reasonably well and quickly to the labour process. The difficulties that emerge from the beginning of the seventies onwards would accordingly appear to have their origin more on the Dutch side: declining employment opportunities, as a result of which the Surinamese does not even get the chance of fitting in; and without doubt – as shown fairly clearly by Bovenkerk's research – the attitude of Dutch employers, who were more able to be selective given the abundance of the labour supply and who 'wish to avoid the risk of taking on people with lower language ability (both written and oral), who often arrive at work late, who arouse antipathy among the Dutch personnel, and so on' (Bovenkerk 1977, p. 74).

Finally it is not impossible that the changed composition of the immigrant flow affected the ability of the migrants to fit in: during the seventies a greater number of 'less suitables' were registered by local employment offices among the Surinamese and Antilleans, i.e. workers without job experience in Surinam or the Netherlands and with very little or no training (uncompleted primary school) etc.

It is however difficult to determine the extent to which the growth in the 'less suitables' category of Surinamese Dutch is attributable to the altered composition of the immigrant flow and the extent to which it should be attributed to the more exacting requirements for obtaining jobs at times of economic recession.

#### Registered unemployment among Surinamese and Antillean Dutch

Date	Surinamese Dutch	Antillean Dutch	Total
19.12.1973	3,852	420	4,272
26.06.1974	4,312	486	4,798
27.12.1974	3,594	536	4,130
26.06.1975	7,220	680	7,900
19.12.1975			12,929
25.04.1976			12,072
31.12.1977			10,406

Sources: *Rapport Werkgroep Migratie* 1976, p. 122;  
*Migratie en Begeleiding* 1976, no. 14, p. 4;  
*Positie van Migranten* 1977, p. 93.

In contrast with other important fields of adjustment, the situation of Surinamese and Antillean Dutch on the labour market is comparatively well documented, especially as regards unemployment. In particular, the publications issued by a number of local employment offices in the western conurbation enable a picture to be formed of developments in the labour market (Enkele aspecten 1971; Abbenhuis 1974; Strosnijder 1974; Biervliet 1975). The following outline of developments has been taken from Biervliet (1975, pp. 911–916).

'Between the end of 1971 and the end of 1974 the number of Surinamese in the Netherlands rose by 35,000. These groups included many unskilled and unmarried women who need more time to adjust to the norms and the usual way of doing things in the job situation and to become accustomed to working methods in the Netherlands, the regularity of the labour process

and the pace of work. As of 1 July 1975, 7,220 of the 100,000 Surinamese in the Netherlands were unemployed.

Surinamese formed a steadily growing proportion of registered unemployed in the large cities of the western conurbation. At the beginning of July 1975 17% of the registered unemployed males in Amsterdam were Surinamese, in Rotterdam 16% and in The Hague 17%. The proportion of Surinamese women among the registered unemployed is significantly higher again: 21% in Amsterdam, 26% in Rotterdam, and 17% in The Hague (...). Unemployment among Surinamese in the Netherlands is principally concentrated in Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The Hague; 80% of the unemployed Surinamese live in these cities. 56% of all Surinamese in the Netherlands live in these cities.' The rate of unemployment among young Surinamese is striking: 'between 20% and 25% of young Surinamese in the 20–24 year-old age group in these towns are unemployed.' 'To an increasing extent,' these young Surinamese people 'fall into the category of the chronically unemployed; furthermore a large number are untrained and many are classified as being of limited suitability for employment.' In general 'the proportion of those of limited suitability among unemployed Surinamese is high by Dutch standards. At the beginning of July 1974 the proportion stood at over 45%, which was some 2½ times that among registered unemployed as a whole and which reflected the unfavourable position of the Surinamese on the labour market.'

The recent memorandum on Young Surinamese migrants in the Netherlands (1978, pp. 13–22) confirms the developments noted by Biervliet: a comparison of the data for 1974 and 1977 indicates that the percentage of young Surinamese men (under 25) among total unemployment within the Surinamese labour force has remained more or less constant (40%) and that the figure for young Surinamese women has risen from 43 to 51%. This same memorandum is, moreover, the only study to have hazarded an estimate of the ratio between the labour force and the total population of Surinamese origin: 'Although there are no precise national data on the size of the labour force among Surinamese migrants, it may cautiously be concluded on the basis of such data as are available in the big cities that some 55% of the Surinamese community belongs to the labour force' (Memorandum on Young Surinamese migrants 1978, p. 13).

These developments prompted the authorities to introduce a number of measures. Policies specifically directed towards this category did not get under way until 1974 (experimentally). The substantive measures aimed at combatting unemployment among Surinamese and Antillean Dutch may be classified as follows:

1. measures directed towards improving the initial position of migrants on the labour market: job familiarisation, training and schooling;
2. measures to improve arrangements for finding work for Surinamese and Antilleans;
3. measures directed towards making it more attractive for employers to engage Surinamese and Antilleans.

*1. Measures directed towards improving the initial position of migrants on the labour market*

The Centres for Occupational Orientation and Vocational Training (CBBs): in 1974, a Test and Training Centre (TTC) was set up in Rotterdam at the initiative of the Foundation for the Social Interests of Surinamese, the municipal executive and the local employment office. This experiment was to be the precursor of a large number of training centres, which became known as Centres for Occupational Orientation and Vocational Training (CBBs), and for which a blueprint was developed. The training consists of three components:

1. giving or refreshing primary education, if possible up to sixth-form level of primary school;
2. the provision of further training, including occupational orientation and insight into work relationships and customs;

3. vocational training in technical, administrative, service and social-service occupations.

The aim of the course is to equip the participant to pursue further training, for example at an Adult Vocational Training Centre (CVV), or to find suitable employment.

A number of such courses were introduced in several Dutch towns from 1974 onwards: in 1974, in Amsterdam and Rotterdam; in 1976, The Hague, Nijmegen and Enschede were added, and in 1977 Heerlen, Leeuwarden, Groningen and Utrecht. It was hoped to set up courses in Breda, Middelburg and Eindhoven during 1978.

By 1 October 1977, 286 Surinamese and Antilleans had completed courses of this kind, of whom 154 found employment and 79 pursued further education and training (including at CVVs). At that stage 403 immigrants were still being trained (Informatieblad 1977, no. 10; TK 13 254, no. 1 and no. 9) According to the ICBM's memorandum (Positie van Migranten 1977, p. 94), the initial experience indicated 'that this gateway to employment or further training has fulfilled expectations and would justify the continuation of the project for the next few years'.

Another system of initial training and job familiarization was instituted in 1976. 'Within the framework of the Additional Stimulation Programme for 1976, 5 million guilders was made available to finance a job placement and familiarization scheme. (Temporary subsidy scheme for the placement of immigrants from Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles). Under this scheme migrants can be placed in a company for up to 6 months without becoming classified as employees; during this period they continue to receive benefit. The company in question receives a subsidy of 25 guilders per person per day as a contribution towards training expenses.' Nothing is known about the type of training and the number of Surinamese and Antillean immigrants that have been able to benefit from this scheme. But according to the ICBM memorandum (1977, p. 94) 'This scheme will remain in force at least until 1978.' In principle of course, the existing measures of the Ministry of Social Affairs to promote job placement apply to Surinamese and Antillean Dutch as well, i.e. the regulation of 1975 concerning temporary positions, industrial training, the regulation on study expenses and CVVs. The extent to which Surinamese and Antillean Dutch make use of these regulations is not, however, known. There are some figures on CVVs: in 1975, 140 Surinamese Dutch completed training courses at one of the CVVs (TK 13 254, no. 9, p. 16). In the same year (in May), a total of 2,400 people were following courses at CVVs, including some 200 Surinamese (TK 13 254, no. 2, p. 12).

## *2. Measures to improve arrangements for finding work for Surinamese and Antilleans*

In 1975 ten additional job mediators were said to have been appointed, who were familiar with the immigrant's problems. They were generally attached to local employment offices in the big cities. Their functions were to include: the provision of information to companies on Surinamese and Antillean manpower; investigating the scope for placements and training among companies and institutions, and promoting the use made of existing regulations; and, in collaboration with others, instituting special training and job familiarization projects. It is, however, unclear where these ten mediators have been appointed and what they have managed to achieve in practice.

In addition, the local employment offices received instructions in 1974 with regard to companies submitting requests for foreign labour. In such cases the employment offices were instructed to examine, together with the companies in question, whether such labour was already available in the Netherlands, especially with a view to placing citizens from the overseas territories. The Ministry noted in 1974 that the results of the arrangements to date warranted its continuation (TK 13 254, no. 1, p. 9). The scheme is not

however referred to in later documents, and the effect this measure has had is unclear.

Finally, the declaration of applicability of the 1971 migration regulation to Surinamese and Antillean migrants may be classed as part of the extension of job placement measures. This regulation applies in the first instance to unemployed married persons for whom suitable employment of a permanent nature cannot be found within a reasonable distance from where they live. This regulation was extended in two respects for Surinamese and Antilleans: it also applies to unmarried Surinamese and Antilleans and also to moving house within the western conurbation (TK 13 254, no. 1, p. 16). Among other things the migration regulation provides compensation for removal expenses and assistance towards refurnishing costs (TK 13 254, no. 9, p. 15).

### *3. Measures directed towards making it more attractive for employers to engage Surinamese and Antilleans*

Companies have been encouraged in various ways to take on immigrants from Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles:

(i) The 30% wage-bill regulation of 1973 (intended to cover 'unemployables' and older workers) was also made applicable to Surinamese and Antillean Dutch, with age and the period of registration as unemployed to be interpreted flexibly. In the case of workers aged under 45, the employer is eligible for subsidies for six months, and in the case of older workers for a year, amounting to 30% of wages and salaries, with a weighting for social security payments (TK 13 254, no. 9, p. 15). How many Surinamese and Antillean migrants have made use of this regulation is unknown.

(ii) Reference has already been made in section 1 to the temporary subsidy regulation of 1976, under which Surinamese and Antillean Dutch can continue to receive government support during on-the-job training, with the employer receiving 25 guilders.

In the absence of data on the results of these measures it is difficult to assess the effects of labour market policies on Surinamese and Antillean immigrants.

The ICBM memorandum also fails to provide an answer: with reference to the notable fall in the number of registered unemployed Surinamese and Antillean Dutch from 13,500 to 10,500 between the end of 1975 and the end of 1976, the paper observes:

'It is clear that a number of immigrants were placed in employment or vocational training by the local employment offices and that others found work by themselves. Many immigrants are no longer on the local employment offices' books because they did not extend their registration with them. Another cause of the decline in the number seeking work was the – albeit limited – remigration to Surinam' (Positie van Migranten 1977 p. 93).

### *3.2.3. Housing*

In the above discussion of overall policy it was noted that after 1974 initial reception and housing were of central importance. In this regard the explicit objective became the dispersal as far as possible of Surinamese and Antillean immigrants, preferably outside the western conurbation, on a voluntary basis; initially, such factors as the availability of work and educational and welfare assistance facilities were meant to be taken into consideration, but as noted above these subsidiary objectives rapidly faded from sight in order to get some way towards achieving the prime objective of dispersed accommodation.

The most significant official instrument in this regard was the extension to the group of Surinamese and Antillean immigrants in January 1975 of the 5% regulation concerning government (i.e. Housing Act) housing. This followed the Minister for Housing's unsuccessful appeal to the municipalities and housing corporations for voluntary cooperation. In order to give the

municipalities room for manoeuvre this regulation was applied flexibly, in that instead of making new housing act dwellings (or housing still under construction) available to Surinamese and Antilleans, the municipalities were enabled to provide an equivalent number of other dwellings under their control.

The result of this measure was that 2,092 dwellings became available for Surinamese and Antillean immigrants by 1 March 1976; and these dwellings were indeed spread throughout the country. The measure remained in force and the ICBM memorandum foresees the regulation being maintained for the next few years.

'This means that in a national context some 1700 dwellings can be placed at the Central bureau's disposal annually' (Positie van Migranten 1977, p. 93).

Supplementary measures have also been introduced for housing groups other than normal families.

'Within the framework of the job opportunity programme, municipalities and approved institutions became eligible in June 1974 for financial support from the central government for housing large families and single people (Ministry of Housing and Physical Planning circulars MG 74-17 and MG 74-34). This entails the possibility of financing and subsidy scheme for the purchase or conversion of buildings and for rendering them habitable. In the case of housing for single people and two-person households there now exists a broadened subsidy scheme of general application for the construction of dwellings and the conversion of acquired premises that were formerly non-residential or used for different residential purposes from normal dwellings' (Positie van Migranten 1977, p. 93). Official documents do not reveal the extent to which use has been made of these regulations on behalf of Surinamese and Antillean migrants.

The literature suggests there was little discussion in the Netherlands concerning the principle that there should be a policy of dispersion; references to the over-crowding in big cities, the increasing degree of concentration there and the dangers of ghetto-formation, together with the stigmatization of this physically identifiable group, appear to have been sufficiently compelling for this principle to be accepted. But the manner in which the CB implemented the policy of dispersal in practice did run into criticism, especially from the Surinamese Welfare Units, with others in their wake. The initial plan was for the Surinamese and Antilleans to be housed in small groups (grouped deconcentration) in the larger towns (over 25,000 inhabitants) so as to guarantee that they would receive attention from at least one of the welfare bodies after they had settled there.

When accommodation was found for the Surinamese in government housing literally all over the country, the welfare bodies found it much more difficult or even impossible to carry out welfare activities (Roseval in Span'noe 1976, no. 1).

The municipalities should be looked at separately with regard to the housing of Surinamese and Antillean immigrants (and other groups of aliens). Long before the national authorities became concerned about a policy of dispersal, a number of municipalities, especially in the large Dutch towns, had occupied themselves with the problems of the concentrated settlement of ethnic groups. As early as 1972 the municipal executive in Rotterdam proposed setting a maximum limit of 5% foreigners in each district. This proposal was later adopted by the Municipal Council, but the decision was overruled by the Minister for Housing. In Amsterdam, similar decisions have not been taken openly but the same procedure has been followed, based on an agreement between housing corporations, the Municipal Building Corporation and the Municipal Rehousing Service; this agreement became public knowledge in December 1977 when questions to the aldermen revealed that a number of districts in Amsterdam were 'closed', because too many foreigners and/or Surinamese and Antillean immigrants lived there (Zwartboek 1978; Valkonet-Freeman 1977).

It will be evident that such administrative ideas and practices sprang from the difficulties that have arisen in recent years in a number of cities in the

western conurbation; but at the same time these mutual agreements reached among the big landlords clearly indicate that foreign groups are obliged to take a back-seat in housing policy: the interests of the indigenous community, organized within the housing corporations are able to leave their mark on the policies pursued. The consequences of closing a number of districts in Amsterdam to Surinamese and Antillean immigrants and foreigners from the Mediterranean are not taken into consideration: these groups simply see a further segment of the already very restricted housing market cut off for them (see the analysis of Valkonet-Freeman 1977).

In defending these policies, those responsible for current policy in Amsterdam habitually refer to the traumatic experience which the municipal authorities had with a number of flats in the new suburb of de Bijlmer; but research into the complexities of for example Gliphoeve I and II in de Bijlmer (Van Diepen and Bruyn-Muller 1976) shows that the municipality's hesitant and passive approach itself helped bring about those traumatic experiences.

But the general conclusion that may be drawn from the research referred to above is even more important: while the instruments available to the municipal authorities for conducting housing policies may appear impressive on paper, they are used only sparingly by them in practice (as clearly indicated for Amsterdam by Valkonet-Freeman's study) or are even partially handed over to housing corporations and private landlords. Valkonet-Freeman's survey shows the larger part of the Amsterdam housing market to be controlled by private individuals or bodies and that the actual influence of the municipal authorities is relatively slight. The result of these ownership patterns and the vested interests of the owners, as well as the limited influence of the municipal authorities and the necessity for foreign groups to find reasonable accommodation they can afford, is a housing pattern in which these groups of non-Dutch origin end up in certain districts. The question is how such concentration can be best prevented if it is regarded as undesirable.

Van Amersfoort and Cortie (1973), as well as Valkonet-Freeman, look beyond the Surinamese, Antilleans and foreigners to more important causes (and hence more important ways of tackling the problems): 'To a large extent Surinamese settlement (in Amsterdam) is concentrated in neighbourhoods with a highly transient population (...). These are districts in a transitional phase whose stable communities are being replaced by a much more mobile one, in general of a lower occupational level (Cortie 1973). We consider that there is a disproportionate tendency to attribute this process, with all its concomitant social implications, to the physically identifiable and hence most obvious category, the Surinamese' (Van Amersfoort and Cortie 1973, p. 293; cf. Valkonet-Freeman 1977, p. 43).

That the policy of dispersed housing conducted by the Amsterdam municipality not only lacks adequate basis but is also arbitrary more than amply shows the weakness of municipal administration: 'The question inevitably arises why these particular neighbourhoods should be closed and not other neighbourhoods in the nineteenth century zone where the concentrations are as high if not higher. This is related to ownership patterns in the Amsterdam housing market. Given the high concentration of foreigners and the city's rebuilding problems, the general level of dissatisfaction in the nineteenth century districts is probably just as great; but the possibility of closing these districts does not exist, for many of the local residents rent their accommodation privately and, unlike housing association tenants, lack any internal organization.

The scope for complaining to the landlord about one's neighbourhood is much more limited. In the case of the (municipal) Housing Corporation and the housing associations, complaints may be lodged en masse. In addition, housing associations have the interest of their tenants clearly in mind, and are more likely to feel impelled to do something about complaints. All the closed neighbourhoods are in large part housing association or municipal property. This in itself indicates the existence of a certain degree of arbitrariness with, moreover, the risk that these districts' problems will be displaced onto districts with a high degree of private ownership' (Valkonet-Freeman 1977, p. 44).

What would appear important is the general conclusion that local housing policies are implemented in certain large municipalities which, while they may correspond in name ('dispersal policy') with national policy, are in practice at variance with the basic premises of that policy. The national policy of dispersed settlement has consistently been based on voluntariness and openness, while policy in Amsterdam, for example, involves dispersal of a clearly enforced nature, based moreover until recently on unpublicized private agreements. There has, consequently, been substantial criticism of the dispersal policy administered in Amsterdam (Zwartbroek 1978): and justifiably so, for, as Haakmat has argued persuasively (Haakmat 1977), there is no legal basis for such a policy.

### 3.2.4. *Education*

Although both Surinamese and Antillean children receive primary education in their countries of origin in Dutch, it has been found for some time that their language proficiency is generally below standard when they come to continue their primary schooling in the Netherlands or move on to secondary schooling (Alers 1974; Wassenaar, no date (1976); Eijssenring 1975). Additional factors are that Dutch is not the language generally spoken in the home and that the standard of education in the country of origin is usually lower and teaching methods different. Another complaint frequently heard is that Dutch education fails to relate in any practical way to the experiences these children have had in their mother-country and in their home environment (see too Wijnstra 1977; Kloosterman 1977). In general the problems would appear to be comparable with those of second generation Moluccan children.

The policy measures of the Ministry of Education and Science directed towards reducing the educational problems faced by children of Surinamese and Antillean origin may be divided into three categories: measures concerning (1) primary and secondary education (2) training and education for children above school-age and (3) adult education. Some of the measures apply to a wider group than Surinamese and Antillean migrants alone.

#### 1. *Primary and secondary education*

(i) Within the framework of programmes for stimulating the educational process for disadvantaged children, additional teachers may be attached to schools to help Surinamese and Netherlands Antillean children when they first arrive and to provide subsequent assistance (TK 13 254, no. 1). In 1975 'several dozen such teachers were appointed' (TK 13 254 no. 9, annex V). During the school-year 1975/1976, the central government paid for 44 supernumerary teachers in Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The Hague to assist in public and 'private' primary education (TK 13 254, no. 24). The ICBM memorandum adds that these additional teachers were either in charge of adjustment classes, formed part of a so-called flying squad or were intended to help reduce class-sizes. The memorandum promises the introduction of new national guidelines for the school-year 1976/77 so that further additional hours may be allocated to primary schools for Surinamese pupils who have been through the initial reception and have been in the Netherlands for less than two years (Positie van Migranten 1977, p. 94).

(ii) In 1974 the ABC-Bijlmer project of the Advisory and Assistance Centre in Amsterdam got under way, subsidized by the Ministry of Education and Science. Among other things this project prepared new teaching material geared to Surinamese children, as well as coaching teachers dealing with Surinamese children. Following this successful experiment, the ICBM memorandum expresses the wish that the supportive role hitherto performed nationally by the ABC project should be taken over by local and regional school counselling services (Positie van Migranten 1977, p. 94).

(iii) National guidelines exist for the provision of extra staff with regard to normal secondary education. This applies to the education of children who

have lived in the Netherlands for less than two years (Positie van Migranten 1977, p. 94). Bridging classes can be set up if there are enough children of migrants falling into this category (TK 13 254 no. 9). If so desired, students from Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles may be released from doing French or German, or both.

The experiment of taking Spanish instead, which is taught in a number of schools, could be of use to them (Positie van Migranten 1977, p. 95).

## *2. Training and education for children above school-age*

According to the ICBM memorandum, the Ministry of Education and Science is to devote extra attention to young persons above school-age. In 1975, the Berkenhoven training centre in De Bilt began an experiment, subsidized by the Ministry of CRM, designed to give this category of young people a better start in society.

By means of supplementary primary education, training and vocational counselling over some 15 weeks in a boarding establishment, the centre aimed at enabling youths to go on to further training. An evaluation survey conducted by the Ministry of CRM (Mak and Kraan 1977) advised in 1977 that the experiment should be extended, while making a number of suggestions for changes in the way it was planned. This recommendation has been taken up in the ICBM memorandum; more reception and training centres are to be set up. By the middle of October 1977, five groups comprising a total of 84 pupils had followed courses at Berkenhoven. It is hoped to improve the results of the courses still further by means of intensified follow-up counselling for those who have completed them.

In consultation with the National Federation of Welfare Foundations for the Surinamese and two adult education institutes, the Ministry of CRM recently drew up a standardized subsidy scheme for training activities and the development of expertise. The training activities will be particularly directed towards the needs of welfare organizations, while the promotion of expertise applies to officials from bodies concerned with cultural and social work, administrators and officials in government bodies.

## *3. Adult education*

Finally, the Ministry of CRM, in collaboration with the Ministry of Education and Science, has made subsidies available for Dutch language and social orientation courses for Surinamese and Antillean adults organized by municipalities and non-governmental bodies. The courses must be designed for people who speak little or no Dutch and who cannot be provided for by an existing training or educational institute in any way. Nothing is known about the effects of these measures.

### *3.2.5. Social and cultural work*

We have already seen that for a long time (until 1974), official policy towards Surinamese and Antilleans in the Netherlands could be equated with social and cultural welfare policies. The authorities relied on private initiatives being undertaken in this field in the form of Reception Assistance Foundations, which were then subsidized by the Ministry of CRM. In the long term, however, the authorities preferred to see welfare policy decentralized to local or regional level and if possible handled by existing welfare bodies. Up to that point welfare policies towards the Surinamese and Antilleans followed the same course as developments in welfare policy towards other cultural minorities. But as a result of the large migrant inflow in 1974 and 1975 these long term objectives took second place and matters developed in exactly the opposite direction. New foundations rapidly sprang up, which the Ministry of CRM was obliged to subsidize in the absence of reception facilities among existing bodies concerned with the provision of social services and social and cultural activities.

In 1972, there were just five welfare foundations among the Surinamese, and five among the Antilleans, with a total staff of 27; in 1974, the Ministry was subsidizing 21 foundations.

In addition, 'assistance committees' were set up in 33 municipalities, consisting of representatives from municipal bodies, general community work and welfare foundations for Surinamese. These committees were, in particular, concerned with assisting in the implementation of the dispersal policy (TK 13 254, no. 9).

By 1978 the number of subsidized welfare foundations had grown to 29. Total establishment levels at the beginning of 1978 numbered around 350, including vacant positions and part-time workers (Aanvullende brief op 1978, p. 119). The ICBM memorandum notes in 1977 that the staffing of these foundations has 'gradually become the exclusive province of residents of Surinamese origin.'

The government recognizes 'that the existing Surinamese welfare bodies were necessary and will continue to be needed for a certain time to come, given the vacuum referred to earlier' in relation to the assistance provided to migrants. In practical terms, the subsidizing authorities initially applied the same slogan in social and cultural welfare policy as that used in the case of welfare policies for other cultural minorities: integration with the preservation of separate identity. This formulation has, however, disappeared in recent official documents.

The objective which the subsidization of the welfare foundations is intended to realize has recently been succinctly expressed as: 'participation in society on an equal basis'. There has been little criticism of the objective as such in Surinamese and Antillean circles; what has been subject to criticism is its implementation in practice (see inter alia Span'noe, nos. 6-7 and 8 under the title of 'Integration or enforced conformity'). In comparison with the attitude one encounters among the Moluccans towards social and cultural policy, the criticism from Surinamese and Antillean quarters appears to be aimed less at policy in general than at a number of its facets. The most important criticism would appear to be focussed on three points:

1. Official policy is determined without consultation with and participation by Surinamese and Antillean immigrants or their representatives in the form of officials from the foundations (see Roseval in Span'noe vol. 3, no. 1; see also various articles in nos. 4-8). It must be conceded that on various points the ICBM has sought to ensure the participation and cooperation of the Surinamese and Antillean foundations in preparing and administering its policies. Representatives from the 'platform' set up in the meantime by the welfare foundations have been included in the working groups established by the ICBM; in a number of these working groups half the members were welfare officers.

On other points as well consultation took place between the authorities and the 'platform' before measures were implemented, including the dispersal policy to be administered by the CB. Cooperation between the central government and its executive organs (and the same would appear to apply to local authorities in a number of cases) has however been far from flexible. In his assessment of ICBM policy, Roseval (1976) sums up the disappointing experience of the 'platform' as regards policy consultations and participation: the ICBM working groups prove to have only an advisory role, and their advice was said not to be reflected in policy; information was claimed to have been withheld from the 'platform', and the government was said to have failed to keep its promises. In 1976, the 'platform' even decided to withdraw its cooperation. In contrast to this version from the Surinamese side there is that of the ICBM; it attempted in numerous ways to allow members of the 'platform' to resume their participation in the working groups of the ICBM. Talks even took place several times between representatives of the 'platform' and the Minister with coordinating responsibilities, at which agreements were reached on the subject. For reasons that remain unclarified these agreements were not kept.

2. Official policy does not pay sufficient attention to remigration. The foundations contest the basic premise that it may be assumed many will

decide to settle permanently in the Netherlands, which they maintain fails to take account of the aspirations and wishes of the Surinamese themselves. 'Thus the memorandum (ICBM-nota 1977) systematically ignores the orientation towards Surinam in its treatment of the education and housing aspects'.

In 1977, a number of demands concerning remigration were made of the new Cabinet in a 'submission to the 'formateur' responsible for forming the new Cabinet'. The two most important of these demands were that the government should in its first year in office attempt to conclude a remigration agreement with the Surinamese government, and that the Surinamese bodies, especially the national bodies (the Federation of Welfare Organizations and Tenasu (Back to Surinam)) should be enabled to maintain and further the orientation towards Surinam (Span'noe vol. 2, nos. 4-5).

3. The inadequate support (in a material sense) and lack of recognition given to Surinamese welfare organizations and the activities they carry out. As indicated above, the Surinamese welfare organizations consider that they are insufficiently involved in policy formulation and, consequently, that they have insufficient means of making their views known.

But, as also emerges in Roseval's assessment of the ICBM (Roseval being the director of the Federation of Surinamese Welfare Units), it is also a matter of allocation of powers. With regard to reception and dispersal policy the welfare organizations were not drawn directly into initial reception centres; instead this task was handled entirely by the CB.


The authorities argued that the welfare organizations were not equipped to take on an additional function of this nature. This led to a certain amount of friction. According to Roseval the competency question also played a role in the 'platform's' participation in the ICBM's working groups. The welfare foundations felt several aspects were being approached competitively. 'The government will surely have to cease adopting a competitive attitude towards the Surinamese foundations', Roseval concludes in his evaluation of ICBM policy (Span'noe 1976, no. 1). This explained the demand in the 'submission to the formateur' that the authorities including both the central government and municipal and provincial authorities and bodies – should recognize the Surinamese welfare organizations as bodies fulfilling a structural need within Dutch society, and that the authorities' policy intentions towards Surinamese immigrants should accordingly represent the outcome of consultation between Surinamese welfare organizations and the authorities (Span'noe 1977, nos. 4-5). These considerations in turn lead to criticism of the objective of decentralizing welfare policy and transferring functions from group-specific welfare bodies to general welfare bodies: 'To the extent that decentralization remains central to the policies of the next government, account will have to be taken of the fact that the Surinamese are scarcely organized at the levels onto which functions would be devolved under decentralization. The idea that group-specific welfare activity is not a proper part of the Dutch welfare system needs to be replaced by the idea that minority groups should be assured of their own place within the legal framework of the 'new' welfare policy' (Span'noe 1977, nos. 4-5).

### **3.3. Administrative organization of policy**

A number of aspects of the organization of policy formulation and implementation have been examined in previous sections (see sections 1.2 to 1.4). This section is consequently limited to providing an overall picture, with references as appropriate to more detailed accounts above.

The major *consultative structures* which have been set up to deal with policy formulation and implementation with regard to Surinamese and Antillean migrants are shown in the following diagram:

## Consultative structures



The consultative structure between the coordinating Minister and the ICBM and that of the ICBM with its working and study groups were discussed in detail in sections 1.2 to 1.4. The status and functions of ACOM were discussed in chapter II, section 3.

Some comments are in order on the Liaison and Consultative Committee (CCO).


A committee of the same name existed in the nineteen-sixties, but was disbanded when the ICBM was set up. A new committee of the same name is however in the process of being formed. Its function will be to advise the Minister for CRM on welfare policies for Surinamese and Antillean migrants. The National Federation of Surinamese Welfare Foundations will be represented on it.

The appointment of coordinators for policy on Surinamese and Antillean migrants in the cities, as well as the establishment of urban assistance committees, resulted from the ICBM's administration, which regarded proper coordination between the national and local levels as an essential pre-condition for purposeful policies. In recent years, the ICBM has therefore urged the large municipalities to submit annual costed plans for their activities; part of these activities were financed by the ICBM, which acted as an incentive. The costs of appointing an urban coordinator are borne by the ICBM. The participation of these coordinators in the ICBM ensures a direct link between national policy and local administration, at least as far as a few large municipalities are concerned.

Ultimate responsibility for policy at a national level naturally resides with Cabinet. Within Cabinet the coordinating Minister (CRM) bears the major responsibility. At the next level responsibility for policies in various fields rests with the relevant minister. The ICBM advises the coordinating Minister and consequently does not itself bear any direct responsibility for policy.

A number of aspects of overall policy are concentrated within the coordinating Minister's Ministry; the lines of responsibility of the executive bodies may be depicted as follows:

#### Lines of responsibility within the Ministry of CRM



#### 3.4. Conclusions with reference to current policy

Given the social position of Surinamese and Antillean migrants in the Netherlands and the related developments noted above, and assuming that the majority of these immigrants will remain permanently in the Netherlands, how should the government current policies be assessed? In the light of this long-term perspective there follow a number of critical observations on policy intentions, policy as pursued at present, and the organizational structure for administering that policy.

Migration from Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles grew slowly but steadily during the sixties, and the composition of the migrant flow altered. The growth in this migration increased the migrant problem in the Netherlands, and concern and disquiet about such migration increased from 1969–1970 onwards among both politicians and the general public. Political developments in Surinam prior to independence led to a veritable exodus to the Netherlands. Policy response to these developments was sluggish in the extreme. There was a political division of opinion on the question whether immigration should be restricted, if necessary unilaterally, in spite of the obligations accepted earlier under the Charter of the Kingdom of the Netherlands of 1954. The decision that this was out of the question, and that a previously devised plan for reception and subsequent assistance needed to be implemented, came late in the piece. The delay was caused partly by the difficulties in forming a coalition and by the ensuing oil crisis.

It was not until 1974 that the old policy concept was abandoned, which had limited itself almost entirely to activity in the social and cultural sphere for Surinamese and Antillean migrants, and that new policies took shape.

At that time there was a short-term need for measures to be taken in a number of fields in order to provide the migrants with some form of reception and assistance. The problem was increased by the fact that the migrants tended to settle in a number of cities, thereby accentuating the existing housing problems there; the economic downturn and associated reduction in employment was a second negative factor of significance. Partly as a result of the volume of practical activities associated with the direct reception of and assistance to the immigrants, the official formulation of policy and a full assessment of the long-term implications was postponed and did not occur until after the event.

In the light of the basic premises underlying current Dutch policy as expressed in the government paper of 1977 (see 1.2.4), it seems to me that in broad terms the authorities are approaching the problem of the Surinamese realistically: the expectation is that 'a large number' or 'many' will decide to settle permanently in the Netherlands, while the paper speaks of 'some' who are deliberating whether to return to Surinam. The language used is cautious but nevertheless suggests that the former group is larger than the second. And from the paper, the government would appear to realize that welfare work alone will be insufficient to enable those immigrants who remain to be accepted properly and to be given equal opportunities. According to the paper, this will require the combined efforts of numerous ministries, local authorities and private organizations.

A central policy concern is that immigrants should be accepted into Dutch society in such a manner that they will in time have equal opportunities and ability for selfdevelopment. The elimination of the gap between this category of immigrants and society in general is therefore a prerequisite, since the immigrants start at a disadvantage. The summary of measures designed to improve the immigrants' position amounts, however, to nothing more than an enumeration of existing measures. It is implicitly assumed that there is a relationship between the objectives set and these measures; but it is questionable whether these measures as a whole – which are often implemented hastily and in an improvised manner – do in fact lead to the realization of those objectives. A number of surveys intended to provide an answer to this question are currently being prepared.

A more important question, however, is whether official activities as a whole are adequate for the prescribed objectives ever to be achieved. The developments noted by ICBM study and working groups in recent papers tend to suggest that opportunities are declining rather than improving, especially among young immigrants. A subculture of youthful outcasts is emerging; the number of young people embraced by this subculture is growing rapidly.

The only possibility for these youths to return to society, a memorandum on youth by the ICBM suggests, lies in providing them with opportunities for a reasonable existence (at the least accommodation and a job); the lack of such chances leads to an ever growing number of young immigrants ending up in the subculture. The conclusion would appear to be that there is a need for greater official input, at least in the material sense, if undesirable developments are to be arrested.

#### *Administrative organization*

Since the Interministerial Committee for Coordination of Policy on Migrants from Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles (ICBM) took up its work, there has been a greater degree of administrative coordination with respect to this category than there is in the case of Moluccans or foreign workers. When it was set up, the ICBM had the practical advantage that the scale of Surinamese migration obliged it to draw up totally new policies, with a requirement for considerable input and activities in virtually all fields of policy. The policy reversal was so far-reaching that the newly-established

bodies were scarcely impeded by the way in which matters had evolved historically.

Where the past did continue to have an effect was in the decision as to who should be responsible for policy coordination: the choice ultimately fell upon the Minister for CRM, probably on the grounds of this Ministry's previous experience with Surinamese and Antillean immigrants. It is, however, open to question whether this choice was the right one. The fact is that a number of new administrative functions have been allocated to CRM which should perhaps rather have been allocated to the ministries most directly concerned. Examples include the Central Office for Housing and the Centres for job orientation and vocational training (CBBs).

At any event, the reasonably intensive coordination of policy within the ICBM has, in general terms, ensured a certain consistency as far as concrete measures in various areas of administration are concerned.

It was not possible to examine administration at local level in any depth in this survey, and it is only possible to make some cautious judgments. We have, however, been able to note that the ICBM has attempted to draw the local authorities and local initiative firmly into dispersal and reception policy, among other ways by establishing local and sometimes regional assistance committees. At least as far as the big cities are concerned, there is intensive liaison and consultation concerning the Surinamese and Antillean immigrant problem. The ICBM has sought to link local activities with those being conducted at the national level by asking the big cities to work up local policy plans and to submit these to the Ministry of CRM with a view to (partial) subsidization. At the same time the Ministry of CRM has provided a number of general facilities (usually of a financial nature) to the local authorities.

Collaboration between the national and local authorities has, however, by no means always been equally smooth, it did not prove possible to implement a dispersed-housing policy on the basis of voluntary cooperation by the municipalities to make accommodation available, and the policy had to be enforced by means of the 5% regulation. In addition a number of the larger municipalities – notably Amsterdam – proved to be conducting their own 'unofficial' housing policies, which could not easily be squared with the policy guidelines laid down at the national level.

#### *Data, research and policy*

Statistical data on the group to whom policy applies are extremely scarce, and are becoming scarcer. Since the group in question mostly possesses Dutch nationality it is not generally registered separately. Nothing is known for example about the group's fertility, age structure, the incidence of marriage with partners of non-Surinamese or Antillean origin, etc. In brief, there exist only estimates for the group as a whole, which vary by some tens of thousands.

As for the groups covered by specific measures there is even greater uncertainty: as far as unemployment is concerned, for example, the data are confined to registrations with local employment offices, but nobody can, or would venture, to relate these figures to the group as a whole because nothing is known about the relationship between economically active and non-active persons within the group. Similar examples are to be found in the administrative areas of housing and education, where there is also very little idea of how big the group is for which measures should be taken.

The recent appointment of the Advisory Committee on Research into Cultural Minorities, and the allocation to the Institute for Applied Sociology of a large project to evaluate ICBM policy, including a population survey among the Surinamese community, are signs of the growing need of the authorities for improved research and data on which to base policy.

### *Participation in policy formulation*

Participation in policy formulation is a difficult and laborious affair. One problem is the lack of internal organization on any scale among the immigrants themselves. On the other hand there is no question of the Surinamese and Antillean Dutch having found a place of any significance within the Dutch political party system or in the socio-economic power system (e.g. the trade unions), or in other systems, or of their being able to exploit these channels to voice their wishes and aspirations.

It is only for want of an alternative that the Surinamese and Antillean Welfare Units have increasingly succeeded in projecting themselves at the sole and exclusive representatives of these groups' interests. It is however questionable whether this is a desirable development. It is known that at least among the Surinamese these units are relatively unknown and reach only a small group. A survey conducted by Bureau Lagendijk in 1975 indicated that 39% of a national sample of Surinamese had never heard of these units, while the percentage among Surinamese in reception centres was 70%. The same survey indicated that only 19% of all respondents had ever been in touch with a welfare unit (Surinamese in the Netherlands 1976).

Nevertheless, the ICBM has made provision for considerable participation by the paid representatives of the units, especially in its advisory committees and working groups, and new policy measures have generally been discussed beforehand with the 'platform' of the Surinamese and Antillean units. In addition the ICBM has also made an effort to include a number of Surinamese and Antillean Dutch experts in its advisory arrangements in a personal capacity, without definite affiliation to any organization.

Looking to the future, the question arises whether and to what extent the Dutch authorities should adopt policies geared towards encouraging self-organization on a wider scale outside the ambit of paid representatives, and ensuring that participation and consultation be conducted to a greater extent through such channels. This question will be all the more pressing if the existing Dutch power structure should turn out to be uninterested or unable to develop into an adequate channel for expressing the desires and needs of Surinamese and Antillean Dutch people.

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## **CHAPTER 4. FOREIGN WORKERS OF MEDITERRANEAN ORIGIN AND THEIR FAMILIES**

### **4.0. Background statistical data**

Foreign workers are registered in at least two ways in the Netherlands: as 'aliens' and as 'non-Dutch' employees. As 'aliens', they and members of their families are required to possess a temporary or permanent residence permit. Temporary residence permits are generally issued for a one-year period; a permanent residence permit can only be applied for (and issued) after a foreigner has lived in the Netherlands for five years with temporary permits. As 'non-Dutch' employees they are required to have a work permit, which is issued by the local employment offices. The usual sort of work permit is also of a temporary nature, valid normally for one year. A permanent work permit may be applied for (and issued) after five years employment in the Netherlands without a gap other than normal holiday periods.

Most of the statistical data on foreign workers in the Netherlands derive from these two systems of registration. The most reliable data are those derived from the registration figures for temporary residence and work permits, since these have to be extended annually and are thus subject to checking. The reliability of the figures for permanent residence and work permits is lower since they are less subject to being checked (e.g. whether the person in question has in fact remained in the Netherlands).

At the end of 1976 there were over 360,000 foreigners with valid residence permits in the Netherlands (Fragmenten uit ... 1978, p. 12).

Of these over 113,000 came from the member-states of the European Economic Community, including some 20,000 Italians.

Nearly 180,000 originated from the so-called recruitment countries (Greece, Yugoslavia, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, Morocco and Tunisia), and a little under 70,000 from all remaining countries.

This chapter is solely concerned with foreigners from the Mediterranean recruitment countries, as well as Italy: together these countries account for about 200,000 people. This figure is an official statistic based on the number of residence permits issued and does not, therefore, include the category of 'illegals' (i.e. foreigners without valid residence papers). Estimates of the size of the illegal category vary greatly: the official estimate is 10,000–15,000 but among welfare officers one can hear figures of up to 40,000, even after the regularization of 1975.

**Table 4.1. Labour reserve in the Netherlands; official recruitment. Total number of new work permits issued. Total number of temporary and permanent work permits and total number of citizens from recruitment countries<sup>1</sup>, yearly totals 1959–1978**

Year	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
1959	2.4					410	
1960	1.5		279			545	719
1961	1.1	1,623	2,091			1,896	2,510
1962	1.0	3,374	4,367			5,030	6,110
1963	1.0	4,297	8,316			10,275	10,803
1964	0.9	6,797	18,839			23,031	22,690
1965	1.0	4,800	20,646			33,393	39,950
1966	1.2	2,744	25,998			46,359	56,877
1967	2.4	566	4,592			39,245	48,511
1968	2.2	2,173	10,013			45,213	54,736
1969	1.8	10,652	16,668	50,663	2,705	53,368	70,205
1970	1.4	16,551	25,561	60,441	8,102	68,543	92,870
1971	1.7	16,765	25,500	66,810	16,914	83,724	?
1972	2.8	3,981	7,813	60,429	25,082	85,511	128,572
1973	2.9	6,164	8,523	60,102	29,881	89,983	139,490
1974	3.5	5,129	?	56,831	36,327	93,158	153,120
1975	4.9	920	?	?	?	?	169,737 <sup>4</sup>
1976	5.4	14	9,300 <sup>2</sup>	38,500	61,400	99,900	179,032 <sup>4</sup>
1977	5.2	99	8,000 <sup>2</sup>	28,200	76,875	105,075	185,160 <sup>4</sup>
1978	5.5			26,725 <sup>3</sup>			

**Key:**

- (1): labour reserve (%)
- (2): official recruitment
- (3): new work permits issued
- (4): temporary work permits<sup>1</sup>) as of 31 December
- (5): permanent work permits<sup>1</sup>) as of 31 December
- (6): total work permits<sup>1</sup>) as of 31 December
- (7): legally resident citizens from recruitment countries<sup>1</sup>) as of 31 December

<sup>1</sup> Recruitment countries comprise the following seven countries: Spain, Portugal, Turkey, Greece, Morocco, Tunisia and Yugoslavia. Italians are not included in the table. See Table 4.2.

<sup>2</sup> This figure also includes a.o. regularization cases, family members of foreign workers already legally resident in the Netherlands who take up employment, and the employment of trainees. Explanatory Memorandum to 1978 Budget (Fragmenten uit .... 1978, p. 46)

<sup>3</sup> As of 15 June 1978: Sociale Maandstatistiek, Central Bureau of Statistics, August 1978.

<sup>4</sup> The figures for the end of 1975 (169,737) and 1976 (179,032) have been taken from the Explanatory Memorandum to the budget for the Ministry of Justice for 1977 and 1978. The CBS's figures are however higher: 176,056 as of 1 January 1976 and 185,160 as of 1 January 1977 (provisional figures, excluding births). See Motief 1977, no. 7, p. 19.

**Sources used for table 4.1.:**

- Column 1: 'Registered unemployed as a percentage of the employed labour force', in: Central Economic Plan 1975, Central Planning Office, The Hague, p. 264. For 1975, 1976, 1977 and 1978 see Central Economic Plan 1978, p. 325.
- Columns 2–6: 'Memorandum on Foreign Workers', Lower House of Parliament 1969–1970, 10 504, no. 3 and 'Memorandum in reply to the Provisional Report on the Memorandum on Foreign Workers', 1973–74, 10 504, nos. 9 and 10. Further data from the explanatory Memoranda to the Budget for the Ministries of Justice and Social Affairs in various years. (See Fragmenten .... 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978 and 1979).
- Column 7: Since precise figures held by the Ministry of Justice on foreigners living in the Netherlands have only been released since 1972, the figures up to and including 1970 have been taken from a statistical publication issued by the Ministry of CRM. (Enkele statistische gegevens, 1971, p. 13). The figures for 1972 onwards may be found in the Explanatory Memoranda to the Budget for various years (Fragmenten uit ....).

Table 4.1 consists of a number of basic statistics on the growth in the number of Mediterranean workers and members of their families in the Netherlands. This table includes only workers and their families from the seven recruitment countries.

Italians are not included in the statistics on Mediterranean workers after 1969, when free movement of labour came into force in the European Economic Community and different (and more favourable) legal conditions and a better legal status were introduced for them. Intrinsically, however, Italian subjects in the Netherlands need to be included in the category of Mediterranean migrant-workers. See table 4.2.

**Table 4.2. Total number of Italian citizens living in the Netherlands: 1972–1977**

Year	Men	Women	Total
1972			19,300
1973			19,300
1974			19,700
1975	13,100	6,783	19,883
1976	13,206	6,905	20,111

Sources: 1972–1974: Statistisch Zakboek, CBS.

1975 and 1976 (as of 31 December): Gemeentelijk Beleid 1977, p. 7.

The stabilization or even decline in the number of work permits issued to citizens from the more developed Mediterranean countries (Greece, Spain and Yugoslavia) is striking, as is the steady increase in the numbers from the least developed countries (Turkey, Morocco and Tunisia). See table 4.3.

**Table 4.3. Work permits issued by nationality: recruitment countries**

	15-12 1965	15-12 1968	31-12 1970	31-12 1972	31-12 1974	31-12 1976	31-12 1977
Greeks	1,755	1,259	1,814	1,926	1,955	1,900	1,925
Yugoslavs	984	1,181	6,425	8,683	9,098	7,350	8,000
Portuguese	?	?	3,079	3,923	4,528	5,000	5,175
Spaniards	16,528	9,637	16,946	20,310	20,071	17,525	17,475
Turks	7,286	13,243	20,615	27,771	33,559	39,200	42,300
Moroccans	5,497	14,072	19,445	22,347	22,936	27,875	29,125
Tunisians	?	?	219	551	1,011	1,050	1,075

Source: Ministry of Social Affairs (Fragmenten uit . . . 1976 and 1978; Nieuwsbrief B.W. (Foreign Workers Newsletter) 1970, no. 9).

As far as the total foreign population by nationality (recruitment countries) is concerned, the same countries are once again responsible for the marked increase: Turkey heads the field, while Morocco would appear to be lagging behind somewhat if these figures are compared to those for work permits issued.

**Table 4.4. Foreigners from recruitment countries in the Netherlands, by nationality (residence permits)**

	1960	1965	1968	1970	1973	1974	1975	1976 <sup>1</sup>	1977 <sup>1</sup>
Greeks	404	3,042	3,216	4,038	3,989	4,035	4,164	4,199	4,227
Yugoslavs	5	1,034	1,957	7,812	11,618	11,973	12,873	13,802	13,318
Portuguese	1	1,521	3,113	4,789	6,952	7,417	7,813	8,815	9,174
Spaniards	309	21,025	18,526	25,866	31,362	31,790	31,312	29,092	26,887
Turks	—	8,822	15,314	29,325	46,018	53,529	62,587	76,473	82,913
Moroccans	—	4,506	12,610	21,040	27,901	29,637	33,156	42,201	47,089
Tunisians	?	?	?	?	732	1,109	1,215	1,474	1,552
Total	719	39,950	54,736	92,870	128,572	139,490	153,120	176,056	185,160

<sup>1</sup> The figures for these years (as of 1 January of the year in question) are counts made by the Central Bureau of Statistics; provisional figures excluding births.

Sources: Ministry of Justice (Fragmenten uit . . . 1975, 1976; Nieuwsbrief B.W., 1971, no. 8). The figures for 1976 and 1977 are taken from Motief 1977, no. 7, p. 19.

Few statistics are available concerning sex, age structure and other significant demographic characteristics of Mediterranean foreigners in the Netherlands.

With regard to Italians, it may be noted in relation to the sex-breakdown that men still far outnumber women (see table 4.2). The same applies to Mediterranean workers from recruitment countries, the ratio between men and women remaining approximately constant at: 2:1 during 1976 and 1977.

**Table 4.5. Citizens from recruitment countries resident in the Netherlands, by sex: as of 1 January 1973–1977**

	Men	Women	Total
1973	95,087	33,485	128,572
1974	99,689	39,801	139,490
1975	105,623	47,497	153,120
1976	115,072	54,665	169,737
1977	118,361	60,671	179,032

Source: Various Explanatory Memoranda to the national Budget.

It may be seen from table 4.5 that the number of female citizens from recruitment countries is clearly catching up, especially when it is taken into account that the bulk of the increase in male foreigners between 1 January 1975 and 1 January 1976 was due to the regularization of males already resident in the Netherlands at that time (cf. table 4.6).

As far as age structure is concerned the only available figures are those from the 1971 census.

**Table 4.6. Nationals from recruitment countries, by age and sex: 28 February 1971 (sample of 1 in 10 (x10) : N = 97,600)**

	Men %	Women %
0–19 years	10.7 7,700	38.8 7,900
20–39 years	77.7 60,000	51.4 10,500
40–64 years	12.2 9,400	9.0 1,800
65 years and over	0.2 100	0.8 200
	100.0 = 77,200	100.0 = 20,400

Source: 14th General Census part 1B, 1978, p. 29.

The bulk of the Mediterranean workers are settled in the west of the Netherlands, with significant numbers of foreign workers in the industrial centres in North Brabant and Gelderland as well.

Table 4.7 provides a picture of the geographical distribution of Mediterranean workers on the basis of temporary work permits.

**Table 4.7. Geographical distribution of foreign workers<sup>1</sup> (temporary work permits) by province and region in the Netherlands**

	15-9 1969	15-6 1971	15-7 1973	15-9 1974	15-4 1977
Groningen	0.2	0.4	0.4	0.5	
Friesland	0.2	0.5	0.5	0.5	
Drenthe	0.5	0.8	0.6	0.8	
North Netherlands	1.0	1.8	1.6	1.8	1.4
Overijssel	5.7	6.3	7.5	8.0	
Gelderland	9.8	10.5	10.8	10.4	
East Netherlands	15.5	16.8	18.3	18.4	13.1
Utrecht	12.8	8.6	7.8	7.0	
North Holland	24.0	20.8	20.6	20.8	
South Holland	29.0	28.0	26.5	26.6	
West Netherlands	65.8	57.3	54.9	54.4	67.2
Zeeland	0.3	1.2	0.9	9.8	
North Brabant	13.4	16.8	18.1	18.1	
Limburg	4.0	6.2	6.3	6.4	
South Netherlands	17.7	24.1	25.2	25.4	18.3

<sup>1</sup> Workers from recruitment countries only.

Source: Calculation based on statistics from Ministry of Social Affairs.

Percentages for later years (especially 1977) need to be interpreted with caution, since the relative share of temporary work permits in the total number of permits declines sharply after 1974 (see table 4.1).

An examination of population registers in the municipalities, however, indicates the conclusion to be justified.

**Table 4.8. Municipalities with over 2000 foreigners originating from recruitment countries, including Italy, as of 1 January 1976**

1. Rotterdam	27,230	11. Hengelo	2,721
2. Amsterdam	23,640	12. Almelo	2,679
3. The Hague	9,985	13. Schiedam	2,521
4. Utrecht	9,726	14. Arnhem	2,507
5. Enschede	5,302	15. Deventer	2,418
6. Eindhoven	4,568	16. Den Bosch	2,343
7. Zaanstad	4,190	17. Vlaardingen	2,338
8. Haarlem	3,033	18. Alkmaar	2,073
9. Nijmegen	2,875	19. Tilburg	2,030
10. Dordrecht	2,846		

Source: CBS (see Motief, vol. 3, no. 6).

To the extent that foreign employees have been issued a temporary work permit, the Ministry of Social Affairs also has data on the number of foreign workers in particular sectors or occupational categories (at least at the time the permit was issued).

For those years during which the great majority of work permits issued were temporary permits, these data provide an approximate picture of the sectors and branches in which guest workers were employed. The calculations have not been taken beyond 1975, because by that time the proportion of temporary permits had dwindled to well under half (see table 4.1).

**Table 4.9. Foreign Workers<sup>1</sup> (temporary work permits) by branche of trade and their share in total employment in branches**

	Distribution by branche of trade				Percentage of total employment			
	1969	1971	15-10 1973	15-3 1975	1969	1971	15-10 1973	15-3 1975
1. Agriculture and fishing	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2
2. Mining	1.4	1.0	0.6	0.5	3.3	4.1	3.0	3.0
3. Foodstuffs	12.5	14.0	13.6	13.3	3.7	5.5	4.9	4.4
4. Textile industry	7.9	7.0	6.6	6.6	5.6	7.3	7.2	6.9
5. Footwear and clothing	2.0	1.8	3.0	2.8	1.4	1.9	3.4	3.3
6. Timber and furniture industry	2.3	2.2	2.4	2.1	2.1	2.8	2.8	2.2
7. Paper industry	2.8	2.2	2.2	2.0	5.0	5.4	4.9	4.1
8. Printing industry	1.1	0.8	0.8	1.0	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.8
9. Leather, rubber, chemicals and oil	8.3	8.2	7.3	6.9	3.9	4.9	4.0	3.4
10. Building materials, earthenware, glass	4.7	5.0	4.4	3.9	5.4	7.6	6.5	5.3
11. Metal trades	32.6	33.6	34.0	34.1	4.2	5.6	5.2	4.7
12. Construction industry	4.9	5.0	3.8	3.0	0.6	0.8	0.6	0.4
13. Public utilities	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0
Total industry (2-13)	80.5	80.6	78.7	76.2	2.7	3.6	3.4	3.0
14. Commerce	4.4	3.7	4.0	4.0	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.3
15. Transport industries	3.5	2.9	2.1	1.9	0.9	0.9	0.6	0.5
16. Hotel and restaurant trade	3.2	3.8	5.1	5.8	2.0	3.2	3.8	3.9
17. Other services	7.7	8.2	9.4	11.4	0.6	0.7	0.6	0.7
Total services (14-17)	18.9	18.7	20.5	23.0	1.5	1.9	1.7	1.6
Total occupations	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	1.5	1.9	1.7	1.6

<sup>1</sup> Workers from the recruitment countries plus other nationalities; EEC nationals not included.

Sources: Work permits for 1969 and 1971, taken from 'The free movement of labour and the EEC Labour market', EEC publication, 1972. The figures for 1973 and 1975 are based on Ministry of Social Affairs data. In calculating the percentages in the last four columns use has been made of CBS data on total employment per branche of trade, published in Sociale Maandstatistiek (Monthly Social Statistics) (September 1973 and 1975). The CBS's estimates for 1973 have been used for that year; for 1975 the 1974 estimates have been used.

Finally, the local employment offices provide a regular flow of data on registered unemployment among foreign employees – which rose sharply from the end of 1974 until spring 1976.

**Table 4.10. Unemployment among workers from recruitment countries, 1974–1978**

January	1974	1652	1.8% <sup>1</sup>
August	1974	1345	1.4% <sup>2</sup>
September	1974	1638	1.8%
October	1974	1906	2.0%
November	1974	2374	2.5%
December	1974	2794	2.0%
January	1975	3532	3.8%
February	1975	4200	4.5%
March	1975	4719	5.1% <sup>3</sup>
April	1975	4690	5.1%
May	1975	4827	5.2%
June	1975	5113	5.5%
July	1975	5228	5.7%
August	1975	5418	5.9%
September	1975	5679	6.1%
October	1975	6312	6.8%
November	1975	7253	7.8%
March	1976	9130	9.9%
April	1976	8451	9.1%
March	1977	8453	8.5% <sup>4</sup>
May	1977	7789	7.8%
March	1978	9213	9.2%

<sup>1</sup> Percentage of the total number of work permits as at 31 December 1973.

<sup>2</sup> Percentage of the total number of work permits as at 31 December 1974.

<sup>3</sup> Percentage of the total number of work permits as at 31 March 1975.

<sup>4</sup> Percentage of the total number of work permits as at 31 December 1976.

Source: Ministry of Social Affairs: (Fragmenten uit . . . 1976, p. 74; Motief, various volumes).

#### **4.1 Migration from Mediterranean countries: main issues and official policy**

##### **4.1.1. Labour migration in the Netherlands: background and development**

The Dutch economy suffered extensive damage as a result of the Second World War, and the immediate post-war period was dominated by the need for reconstruction. Reconstruction policy was particularly directed towards building up a strong, export-oriented industrial base. Some of the major factors enabling the Dutch economy to be built up included wage controls, an internal migration policy, a policy of encouraging economies and import substitution by means of domestic production. During these initial years the amount of work available was still too limited to absorb the labour supply, and the government consequently conducted an active emigration policy. The Netherlands regarded itself as an over-populated country (Marshall-Goldschwarz 1973). As early as the mid-fifties reconstruction policy was seen to have been a success.

The strong growth of the economy was already leading to sectoral labour shortages, and the first manpower was recruited from Italy for mining and industry. Initially it was the mines that experienced particular difficulty in attracting sufficient labour, because Dutch workers had become steadily less inclined to accept this type of work on account of the low wages paid and the relatively onerous working conditions. The competitive wages paid in the German mining industry were also a factor.

Up to the 1958 recession, however, the use of foreign labour in the Netherlands got under way only hesitantly.

## **The first wave of foreign workers 1960–1966**

After the temporary slump in 1958, the effects of which were felt in the employment sector until 1959, the Dutch economy continued to expand. The Netherlands had secured a sound place for itself in international markets and the prospects were good. But this growth – especially the industrial growth – began to have an impact on the labour market. Despite the marked increase in the labour force (which exceeded that in other Western European countries), shortages began to emerge in the labour market, which were much more serious than those in the fifties.

The increase in demand for manpower by industry could no longer be met by the displacement of labour from the agricultural sector because the proportion of the labour force in agriculture had already fallen to 10% by the beginning of the nineteen-sixties. Attempts to increase the rate of participation in the labour force, among other things by recruiting married women, proved inadequate, and the shortages persisted. These developments placed the trade unions in a stronger bargaining position, which ultimately led to the end of the guided wage policy (1963) and a wage explosion. The problems in the labour market were accentuated by the introduction of shorter working hours and the five day week, which were also a result of labour's strong position. On the other hand, very sizeable investments had been undertaken by the business sector, and the shortage of labour raised the prospect of under-utilization of the existing productive capacity. This threatened to frustrate the business sector's short-term profit expectations. In this situation the recruitment of foreign labour had several advantages in the short term over other solutions (such as labour-saving investment):

- the use of foreign labour would enable productive capacity to be utilized more fully and investments already made to show a greater return;
- pressure on the labour market would be relieved by the recruitment of foreigners; the bargaining position of the trade unions would become less strong and wage pressure would be lessened.

Or as Marshall-Goldschwarz (1973, p. 49) puts it in her analysis: on account of the existing under-utilization of productive capacity good profit expectations existed for the business sector 'provided that sufficient labour was available at existing wage levels'.

The first wave of foreign workers from Mediterranean countries in the first half of the sixties needs to be seen in this context. At that time scarcely any arrangements had been devised by the authorities for attracting and recruiting foreign labour. Until 1960, virtually only Italians were recruited. The business sector, however, had already begun to solicit and recruit foreign labour from Mediterranean countries on its own account. In a number of cases this uncontrolled recruitment led to gross abuses.

This led the government to step in and at least provide the official framework within which the recruitment of foreign workers could take place. Labour-recruitment agreements were concluded during this period with Italy (1960), Spain (1961), Portugal (1963), Turkey (1964), and Greece (1966). In the period after the economic recession of 1967, Morocco (1969), Yugoslavia (1970) and Tunisia (1970) were added. By means of these recruitment agreements and the bodies set up to handle their implementation, the government laid the basis for the provision of foreign workers for the Dutch business sector on the one hand, and the regulation of immigration on the other. This latter aspect did not become an issue until during and after the 1967 crisis.

The conclusion of the recruitment agreements referred to above brought about the successive appearance in the Netherlands of workers from various countries. The Italians had already been a familiar feature in the Netherlands for some years, although their numbers were still small. In 1960, they were the only significant group, numbering around 3,000. After 1964, the number of Italians recruited fell sharply. The number increased steadily

however to about 10,000 in 1968, when they obtained a different status from other foreign workers from the Mediterranean region as the free movement of labour within the EEC came into force (see table 4.2).

From 1961 to 1968, workers recruited from Spain set the pattern for foreign workers in the Netherlands, followed by the Turks in 1964.

Up to 1966 the number of foreign workers grew rapidly and without interruption (table 4.1: total number of work permits).

A comparison of the number of workers officially recruited and the number of work permits issued between 1961 and 1966 indicates that over half the foreign workers obtained employment without going through recruitment channels. In 1966, there were some 46,000 Mediterranean workers (including Italians) with work permits in the Netherlands.

### **The economic recession of 1967 and the second wave**

The economic recession of 1967 prompted the first discussion of the significance and function of foreign workers in the Dutch economy. In general, the discussion drew on the lines of thought developed earlier in Germany and Switzerland (see Lucassen et al., 1974). The fact was that unemployment in the Netherlands rose sharply to reach 2.4%. Recruitment came virtually to a standstill and the number of work permits issued fell by over 7,000 from 46,000 in 1966 to 39,000 in 1967.

On the hand, it became clear that one of the functions of foreign workers was to act as a buffer against fluctuations in the economy. At times of economic prosperity, large numbers could be recruited relatively easily through official recruitment or by means of personal contacts with foreigners already working in the Netherlands (nominative recruitment). At times of recession recruitment ceased and a number of foreign workers returned to their country of origin because they could no longer obtain work and the rights of an unemployed worker were either denied them or extended for a very short time only (see Kayser 1972). On the other hand the economic crisis also revealed that, even at a time of economic recession, the great majority of foreign workers remained indispensable. They occupied positions in the Dutch economy which the Dutch themselves were no longer prepared to fill (see below). Although both the government and industry had until that time consistently maintained that foreign workers were being engaged only temporarily, it became clear in 1967 that foreign labour in the Netherlands was in for a longer innings.

The lessons to be learned from the 1967 crisis were, however, quickly forgotten: the slump was of short duration and the resumption of recruitment in 1968 brought the number of work permits at the end of that year back to 1966 levels.

This was followed by a period of recruitment on a large scale between 1969 and 1972. This recruitment was conducted almost entirely through official recruitment offices, since measures introduced in 1968 and early 1969 had officially closed off other avenues for recruiting foreigners. The government monopolized recruitment completely, thereby rendering possible an efficient supply of labour to industry.

This second wave of recruitment of foreign labour took place in different circumstances: whereas relatively small numbers of foreigners had been recruited between 1960 and 1966, when the labour market had been tight (unemployment averaged around 1%), greater numbers of foreigners were recruited in the period 1968–1971, at a time of higher unemployment rates (see table 4.1). There are two explanations for this phenomenon:

1. In the first place, Dutch industry had become increasingly familiar with the recruitment and employment of foreigners.

2. Secondly, part of the explanations lies in the fact that Dutch workers increasingly avoided certain occupations and positions and that Dutch workers shifted steadily towards better-paid and more congenial work. Although the overall level of unemployment was higher, there was still a

shortage of labour for jobs of low social standing or that were less well paid (see employment).

In the space of a few years the number of valid work permits rose from 39,000 in 1967 to nearly 84,000 by the end of 1971.

### **Foreign workers after 1972**

The international economic slump began to affect the Dutch economy in 1972. In 1972 and 1973 the rate of unemployment rose to nearly 3%; the situation was aggravated by the oil crisis at the end of 1973. The rate of unemployment, as a percentage of the employed work-force, rose from 3.5% in 1974 to over 5%.

Although the rate of unemployment was higher than during the brief recession in 1967, the number of work permits did not decline but actually rose, if only slightly (table 4.1).

Between the beginning of 1972 and the end of 1974, over 15,000 foreigners were recruited through official channels. This may be interpreted in terms of the continuing need for foreign workers even at a time of relatively high unemployment, while their function as a buffer in fluctuating economic conditions had declined further since 1967. The buffer function consisted exclusively of a reduction in official recruitment, and no longer in a reduction in the total number of foreign workers (i.e. work permits) in the Netherlands.

During this period – in fact as early as 1970 – a new trend becomes discernible with regard to the migration of foreigners, namely an increasing influx of members of the family of foreign workers. These family members also swelled the Dutch labour market. In 1972, for example, 3768 work permits were issued to foreigners who had come to the Netherlands under provisions for family reunification. In 1973 the number was 2308 (Lower House 1973–74, 10 504, no. 9).

From early 1975 onwards the number of work permits begins to stabilize and even to fall slightly. The figure of 99,900 and the growth that this number would suggest, must in fact be attributed to the regularization of over 14,000 illegal migrants during the period March 1975 to 1 June 1976 (Fragmenten uit .... 1977, p. 17).

Unemployment among workers from recruitment countries begins to rise rapidly from this point – i.e. appreciably later than for the Dutch labour force as a whole (see table 4.10).

The delayed onset of unemployment among foreign workers indicates the isolated nature of the sector of the labour market in which they are employed (see below). In this sector the saturation point was not reached until late 1974, leading to a rapid rise in unemployment.

The general conclusion that one may draw from this brief account is that the growth in the number of foreigners in the Netherlands during the sixties may be regarded as a function of the growth of the demand for labour in the Netherlands. While the state of the Dutch labour market was determined by the post-1972 downturn, the slump also indicated that foreigners could no longer be regarded as a simple buffer to help cushion fluctuations in the economy, but that they had begun to fulfil a number of functions that made them virtually indispensable to the Dutch economy.

#### **4.1.2. Conditions in the countries of origin**

For a considerable period, the Mediterranean-worker problem in Europe was examined solely from the point of view of the host countries (Penninx and Van Velzen 1977). Conditions in the countries of origin were regarded in Western Europe as being of little interest. It was generally maintained that labour migration was a development that operated 'to the benefit of all concerned' (Gastarbeid in .... 1972) and of which the countries of origin therefore also enjoyed the benefits (some reviews of the consequences of

worker migration in the countries of origin include: the OECD and ... 1975; Bovenkerk 1974; Yap Kioe Sheng 1975; Lucassen et al., 1974; Penninx and Van Velzen 1977). OECD surveys in the countries of origin in the late nineteen-sixties revealed that the favourable implications of labour migration for the countries of origin that had been anticipated did not exist (Emigrant workers 1966; Trebous 1970; Kayser 1970 and 1972). As a result, the view slowly gained ground that the phenomenon of worker migration could not be properly understood in terms of a harmony of interest, but that the preconditions for such worker migration and the explanation for the consequences in the country of origin had to be understood in terms of unequal growth and dependence between the industrialised Western European countries and the relatively under-developed economies of the Mediterranean region (Penninx and Van Velzen pp. 49–88).

There follows a brief sketch of several aspects of developments in the countries of origin, broken down into the same periods used in 4.1.1.

### **Labour migration from its inception up to 1966**

In comparison with Western European countries, economic development in Mediterranean countries after the Second World War started out from a much less favourable base. To the extent that development got under way at all, it was overshadowed on the one hand by the rapid growth in population, while on the other it was confined to a few growth regions. The creation of new jobs in industry and services was quite unable to keep pace with the amount of labour being displaced from agriculture as a result of mechanization and increases in scale. In addition, the individual's prospects of obtaining work and income were reduced by the rate of population growth in these countries. The introduction of development plans in these countries during the sixties moreover had the effect of drawing attention to this increasing level of concealed or open unemployment.

People who felt that job opportunities or their earning power were too limited in their own localities, or who saw good prospects for advancement in Western Europe, became interested in working abroad. But no matter how eager one might be, opportunities of moving were not open to all during the initial phase of international migration. If one went to Europe as a 'tourist' (i.e. without a prior employment contract), this meant being able to finance the journey and the initial stay on arrival, and even if one were recruited by a private intermediary this was not generally done free of charge. In rounding up labour, and also in organizing travel to Europe for workers going on spec a system of 'contact men' or 'brokers' arose, demanding not inconsiderable fees for their services. All sorts of falsified passports, fraudulent employment contracts or work permits and nominative contracts ensured that many a migrant was fleeced by these middlemen. For those lacking financial resources these initial outlays formed insurmountable barriers.

There are sufficient indications for believing that migration did not initially get under way among the poorest but among those income-groups able to meet, or borrow for these initial expenses (Abadan-Unat et al. 1976).

Once recruitment began increasingly to take place within the framework of procedures agreed between countries of origin and recipient countries, in the mid-sixties, the poorest citizens also got a chance, since official recruitment involved less expense.

This new procedure did not, however, always prove to be 'free'. Applications from abroad were lodged with employment offices in such numbers that enormous waiting lists developed. In Turkey, example, waiting lists of people registered for employment abroad exceeded one million (Abadan-Unat et al. 1976; for Tunisia see Penninx 1973). The supply of labour far exceeded the demand in Europe, which enabled European employers to tighten the criteria for selection.

Contrary to popular opinion, migration from the Mediterranean countries to Western Europe did not originate in rural areas but generally in the cities. In this respect Morocco formed an exception. In the course of time the

process spread from urban centres to the rural hinterland. That is not to say, however, that many migrants were not of rural origin, for a high degree of urbanization became a prominent feature of these countries after the Second World War; many had already migrated within their own countries before moving to Europe.

In many cases, labour migration did not first get under way in the least developed regions of the Mediterranean. The reverse may be conclusively demonstrated in Turkey, Yugoslavia and Tunisia (Penninx 1973; Van Velzen 1974; Abadan-Unat 1976; Tieleman and Koelstra 1977).

In more developed countries of origin, such as Italy, labour migration appears to have been particularly concentrated in less developed regions. Migration from Morocco is of a highly characteristic, historically-determined nature, with the least developed areas having traditionally been areas of outflow (Heinemeijer et al. 1976).

To such extent as they had formed ideas during this phase concerning the potential uses of migration for planning and development, the regional and national authorities in the countries of origin entertained exaggerated expectations about the policy implications. In Turkey, for example, Prof. Talas, then Minister of Labour, formulated the rotation principle in the early nineteen-sixties; migrant workers would work in Western Europe for a few years, acquire industrial training and experience and save money, after which they would once again be employed in the Turkish economy. Thus the Turkish authorities encouraged the establishment of village development cooperatives from 1965 onwards, the idea being that members of the cooperative would receive priority in being permitted to go abroad, from whence they would be required to pay contributions out of their earnings with which they had come. The optimistic expectations of these two lines policy were later frustrated (see Penninx and Van Renselaar 1978). The interests of the individual migrant proved to be inconsistent with the objectives envisaged at both regional and national level. The individual migrant who had established himself in Western Europe was found not so willing to 'rotate' (apart from the fact that his employer would not have wished him to leave). The expectation that migrant workers would undergo training proved unfounded (Emigrant workers 1967; Paine 1974); while such training might well have been in the migrant's own interests, his Western European employer did not have slightest motivation to encourage the training of foreign workers whom he had engaged precisely because they were unskilled. In this respect the interests of employers in Western Europe were diametrically opposed to the interests both of the individual migrant and of the regional and national authorities in the country of origin.

Moreover, a competitive struggle ensued between the countries of origin during this initial phase, which employers in Europe were able to exploit to advantage. In order to capture the 'export market for labour' in Europe, the authorities in the countries of origin implemented a number of measures designed to satisfy Western European clients as quickly and fully as possible. Particularly in the case of countries such as Turkey and Tunisia, it has been clearly demonstrated that the objectives of national development and protection of the domestic labour market, especially with regard to the departure of scarce skilled labour, were completely subordinated to the promotion of labour as an export article (Abadan-Unat 1976; Tieleman and Koelstra 1977; Penninx 1973).

### **Policy impact of the 1967 slump and the second wave**

In 1967 there occurred a brief economic downturn, of which migrant employees working in Europe were the most direct victims. As a result of unemployment or a sharp reduction in income (cuts in overtime), many migrants were forced to take a sort of extended holiday in their homeland, a practice encouraged by the strict policies with regard to the issue of work and residence permits in the immigration countries. OECD surveys (Kayser 1972) have indicated that migrant workers regarded their protracted stay at home as temporary and were waiting for better times to return to Europe.

The 1966–67 recession revealed clearly to the migrant countries the extent of their dependence on Western European countries: recruitment came to a standstill, thereby frustrating the expectations of the many individuals waiting for their opportunity, as well as national (emigration) plans, which had by then been drawn up in most countries. Worse still, the emigration countries were forced in a short space of time to absorb large numbers of migrants returning prematurely against their will. Even where reception and reintegration arrangements existed at all, the countries of origin were not equipped to cope properly with these large numbers. The preconditions for absorbing these migrants adequately in regional labour markets simply did not exist. The returned migrants mostly regarded their return as temporary. They had not obtained any special qualifications in Europe, and because they had been obliged to return they had been unable to accumulate a stock of savings with which they could establish themselves properly in the regional economy.

The migrants thus returned temporarily in an unemployed capacity. Kayser (1972) accordingly maintains in the OECD survey of these cyclically-determined homeward flows that the emigrant countries had simply become the temporary repository for Western Europe's surplus labour.

To a large extent this function was performed by the agricultural sector. In this way the Western European countries were able partly to deflect the burdens of the recession onto the emigrant countries.

The brief recession was, however, rapidly followed by a strong recovery, and between 1969 and the end of 1973 the Mediterranean countries witnessed an unprecedented wave of emigration.

From Turkey alone over half a million workers left for Europe through official recruitment in those five years (Abadan-Unat et al. 1976, p. 11). Recruitment switched steadily from the (more developed) countries on the southern flank of Europe (Italy, Spain, Greece) towards North Africa and Turkey.

In a number of rural regions in the latter countries there occurred something of an exodus: in Turkey, Morocco and Tunisia, some villages and districts were inhabited almost exclusively by older men, women and children during the winter, with villages only becoming 'manned' during the summer holidays (Heinemeijer et al. 1976; Abadan-Unat et al. 1976; Koelstra and Tieleman 1977). The regional and national authorities did not exercise any control over recruitment selection, and family migration rapidly got under way in districts from which there had been migration to Europe for some time.

At a secondary level, the emigrant countries took a number of initiatives; an increasing number of labour attachés and teachers were sent to Europe. In a number of cases this was not just a matter of extending services to nationals abroad, but also represented an attempt to exercise political control over these subjects. In the case of the North African countries and Turkey, return to the country of origin was extremely limited. To the extent it occurred, it consisted of return on account of failure, brought about by family circumstances, illness, home-sickness and so on. This return failed to contribute towards economic development there. The flow of remittances from Europe had a much more discernible impact, in the form of inflation (which especially hit the poorest non-migrants), speculation and a heightening of socio-economic discrepancies. The services sector, in particular, benefitted on a large scale from the growth in demand: its spectacular growth was largely based on the flow of remittances from Europe (in 1974, Turkish migrants remitted over US\$ 1,4 billion by official means alone from Europe), but this sector is also dependent on the continuation of this flow.

During this period, migration became a matter of considerably greater national importance in the emigrant countries. The national authorities treated emigration as a significant escape valve for labour market policy: Turkey and Tunisia form the outstanding examples in this regard. The impact of foreign exchange transfers on the balance of payments of the

countries of origin had, however, become of possibly even greater significance. In 1974, foreign exchange earnings derived from migrant remittances were nearly as great as the country's total exports. Much the same was true for Morocco.

### **Post-1972 economic crisis**

After 1973, the emigrant countries' dependence was experienced at all levels. Individuals saw their chances of obtaining work in Europe reduced to nothing, and those who nevertheless tried their luck as 'tourists' generally returned home with considerable debts.

At regional level we find rising unemployment, while the processes of inflation and accentuation of socio-economic discrepancies continue. The exodus of workers to Europe ceases and other solutions are pursued in the rural areas in the form of internal migration. The departure of families (especially young families) does however continue from areas the bulk of whose economically active male population is already in Europe. During the next few years the contraction in remittances could take its toll of the inflated services sector. Processes set in train by emigration are discontinued. This sometimes leads to tension and political unrest, especially in regions strongly affected by migration.

At the national level, considerable efforts have been made to find alternatives to emigration to Europe: migration to Australia, Libya and other Arab countries, does not, however, appear to substitute for migration to Western Europe.

The reduction in the level of remittances made by migrants (resulting from increased unemployment, reduced overtime, greater family reunification etc.) is a set-back at the national level. Turkey, for example, which had geared its import policies to an anticipated growth in foreign exchange transfers by migrant workers, saw these remittances decline by over a third in the space of two years, and was forced to contend with an enormous foreign exchange deficit. This crippled the sector of the Turkish economy dependent on foreign imports for raw materials, semi-manufactures and machines. The enforced repatriation of migrant workers (although on a much more limited scale than in 1967) aggravates difficulties at all levels in the emigrant countries: there is no work for them unless they are able to create their own employment with the money they have saved.

The relationship between countries of emigration and immigration has become increasingly characterized by one-sided dependence and a conflict of interests. Emigration countries wish to continue the export of labour, but are unable to. To the extent that explicit undertakings had been made earlier, for example to Turkey, which had been promised the phased introduction of free movement of labour within the framework of its prospective membership of the EEC, these undertakings have been withdrawn or deferred indefinitely (Abadan-Unat 1976, pp. 27-43).

The outline above applies particularly to countries such as Turkey, Morocco and Tunisia and, to a lesser extent, to Yugoslavia. The chances of an economically meaningful return are far greater in more developed countries such as Greece and Spain (see Entzinger 1978).

#### **4.1.3. *Temporary or permanent immigration?***

Up to the present, the Dutch authorities have always acted on the assumption that the employment of Mediterranean workers in the Dutch economy was and had to be a temporary matter; the Netherlands cannot be an immigration country, the rule states; but the gap between 'norm' and 'fact' (Entzinger 1975) has developed to untenable proportions.

Penninx and Van Velzen (1976, pp. 19-21) have attempted to review the facts by asking two central questions: is it possible to conceive of the Dutch labour system without foreign workers? And what tendencies can be observed in the migration behaviour of workers from the Mediterranean in the Netherlands?

With regard to the former question they reach the conclusion that it is totally unrealistic to think in terms of workers from the Mediterranean countries remaining in the Netherlands only temporarily or briefly.

The indispensability of foreign workers for the Dutch economy – and hence the permanent nature of their presence – is indicated by the special (irreplaceable) position they occupy in the occupational and wage structure and their distribution throughout virtually all branches of industry and regions in the Netherlands.

On the other hand, the foreign workers' own migration behaviour suggests a steadily growing propensity to settle permanently in the Netherlands.

Right from the inception of worker migration from the recruitment countries, it was apparent that the length of residence of individual foreigners was steadily increasing; a study by the Ministry of CRM, which analysed the length of stay of cohorts of foreigners who arrived in 1961 and 1965 respectively, reached the conclusion that the rate of return was much lower among the 1965 cohorts than it had been before (Enkele statistische gegevens, 1971). The much more recent data of early 1975 on this trend leave the matter in no further doubt: see table 4.11. Once again there are notable differences between Spaniards on the one hand and Turks and Moroccans on the other (Sociaal en Cultureel Rapport 1976, pp. 213–214).

A further reliable indication of the extended length of residence is the increase in the number of 'permanent work permits' (table 4.1 column 5). Such permits are only issued if the applicant has worked in the Netherlands for five years under a valid temporary work permit without a break exceeding two months. Despite the fact that permits were issued strictly, their number rose spectacularly to over 61,000 in December 1976.

Conversely it may be demonstrated that the scale on which foreigners working in the Netherlands return home has declined.

Table 4.12 shows such an estimate of return, based on the number of work permits issued in the Netherlands. The table indicates that up to the end of 1967, a considerable number of foreign workers tended to return to their country of origin after working in the Netherlands for a few years; but after 1967 the rate of return declined sharply. As a complement to the lower rate of return, family reunification greatly increased.

The requirements for reunification remain exacting: pre-conditions for bringing one's family over include a year's guaranteed employment, approved housing for the family, a clear criminal record, and so on. Nevertheless the number of family reunifications continues to rise.

Up to the present no figures on family reunification have been published. An exception is the statement in the 'Nota naar aanleiding van het Eindverslag op de Nota Buitenlandse Werknemers' that 3,635 residence permits for family reunification purposes were issued during the first four months of 1974 (Lower House 1974–75, 10 504, nos. 12, 31).

A comparison between the number of work permits issued to subjects from the recruitment countries and the total number of residence permits affords a reasonable guide to the scale and growth of family reunification. On the basis of such calculations, 90% of all nationals from recruitment countries could be numbered among the active labour force in the early nineteen-sixties. According to CRM estimates the figure at the beginning of the nineteen-seventies was still as high as 80% (Enkele statistische gegevens 1971). A calculation based on the relevant figures for March 1975 produces a figure of only 58.6%, and a little under 56% in 1976. The latter percentage has clearly been influenced by the large number of work permits issued under the regularization scheme in 1975 and 1976; nevertheless it more accurately reflects the true situation.

**Table 4.11. Numbers remaining from various migrant cohorts according to length of residence and nationality as of 1 January 1975 (in %)**

	Remaining in the Netherlands after a stay of						
	2 years	4 years	5 years	6 years	7 years	8 years	9 years
<b>Spanish migrant cohort</b>							
1965	43.5	31.9	?	?	?	?	?
1966	47.4	38.7	36.1	33.9	31.2	28.4	25.5
1968	70.3	58.0	52.5	47.6	43.5*		
1970	57.9	42.7	36.5*				
1972	60.3						
<b>Turkish migrant cohort</b>							
1965	61.0	48.1	?	?	?	?	?
1966	69.1	60.7	58.3	56.2	54.7	53.7	53.0*
1968	85.7	77.9	75.6	74.1	72.5*		
1970	87.1	80.2	78.0*				
1972	86.4						
<b>Moroccan migrant cohort</b>							
1965	70.5	63.0	?	?	?	?	?
1966	72.6	69.4	68.3	67.1	66.5	65.7	65.0*
1968	94.6	91.2	89.8	88.4	87.0*		
1970	92.9	89.3	88.0*				
1972	92.9						

\* Minimum estimate based on data for the first six months of 1975.

Source: Statistics on foreign migration, CBS;  
table drawn from (Sociaal en Cultureel Rapport 1976, p. 214).

**Table 4.12. Return migration among foreign workers from the recruitment countries, 1960–1973**

Year	Calculated <sup>1</sup> no. returning; absolute numbers	Percentage return rate <sup>2</sup>
1960	144	26.4
1961	740	39.0
1962	1,233	24.5
1963	3,071	29.9
1964	6,083	26.4
1965	10,284	30.8
1966	13,032	28.4
1967	11,706	29.8
1968	4,045	8.9
1969	8,513	16.0
1970	10,386	15.2
1971	10,319	12.3
1972	6,026	7.0
1973	4,051	4.5

<sup>1</sup> Own calculation based on the number of work permits as of 1 January of the year in question + the number of newly issued work permits during that year – the number of valid work permits as of 31 December. For the data see table 4.1.

<sup>2</sup> Number of those returning expressed as a percentage of the total number of work permits at the end of the year in question.

It may be concluded that the migration process has reached the 'maturing' stage. It may safely be predicted that, in the next few years, the Turks and Moroccans in particular (the largest groups) will increasingly bring their families to the Netherlands. This is bound to have far-reaching policy implications (i.e. second generation problems). It is, however, difficult to determine the extent of potential migration of this kind, particularly since it is influenced by the policies adopted: admission and expulsion policy, housing policy, and policy in general. The CBS's projections made on behalf

of the Muntendam Committee however might well be too low (Bevolking en ... 1976, p. 80). Including new permits issued and family reunification, the CBS arrives at the following minimum and maximum variants:

**Table 4.13. Foreign migration by foreigners from recruitment countries 1978–84, in thousands**

	1978		1980		1982		1984	
	max.	min.	max.	min.	max.	min.	max.	min.
Immigration	14.0	9.9	7.8	4.3	6.3	2.3	6.8	1.9
Emigration	6.7	6.7	5.4	5.4	4.0	4.0	3.0	3.9
Balance	7.3	3.2	2.4	-1.1	2.3	-1.7	3.8	-1.1

Source: CBS, taken from Bevolking en ... 1976, p. 80.

#### *4.1.4. The position of Mediterranean workers in the Netherlands and official Dutch policy*

Like its counterparts in previous chapters, this section contains a brief account of the four sets of factors that determine the extent and nature of immigrants' integration into the new society and thus, ultimately, their position in that society (Van Amersfoort 1974, pp. 17–82).

##### **4.1.4.1. Individual immigrants and the degree and nature of their adjustment**

In his thesis of 1974, Van Amersfoort (1974, p. 190) observes that, for all the numerous publications on foreign workers, very little is known about the way in which the process of adjustment of this category actually occurs. Although there have been more studies in the international field on this subject than Van Amersfoort cites (for a survey see Lucassen et al. 1974, pp. 72–85), the conclusion holds for the Netherlands. Up to 1974, there was little research among foreign workers apart from the general survey taking stock of the situation which was commissioned by the Ministries of Social Affairs and of CRM in 1968 among Italians, Spaniards, Turks and Moroccans (De Buitenlandse Arbeider 1971, vols. I and II). After 1974 four studies appeared which deserve to be mentioned of which three – the survey conducted by Van Amersfoort and Van der Wusten among Moroccan workers in the Netherlands, the survey carried out by the Transport Workers Union (CNV) among Turkish employees of the Netherlands Railways, and the study by Brouwers-Kleywegt and others among Italians in the Netherlands – are of the survey kind.

The first of these is probably reasonably representative of Moroccans in the Netherlands; the survey among Italians is a good deal less representative, because the sample was drawn from the list of addresses held by the foundations for Assistance to Foreign Workers in South Holland; while the survey among Turkish workers in the Netherlands Railways is simply unrepresentative of Turks as a whole in the Netherlands. Finally, there is the recent thesis by Van den Berg-Eldering, who adopted a totally different research approach; in an exploratory research she attempted by means of participatory observation to record the migration of 45 Moroccan families. More than any others, this survey affords insight into the family migration process and the factors that play a role in that regard (Van Amersfoort and Van der Wusten 1975; 'Leven en Werken' ... 1976; Brouwers-Kleywegt 1976; Van den Berg-Eldering 1978).

The sections that follow set out to illuminate a number of relevant aspects of the 'Mediterranean foreigner in the Netherlands' on the basis of these surveys.

#### **The selective nature of migration**

As described earlier, worker migration from the Mediterranean area is conditioned by economic factors, both in the host countries and in the

countries of origin. The selection of migrants is thus primarily based on economic factors.

Dutch employers are interested in healthy workers in the prime of life possessing a particular level of qualification. These wishes became converted into hard and fast selection criteria when recruitment became officially institutionalized: the need for a medical examination before departure to the Netherlands and age limitations for unskilled labour (between 18 and 35) and skilled labour (between 18 and 45) were officially laid down in the recruitment agreements. On top of these general selection criteria there were the particular requirements of the demand for labour in the Netherlands (and the qualifications sought). All this inevitably led to selective migration:

- The average age of the Mediterranean worker, as indicated by the 1968 survey, was a little over 30. Differences between nationalities were slight (De Buitenlandse Arbeider 1971, p. 13). In the survey conducted among Italians by Brouwers-Kleywegt seven years later the average age was found to be 37.5 years (Brouwers-Kleywegt 1976, p. 9). Similar averages were encountered by the CNV survey conducted at the same time among Turks working for the Netherlands Railways. (The average length of residence in these last two surveys was very long. The Italians surveyed had been in the Netherlands for an average of 11.5 years, while of the Turks with the Netherlands Railways who were surveyed, 90% had been in the Netherlands for over five years and a third for over ten years). We may safely conclude that, on arrival in the Netherlands, the average migrant worker is young (between 25 and 30), but, with the passage of time and given the cessation of recruitment, the original stock of Mediterranean workers in the Netherlands ages. On the other hand, family migration and high fertility rates have had a strongly rejuvenating effect since 1970.
- The recruitment of Mediterranean workers by the Netherlands was almost exclusively confined to men. While the number of work permits issued to women rose in the seventies, this was not so much the result of recruitment as of family reunification.
- Demand from the Dutch industry has been primarily for unskilled labour. The average level of education of Mediterranean employees is accordingly very low. Roughly half the Moroccans surveyed by Van Amersfoort and Van der Wusten were found to be illiterate (1975, p. 44). The Turks with the Netherlands Railways did somewhat better, but here too 12% were found to have had no formal education whatever and 69% had only had 5 years of primary education (Leven en werken 1976, 2.2). Nevertheless, they compare favourably with non-migrants in the country of origin in this respect.
- As a result of the above factors, Mediterranean workers are generally engaged only as unskilled or untrained labour (see also 4.2.2).

#### **Attitudes towards Dutch society and their own future**

All surveys depict the same image of the Mediterranean worker arriving in the Netherlands: in large measure his motivation is economic. He sees himself coming temporarily to the Netherlands in order to earn 'good money', to save and subsequently to use his savings to improve his position in his country of origin or that of his children and family. Some surveys place more emphasis on push factors (lack of work and income at home) in the country of origin, while others tend to emphasize pull factors in the Netherlands (prospects of high wages and more rapid advancement). A smaller group of migrants also cite other motives ('to see the world' is a frequently encountered motivation among young unmarried migrants; the training argument is also sometimes heard); but this does not alter the fact that they intend ultimately returning to their home country. Essentially, therefore, the migrant arriving in the Netherlands will only orient himself to Dutch society to the extent that this serves his ultimate goal of returning home. Up to the present, the Dutch authorities have consistently allowed themselves to be guided by this concept.

The survey commissioned by the Ministries of Social Affairs and CRM in 1971, however, provided the first research evidence that the issue was not so straightforward. The link between longer periods of residence and reorientation towards the future is described as follows in the survey: 'Length of residence and deciding on the time for departure (i.e. return – ed.) are related in such a way that those who have recently arrived have the most specific ideas about when they intend to return, while those who have been here the longest become more vague in answering the question when they intend to depart. In other words: the newcomers regard their stay as a necessary evil, but the 'stayers' would appear to have different aspirations and place a different sort of value on their stay in the Netherlands. It will be self-evident that we are concerned here with an adjustment to Dutch conditions that grows the longer one stays in the country. (...) It is important to know which aspects of living and working in the Netherlands dominate this process of adjustment. Central elements in this regard are the family and accommodation. Many (married) foreign workers are much more able to lead a satisfying life in the unfamiliar conditions of our country once they are joined by their wives. On the one hand, the presence of a migrant's spouse depends on the availability of accommodation, while on the other the arrival of the wife (and possibly the family) represents a basic decision which the foreign worker is apparently only able to reach once he feels he has come to terms sufficiently with the Dutch environment. As noted previously, the Moroccans adjust the least. The extent to which the readiness to bring over one's wife and the degree of adjustment are connected becomes apparent when satisfaction is used as an index.' (De Buitenlandse Arbeider, vol. 1, 1971, p. 18 and 29). Thus it may seem that there is something of a chain-reaction: a certain degree of adjustment and satisfaction after some time in the Netherlands, family reunification (if feasible), greater satisfaction, revision of attitudes towards the future.

The CNV's survey among Turks working with the Netherlands Railways pointed to the same process, if in somewhat different terms: 'The more one becomes integrated the more one adopts Dutch customs and wishes to speak Dutch better. There would appear to be (or to develop) a certain interaction between knowledge of Dutch, neighbourhood contacts and the desire to speak better Dutch, with these factors possibly reinforcing each other. In addition the number of contacts and certainty about returning are inter-related. The more extensive such contacts become, the less certain one becomes about returning, until eventually people increasingly express no intention of returning. The latter applies however to only a small group' (Leven en werken ... 1976, IV–V).

This process is most clearly developed among Italians, as shown by the conclusions drawn from the survey by Brouwers-Kleywegt et al. (1976, p. 14): 'As a result of the lengthy average period of residence in the Netherlands (11.5 years) and in view of the fact that three-quarters of those married are married to Dutch women, the Italians have become extremely familiar with Dutch culture. Nevertheless strong ties persist with Italy. The largest group of those surveyed return to Italy on holidays at least once a year. 65% wish to retain Italian nationality. Uncertainty concerning the future and cultural bipolarity are also reflected in replies to the question about plans for returning to Italy or remaining for good in the Netherlands. The majority of respondents did not yet know.'

Among Mediterranean migrants as a whole the Moroccans would appear to follow a somewhat different pattern. According to the 1971 survey referred to earlier the Moroccans as a group score lowest for adjustment and highest for dissatisfaction (p. 26). This is borne out by the survey conducted by Van Amersfoort and Van der Wusten (1975, p. 51): 'The Moroccan workers in the Netherlands whom we surveyed fitted the stereotyped image of foreign workers, possibly to a greater extent than workers of other nationalities. They lack education and the work they perform is correspondingly simple and poorly-paid.

In a physical or geographical sense they often live apart from the rest of the community and remain oriented towards Morocco, or more strictly

towards their region of origin.' As noted previously, a large number of Moroccan migrants originate from the severely underdeveloped and economically overpopulated regions of the Rif and the Anti-Atlas, in large parts of which there had already existed a far longer tradition of migration within North Africa.

With regard to the Moroccan migrant's attitude towards the future Van Amersfoort and Van der Wusten report (1975, p. 39): 'The average Moroccan worker left Morocco with an uncertain time-horizon; 85% were unsure how long they would be staying in Western Europe. They left primarily in order to improve their families' economic circumstances and not as proper migrants. Ties to the region of origin are particularly strong among respondents from rural areas. This makes it difficult for them to adjust to Dutch society, a step they do not readily take.' No less than 77% replied 'don't yet know' to a question in this survey about the intended date of return, while only 3% replied 'will never return'; only 9% were able to name a definite date.

On the basis of her survey among Moroccan families in the Netherlands, Van den Berg-Eldering similarly lists a chain of factors which in all probability will eventually result in these families deciding to remain permanently in the Netherlands:

- In the first place she concludes that the dislocation of marital and family life generally form the basis for deciding to bring over the family; this means that there is no direct connection between family migration and the degree of adjustment.
- In the period preceding family migration they are engaged in improving their position in Morocco by investing their savings in real estate and other property.
- After reunification in the Netherlands these families remain tied in all sorts of ways to their relatives in Morocco (living together, responsibility for maintenance).
- A strange paradox then arises: these very ties with Morocco and the financial obligations assumed in relation to those who have remained behind causes these families to remain in the Netherlands for longer and longer (even though they have not deliberately decided to settle permanently) in order to discharge these financial obligations and the costs of family migration; and this makes it very likely that they will remain in the Netherlands for good. In this latter respect the children play an important role, in that they establish themselves in Dutch society and in Dutch schools. 'After a few years,' the children and their education and future prospects come to 'form an independent factor that stands in the way of a final return' (Van den Berg-Eldering 1978, pp. 265-266).

Although the specific questions asked in each of these surveys approach the problem from a different angle and are differently formulated, a common thread runs clearly through all the surveys. The longer the migrant (and his family) remain in the Netherlands, the greater the conflict between the orientation towards the homeland and Dutch society. It would, however, appear that in all sorts of ways, the circumstances in which migrants find themselves are conducive to their settling down more or less permanently with their families. This process can take some time but seems inevitable. Those who came to the Netherlands as adults retain strong links with their country of origin, as may be seen from the small number of applications from Mediterranean workers for Dutch nationality, from the considerable flow of remittances to the home-country, the intense holiday-traffic with the countries of origin, and from the fact that the majority of Mediterranean workers spend their leisure time with their compatriots, continue to read newspapers from their own countries, and so forth. As Van den Berg-Eldering notes, the point at which the balance shifts in favour of a permanent adjustment towards Dutch society occurs in the second generation, whose knowledge of the original country is confined to vague childhood memories and holidays, or who even do not know it at all.

## **Inadequate knowledge of Dutch as the major factor preventing integration**

All researchers are agreed that language difficulties present the biggest obstacle towards proper participation in Dutch society by the Mediterranean migrant and his family. This factor is incomparably more important for Mediterranean workers than it is among the groups described earlier, i.e. the Moluccans, Surinamese and Antilleans. The CNV survey concluded that 'although a large number (of Turks, ed.) had been in the Netherlands for some time, this period of residence had not always led to a sound knowledge of Dutch. One third understand Dutch well, one fifth also speak it well. People who have been in the Netherlands for longer periods do, however, tend to speak and understand Dutch better, as do those with higher levels of education and people drawn from the cities. Knowledge of Dutch turns out to be a significant factor for enabling people to function properly in society. People who speak better Dutch are more integrated into their surroundings, have adopted rather more Dutch customs, feel less discriminated against or lonely, are in higher occupational categories, enjoy better working relationships, are more familiar with the regulations and more understanding of them, are more able to cope with problems and feel more secure about their position in the Netherlands' (Leven en werken ... 1976, I). Language knowledge or its absence prove to be the crucial factors in spiral processes which can either lead to isolation or to more rapid integration. Many migrants, however, start from a very unfavourable position (half the Moroccans, for example, are illiterate). 'A more advanced starting level, by Moroccan standards, proved also to be beneficial in the Dutch context for learning Dutch, which in turn forms a condition for continuing to broaden one's knowledge', according to Van Amersfoort and Van der Wusten (1975, p. 51).

Van den Berg-Eldering also attached a great deal of importance to language knowledge among Mediterranean families. She notes that apart from the poor starting position many migrants have, the circumstances in which Moroccan migrant families find themselves and the ties with Morocco impede the development of language knowledge and participation in society: 'The financial obligations of Moroccan families in the Netherlands, including those towards relatives in Morocco, and their close ties with Moroccan society not only render an early return to Morocco unlikely but also present obstacles to participation by these families in Dutch society. This applies particularly to first-generation migrants. Participation only becomes possible when one knows Dutch and is familiar with Dutch society and culture. The obligations and ties referred to force the migrants to earn as much as possible by working shift-work and overtime. This prevents them from taking a course in Dutch or other training or introductory courses that would enable them to participate more easily in Dutch society. The majority of Moroccan women do not have any employment outside the home. As long as there are no official arrangements and there is no official requirement to take a course in Dutch or an introductory course, these women lack any means of participating in Dutch society. They will always remain dependent on their husband and children for contacts with Dutch people' (Van den Berg-Eldering 1978, p. 266). Lack of language knowledge constitutes the crucial factor in her gloomy assessment of the future for Moroccan families in the Netherlands: 'It is highly probable that Moroccan families in the Netherlands will come to occupy a minority position on the labour market and in the school system:

- As a result of their inadequate knowledge of the Dutch language and their limited training, adult Moroccan migrants have virtually no chance of participating in Dutch society, let alone any prospect of rising on the social ladder. This is particularly frustrating for more educated Moroccans.

- The prospects are not much better for Moroccans aged between 15 and 18 who migrate to the Netherlands within the framework of family reunification. Although these young people are still obliged to follow some part-time education, they do not often take courses for early school-leavers, since these courses are not geared to the needs of foreign teenagers, while

for various reasons there is little motivation to participate in such courses among these teenagers and their parents. Thus, although the necessary institutional set-up exists, they too will fail to learn Dutch sufficiently well to participate properly in Dutch society and to climb up the social ladder. Like their parents, they will come to occupy, and stay in, the lowest positions in industry and commerce.

- Moroccan children who migrate to the Netherlands at the age of eight or older, and who must therefore follow full-time education, have scarcely any chance of doing well at Dutch schools and obtaining a better position than their parents if they do not receive appropriate support and attention at school immediately upon arrival in the Netherlands, and if the parents are not drawn into the children's education. The dislocation of family life that often forms the reason for the family to migrate to the Netherlands continues to pose problems after the family has been reunified. This applies particularly to Moroccan boys aged eight or more.

- The only children with a chance of doing well in the Dutch education system are those who receive pre-schooling and primary schooling from the very beginning, provided that living in two cultures (i.e. at school and at home) does not represent an excessive psychological burden' (Van den Berg-Eldering 1978, pp. 266 and 267).

#### 4.1.4.2. The immigrant group and the institutions established by it

The nature of the migration (labour-migration) and the widely-dispersed origins of the migrant-workers (both among the eight countries of origin and within each of the countries themselves) has far-reaching consequences for (internal) organization within the community of foreign workers in the Netherlands. Moreover, they were all either individually recruited or came to the Netherlands on their own initiative, so that before arrival they in no way form a group in the sociological or socio-psychological sense.

Although a great many efforts have been made in the course of time to develop organizations representing the interests of foreign workers, it must be noted at this stage that they have succeeded in persuading only a small proportion of migrant-workers to join. As a general rule foreign workers' contacts are channelled through informal networks (i.e. among fellow-nationals), usually with people from the same region in the country of origin. The majority of migrants not only spend their leisure time within informal structures of this kind but also rely on these networks for dealing with problems and for any assistance they might need in that regard. Mutual assistance in such matters as helping find (better) work, accommodation, the correct way of handling formal procedures in the Netherlands, and loans, extended in the first instance on the basis of kinship, but also in the basis of neighbourhood ties or having come from the same region, are often undiscerned but real functions of these informal networks.

As far as the formal organization of foreign workers is concerned it may be best to distinguish various categories:

##### *Activities initiated by the authorities of the countries of origin*

Embassies, consulates and other official missions of the countries of origin in the Netherlands extend services to and generally look after the interests of their subjects in the Netherlands. But the scale and nature of the activities undertaken by the various countries differ widely. (For a survey see: Van Twist 1977, p. 111 ff.) Thus Yugoslavia (which moreover has a totally different 'emigration policy' from the other recruitment countries, and operates by means of government 'lending' agencies which make labour available for Western Europe) has a good reputation with regard to caring for the interests of its nationals in the Netherlands.

In the case of the official missions of some other countries, however, the provision of assistance and maintenance of their nationals' interests is minimal or totally lacking, and the activities undertaken are more by nature of a controlling function with more or less unmistakable political overtones.

At the time of Greek fascism, for example, it turned out that the political climate in Greece was making itself felt in the activities of Greek teachers and of a Greek labour-placement bureau in Utrecht. Among organizations action groups and foreigners themselves, the activities of the Moroccan Amicales – which have achieved prominence in recent years, partly as a result of the numerous legal proceedings against this 'cultural association' in the Netherlands – are regarded as the clearest example of political suppression and intimidation controlled from the country of origin. Similar suggestions were heard about the activities of the Turkish 'grey wolves', a European political offshoot of the National Action Party in Turkey which together with other coalition parties formed part of the Suleyman Demirel national front government between 1975 and 1977. This body was said to have been organized in Europe with governmental support. The matter achieved such political prominence in West Germany that the organization was banned by the German authorities, whereupon the organization was said to have shifted its headquarters to Rotterdam. Up to the present the national authorities have found no reason to take action against these organizations. Action was taken several times at local level with the municipal authorities exerting their influence to prevent these organizations from convening meetings in the municipalities in question (including Rotterdam).

At any event it is clear that violent confrontations occur regularly between the organizations mentioned above and leftist groups and organizations of fellow-countrymen (e.g. the recent clash between members of the Amicale and the Moroccan Workers in the Netherlands Committee (KMAN) over premises in Amsterdam; and the disruption of the Dutch-Turkish Workers Association (HTIB) May Day celebrations by members of the Grey Wolves organization, and so on: see various volumes of *Motief* and *Perifeer*).

As is apparent from the Explanatory Memorandum to the CRM Budget for 1977, these developments have not escaped official notice: 'Although I value the contribution made (by organizations of foreigners themselves), I am nevertheless concerned about certain developments, and intend watching these activities closely in order to prevent welfare policies on behalf of foreign workers from being interfered with' (Fragmenten uit ... 1977, p. 54). To date the authorities have not taken any specific action.

#### *Activities based in the Netherlands*

From the inception of labour migration there have been bodies and individuals concerned to promote the interests of foreign workers, and which have attempted to stimulate self-organization, not only in the leisure sphere but also to represent their interests in general. The Foreign Workers Assistance Units which were often the result of church initiatives, stemmed from these efforts. The units themselves, however, cannot be regarded as a form of internal organization; where there are foreigners on the executive of these foundations they constitute a minority. The staff of these units is approximately half Dutch and half from the Mediterranean countries. While their duties include community work and group work, the encouragement or establishment of self-organization among foreigners is not an explicit function.

Apart from these units, there are many other active action-groups, especially since the late sixties. Van Twist distinguishes two types of action groups (1977, pp. 104 and 105): 'A group can be formed spontaneously within the community in order to help foreign workers by teaching them the language or providing recreational facilities, or a committee is organized as a municipal initiative designed to help foreigners where a particular need arises, e.g. in the case of visiting the doctor, finding a house or bringing one's family across. Action groups solely aimed at providing assistance generally lack any political affiliation.' In addition there are action groups 'which regard the provision of assistance to foreign workers as part of their activities in a wider political context.' They work on the premise that 'there are no fundamental but only relative differences between foreign and Dutch

workers and their interests. These action groups regard the promotion of solidarity between the two groups as vitally important'. There are some 25 of these action groups in the Netherlands, of which the Buitenlandse Arbeiders Kollektief (Foreign Workers Collective, BAK) in Amsterdam was the best-organized example until it was dissolved. A number of these latter type of action groups also have a few foreigners among their members. The majority of the members are, however, Dutch. Action groups of this kind perform an important function in drawing attention to abuses: time and again they have exposed and publicized outrages in accommodation, employment and in the legal sphere, thereby forcing others to take action (e.g. the authorities or welfare foundations).

#### *Political and group-interest organizations among foreigners themselves*

Although it cannot be said that foreigners are organized on a comprehensive or influential scale for political purposes or in order to advance their interests, it is nevertheless fair to say that a good deal has changed in the last five years. Van Twist (1977, p. 108) characterizes the situation as follows: 'As pressures on foreign workers accumulate, they are putting their case in an increasingly organized manner. In Amsterdam alone there are about twenty internally organized groups among foreign workers. It is very difficult to estimate the number of internally organized groups of foreign workers in the Netherlands as a whole.

Among each nationality there are numerous small leftist and rightist groups. The Ministry of CRM recently embarked upon an attempt to catalogue these organizations (...) Many of them are only active at a local level and do not have any wider connexions. It is therefore very difficult to draw up a comprehensive inventory of them.'

At a national level, the most important organizations for each nationality are:

Turks: 'Dutch-Turkish Workers Association' (HTIB), leftist; 'Nationalist Turkish Workers Association', right-wing counterpart of the HTIB, said to be linked with and supported by the fascist National Action Party in Turkey.

Moroccans: 'Moroccan Workers in the Netherlands Committee' (KMAN), left-wing and resolutely opposed to the current political regime in Morocco; 'Moroccan Workers Committee' (MAK), also leftist and fiercely anti-Hassan II and the Amicales; '*Amicale des Marocains en Hollande*', see above.

Italians: 'Federation of Italian emigrants and their families' (FILEF), leftist; 'Association of Christian Italian Workers' (ACLI), oriented towards the Christian-Democrat movement in Italy (see inter alia *Welzijnsweekblad*, 11 August 1978).

Spaniards: General Union of Spanish Workers' (UGT), existed until recently only outside Spain; linked to the PSOE; 'Workers Committees' (Comisiones Obreras); communist-oriented.

Most of the organizations listed above have as yet few members. In general, membership numbers several hundreds (with the exception of the Amicales, to such extent as it can be said to have members); some of the organizations referred to also have a number of Dutch members or staff (including KMAN and MAK).

Nevertheless, the emergence of such organizations is a sign of the development of political attitudes and greater self-assertion.

The latter may still be weak, but on the other hand it would have been inconceivable a few years ago that a number of the organizations listed above should have been able, in conjunction with foundations, Dutch political parties and action groups, to rally nearly 10,000 foreign workers in a demonstration against Dutch government policy (in this case to protest against the Foreign Workers Employment bill, a demonstration held in Utrecht on 8 May 1976). This demonstration was one of the rare instances of

a large number of groups organized by nationality appearing together. But it is clear that the longer a large group of foreigners resides in the Netherlands and becomes familiar with the country and switches its frame of reference from the home country to the Netherlands, the more organized and assertive the group will become (examples include the actions by the 182 non-regularized 'illegals', and squatting by Turkish families in Utrecht). And herein lies the source of growing conflict among organizations of foreigners, to the extent that these organizations reflect opposing political forces in the country of origin.

#### *Participatory bodies for foreigners in the Netherlands*

Given the fact that foreign workers have no political rights and no right to vote, the idea evolved of providing migrants with a certain degree of participation at local level by means of advisory boards. In 1972, a Migrant Council was appointed in Utrecht, modelled on the longstanding Belgian pattern which in a number of cases had met with obvious success. The Council consisted of elected representatives of various nationalities, and was entrusted with advising the municipalities on all matters concerning foreigners at municipal level. The initiative came from the Dutch side (the Working Group on International Policy). The actual operation of the Migrant Council, however, became fraught with difficulty: the Council encountered within its ranks the same conflict of views as exists within the various nationality groups themselves. Furthermore it became ensnared among the various bodies concerned with assisting foreigners (at least in part): the municipal council, foundations and action groups. The Council disbanded itself in June 1978.

In a number of other municipalities, including Dordrecht and Gouda, similar efforts have been made to set up committees of foreigners to advise the local authorities (for which provision exists under the Municipalities Act). So far, however, the results have been disappointing.

#### *Social clubs, cultural associations etc.*

Apart from the types of organization of (or for) foreigners referred to above, there are also a number of social and sporting clubs and cultural associations within the separate nationality groups. These are generally organized at a local or regional level, sometimes with their own meeting place, and may or may not be subsidized by the welfare units. Some of these associations may also represent their members' interests in a limited way, but such activities are subordinate to their other objectives.

#### **4.1.4.3. Individuals in the host society and their preparedness to accept newcomers**

A number of recent attitudinal and racial discrimination surveys in the Netherlands were examined in some detail in the relevant section in the chapter on Surinamese and Antilleans.

These revealed that in comparison with other ethnic groups, 'guest-workers' (generally represented by Turks, Moroccans and Spaniards) recorded a particularly negative score, that their treatment in the press could be classed as discriminatory, and that the discriminatory behaviour of the Amsterdam employer towards Spaniards did not differ significantly from that towards Surinamese (Theunis 1968, Bovenkerk-Teerink 1972; Houdingen van Nederlanders 1972; Bagley 1973; Bovenkerk 1977). While the scanty data suggested a tendency towards discrimination and more negative scores on attitude scales among the Dutch towards Surinamese and Antilleans, such negative attitudes would appear to date back further in the case of foreign workers.

The disturbances between Dutch and foreign residents in certain residential areas (Rotterdam, Afrikaanderwijk 1972; Schiedam 1976), and the extreme tension which was only just prevented from erupting into violence

(Amsterdam, The Hague (Schildersbuurt), Leiden) occasioned a great deal of discussion of the negative attitudes of some of the Dutch population, but these were never researched. From the beginning of the nineteen-seventies, there has been a steadily rising level of tension in certain neighbourhoods, especially older districts with low rents where the majority of poorly-paid Dutch workers live. The following two factors are put forward by way of hypothesis as having contributed to this process, together with the increasing scale of foreign settlement in those districts:

1. A steadily growing group of foreigners remain in the Netherlands for ever increasing periods and seek to bring over their families. To accommodate them they are forced to resort to the lower end of the housing market, where a shortage has existed for years. The foreigners concentrate on the cheapest rented accommodation thereby competing directly with the most poorly paid Dutch workers.

2. In general there were more opportunities in the labour market in the pre-1972 period for both foreigners and Dutch people. But when these opportunities are severely curtailed as a consequence of large-scale unemployment, competition becomes intensified between indigenous and foreign labour in that sector of the labour market favoured by foreign workers. This is not only a matter of objective, demonstrable competition, but also of subjective rivalry. Of relevance in this regard is the fact that foreigners often live in the midst of the economically weaker Dutch groups who display little inclination towards cultural pluralism. Where there is a marked concentration of foreigners, many Dutch inhabitants claim that 'the character of the neighbourhood', 'the social status', or 'solid cultural values' are being disturbed.

These two developments manifest themselves in the form of friction and tension between foreigners and indigenous persons, especially in those areas where there are concentrations of foreigners and of the worst-paid Dutch workers and where competition is experienced on both scores at once.

This tension finds an outlet in the form of physical violence and/or discrimination between groups of different outward appearance and culture. Small reactionary political parties such as the Nederlandse Volksunie (NVU) are able to exploit the situation in such neighbourhoods; at the May 1977 elections this party secured most of its votes in old neighbourhoods of this kind in Rotterdam-Schiedam, The Hague and Amsterdam. However, even in these areas the NVU rarely obtained more than 3% of the votes cast (see Bovenkerk 1978, pp. 103–118).

By way of comparison, and to place matters in perspective, it should be added that relationships between foreigners and indigenous citizens are a good deal tenser in neighbouring countries. Well-known xenophobes such as Schwarzenbach in Switzerland and Enoch Powell in England are able to count on a considerably greater following. And riots such as those in Schiedam in 1976 that attract a lot of publicity and arouse indignation in the Netherlands would scarcely rank as newsworthy in France or West Germany. It is within this comparative framework that Bagley singles the Netherlands out for praise for its reception, care and integration of foreigners (Bagley 1973).

#### 4.1.4.4. The host society and the institutions set up by it to deal with the immigrants

##### *Official policy in the initial phase, 1958–1967*

Policy was dominated by the belief that foreigners were being engaged only temporarily. This temporary engagement was officially regarded as having two functions. In the first place, the temporarily employed foreigners would provide a buffer while a number of industrial sectors were being restructured. The engagement of Italians during the phased cut-back and restructuring of mining in the Netherlands became an example of this.

Secondly, foreigners could act as a temporary buffer to fluctuations in economic activity, eliminating bottlenecks in the labour market as booms approached their peak. This also implied that at times of relative recession they could be sent back (or at least some of them).

Given the comforting notion of the temporary nature of 'guest-work', the government saw little reason for interventionist policies. Van der Staay (1967 and 1973) speaks of 'ad hoc policy' lacking 'any central, underlying concepts'. Van Praag (1973) characterizes policy as being 'weakly interventionist' with 'intervention to date having been largely based on the belief that industry's need for manpower had to be satisfied, without the present-day norms of Dutch society being disrupted in the process, especially in the fields of housing, public health and employment.' The latter description would appear to go to the heart of the matter and places the lack of official involvement in the correct light.

In the interests of efficiency and to avoid abuses, it was desirable to regulate recruitment officially in the form of a number of recruitment agreements. This at the same time guaranteed the rapid provision of labour from abroad. The phenomenon of labour migration also necessitated the revision of the Aliens Act. The new law of 1965 merely lays down the general framework and permits this legal framework to be interpreted and applied as flexibly or strictly as desired by means of the Aliens Regulations, which can easily be amended, and by means of internal circulars laying down administrative guidelines (see also 4.2.1).

In this way this Act could readily be applied in accordance with the dictates of the economic situation.

There was scarcely any social or community policy for foreigners at the national level. Responsibility for foreigners' social welfare devolved upon the lower levels (Van Praag 1973).

One example of this is the problem of finding housing for foreigners, in which respect exclusive reliance was placed on the dated lodging-house by-laws operating at municipal level. The central government devoted insufficient attention to the specific problems associated with finding accommodation for foreign workers in the tight housing market, and failed to recognize that the existing regulations and powers at the lower levels were inadequate for coping with these new problems. The same happened with the reception of foreigners and the support subsequently provided for them. Private initiatives at local or regional level were encouraged, especially those by the churches (the initial migrants being Catholic Italians and Spaniards), and Foreign Workers Assistance units were widely set up. By subsidizing these units the government was able to transfer important responsibilities to them.

#### *The second policy phase: 1967–1972*

During this period the underlying principles on which policy was based remained virtually unchanged. As a result of the brief recession in 1967, the concept of the foreign worker acting as a buffer against fluctuations in economic activity admittedly receded into the background, but the temporary nature of 'guest-work' remained a basic policy premise. 'The Netherlands is not an immigration-country,' the first official document on the subject states (the Memorandum on Foreign Workers of 1970), with the clear implication that the Netherlands could not permit itself to become an immigration country. The publication of this initial government paper on policy with respect to foreign workers led to a good deal more discussion of policy objectives. This was not because the paper was remarkable for the clarity of its approach, but mainly because many people considered it did not go far enough as a simple description of the situation at that time (commentaries on this government paper are assembled in: Van der Velden 1971; Nieuwsbrief B.W. No. 5, 1970).

A second basic premise underlying policy was and remains 'the existing and anticipated future need to employ foreign labour in the Dutch economy;

policies are designed to ensure as far as possible that the number of foreigners coming to the Netherlands corresponds to the requirements of the labour market' (Memorandum on Foreign Workers 1970, p. 13).

During this period, the dilemma posed on the one hand by the considerable increase in the number of foreigners in the Netherlands staying for increasingly lengthy periods, and on the other by the undesirability of permanent settlement, became more acute. The government attempted to find a way out of the dilemma by exclusively highlighting the part played by foreigners as a buffer in the restructuring of the Dutch economy. In the somewhat longer term, the Memorandum on Foreign Workers maintained 'guest-work' would become redundant when this restructuring process had been completed.

The concept of 'temporary employment during the restructuring process' had a number of logical implications for the government's policies:

- a. the exercise of greater control over migration and employment;
- b. encouraging the temporary nature of 'guest-work' where possible;
- c. the continued displacement onto lower levels of the responsibility for foreigners' social and community welfare.

a. Greater control over migration was exercised particularly by means of permit policy. The Work Permits Act of 1969 ruled out spontaneous recruitment, while a tightening of residence permit procedures led to the requirement for foreigners to have a visa permitting temporary residence before being admitted to the Netherlands. Visas could only be applied for in the country of origin.

During the boom years 1969–1971, however, the more stringent policies on the admission of foreign workers proved to have little effect on controlling the actual inflow of workers offered employment. There was an increasing demand for cheap labour, and foreign workers had been indispensable for some time.

b. While it was attempted as far as possible to encourage the idea of temporariness, no policy instruments existed for the implementation of that policy. The discussion did not really get under way until the General Employers' Association laid down a number of basic principles in 1969. These principles, which have repeatedly cropped up again since then in debate about the appropriate policy, may be summarized as selective and limited employment of a non-permanent nature for individual foreigners. The rotation principle dates to this time, i.e. that foreign workers be restricted to two or three years residence. In this way it would be possible to prevent the permanent settlement of foreigners, while employers would remain able to recruit fresh labour. The costs associated with such matters as family reunification and the integration of foreign children would then be avoided. Similar ideas were sounded out by policy makers at a somewhat later stage, which in 1972 led to the expectation that a two-year regulation would be introduced. Resistance to policies of this kind was however so great that these proposals were not even formulated. (They are, however, formulated in the Rotterdam municipality's De Vos Memorandum of 1972).

In arguing the case for this measure, the government for the first time clearly established the relationship with development cooperation, for which one of the essential conditions was that the engagement of foreign workers should be of a temporary nature, or in other words that the return of the foreign workers to his country of origin should be ensured.

c. It has already been indicated that a large part of the central government's responsibility was transferred to lower levels during the initial phase. This inevitably came under fire.

Around 1970 a great many action groups sprang up, which tackled official bodies (particularly at a lower level) concerning their responsibilities for housing, education, reception and assistance for 'guest-workers'. Municipal authorities were subjected to considerable criticism for their housing policies and their policies in relation to older neighbourhoods in the cities, where the concentration of foreigners was rising rapidly and there was increasing tension. Action groups carried out surveys of the housing of foreigners in many localities, attracting publicity for the results. Public opinion was shocked by a number of large fires in which a number of people

died. (For a list of these housing surveys see Lucassen et al. 1974, pp. 101–103).

The reaction by the municipalities was disappointing. Here and there new organizations were set up known as Migrant Housing organizations. New lodging-house by-laws were sought in virtually all municipalities. The municipalities occasionally undertook to supervise boarding houses more strictly, but little changed.

For their part, the municipalities transferred their responsibilities to enterprises that had engaged foreigners, as well as back onto the central government. The latter established guidelines for the granting of subsidies to non-profit making boarding-houses. Up to the present, however, very little use has been made of this regulation. The displacement of responsibility onto enterprises had little point, since nothing could be expected of them on a voluntary basis. Enterprises that were already taking their responsibilities seriously at that time continued to do so, while employers who did not could not be compelled.

A second group of organizations that had a hard time during this period were the Foreign Workers Assistance units. All sorts of interest groups were represented on the governing boards of these bodies: employers, churches, trade unions, municipalities, etc. Heterogeneous groups of this kind could scarcely be expected to arrive at purposeful policies. As such they came in for a great deal of criticism for 'simply not doing anything.'

Trenchant criticism was levelled at the political patronage of the assistance units, especially the relationship between them and Embassy or consular representatives.

Meanwhile a greater consciousness had arisen in official circles about the 'guest-work' problem, as may be seen from a number of surveys (with the purpose of policy development) and advisory studies commissioned by the government. This realization of the general social problems connected with labour migration was at its most evident among ministries such as CRM and Development Cooperation, while the Ministry of Social Affairs saw its responsibilities as being confined to the labour-market problem. The Ministry of CRM commissioned a team of six people to conduct a study, which appeared in 1971 under the title 'Allochtonen in Nederland' (Foreigners in the Netherlands). A survey of 'Segregation in Rotterdam' was also commissioned by the Ministry of CRM, with a preliminary survey appearing in 1972. Also in 1972, the NAR (National Advisory Council) published its *Advies Gastarbeiders* (Recommendations on Guest-workers), drawn up at the request of the Minister for Development Cooperation, which observed that the existing form of worker migration could in no way be regarded as assisting economic development in the countries of origin; a number of pre-conditions would need to be fulfilled before labour-migration could have any value in the development context. A survey commissioned jointly by the Ministries for CRM and Social Affairs was conducted among foreign workers in 1968, the results of which appeared in 1971 'De Buitenlandse Arbeider' (The Foreign Worker) I and II 1971/72. Finally the Central Planning Office, at the request of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, examined the economic effects of the employment of foreign workers in the Netherlands (*Economische Effecten ...* 1972).

#### *Official Dutch policy since 1972*

As mentioned earlier, the Foreign Workers Memorandum (1970) aroused a storm of criticism, directed particularly 'towards its narrowly nationalistic, one-sided economic character and the fact that policies were not placed in the framework of development cooperation' (Baelde-van Hugte et al. 1975, p. 349). The main complaint voiced by welfare organizations was that it paid too little attention to the social consequences in the Netherlands of labour-migration. The harsh criticism was apparently unable to convince policy makers of the urgency of the problems: the Den Uyl Cabinet produced a Memorandum of Reply in 1974, which was by way of being a new policy document. It sought to place the problem in a somewhat broader context

and to devote more consideration to the long-term aspects. With regard to the former point, a chapter in the Memorandum of Reply was devoted to the relationship between labour-migration and economic development in the countries of origin. As far as the latter is concerned, greater attention (prompted by the CPB's study) was devoted to the long-term economic and social consequences of labour-migration in the Netherlands, and views are expressed on 'possible means of reducing' the number of guest-workers.

In comparison with the 1970 memorandum, the Memorandum of Reply is more balanced, in the sense that more facets of the problems are explored. The Ministries of Housing and Physical Planning, of Education and Science and of Development Cooperation, which had not been involved in the first memorandum, participated in the preparation of the Memorandum of Reply.

As regards substance, however, the Memorandum of Reply leaves a lot to be desired. The outstanding analysis by Baelde-van Hugte et al. (1975) exposes the weaknesses of this policy document in terms of five requirements that need to be fulfilled for a consistent and practicable policy:

1. 'The interpretation of the situation and associated expectations have not been spelled out. In a number of respects we would also query its inherent realism (requirement 1).

2. The objectives are often vague and unclear and have not been made operational. The government's discussion of integration with the preservation of separate identity is particularly inadequate. In addition, the objectives are inherently contradictory, namely restriction of entry versus integration of foreign workers, and coordinating demand and supply in the Netherlands versus responding to the interests of the countries of origin (requirement 2).

3. The measures put forward for meeting individual objectives are consistent. When the various measures are taken as a whole, however, certain internal inconsistencies become apparent. In a large number of instances we would cast doubt on their feasibility (requirement 3).

4. The requirement that the interpretation of the situation and the measures advocated should be based on properly assembled data and literature (including foreign literature) has scarcely if at all been met. This is a serious deficiency, especially as regards interpretation and expectations, since these can be demolished by sound analysis thus destroying part of the foundation of current policy (requirement 4).

5. The requirement that means of participation be provided and policy objectives be presented clearly has hardly been met at all (requirement 5) ' (Baelde-van Hugte et al. 1975, pp. 357-358).

After reading the Memorandum of Reply it is fair to conclude that there has been little substantive change in the basic premises underlying policy: the Netherlands is not an immigration country and the employment of foreign workers is therefore a phenomenon of a temporary nature. Ideas concerning the 'guest-worker' as a temporary buffer against fluctuations in the level of economic activity or in the context of restructuring certain branches of industry in the Dutch economy have been dropped in the Memorandum of Reply, since these ideas have been contradicted by the facts. Increasing recognition is given to the fact that foreign workers tend to be employed in certain sorts of work, i.e. poorly-paid and generally unpleasant and/or heavy work well down the social scale. But despite this recognition, the Memorandum of Reply continues to maintain that foreign workers can be dispensed with in the long run: the Memorandum of Reply refers to the need for 'specific labour-saving' investment in order to do away with the need for unskilled labour. The second basic principle underlying policy remains the coordination of demand and supply in the Dutch labour market, although greater efforts will be made to ensure that Dutch employers applying for labour have done all they could to obtain labour in the Netherlands. In the somewhat longer term, the government will attempt either to make those positions for which foreigners are recruited more attractive or to eliminate them, but essentially recruitment remains possible.

Accordingly in this phase the same concepts occupy a central place in terms of the administration of policy as they did in phase 2:

*a. stricter control of migration and employment; restriction of the number of foreigners in response to economic realities*

Stricter application of the Aliens Act provided an initial means of regulating and limiting the inflow of foreign workers. Thus a circular was sent to the municipalities in 1972, when unemployment was rising rapidly, with the object of making it impossible for foreign workers to be unemployed for periods exceeding six months by withdrawing their right to unemployment benefits (Informatie bulletin Werkgroepen 1972, no. 3). The foreigner in question can then be deported for want of adequate means of support (see legal status). In the same spirit a more active policy of prosecuting illegals and stricter border controls were introduced. The inflow of newly-recruited migrants also became subject to stricter conditions.

In the 1974 Memorandum of Reply, the Minister for Social Affairs indicated that he would be introducing new legislation covering the employment of foreigners that should enable their employment to be efficiently controlled and regulated. On 3 November 1975 the Minister of Social Affairs submitted a bill, 'Provisions governing the employment of foreign workers' (Foreign Workers (Employment) Act TK 1975–1976–13 682, no. 1). The bill laid down that an employer needed to obtain an employment permit before he could engage a foreign worker. The employment permit issued to the employer was valid only for the foreigner named in it. This made the foreigner tied to and dependent on 'his' employer. Furthermore the bill envisaged the imposition of limits on the number of foreigners who could be employed by companies employing over 20 foreigners. Foreigners holding a permanent work permit do not require an employment permit.

Up to that time, foreign workers were recruited under contract for one year, after which they were free to leave their employers and to seek other work in the labour market. The introduction of the new law would mean that after a foreign worker's contract had expired he could only obtain work with employers who had fewer foreigners on their staff than their limit. The limits were to be determined by the government.

The principles of this new law were discussed in the Memorandum of Reply (1974) and came in for criticism from many quarters, for highly diverse reasons. The Barendregt motion (TK 1974–75, 10 504, no. 14) especially criticized the additional limitations imposed on foreigners' freedom, and was accepted by the Lower House. The government – in this instance the Minister for Social Affairs – did not however wish to retract the principles contained in the law. It would therefore appear worthwhile to examine the new legislation and its background in somewhat greater detail.

The Explanatory Memorandum to the bill put forward two reasons for the desirability of amending the existing Work Permits Act. It was the intention of the draft bill that where employers engaged foreigners without a permit the employers should be subject to prosecution. Consequently it was considered self-evident that the permit should be applied for by and issued to the employer. Secondly, the introduction of permit limits was only feasible with a system of employment permits (TK 1975–76, 13 682, no. 3, p. 10).

The first argument was rejected by virtually all critics on the grounds that there were alternative possibilities. With regard to the second argument, the introduction of a permit limit gave the government a new instrument to 'provide an effective basis for the restrictive policies it wished to introduce'. In the case of companies employing more than 20 foreigners, a ceiling must be determined by the government for the number of foreigners they may employ. It is, however, easier to devise than to implement a measure of this kind, particularly because there are virtually no criteria for determining such limits. The only criterion cited was the question whether there were sufficient Dutch workers in the labour market who could perform the work in question.

It goes without saying that this will not only depend to a great extent on the wage the employer is prepared to pay, but also on the state of the

economy and the level of unemployment. In practice it will not be possible to hold these limits steady during upswing phases or, as the government maintains, even to reduce them.

Reaction to the bill was almost uniformly negative. Employers particularly rejected the permit limits, since they 'could have a stifling effect on industry generally and on staffing in particular' (TK 1975-76, 13 682, no. 3, Annex II, p. 31). The trade union movement pointed to the 'unacceptable consequences of the proposed regulations, since it considers that foreigners who had been allowed to enter the Netherlands deserve to be given equal opportunities and rights to obtain work with Dutch people'. The Foreign Workers Assistance Foundation considered that the new law represented 'a serious erosion of the existing rights and liberties of foreign workers and increasing discrimination' (Kommentaar ... 1975, p. 14). Furthermore lawyers pointed to the fact that the new proposals conflicted with the international agreements into which the Netherlands had entered or would shortly enter within the International Labour Organization, The European Community, the Council of Europe and other organizations (Groenendijk and Swart, 1976).

Nevertheless, after lengthy deliberation and many amendments a majority of the Lower House proved to be in favour of the bill in autumn 1976. The most significant change to be introduced by amendment was that foreigners who had worked in the Netherlands legally for three years (as opposed to the original five years) would fall outside the scope of the Act. Given the small number of foreign workers who would currently be subject to the Act, the bill has become an impotent instrument. Use could, however, be made of the legislation if recruitment were to be resumed.

The bill has still, however, to go through the Upper House. One of the main reasons why consideration of the bill has been continually deferred in the Upper House is said to be the argument that the draft legislation conflicts with a number of international agreements to which the Netherlands is a signatory or which are about to be submitted for ratification (e.g. The European Social Charter).

#### *b. encouragement of the temporary nature of guest-work*

As a follow-up to the earlier discussion about a possible two-year regulation, the Memorandum of Reply (1974) proposes the payment of a departure premium (reference being made to a sum of 5,000 guilders) to every foreigner who had worked in the Netherlands for two or three years, in order to encourage the remigration of foreigners and the rotation principle. Such a departure premium would also have the policy advantage of clearly distinguishing 'temporary' and 'long-standing' migrants.

This proposal – which soon became popularly known as the 'piss-off premium' – came in for sharp criticism from all sides, for very varied reasons, and its implementation proved politically unfeasible.

During the debate on this question the argument was once again employed (despite the NAR recommendation of 1972) that remigration and the departure premium could make a contribution towards economic development in the country of origin. This concept was also behind the survey by the interuniversity research project REMPLD, which was commissioned by the Minister for Development Cooperation. This project was designed to advise the Minister about the scope for remigration projects and for development projects in the country of origin, on the basis of research carried out in Turkey, Tunisia and Morocco. In 1975, the Turkey survey produced the first results. These suggested that the scope for remigration projects was not great: 'It appears improbable that return migration can be linked up with Dutch policies directed towards the promotion of regional development. One is forced to the conclusion that there is little to be said for basing Dutch policy on projects initiated by groups of individual migrants in the Netherlands'. The latter conclusion was

broadly adopted by the Minister as part of policy in 1976. The main emphasis of the Ministry's expenditure in the countries of origin would be placed on the direct creation of employment in the leading emigration areas. Remigration projects were not, however, ruled out, and the Ministry for Development Cooperation launched a remigration projects programme in November 1975 (see: Abadan-Unat et al. 1976; Van Renselaar et al. 1975; Koelstra and Tieleman 1977; Heinemeijer et al. 1977; Koelstra 1978; De Mas 1978; Terugkeerprojecten ... 1976).

*c. responsibility at the community and social level*

In general the principle of diverting responsibility for housing, education, health and welfare has continued to be applied during this period. Employers and local authorities are given the basic responsibility, while private initiatives are encouraged to step in as necessary.

With regard to housing for foreigners, the Minister for Social Affairs put forward a proposal at the very beginning of this period that, in addition to the existing work and residence permits, an accommodation permit should also be required. The idea was that foreign workers should be obliged to live in boarding-houses under contract to employers. But this represented an unacceptable restriction on foreigners' liberties, and the proposal was buried.

When the increase in the number of foreigners began to slow down, the housing problem tended to recede into the background. There was less pressure in the housing market for unattached foreigners (i.e. pension/boarding house accommodation) because more foreigners had obtained family-type accommodation. Furthermore, it was decided to include unattached foreigners among the wider category of unattached persons (i.e. together with young employed people, students and pensioners) for whom the government provides facilities under certain conditions. In some towns, usually at the municipality's initiative, high-rental flats were experimentally let to a number of unattached foreigners.

During this period the reception and further assistance to foreigners became functions of the Foreign Workers Assistance Foundations alone. These consisted of 19 regional units and the umbrella Netherlands Centre for Foreigners, which also provided services. In this period these foundations have been financed entirely by the Ministry for CRM. But these units became increasingly enmeshed in an internally inconsistent set of functions: on the one hand they were required to promote the integration of foreigners into Dutch society and their effective participation in that society, while on the other 'training and education aimed at emancipation and remigration' (TK 1974-75, 10 504, nos. 12, 39) had also to be counted among their tasks.

During this period there arose a Babel of tongues in welfare matters concerning the theme of integration and official policy, which has still not been sorted out (see 4.2.6). In addition these foundations found their functions being extended as a result of the arrival on an increasing scale of women and children and the associated reception problems.

Finally a paragraph or two needs to be devoted to the attitude of trade unions towards foreign workers, although their policies do not form part of this study.

The attitude of the Dutch trade union movement in general may best be characterized as ambivalent and passive. Two things need to be clearly understood: in the first place there is a fundamental conflict of interests between employers who wish to recruit Mediterranean workers, and trade unions which wish to strengthen their negotiating position in relation to employers, among other things by as high a degree of organization as possible. This conflict becomes all the more marked at times of an excess supply of labour. A second important factor is that in determining their official policy, unions must take full account of the views and attitudes held by their members. The objectively or subjectively experienced competition between indigenous and foreign workers is at its most direct among the rank

and file, and stereotyped images – even if they lack foundation – often exist of foreign workers as being ‘too docile or subservient’ or even notorious strike-breakers.

The literature concerning the attitude of the trade union movement with respect to the foreign worker problem in the Netherlands is generally rather critical (see for example Van Twist 1978, pp. 84–94; Bovenkerk 1978, pp. 166–168). There is little suggestion of international solidarity. Even so, a number of initiatives have been undertaken by the union movement in recent times which have been almost exclusively concerned with foreign workers.

#### **4.2. A more detailed examination of various aspects of the social position of foreign workers in the Netherlands and official policy**

##### **4.2.1. *Foreign workers’ legal status in the Netherlands***

This section draws heavily on the outstanding literature by a number of lawyers specializing in Dutch aliens law: Groenendijk 1978; Groenendijk and Swart 1976; Swart 1977; Swart 1978; Brummelhuis et al. 1975; and Zwinkels 1971. I shall confine myself to a few of the most significant aspects of foreigners’ legal status. In the first place it should be noted that there is a fundamental difference between the legal status of foreign workers in the Netherlands and that of Moluccans and Surinamese and Antilleans. The vast majority of the last two groups are Dutch citizens while the Moluccans have been ‘treated as such’ since 1977, although in formal terms most of them are stateless. Foreign workers, however, are aliens and as such fall under the Aliens Act. A further distinction has to be drawn within the group of foreign workers between ‘subjects from recruitment countries’ and subjects from EEC member-states (Italy).

The latter category enjoys a considerably better legal status in the Netherlands than the former. The remarks below are confined to the legal status of foreign workers from the recruitment countries.

#### **Characterization of foreigners’ legal status**

The current Aliens Act dates to 13 January 1965, amplified in the Aliens Decree and the Aliens Regulations (Act of 13 February 1965: Bulletin of Acts, Orders and Decrees 40, taking effect 1 January 1967; Decree of 19 September 1966: Bulletin of Acts, Orders and Decrees 387, taking effect 1 January 1967; Order of 22 September 1966: Government Gazette 188, taking effect 1 January 1967). This Act and the implementary provisions replaced the Aliens Act of 1849, the Act on the supervision of aliens (1918) and the Border Control Act (1920). In addition there were the Acts concerning the performance of work and self-employment in professions or business by foreigners of 1934 and 1937 respectively. The former was replaced by the Work Permits Act of 1964, which came into force in 1969 (Act of 20 February 1964, Bulletin of Acts, Orders and Decrees 72, taking effect 1 March 1969). The latter was intended to be replaced again by the ‘Provisions governing the employment of foreign workers’ Act, which has still, however, to be considered by the Upper House (see 4.1.4). The main elements of these two acts have already been summarized. The following brief account of legislation on aliens is based on Groenendijk’s address at the Noordwijkerhout seminar of 1978. In the first place, Groenendijk notes (as do Swart 1978, p. 30 and Zwinkels 1971) that there is a sharp distinction between the legal status of Dutch nationals and that of foreign workers, this difference being based on the quality of ‘being alien’, i.e. the possession of different nationality. The legal status of the foreign worker is characterized by the following three features: inequality; the assumed temporary nature of residence; and dependence.

‘Inequality is a cumulation of legal inequality and unequal treatment in practice’. Examples of legal (i.e. legislated) inequality include the reservation

of certain rights for Dutch persons only, such as the right to vote, right to official financial assistance, right to work, right to study grants, etc. Groenendijk speaks of inequality in practice when the same rights extend to Dutch people and to foreign workers but the latter are rarely, if at all, able to fulfil the conditions. The right to certain social security benefits, for example, is linked to the employee's place of domicile or is conditional upon the worker's family being in the Netherlands, and the practical impossibility of making use of these benefits leads to a loss of rights for foreigners whose families are not with them in the Netherlands or who have themselves returned home.

According to Groenendijk, much of the inequality in practice may be traced to the *fiction of temporary residence* (i.e. the possibility of expulsion), which is enshrined in the aliens legislation: 'A residence permit is generally issued for a specific purpose and for a few years. An extension must be applied for annually with the aliens police.'

This means fear of non-extension and expulsion in the case of unemployment, divorce or a misdemeanour, whether criminal or not. After five years residence in the Netherlands a foreigner *may* be granted a permanent residence permit (upon application), but this can be withdrawn or may lapse. There therefore exists no absolute guarantee against expulsion'. This threat of eviction is an additional source of inequality in practice:

- the unemployment benefit provisions do not distinguish between Dutch persons and foreigners legally resident in the Netherlands, but unemployment for more than twelve months can lead to expulsion and thereby to loss of benefits, which are linked to residence in the Netherlands;
- the Constitution guarantees universal freedom of speech, but in the case of foreigners, making use of that right can constitute an 'infringement of public order' and can lead to expulsion;
- there is a universal right to institute legal proceedings against one's employer, but the right to contest dismissal in person in the cantonal courts becomes a fiction if the foreigner is forced to leave the Netherlands because he is involuntarily unemployed;
- the receipt of official financial assistance (to which foreigners have no right) by foreigners constitutes a ground for the withdrawal of a residence permit and for expulsion, since in that case the foreigner lacks adequate means of subsistence, etc.

Nevertheless, Groenendijk at the same time notes that expulsion does not always necessarily take place in all cases where there exist legal grounds for expulsion. In a number of instances, foreigners are in practice granted rights to which they have no legal claim (e.g. official financial assistance or study grants). In practice such decisions rest with the relevant officials of the Social Service or with the aliens police, who have considerable room for manoeuvre under law. And this brings us to the third feature of aliens legislation, *dependence*: 'as a result of the loosely-defined responsibilities of official agencies, it is unclear to foreigners when use will or will not be made of them.'

The regulations are defined more in terms of favours than of rights and many provisions are only to be found in unpublished or hardly accessible circulars. This leads to greater dependence on those providing assistance and to dependence on other persons and bodies'.

This dependence – including on the employer – will be increased still further by the system of employment permits as proposed in the Foreign Workers Employment Act (see also: Groenendijk and Swart 1976).

### **Aliens legislation as a policy instrument for controlling immigration**

Aliens legislation experts are generally agreed that the Aliens Act of 1965 only lays down the broad framework, and that the authorities have adequate scope for pursuing flexible policies within that framework by means of the readily amended Aliens Regulations and the circulars and guidelines issued to administrators. At the same time, however, it is a source of objection, for

the more that aliens legislation is used as an instrument to control immigration, the more the legal status of the foreigner is undermined. This is particularly true if immigration cannot be exclusively controlled through the medium of entry provisions. Several aspects of the development of a set of instruments to control immigration were referred to in 4.1.4. A number of the stages are briefly outlined below:

- In the earliest period of labour migration it was comparatively easy for foreign workers who had come to the Netherlands (either on their own account or recruited by employers) to obtain a work permit if they could demonstrate that they had obtained work; and a residence permit was issued on the basis of the work permit.

- The 1967 recession led to much stricter policies with regard to the issue of work permits: in the space of one year the number issued fell from 46,000 to 39,000. Furthermore the same slump led the Ministries of Justice and Social Affairs to confer on 'the implementation of a priority system for recruitment or issuing work permits, closing sectors with high rates of unemployment to foreign workers, the transfer of foreign workers who were unemployed or threatened with unemployment to the western part of the country and, in a number of cases, the relocation of foreign workers who had voluntarily sought to be transferred to other parts of the country', in order to make jobs available for Dutch persons (Memorandum on Foreign Workers 1970, p. 4).

- As from 1 June 1968, foreign workers crossing the border were required to have a visa ('authorization of temporary residence'), obtainable from Dutch consulates.

- On 1 April 1969, a regulation was introduced that a visa could only be obtained in the country of origin or in the country where the applicant was legally entitled to reside, from the Dutch consulate in that place. The Minister of Justice's circular concerning the supervision of aliens also dates to that time (Politieblad (Police Journal) 1969, p. 530).

- Measures were introduced on 1 October 1970 to prevent spontaneous recruitment (i.e. circumventing the official recruitment offices). Only a limited number of exceptions were made, including for skilled and specialized employees (Government Gazette 1970, no. 205).

- In 1972, fresh, internal measures were taken in the face of the new recession. The Minister for CRM issued a circular to municipal executives containing guidelines for restricting official financial assistance to foreigners. During the same period the Minister of Justice drew up measures concerning new guidelines for the police in the case of unemployment among foreign workers, strikes and illegal entry. Neither the foreign community nor bodies providing assistance to foreigners were informed of these restrictive measures. They came to light when they were published in the Foreign Workers' Working Groups Information Bulletin (1972, no. 3).

- Also in 1972, stricter controls over foreigners resident in the Netherlands began to take shape (see the Explanatory Memorandum on the Budget of the Ministry of Justice for 1973). This took the form – especially in the big cities – of large-scale nocturnal actions centred on reception centres, boarding houses and meeting-places frequented by foreigners. Within the welfare community there was talk of raids. The explanatory memorandum on the 1976 Budget (Fragmenten uit ... 1976, p. 26) put it as follows: 'As in previous years, the local police continued to carry out regular checks on the presence of foreigners residing illegally in the Netherlands (...). All in all 6,332 foreigners were expelled in 1974 (i.e. repatriated). About 50% of them were in the Netherlands illegally. The most numerous categories were those of Turkish and Moroccan nationality. The second group of expelled foreigners (20%) were people possessing inadequate means of support. The remaining 30% were expelled for various reasons, many on account of having committed offences'. In 1975 and 1976 the numbers expelled from the country rose to 6,607 and 6,647 respectively.

- With the onset of the oil crisis in 1973, the government included an article in the 'Special Powers Act' (TK 1973–74, 12 723, nos. 1–3) empowering the Minister for Social Affairs to introduce regulations

'concerning the performance of work by foreigners and the employment of foreigners. These regulations may depart from the provisions laid down by or pursuant to the Aliens Work Permits Act (Bulletin of A.O.D 1964, p. 72)' (Section 9.1). The powers sought are elaborated in the Explanatory Memorandum: 'It could (in certain circumstances) be necessary to limit the number of foreigners employed in the country to a ceiling in line with economic conditions. It will be possible for such a limit to be laid down nationally by the Minister for Social Affairs, with limits subsequently imposed company by company.' Fortunately the Special Powers Act has remained an unused emergency act as far as foreigners are concerned. In practice it was confined to the announcement of a recruitment-stop.

– In 1975, the Foreign Workers (Employment) Bill was submitted (see 4.1.4).

The above survey, while not exhaustive, should suffice to indicate that it has been attempted in many ways to frame and interpret legislation on foreigners in such a manner that control can be exercised over immigration. At the same time the survey will have indicated that this has often been at the expense of the liberty and legal security of foreigners resident in the Netherlands.

### **Contradictory legislative developments and the significance of legal status for integration policy**

Swart (1978, pp. 18–30) has pointed to the crosscurrents within aliens legislation in the Netherlands in recent years. On the one hand, a democratic country such as the Netherlands assigns a high value to the equality of all persons legally resident in the country and to the principle of non-discrimination. On the other hand, it is taken as a matter of course that an increasing number of restrictions should be imposed on foreigners in the Netherlands on the basis of nationality. Swart cites several examples from recent legislation: 'On the one hand, a recent bill to amend the Constitution aims to breach what has previously appeared an inviolable principle – namely that purely constitutional rights be reserved for persons of Dutch nationality – by enabling legislators to give non-Dutch residents the right to vote and to stand for election at municipal level (Tk 76–77, 13991, no. 1). On the other hand, the bill for the inclusion in the Constitution of provisions concerning basic social rights proposes that the right to official assistance of those in need be confined to Dutch persons (TK 75–76, 13873, no. 1). A provision was included in the same bill by means of an amendment that referred to the right of all Dutch persons to employment of their own free choice. While the Foreign Workers Employment bill imposes considerably more restrictions on foreigners with regard to accepting work of one's own choice than does the Aliens Work Permits Act of 1964, thus increasing an existing inequality between Dutch persons and foreigners (Tk 75–76, 13682, no. 1), the Extension of Legal Remedies and Legal Aid for Foreigners Bill inter alia envisages reducing the significance of several provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure and the Legal Aid Act of 1957 in which a distinction is drawn between Dutch persons and foreigners (Tk 75–76, 13974, no. 1)'. 'In purely practical terms,' Swart adds, 'both the bills in which nationality is introduced as a yardstick or given more weight are of greater significance for the legal residential position of foreigners than the draft legislation in which this yardstick is no longer applied or is of reduced importance'. The lot of the foreign worker has therefore certainly not been improved (Swart 1978, pp. 20–21).

The ambivalence noted by Swart is also to be seen in the attitude of the Netherlands towards international agreements it has signed or ratified, especially with regard to their interpretation. Apart from the fact that the Netherlands is bound by international customary law, the Netherlands has ratified the following agreements which 'in principle afford protection to all foreigners irrespective of nationality' (Swart 1978, pp. 3–9): the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights (1950); the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966); the International Covenant on

Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966); the International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination (1965) and the conventions relating to the status of refugees and stateless persons (1951 and 1954).

According to Swart, the practical significance of these undertakings should not be overrated: 'With regard to the admission and expulsion of foreigners, international customary law imposes certain but not very numerous restrictions on states in relation to the state of origin and to third states. The agreements discussed above, which stress the relationship between the state and the individual foreigner irrespective of nationality rather than that between states, contain a number of provisions whose practical significance is, or can be, far greater. At the same time it is clear that both customary international law and the agreements discussed do not fundamentally interfere with the ability of states to decide about admission and expulsion as they seem fit, but only impose certain limitations. In theory these self-imposed obligations range between two extremes: complete lack of rights for foreigners and complete equality with the state's own subjects' (Swart 1978, p. 9).

The recent consideration of the European Social Charter by the Lower House in April and May 1978 provided a further revealing example of this ambivalence. The Minister of Justice proposed entering a reservation with regard to two articles concerning migrant workers. The first article concerned an undertaking to liberalize employment regulations. The government was concerned that this provision would invalidate the draft Foreign Workers Employment Act. The second article concerned a limitation of the grounds for expulsion to disturbances of public order or threats to national security. The lack of adequate means of subsistence would thus disappear as a ground for expulsion (Kruyt in Motief 1978, no. 6). The Lower House rejected the reservation sought for the former article but accepted that for the latter.

In this rather motley revue of the legislation and agreements affecting the legal status of foreign employees in the Netherlands, mention should also be made of the bill submitted in 1976 for the incorporation of a non-discrimination provision in the Constitution.

'The wording of the new article 1.1 as amended runs as follows: 'All persons in the Netherlands will be subject to equal treatment in equal circumstances. Discrimination is not permitted on grounds of religion, philosophy of life, political persuasion, race, sex or any other grounds' (Tk 75-76, 13872, no. 1; Swart 1978, p. 25). Such an article would appear to conflict with some of the new or proposed legislation discussed above, if not on paper then at least as regards the application of the law.

The legal status of the foreign employee has been considered in some detail in this section since it is of great importance for smooth integration of foreigners into Dutch society. Groenendijk (1978, pp. 6-11) has attempted to chart the importance of legal status for such an integration process. He considers the present weak legal status of the foreign employee to act as a double-edged impediment to integration. The recurrent experience of unequal treatment (often brought about by the unequal legal status) continually gives the foreigner the feeling of not being accepted as a full citizen, while the threat of expulsion acts as a further brake on the foreigner's propensity to integrate. On the other hand, the unequal (weaker) legal status of foreigners in the Netherlands forms a 'permanent justification for unequal treatment in all sorts of areas.' He cites examples both from the literature and from experience.

Groenendijk considers the strengthening of the legal status of foreigners to be a necessary but not a sufficient condition for integration in Dutch society. He puts forward numerous suggestions for the way in which the legal status of foreigners could be considerably improved in the short term, without amending legislation. The question is to what extent the government is really serious about attempting to place the foreign employee on an equal foot-

ing. In this respect their legal status forms a sound indicator of the government's good intentions, and certainly does not emerge in a consistently favourable light (Groenendijk 1978).

#### 4.2.2. Employment

##### The position of the foreign worker in the occupational structure

Although few studies have been conducted of the position of foreign workers from the Mediterranean region in the Dutch occupational hierarchy, it is generally accepted that workers from recruitment countries are at the bottom end of the scale. On the basis of estimates made for 1969, Marshall-Goldschwartz (1973, p. 77) reached the conclusion that 72.6% of Mediterranean workers in the Netherlands were performing non-skilled work.

She then compared this figure with the total male labour force in the Dutch industrial sector in 1966, where only 14% of Dutch workers were performing unskilled work, with 35% performing semi-skilled work and 51% in skilled and higher professions.

A survey conducted in 1968 for the Ministries of CRM and of Social Affairs, confirmed these tendencies.

**Table 4.14. Level of qualification of workers in 261 companies surveyed**

	Total	Lower administrative staff	Skilled workers	Semi-skilled workers	Unskilled workers
Dutch	86,800 = 100%	13%	34%	49%	4%
Italians	2,370 = 100	1	16	73	10
Moroccans	2,777 = 100	1	3	88	8
Spaniards	4,456 = 100	—	11	77	12
Turks	3,522 = 100	1	12	74	13
Others	3,353 = 100	13	21	63	3
Total	103,278 = 100	12	30	54	4

Source: De buitenlandse arbeider in Nederland, deel II, N.V. v/h Nederlandse Stichting voor Statistiek, The Hague, 1971, p. 47.

On the basis of their research among Moroccans in the Netherlands, Van Amersfoort and Van Wusten (1975, p. 36) described the place of this group in the Dutch occupational structure as follows: 'As a result of their lack of training, the Moroccan group nearly always perform activities of a non-skilled nature. Only a few (4%) reach anything like administrative positions in industry and commerce, and when they do, it is generally as foremen and the like, supervising their compatriots or other foreign workers. By any objective criteria the position of the respondents can only be described as low.' Although there are differences among the nationalities, it may be assumed that the position of workers from other recruitment countries is not fundamentally different from that of the Moroccans.

The wages paid to foreigners are another general yardstick of the place of foreigners in the occupational structure. Marshall-Goldschwartz herself looked into this aspect in a limited survey conducted among 86 companies.

In 52 cases, foreigners turned out to be overrepresented in below-average wage occupations, in 26 cases there was equal representation of Dutch and foreigners, and in 9 instances foreigners were underrepresented in occupations below the average wage (Marshall-Goldschwartz 1973, p. 84).

The data referred to above were confirmed in a recent survey conducted by Visser among North Holland companies, commissioned by the Regional Council for the Labour Market:

'Foreign workers are particularly employed in open occupational categories.'

- He is a manual worker (79% are engaged in production-jobs).
- He is generally unskilled or at the most semi-skilled (47 % and 39 % respectively).

- In view of his high mobility he often accepts temporary work or works at hourly/daily rates (...).

'Foreign workers are especially employed in the secondary/external sector of the labour market'.

- He is often unskilled/semi-skilled (86%).

- He often works shift-work: 43% within the industrial sector.

- A high rate of turnover and mobility indicate them to be highly sensitive to the state of the labour market (...)

'The foreign employee is an inferior employee'.

- He often performs secondary functions which Dutch workers are no longer prepared to carry out (unskilled work, shift-work).

- He is scarcely if at all employed in the primary sector serving the internal market' (Visser 1976, p. 20).

As the number of foreign workers from recruitment countries in the Netherlands rises, the lower rungs of the occupational and wage ladder tend to be increasingly filled by these foreigners. The sector of the labour-market which includes the types of jobs they perform is beginning increasingly to assume an independent existence, detached from the rest of the Dutch labour-market. Foreigners are relied on more and more to fill these positions. Visser's survey, referred to above, into the position of foreign workers in North Holland confirms such a theory of a double labour-market structure 'in broad terms, with the exception of part of the metal industry' (Visser 1976, p. 21).

This development is determined by two major factors. The first is the change in the quality of available indigenous labour. During recent decades there has been a marked trend towards an improvement in the quality of the supply of Dutch labour. More and more young people are prolonging their studies and come on to the labour market with more training. Older people are able to move up into more highly classified jobs by means of retraining and further training. The number of unskilled Dutch workers is steadily declining.

This trend towards higher qualifications in the Dutch labour to higher occupations expected to persist, thereby releasing an ever increasing number of low-paid jobs of low social standing (unless Dutch people begin working below their qualifications, for example as a result of very high unemployment or in response to specific official measures).

The obverse of this upward percolation of Dutch labour to higher occupations has been an increasing reliance on foreigners. But a second factor also needs to be taken into account. A clear distinction is drawn in the labour market between levels of qualification (especially between skilled and unskilled labour), which is reflected in marked pay differentials. But while the government is not in a position to intervene in this 'relatively rigid wage structure' (see Memorandum of Reply, 1974, p. 6) in favour of unskilled labour, its policy of admitting foreigners permits the existing wage structure to be maintained.

The concept of making work of currently low social standing more attractive by increasing pay for that sort of work and by improving terms of employment is rejected – on the one hand, by the business sector, for profit motives, and on the other by the government, on the grounds of maintaining employment (since an increase in pay for unskilled labour would lead to a general increase in wage levels, thereby aggravating unemployment). The result is that both the occupational and the wage structures are stabilized.\*

In a situation of continuing labour shortages and unchanging wage differentials for various occupations, it is primarily the Dutch who are given the opportunity of shifting upwards in the occupational hierarchy, and thus to higher pay levels. Foreigners are then engaged in the lowest jobs that have become free. The occupational and wage differentials remain largely unaltered; only people (workers) shift upwards within an unaltered system.

\* In 1975, the Dutch government asked the Socio-Economic Council to submit policy recommendations concerning an appropriate income policy. The government's request included a specific request for recommendations concerning unskilled labour; the scope for modifying the wage structure is therefore still being examined.

If such a process persists in the longer term it can lead to the situation of virtually all unskilled work in the Netherlands being performed by foreigners. This process was retarded after 1972 because of the slump and consequent recruitment stop. But the process will continue at an accelerated pace when the children of foreign workers enter the labour market in large numbers, presumably ending up in the same sorts of jobs as their parents (which will partly depend on the policies adopted by the government). The second generation of migrants would be unlikely to accept this passively.

### **Policies directed towards foreign workers in the Netherlands as an under-privileged group**

The foreign worker is not a citizen enjoying equal rights but an alien. He was recruited to fill jobs for which no labour was available in the Netherlands. Finally, foreigners are still regarded by the Dutch authorities essentially as a temporary phenomenon. These three factors explain why foreign workers are not regarded as an under-privileged group and why no policies are conducted aimed at improving the position of this group in the labour market. Although a series of measures have been introduced in an effort to improve the position in the labour market of groups such as Surinamese and Antilleans and Moluccans, the majority of whom the authorities accept for policy purposes will be remaining in the Netherlands permanently, no official efforts whatever have been made on behalf of foreign employees. In a number of respects, the reverse even applies, e.g. restrictions on the freedom of foreign employees in the labour market under the Foreign Workers Employment Act, which will unquestionably lead to an increase in the socio-economic gap.

There is no reference to any measures aimed at improving the position of foreign employees in either the most recent policy statement, the Memorandum of Reply (1974), or in the explanatory memorandum on the budget in subsequent years. There is only a statement in the explanatory memorandum on the budget for 1976 of the Ministry of Social Affairs that, given that unemployment among foreign employees had doubled in a short space of time, redeployment policies were being pursued (Fragmenten uit .. 1976, p. 73). In addition, after a year's residence in the Netherlands foreign employees have a formal right similar to that of Dutch people to make use of general facilities (such as retraining in CVVs); but it has become apparent that foreigners are rarely admitted to such courses, usually because of a lack of prior training and language difficulties. In 1977, the Ministry of Social Affairs opened up the possibility of organizing preliminary courses for foreigners with a view to CVV training. This was taken up in a number of places (including Dordrecht, Roosendaal and Breda), but formal procedures would appear for the present to prevent the application of these arrangements on a large scale (Welzijnsweekblad 1977, no. 42).

Recently the Ministry of Social Affairs added a small open budgetary item to its estimates, for training projects directed towards the remigration of foreigners. This measure is not widely known and has been made use of only by a small group of Spaniards (Welzijnsweekblad 1977, no. 42).

### **Policies directed towards the temporary nature of guest-work and its elimination**

Recent years have seen an increasing number of arguments in support of the contention that the employment of foreign workers in the Dutch economy has become a structural phenomenon.

On the basis of comprehensive statistical data, Penninx and Van Velzen (1976, pp. 12-21) have demonstrated that 'the special (irreplaceable) position of foreigners in the occupational and pay structure and their distribution throughout virtually all branches of industry in all regions of the Netherlands underline their indispensability for the Dutch economy and thereby the permanent nature of their presence'. Visser's survey in North Holland added a further argument: 'A comparison according to company

size indicates that (between 1974 and 1976, ed.) the number of Mediterranean employees increased not only in small companies (i.e. up to 50 employees) but also in medium-sized firms (between 50 and 200 employees) and large companies (over 200 employees, with the exception of Hoogovens)' (Visser 1976, VI). In line with these findings, Visser reaches the general conclusion for North Holland that 'the economic recession of 1974–1976 did not lead to a reduction in the number of Mediterranean employees in the companies surveyed, despite the fact that they are generally employed in jobs of a direct, productive nature. For structural reasons (namely a growing discrepancy between demand and supply in the domestic market) it may be anticipated that the number of foreign employees in these companies will continue to grow in the future' (Visser 1976, VIII).

In the light of such data it would seem appropriate to review recent official policy. The pre-1974 period has already been covered in sufficient detail in 4.1.4., and this section is confined to the Memorandum of Reply (1974) and subsequent policies. The underlying principles for long-term policy as spelled out in the latter document may be summarized as follows:

- 'the unchallenged assumption that the Netherlands, as a densely-populated country, is not and should not become an immigration country'.
- 'For the majority of foreign employees, the objective remains to return to their native land after staying in the Netherlands for a few years.'
- 'In the light of the continuing demand for workers from other countries and of the need to discourage long-term or permanent settlement in the Netherlands', the Foreign Workers Employment Act will be introduced, including provision for a system of remigration-subsidies.
- The government has in mind a 'restrictive admissions policy', aimed at 'official recruitment by the Dutch selection centres and at discouraging spontaneous entry.'
- In the long term, the government is thinking of making foreign workers redundant by 'the improved coordination of the demand for and the domestic supply of unskilled labour', with the following possibilities in mind:

'making unskilled or unattractive jobs more attractive' and 'the elimination of such positions' (TK 1973–74, 10 504, no. 9, pp. 4–6).

By making the jobs now performed by foreigners more attractive is meant not so much altering the pay structure, since this would carry with it the risk of a general pay increase, but 'improving secondary working conditions and circumstances' together with a 'gradual increase in pay.'

And 'the restructuring of a job can make it considerably more attractive.'

As regards 'the elimination of such functions' various possibilities are referred to:

- 'One way of eliminating jobs that Dutch people are not prepared to perform would be *selective* labour-saving investment'.
- 'A second possibility would be to eliminate such functions by restructuring industry in such a fashion that production processes requiring unskilled labour were terminated and (if necessary) transferred elsewhere, for example to developing countries, as a part of a new international division of labour' (TK 1973–74, 10 504, no. 9, 6 and 7).

Two questions might be posed in the light of these quotations. Can these intentions be implemented in practice? And which of these measures had been implemented in 1978 – four years after the Memorandum of Reply?

As regards making unskilled or unattractive work more attractive, it needs to be considered whether an improvement in secondary working conditions and circumstances would be enough in themselves without an increase in the rate of pay.

Possibly an even more important question is what instruments the authorities have at their disposal to bring about or encourage an improvement of this kind in the private sector. The Memorandum of Reply fails to specify any means. A cautious start has been made with regard to making these functions more attractive by improving secondary working

conditions, for which a modest sum was earmarked in the 'Interim memorandum concerning the reduction of unemployment' of 1976.

Later a regulation was announced in the 'Selective growth' memorandum for improving conditions in the workplace. This regulation is of general application and does not apply only to unskilled labour or to foreign labour. Up to the present its effect is not known. The same question concerning the available administrative means arises in the case of official proposals to eliminate such jobs by means of selective labour-saving investments. No substantive measures would appear to have been introduced as yet, although a survey has been undertaken to investigate how companies attempt to deal with the problem of unskilled labour.

A number of questions also arise in relation to the proposal that certain activities be transferred to developing countries. In the first place it is questionable whether there are enough companies with divisions consisting entirely of unskilled labour that could be transferred without adversely affecting other divisions within those companies. And even if that should be so, the question remains how the authorities could direct such a relocation process.

Baelde-Van Hugte's conclusion (1975, p. 355) remains valid: the means specified 'are scarcely realizable, on the one hand because they are vague and there is no phased approach, and on the other because of the narrow limits within which the government has to operate.'

#### 4.2.3. *Housing*

Until the early nineteen-seventies, government action in connection with the housing of foreign workers consisted solely of the regulation (which formed a part of the standard recruitment contract) that the employer was responsible for the foreigner's accommodation for the duration of the contract (one year). The employer was also obliged to make a financial contribution towards housing and food costs. Many foreign workers, however, came to the Netherlands during the sixties independently or were recruited by non-official means, and thus were not covered by these regulations.

In practice, two forms of accommodation for single foreigners evolved, namely accommodation arranged and controlled by the employer, and private boarding houses. In the early seventies the former arrangement attracted some unfavourable attention on account of abuses arising out of the dual function of employer/landlord/supervisor, and in a number of instances the control over such accommodation was transferred to independent parties. The boarding houses came in for considerable publicity as a result of local surveys indicating them to be over-crowded, lacking adequate facilities, and to be fire-hazards.

The Roolvink memorandum (1970, pp. 8-9) once again laid down the responsibilities with regard to accommodation: 'The responsibility in practice for proper housing, the application of the law, the determination of plans and regulations and the supervision of actual accommodation are (however) primarily the task of the municipalities'. In addition: 'The provision of new accommodation is not a task for the municipalities alone. It remains primarily the employers' responsibility to make arrangements on this score.' The latter can however only be enforced in relation to newly-recruited labour during the first year under the contract. The municipalities proved unequipped to handle its functions: the dated lodging-house by-laws mostly offered too little scope for the municipalities to step in. Even after many municipalities adopted the model regulations drawn up by the Association of Dutch Municipalities, it still proved difficult for them to step in. If, for example, the municipalities were to close boardinghouses that were fire-hazards, who but the same municipality would then have to find different accommodation for the occupants? And there were simply no alternatives.

That the problems remained acute is indicated by a circular issued by the Minister for Housing and Physical Planning (VRO) on 26 April 1971 (MG

71–11) to the municipalities, in which the latter were asked to pay regular attention to the occupancy-rate of boarding houses and the observance of safety regulations, as well as to the provision of suitable accommodation for the families of foreign workers (Buskes et al. 1978, pp. 34–35; see also Beleidsnota Huisvesting 1976).

In a second circular of that year (MG 71–19, 28 July 1971), the Minister raised the prospect of central-government financial aid for the conversion and new construction of permanent flat-accommodation for foreign workers. In 1974, these facilities were widened in the 'building encouragement programme' (cf. Ch. III, 2.3). A good three years later, it turned out that use of this facility had been made in only 14 projects; governmental support of 750,000 guilders had made some 780 beds available (Lower House 1974–1975, 10 504, nos. 12, 29).

There is little sign of change in government policy in the Memorandum of Reply to the Preliminary Report on the Memorandum on Foreign Employees (Lower House, 1973–1974, 10504, no. 9, pp. 13–15): 'employers remain primarily responsible for the provision of proper accommodation', while it is noted further on that 'responsibility for public housing is principally a matter for the municipalities'. The memorandum is vague with regard to future official activities: 'It is difficult to make a forecast of the sums likely to be allocated by the central government in the next few years for the accommodation of foreign workers, since their scale will depend on uncertain factors such as the number of initiatives launched in this area (meaning building or reconstruction with government support, ed.), whether foreign workers requiring accommodation in the future are married, and economic developments.'

Housing policy, at least for foreigners living by themselves, appeared to take more shape in 1975 when the Minister for Housing submitted the 'Memorandum on the Accommodation of unattached persons and two-person households' (the Van Dam Memorandum, Lower House, 1974–1975, 13493, no. 1 ff.). This memorandum observes that as a result of the marked emphasis on family housing after the Second World War, the demand and supply for one and two-person households diverged strongly, and that this problem – of which the accommodation of single foreigners forms one aspect – has to be faced up to.

Some of the major points from the memorandum, which was officially published in July 1976, were:

- Municipalities with more than 25,000 inhabitants to be required to set up a steering group, to conduct research up to 1980 into the demand for accommodation of unattached persons and couples; in order to obtain better insight into the demand, municipalities became required to register all persons aged over 18 seeking accommodation.
- The manner in which small dwellings are financed will depend on the sector by which they are built. Housing corporations (for which a distinct role is envisaged in this respect) can build with government loans, but for the present a significant proportion will have to be constructed in the subsidized private sector.
- Up to 1980, 50 million guilders is set aside for subsidizing specific projects; up to 700 million guilders is pledged in government loans for the implementation of plans approved by the Ministry.
- The building programme to be provisionally based on the construction of 40,000 dwellings between 1976 and 1980.

According to the Explanatory Memorandum on the 1978 Budget, the programme got off to a rather difficult start: 'As far as can be determined at present, the provision of new housing for unattached persons and two-person households as envisaged under the construction programme contained in the memorandum of that name will be a slow process.' By the summer of 1978 it became evident that virtually nothing had come of this programme.

Even before this became known there had been a lot of criticism of Van Dam's plans, especially of the arrangements for foreigners. Critics claimed

that Van Dam's policies were based on two highly dubious assumptions (Motief 1975, no. 4; Buskes et al. 1978, p. 50 ff.):

1. Foreigners' accommodation requirements were said to be different from Dutch people's – meaning less demanding; foreigners would voluntarily accept high occupancy levels and fewer facilities, because this would be cheaper. This assumption also appears in the Memorandum on Foreign Workers (1970) and in the Memorandum of Reply (1974), where it is even referred to as an obstacle to solving housing problems (Memorandum of Reply 1974, p. 14).

2. According to the Minister, additional subsidization of housing projects for foreigners would amount to an augmentation of their incomes; a fair distribution would occur if foreign employees had the same rights and obligations as other groups.

The first assumption was rejected by critics as an unsubstantiated generalization. It must be conceded that there is no clear evidence in support of the assumption; nor does the survey 'Evaluation of Housing for Unattached Persons and Couples, Part III, Housing of Foreign Employees' (1977, p. 108), which was commissioned by the Minister for Housing and Physical Planning, provide a definitive answer: 'In general the locations examined offered better accommodation than private boardinghouses at prices that were not significantly higher (except in Leyden). But it remains an open question how many foreigners would still opt for the inferior accommodation in boarding houses if they had to pay say f 5,— or f 10,— a week more for good accommodation.' Clearly it is not possible to proceed on the basis of generalizations.

As regards the second argument a case can indeed be made out for the extra subsidization of foreigners (see for example Buskes et al., 1978, p. 51), if one takes the line that foreigners belong to the lowest-paid class (as once more confirmed by the evaluation report mentioned above) and that the majority have family-maintenance commitments in their country of origin which place them at a disadvantage in relation to other unattached individuals.

For this reason Buskes and others deliberately do not refer to them as 'unattached' persons but as living alone. Buskes and others also point out that if extra subsidies are not made available for housing foreigners, housing corporations will be reluctant to undertake projects for them.

A second problem is housing for families of foreign workers. This problem has already been touched on to some extent in the chapter on the Surinamese where an outline was given dwellings of Valkonet-Freeman's survey of the distribution system for family houses in Amsterdam, and the 5% limit on foreigners was discussed (see Ch. III, 2.3). The pattern of settlement of foreign families in Rotterdam, as indicated by the survey 'Segregation in Rotterdam' (1972), confirms the conclusions for Surinamese earlier in this report, which were based on the surveys conducted by Van Amersfoort and Cortie (1973) and Valkonet-Freeman (1977).

In policy terms, the accommodation of families of foreign workers has remained a poor relation in comparison with recent efforts to arrive at effective policies for foreigners living alone.

Official documents merely observe that a foreign worker must comply with a number of conditions before being allowed to bring over his family: he must remain in the Netherlands for at least a year; he must have guaranteed employment for the next twelve months, and – the major obstacle – he must have found family-accommodation approved by the municipality.

In practice the last requirement is the hardest to meet. For the rest, foreign employees have the same rights to housing as Dutch people, provided they comply with the conditions above.

The size of the backlog of foreigners on the lookout for family accommodation to make family reunification possible is not known. There are, however, indications that the number is very high: the IVA survey commissioned by the Ministry of Housing (1977, pp. 107, 108) notes in passing: 'Many of the foreign employees at present in the Netherlands as

unattached persons fall outside this category (for which recommendations are made on the basis of the survey – ed.) because they are interested in family reunification. The lack of housing for their family often forms the major stumbling block in the way of this desire. This category is seeking family-accommodation on the housing market and will as such be left out of consideration where further recommendations are made. At the same time this category naturally forms a most important factor for the planning of housing construction programmes. This category accounted for approximately half the respondents in this survey. Other surveys cite slightly higher percentages (see for example 'Housing conditions and foreign employees' housing preferences', Foreign Workers Steering Group, Hilversum, 1974, in which 66–80% of married workers sought family reunification)'.

Should the data from the two surveys cited above prove to be more or less representative of foreign workers as a whole, this would have the logical implication for housing policy of switching the emphasis away from foreigners who are unattached (i.e. living by themselves) towards the needs of foreign families. Housing problems for families are on a considerably larger scale but are less evident in the Netherlands because families are not allowed to come until accommodation has been arranged. However, the premises on which policy in general continues to be based ('The Netherlands must not become an immigration country') would appear for the time being to stand in the way of such considerations being taken to their logical conclusion.

#### 4.2.4. Education

As may be seen from the table below the number of foreign children at Dutch schools has been increasing consistently in recent years:

**Table: Pupils of foreign nationality at Dutch schools 1975–1977**

	Pre-school and normal primary education <sup>1</sup>		General secondary education <sup>2</sup>		Junior technical education <sup>2</sup>	
	pupils from the 7 recruitment countries and Italy	other countries	pupils from the 7 recruitment countries and Italy	other countries	pupils from the 7 recruitment countries and Italy	other countries
1975	14,329	5,357	1,549	2,169	1,448	389
1976	17,456	6,293	2,049	3,041	?	?
1977	20,511	7,086	2,528	3,584	?	?

Sources: Central Bureau of Statistics; Department of Statistics of Education and Science.

<sup>1</sup> Reference point 16 January.

<sup>2</sup> Reference point 1 September.

In the light of the steady increase shown in the table, it is surprising that the top officials in the Ministry of Education and Science should expect that 'this number will not change appreciably in coming years' (Fragmenten uit ... 1978, p. 18).

The number of pupils from the recruitment countries and Italy in secondary education is still low, but the number is rising by roughly 25% a year, as are the numbers in nursery and primary education. When the number of pupils in pre-school and primary education is compared with the numbers in secondary education, there is a great disparity between pupils from the recruitment countries and Italy and pupils of 'other nationality'. This provides an initial statistical indication that children of foreign workers have substantially less chance of proceeding to secondary education. The

data are, however, still excessively fragmentary, and one would need to know the total population of both groups in the 12–18 year-old range before being able to draw a proper comparison.

The government paper of 1970 scarcely touched on the problem of education for the children of foreign employees (1970, p. 12); it poses the question whether 'purely national education geared to possible remigration' should be introduced or whether there should be 'purely Dutch education with a view to accelerating the integration of children in the Netherlands'. No policies as such existed at that time.

Before the Memorandum of Reply (1974) appeared, the problem had achieved greater public prominence, and the Memorandum could not escape taking a stand on the issue. The Ministers for Education and Science 'consider it desirable that the policies adopted distinguish as clearly as possible between those pupils who may be expected to remain in the Netherlands and those pupils who will return to their country of origin after several years.

The former should spend as short a time as possible in a reception class in order to learn Dutch as quickly as possible, after which they can be fully integrated into the Dutch education system. This does not, however, mean that these children should be unable to receive education in the language and culture of their own country if their parents so desire. Pupils known to be leaving the Netherlands after a few years should in any event receive this type of supplementary instruction in addition to Dutch education' (Memorandum of Reply 1974, pp. 20, 21).

Essentially, therefore, it is fair to say the line taken is that foreign children should receive Dutch education (with the 'purely national education' of the 1970 Memorandum disappearing from the scene), with 'temporary' pupils receiving supplementary instruction in their own language and culture.

But as indicated earlier, the decision-making process as to whether to stay or to remigrate is a complicated, time-consuming one determined by many factors; in practice, no such distinction can really be drawn. The literature and research surveys suggest that family reunification and the arrival of the children in the Netherlands form a crucial step in the eventual decision to remain in the Netherlands (see 1.4). In this sense, it may be argued that it is realistic for policies to be based on the premise of integration into the Dutch education system. The principal difficulties with regard to the education of children of foreign employees partially overlap with those faced by Surinamese, Antillean or Moluccan pupils. Lack of language knowledge, a different cultural background, familiarity with a totally different system of education and the lack of family motivation and support for the child, combined with a lack of insight on the part of the parents into the Dutch school system – all these form handicaps affecting each of these groups. A number of these factors are, however, of considerably greater relevance for the children of foreign workers (a number of surveys include Snow 1977; Eijzenring 1975; Wijnstra 1977; Kloosterman 1977; Onderwijs aan .. 1976). On the other hand, the question of bi-cultural education has up to the present been exclusively confined to children of foreign workers.

Special government measures to back up education to children of foreigners are as follows:

– *nursery education*

If sufficient foreign infants are attached to a school, the Ministry of Education and Science may allocate an additional supervisor 'with the task of actively drawing foreign infants into various play-situations and helping them adjust to their new society' (Onderwijs aan .. 1976, p. 8). Approximately 50 such supervisors were made available during the 1977–1978 school-year (Fragmenten uit .. 1978, p. 18).

– *primary education*

The Ministry of Education and Science provides two types of facility for primary education:

a. An additional Dutch teacher may be provided for each group of foreign pupils, with the task of 'making them conversant with Dutch as quickly as possible so that they can follow normal education' (Onderwijs aan .. 1976, p. 8). Some 350 teachers were made available for this purpose during the school-year 1977–1978 (Fragmenten uit .. 1978, p. 18).

b. Foreign teachers (drawn from the country of origin) may be appointed for each nationality group, with responsibility for instruction in the pupils' own language and culture as directed by the school (Onderwijs aan .. 1976, p. 8). Approximately 150 foreign instructors were attached to primary schools during the school-year 1977–1978 (Fragmenten uit .. 1978, p. 19).

The emphasis placed on integrating foreign children may be seen from the relationship between the number of additional teachers provided for nursery and primary education in order to eliminate language difficulties (a total of 400) and the number of teachers providing foreign instruction (150).

The way in which official facilities are used is left to the individual school. Various experimental systems have evolved during recent years. In a number of schools there are 'reception classes' consisting exclusively of foreign children, who are prepared for ordinary education by intensive instruction in Dutch; in other cases foreign children are simply placed in Dutch classes, with certain hours being set aside for remedial teaching; the latter system may also be handled by 'flying brigades', i.e. teachers who teach Dutch to children at various schools.

In addition to the direct provision of facilities to schools with foreign children as outlined above, the Ministry has developed a number of activities in recent years in the following fields:

- further training of teachers (both Dutch and foreign) dealing with foreign children;
- the experimental appointment of 12 education counsellors with special responsibilities for furthering the education of foreign children in the form of school advisory and counselling services (1976);
- the allocation of funds (750,000 guilders for the school-year 1976–1977) for the compilation and production of extra teaching aids for foreign children;
- sharing in the financing of a number of experiments with special reception classes for foreign pupils (Fragmenten uit .... 1978, p. 19);
- the publication of a bulletin entitled 'Gastonderwijs' (Guest Education); this monthly journal was however recently discontinued.

#### *– secondary education*

There is much less official effort at this level: 'Experience indicates that secondary education is concentrated on the following three types: (1) lower and middle-level general secondary education; (2) junior technical education; and (3) junior domestic science education. In these three cases particular use has been made of the special arrangements in the form of transition or reception classes. In 1973, it became possible for special 'classes for foreign-language pupils' to be set up in ordinary secondary schools for the children of foreign workers (Onderwijs aan ... 1976, p. 10). In the 1976–1977 school-year, an allowance was allocated to schools with foreign-language pupils 'to compensate them for the expenses of the extra teaching aids and support required (...). This was a once-only allowance (Fragmenten uit .. 1978, p. 19).

There has been next to no official activity with regard to language instruction, schooling and training for adult foreigners beyond school-age, although a great many people, including research workers, have pointed to the need for such efforts. Language instruction for adults is completely left to private initiative; in the most favourable circumstances, volunteer teachers who make their own arrangements can obtain a contribution towards the cost of hiring facilities and/or teaching material expenses from the Foreign Workers Assistance Units, and occasionally from the municipality.

With regard to education for young adult foreigners, private bodies can obtain assistance under a regulation dating to 1971 which provides central government subsidies for 'activities and facilities directed towards community work for groups whose social and cultural position within Dutch society calls for assistance for their acceptance and integration into society'.

During 1970–1973, an experiment was conducted at the adult education institute at Bergen (North Holland) in the form of training courses for Turkish workers (Onderwijs aan ... 1976, pp. 15 and 18).

A number of substantive and organisational weaknesses need to be noted with regard to policy implementation. After the initial experiments, the usefulness and feasibility of bi-cultural education at nursery and primary school level were questioned (Van der Smagt in Motief 1976, no. 3). There is an urgent need for research into the implications of bi-cultural education for the child itself and for the family situation; the same indeed holds in the case of purely Dutch education for these children.

The only investigation into the way in which bicultural education operated (a limited survey at a combined nursery and primary school) reached the following conclusion (Van Keulen 1976, p. 44):

Bi-cultural education is essential for foreign children in the Netherlands. The question is how this education should be given.

- Bi-cultural education cannot remain confined to instruction in two languages. Knowledge of the Dutch language is essential for the child's further communication and is therefore particularly important in such education, but exclusive emphasis on technical language skills by means of language courses provides no guarantee whatever of a good education for these children. Other problems such as social contacts, cultural adjustment and developing a sense of identity are obscured rather than solved in this way.

- The appointment of foreign teachers to provide children with instruction in their own language and culture does not provide a solution for an adequate education: if foreign (Turkish) education is conducted completely separately from Dutch education it tends to have negative rather than positive consequences for the foreign children.

The child's balanced development can only be promoted by means of close cooperation between foreign and Dutch teachers, with this collaboration being reflected in the curricula.

- It is not in the interests of the Turkish child for the notion of returning to Turkey to assume a prominent part in bicultural education. In the first place, the prospect of returning permanently does not exist in the short term; and too marked an emphasis on Turkish education tends to relegate Dutch tuition to 'second place'. The result is that the children are denied the chance of secondary education in the Netherlands and run the risk of becoming 'dual illiterates'.

Apart from the content of education, all manner of organizational problems have arisen concerning the best way to fit foreign children into educational establishments. Should one concentrate these children in a particular school in the town or neighbourhood, so as to offer them more facilities – an approach adopted for example by the municipality of Almelo for the teaching of foreign children (Onderwijs aan ... 1977)? Or should these very concentrations be avoided, an approach preferred by the Rijnmond Corporation: 'A decisive consideration was the desire to distribute small groups among various classes in preference to allowing a sort of ghetto to develop' (Onderwijs aan ... 1977, p. 9). Since the schools are autonomous in deciding on these – quite fundamental – approaches, there can be no question of uniformity.

Numerous problems arise in relation to the instruction of those with 'partial' educational obligations, i.e. a form of education under which the many young foreign people who leave school at an early age are bound under law to receive supplementary education (in the broadest sense) for a few days a week (Drewes and Bakker 1977). Both the parents and the children are poorly informed about these educational obligations and the

content of the education; those administering the courses are not equipped to deal with the problems of second-generation foreigners; the starting level of these young people is usually particularly low, etc.

#### 4.2.5. *Health*

In terms of official policy, the problem of health care for foreign workers and their families is relatively new: neither the Memorandum on Foreign Workers (1970) nor the Memorandum of Reply (1974) devotes as much as a paragraph or even a reference to it.

This does not, however, mean that no such problems had been noted within the health service before 1974: the bibliography compiled by the Foreigners Health Care Information Office contains no fewer than 126 entries (mainly Dutch literature) which discuss health care problems for foreigners; a large number date to before 1974 (Beeld 1977, Annex I and II and 1st supplement to the bibliography).

The literature tends to be focussed on two main aspects: (1) the migration situation and the position of the foreign worker as the cause of (certain sorts of) ailments and accidents; (2) the foreign workers' access to the health service, communication problems resulting from language difficulties, and cultural differences between the foreign patient and Dutch medical personnel.

With regard to the former aspect, the medical fraternity often claim that certain relatively prevalent illnesses among foreigners, such as stomach ulcers, are not just of physical origin (although the food prepared by men living alone often provides a somewhat unbalanced diet); they often have psychological origins as well, especially homesickness, disrupted family life or general problems of adjustment in the new society (see Van der Haar et al. 1975). There has been little research into psychosomatic illness among immigrants. In practice, however, there appear to be numerous problems, especially between foreigners and medical officers at the workplace, because the symptoms and clinical picture of psychosomatic illnesses are usually very hard to determine. A second, much more clearly substantiated problem is the high number of industrial accidents among foreign workers. Ministry of Social Affairs statistics indicate that 'the number of industrial accidents among foreign workers in the Netherlands is significantly higher than that among Dutch workers' (see *Ongevallen bij ...* 1972; *'De veiligheid' (Safety)* 1973, no. 2; *Motief* 1975, no. 1). Nothing is known with certainty about the complex of causes (e.g. over-representation of foreign workers in hazardous branches of industry and jobs; language difficulties; less industrial experience etc.). The high incidence of industrial accidents has, however, resulted in an information campaign among foreigners about risks on the job.

The second set of problems – that of the foreigner's access to medical care and problems of communication – has been extensively discussed in the literature. There has, however, been little research (some significant exceptions are: Paes 1976; Hoekstra and Van der Meer 1977; Declerck 1976; Van der Haar et al. 1975; *Gezondheidszorg en ...*, 1975). The research indicates that the health system in the Netherlands seems particularly complicated for foreigners, being used to far fewer facilities; they are usually not very familiar with the range of facilities available. Language problems are often of great importance when foreign patients turn to the Dutch health service, with an increased risk of faulty diagnosis or treatment. An even more intractable set of problems concerns the cultural differences and barriers between the patient and Dutch medical staff. The patient often has different ideas about illness and treatment as a result of his particular cultural background (see Creighton in *Medisch Contact* 1977, no. 16); cultural attitudes towards relationships between men and women can form a barrier towards the treatment of a foreign woman by male Dutch doctors or nurses; the Dutch health system does not always make allowance for religious customs, for example Moslem customs (the fasting-month; prohibition on pork), and so on.

Although these problems existed from the earliest days of foreign workers in the Netherlands, the authorities made no attempt at coordinated action until late in the piece. In the Explanatory Memorandum on the 1975 Budget, reference is made to the establishment of a 'Consultative body for the medical care of foreign workers' (1973), chaired by the Public Health Supervisory Agency and comprising both civil servants and representation from private bodies. The terms of reference of the consultative body included 'the investigation' of solutions and submission of appropriate recommendations and assisting in the implementation of these solutions' (Fragmenten uit 1975, p. 46). This consultative body reached the conclusion that 'it is essential for people to be properly informed on the nature and working of the therapeutic and prophylactic facilities in our country, as well as their financial availability on the basis of social legislation.' According to the Explanatory Memorandum, consideration was already being given to the provision of such information. A second point would seem of equal significance: 'Given that communication problems form the major barrier to adequate medical care for these workers and their families, priority should be given to measures to deal with these problems' (Fragmenten uit .... 1975, p. 47). In concrete terms, however, there was little to report, except that the government was helping finance 'a medical centre for foreign workers that has been experimentally set up in Utrecht and where a doctor has been engaged with specific training for this type of work.' This therefore represented a first step towards a group-specific approach to health care for foreigners. The experiment did not, however, last long.

In the Explanatory Memorandum on the 1976 budget for Health and Environmental Protection, the Ministry turned out to have moved away from a group-specific approach; instead it had opted for a policy of integrating health care for foreigners into the existing Dutch system: 'One possibility for overcoming this barrier (i.e. language problems – ed.) would be for foreign doctors to be appointed. Apart from the consideration that such an approach would be inconsistent with the concept of integration, which is also a central tenet as far as the provision of health services to foreign workers is concerned, other factors also led to the conclusion that preference should be given to facilities designed to make existing health facilities more accessible to foreigners. These include the fact that in a number of places there is no concentration of foreign employees, and that there is a great diversity of nationalities. Although the engagement of foreign doctors and nursing staff can contribute and has contributed towards a higher standard of medical care, such an engagement is not a general facility to be encouraged by the authorities, partly because of the factors mentioned above. (Fragmenten uit ... 1976, pp. 96, 97). The increased use of interpreters, on the other hand, would be consistent with integration-oriented policies, and was promised in the explanatory memorandum.

The Ministries of CRM and of Public Health and Environmental Protection and some non-governmental organizations accordingly commenced setting up five interpreter pools. These are housed in separate institutes, each responsible for a particular region. The concept was based upon the provision of interpreting services as far as possible by telephone, confined in the first instance to the medical sector. In due course the need for similar interpreting services both within and outside the medical sector could be assessed and a wider system introduced. The help provided by these interpreters in the medical sector is free 'on the basis that at least in the medical sector, no financial barriers should be built into the system that could stand in the way of the desired effect, namely improved access to existing health facilities' (Fragmenten uit ... 1977, p. 57). Initially, the interpreter pools were fully subsidized by the two ministries. By September 1976, the first 18 interpreters/trusted intermediaries had taken up their functions, with particular emphasis on providing assistance to Moroccans and Turks because these groups proved to have the greatest need. In the Explanatory Memorandum on the 1978 Budget an extension of the interpreter pools was announced, principally by means of free-lance workers for several other nationalities for which there had also proved to be

substantial demand. Registration requirements for such assistance were made more exacting in order to obtain more insight into the demand (Fragmenten uit ... 1978, p. 77).

At the same time, the interpreter pools do not always appear to function adequately, and nor is their coverage complete. In Eindhoven (where one of the interpreter pools is located), the local Consultative Committee for Medical Care for Foreign Workers still intends recruiting a Turkish medical consultant. According to the Committee, the interpreter pool helped only marginally in overcoming barriers between doctors and patients. In particular, the interpreter pool was said to be found wanting where 'cultural translation' was concerned (Welzijnsweekblad 1977, no. 46 (9 Dec.)).

Finally reference should be made to the appointment to the National Centre for Nursing Organizations as of 1 September 1976 of an official paid for by the Ministry of Public Health, with specific responsibility for the provision of information on the health system to foreign employees. The Information Office for Health Care for Foreigners, which he mans, issued an initial survey of health information activities in 1977 (Voorlichting, 1977). A number of information brochures for foreigners concerning health care in the Netherlands, which were prepared by this office, also appeared recently.

#### *4.2.6. (Group-specific) welfare work for foreign workers*

For a proper understanding of social and cultural welfare activities for foreigners, it needs to be taken into account that there was for a long time a strict division of responsibilities towards foreign employees. (This persisted until 1972/1973, when separate policies for housing, education and health began to be developed among the respective ministries). On the one hand, the Ministries of Social Affairs and of Justice handled recruitment, admission (and expulsion) and employment; on the other, anything to do with the social consequences of the presence of foreign employees and their families was passed to the Ministry of Cultural Affairs, Recreation and Social Work (CRM) under the head of social and cultural welfare policy. This partition of policy responsibilities is still clearly reflected in the Memorandum on Foreign Workers (1970), which first of all discusses economic aspects, admission and employment, while a subsequent chapter entitled 'Reception and Assistance' covers the social consequences of this labour migration. The Memorandum was signed by only four ministers: those for Economic Affairs, for Social Affairs and for Justice for the first part, and the Minister for CRM for the second.

Traces of this historically-evolved division of functions persist to the present day. As noted earlier, initiatives in the field of education and health are often taken jointly by the Ministry of CRM and the relevant ministry.

Given the totally different functions performed by the Ministries of Social Affairs, Justice and CRM, this division of functions has also been a source of friction and conflict (although this was usually kept internal). Because ultimate responsibility for admission and employment, including the scale and manner, resides with the Ministry of Social Affairs, the welfare sector is confronted with consequences without being able to influence the causes. The yardstick for admission and recruitment is, after all, economic (i.e. the state of the labour market).

The question as to whether the Netherlands is prepared and equipped to receive foreign employees properly and to provide follow-up assistance plays no more than a subordinate role. The frequently sharp criticism levelled by the Foreign Workers Welfare units and the Netherlands Centre for Foreigners at the policies of the Ministries of Social Affairs and of Justice need to be seen in this light. For some time now these bodies have been arguing for a complete recruitment-stop, or at the least for the introduction of proper welfare facilities for foreigners before any new recruitment is conducted; first of all, it is often argued in these quarters, satisfactory arrangements need to be made for those foreigners already in the Netherlands (including illegals) before new foreigners are recruited (see for

example the recommendations of the seminar held for welfare workers concerned with foreign workers at Noordwijkerhout in April 1978).

A second important aspect for a proper understanding consists of the historically-evolved situation in the administration of welfare work for foreigners. Initially (until 1964), such activity was confined to private efforts, usually in the form of Catholic community work or conducted by company apostolates (the earliest migrants being Catholic Italians and Spaniards), which were particularly concerned with individual migrants and handling their problems. In 1964, the Ministry of CRM began to subsidize these organizations (to the extent of 40% of their budgets); the organizations remained autonomous and the only scope the Ministry of CRM had for arriving at any sort of policy lay in the subsidies it provided and the conditions attached to them. The Ministry itself did nothing to set up administrative bodies but relied rather on private efforts, which as time went by it subsidized more and more: in 1969 the subsidy was raised to 70% of (approved) estimates; in 1972 this became 95%, and since 1 January 1975 it has stood at 100%.

The increased scale of subsidization also provided the Ministry of CRM with greater scope for coordinating the implementation of its policies. In order to reduce the number of parties to the discussion and to improve coordination, the Ministry of CRM encouraged the establishment of an umbrella organization for these units, namely the National Foundation for Assistance to Foreign Employees (LSBBW). At the same time the existing bodies were gradually reorganised, so that eventually there were 18 regional units covering the Netherlands as a whole, each with its own area of operation. The Dutch Centre for Foreigners (NCB 1974) succeeded the LSBBW and was also given umbrella responsibility for refugees and persons seeking asylum. After 1975, it was steadily expanded into a major umbrella organization providing services and acting as a counterpart to the Ministry of CRM, although this process was by no means always a smooth one.

In the beginning, the welfare organizations for foreigners projected themselves as representing the interests of foreign employees; the areas in which solutions needed to be found to problems were unlimited. The existence of such organizations also undoubtedly led to public social welfare bodies referring foreigners with problems to them. The staff of the organizations for foreigners developed into jacks-of-all-trades and became overloaded with foreigners' individual problems. In consequence, the public social-welfare bodies failed to develop expertise in the handling of foreigners' problems. On the other hand, it should also be noted that the welfare units for foreigners assumed a steadily greater role for themselves. A recent example is the setting up of an office for return-migration projects within the NCB, based on the argument that welfare needs to be looked at in broad terms and that return-migration forms part of it.

The substance of welfare policies for foreign employees and their families has been the subject of frequent and extensive discussion, and it would not be feasible to provide a concise survey. Accordingly I shall confine myself to two central policy aspects: first, the conflict between welfare activity directed towards 'integration' and those efforts directed towards the 'preservation of a separate identity' and, secondly, the discussion about a 'group-specific' or 'special' approach towards welfare work as against a general approach.

### **Conflict between 'integration' and 'preservation of separate identity'**

From the beginning, welfare policies towards foreign employees have been characterized by ambivalence: on the one hand, 'reasonably satisfactory reception and acceptance' (Popa-Radix 1971) was held to be desirable and necessary for the foreigner's ability to function properly, and for sound relations among the various groups in the Netherlands; as the Roolvink Memorandum puts it, the foreigner 'must to some extent be prepared to come to terms with the new situation, i.e. the Dutch life-style' (Nota Buitenlandse Werknemers 1970, p. 10); on the other hand, the

Netherlands cannot permit itself to become an immigration-country, labour migration is regarded as a temporary phenomenon, and policy should be geared 'not so much towards encouraging assimilation as such' as to 'giving the group the opportunity of preserving a separate identity'. This would in turn minimize the need for readjustment upon return to their own country (Nota Buitenlandse Werknemers 1970, p. 10). As the quotations from Memorandum indicate, the authorities were in no doubt in 1970 as to which of these aspects should be emphasized. Shortly after the memorandum appeared the Ministry of CRM introduced the precept of 'integration with the preservation of a separate identity', which until recently remained the basis for CRM policy.

This policy was implemented by the Foreign Workers Welfare Units which carried out group-specific community work subsidized by the Ministry of CRM. This community work consisted of four elements:

- (i) the provision of information both to Dutch persons and bodies and to foreigners;
- (ii) improving the social environment, meaning the encouragement of activities and provision of facilities in the social, cultural, recreational and other spheres, with a view to foreign workers' welfare;
- (iii) improving relations, i.e. the promotion of good relationships between groups of foreign workers and Dutch society; this needs to be seen in the context of improving the social environment;
- (iv) it is essential for the welfare units to promote the interests of foreign workers, particularly since the elements referred to above are not fully realized (Popa-Radix 1971).

In the approach adopted in the Foreign Workers Memorandum (Nota Buitenlandse Werknemers) the first and third aspects are given special priority.

The changing nature of migration between 1970 and 1974 (increasing length of residence, family reunification) is to some extent reflected in welfare policy objectives as formulated in the Memorandum of Reply (Memorie van Antwoord 1974, p. 16 ff.). There is more emphasis on 'integration' than hitherto, although the need for integration tends to be based on negative considerations (in the wake of tension and conflict in a number of places): 'Attempting to integrate foreign workers into our society is in the interests not only of the foreign workers welfare but also of the society in which he finds himself, since a poorly integrated group can be a source of tension, which can in turn lead to conflict.' On the other hand, there is much less emphasis on preservation of separate identity in the statement that care must be taken 'that foreign workers be provided with facilities for meeting together where they can find support in their own values and customs, because people who become dislocated and are in danger of losing their own sense of value cannot be expected to establish good relations with society as a whole'. The implementation of welfare policies is however made more difficult (and ambivalence is promoted in another way) when the authorities seek to distinguish three categories of foreigners for whom separate policies are required:

'In the first place there is the comparatively large group who already have a permanent residence permit for the Netherlands (...). There can be no doubt that policies aimed at the integration of this group need to be continued, and that existing possibilities in this regard should be further developed.

'In the second place there is a large group of foreign workers who do not yet possess a permanent residence permit and who have not yet opted in favour of remaining permanently in the Netherlands. The postponement of this decision – to which foreign workers are perfectly entitled – means that the length of residence is uncertain. This tends to act as a brake on integration. In many cases it is closely related to the difficulty of finding family accommodation, so that family reunification is delayed (...).

'The third group consists of those who decide after two years – in line with the possibility outlined in Chapter III – to leave the country with a 'departure-premium' (Memorandum of Reply 1974, p. 17). In the case of the

second group, the process of reaching a decision could be accelerated if the procedure for obtaining suitable accommodation were speeded up. But the memorandum fails to clarify how a number of practical aspects of foreigners' welfare work should be handled. In practice, the ambivalence remained unchanged.

As far as welfare work is concerned there is a growing realization that 'aiming at the preservation of a separate identity is basically at variance with the objective of integration'. Entzinger (1975, p. 333): 'Integration necessarily involves giving up part of one's own identity. At the most, this sense of identity can in certain cases provide an impetus for group emancipation. This only holds, however, if the remaining measures to promote integration are unequivocal and effective. Since the latter is decidedly not the case, aiming at the preservation of a separate identity slows down the process of integration, even though that may not be the intention.'

This was the signal for a 'Babel of tongues' among welfare workers concerned with foreigners, which persists to the present day (see Motief 1977, no. 10/11; 1978, nos 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5; Nota Integratie en Welzijnswerk 1978; Köbben 1978 (address to the Noordwijkerhout seminar in April 1978)).

A brief examination of this 'confusion of tongues' concerning integration and integration policy reveals a number of things:

(i) In the first place, the term is *not* used in the restricted sense given to it internationally by sociologists and other social scientists (see Van Amersfoort 1974, p. 46 ff.): in this sense integration consists of the 'introduction into social life' of the migrant grouping as a whole by means of institutions, in which no individual interaction and communication to speak of between members of the immigrant grouping and members of the recipient society or its institutions need occur; the situation of the Moluccans, especially during the first decade of their residence in the Netherlands, measures up to such a definition.

(ii) Although frequently used in official documents, the concept of integration is nowhere defined by them; to such extent as it is explained, the meaning given to it approximates to the definition given in 'Foreigners in the Netherlands' (Verwey-Jonker 1971; 2nd impression 1973, p. 13). This contrasts integration with segregation: 'In theoretical terms, the final stage of the integration process may be regarded as the normal co-participation by all individuals concerned in basic social roles, irrespective of any connexion they may have with a group having a separate identity of its own'. In official documents integration is used as a synonym for 'fitting in'.

(iii) Verwey-Jonker's definition above can be interpreted either 'narrowly' or 'broadly': and this is a major source of the current terminological confusion. To my way of thinking the interpretation given to it tends to be determined by the attitude one has towards labour migration: those who are convinced that labour migration is a temporary phenomenon (or wish it to be so) and that the majority of foreign workers and their families will eventually depart, make do with the interpretation that these temporary migrants should be fitted into (certain) basic social roles for as long as they remain in the Netherlands. Such a 'narrow' interpretation is to be found in the Memorandum on Foreign Workers (1970) and, to a large extent, in the Memorandum of Reply (1974). An increasing number of social scientists and welfare workers are, however, convinced that the majority of foreigners residing in the Netherlands will remain there permanently. For this reason, they consider it essential for there to be more far-reaching long-term integration policies; they believe that active policies are required in all areas in order to eliminate the underprivileged position of foreign workers and to prevent them from becoming a minority in Van Amersfoort's sense (1974, p. 37).

(iv) An additional complicating factor in the discussion is the way in which far-reaching policies of this kind should be implemented. Two approaches may be discerned, each of which is in the process of developing its own terminology. On the one hand there is a group which wishes to realize the objective of integration by means of the central concept of

'participation': i.e. foreign workers and their families must have far more opportunity of participating in all areas (rather than just the labour market); they must be made aware of the possibilities, and be encouraged to use them; and a policy of positive discrimination, as pursued for other under-privileged groups, is called for.

Against this there is the view that the objective of integration would, in the long term, be achieved more quickly by means of 'emancipation policies', i.e. it is first of all necessary to work from the base upwards within the groups of foreigners themselves in order to get internal organization and representation of group interests under way, after which the foreigner will be able to carve out a place for himself in Dutch society in the group context, and integration will proceed more effectively through the medium of the collective.

It is clear that these two approaches expect and seek different things from official intervention. The former approach is largely directed towards the individual and wishes the government to open up the Dutch social and political system to foreigners; the second approach is more geared towards the collective and seeks greater support from the government for group-work and organizational activity among and by the foreigners themselves.

(v) Finally, among a number of foreigners' organizations (see various reactions in *Motief* 1977, nos. 10/11) there exists to my way of thinking a mis-apprehension about the scope for official policy. The authorities are accused of conducting an 'assimilation policy' that would force the foreigner to become a 'brown Dutchman'. In my view it has been sufficiently demonstrated above that there is no question of a policy aimed at assimilation (if anything the reverse applies); and it may be asked how the government could enforce assimilation if that were its objective. At the most, the government could create the conditions for encouraging a process of assimilation. The explanation for these groups' statements needs to be seen in their conviction that the government currently does too little in support of activities directed towards the preservation of separate identity and organization within these groups.

Recently, the Ministry of CRM reacted to the rumblings from 'the fields' described above. To date it remains the only Ministry to do so among those with responsibilities in this area, but the reaction would appear sufficiently significant to warrant attention here. The address by Director-General G. Hendriks of the Ministry of CRM at the seminar on 'Integration and welfare policy for Mediterranean migrants' held on 19 April 1978 contained a number of statements that departed clearly from the previous official line. The approach towards Mediterranean migratory labour had altered: 'The figures are incontestable: we are in the midst of a period in which the Netherlands has become an immigration country (...). The change in the nature of the migration, from labour to family migration, raises the question whether the policies we currently have at our disposal are able to cope with the new problems that have arisen; the Mediterranean migrant has become a permanent citizen of this country.' The conflict between norm and fact as it has existed previously is thus recognized and resolved, at least by the Ministry of CRM. What implications does this new assumption have for the question of 'integration' and 'preservation of separate identity'? Equal opportunities and equivalent treatment have now become central to policy: 'The past has indicated only too clearly that a policy of integration can often only be effective if the under-privileged group of migrants is deliberately accorded preferential treatment in a number of areas. Only in this manner can equal treatment in practice be achieved. If there is no preferential treatment, differences in knowledge, income and power between the various groups in the community will persist or become more pronounced. The encouragement of equivalent treatment for migrants is a highly important function of integration policy.'

A second important aspect of such a policy is the improvement of mutual understanding and relations between the Dutch community and ethnic minorities.'

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(ii) Although frequently used in official documents, the concept of integration is nowhere defined by them; to such extent as it is explained, the meaning given to it approximates to the definition given in 'Foreigners in the Netherlands' (Verwey-Jonker 1971; 2nd impression 1973, p. 13). This contrasts integration with segregation: 'In theoretical terms, the final stage of the integration process may be regarded as the normal co-participation by all individuals concerned in basic social roles, irrespective of any connexion they may have with a group having a separate identity of its own'. In official documents integration is used as a synonym for 'fitting in'.

(iii) Verwey-Jonker's definition above can be interpreted either 'narrowly' or 'broadly': and this is a major source of the current terminological confusion. To my way of thinking the interpretation given to it tends to be determined by the attitude one has towards labour migration: those who are convinced that labour migration is a temporary phenomenon (or wish it to be so) and that the majority of foreign workers and their families will eventually depart, make do with the interpretation that these temporary migrants should be fitted into (certain) basic social roles for as long as they remain in the Netherlands. Such a 'narrow' interpretation is to be found in the Memorandum on Foreign Workers (1970) and, to a large extent, in the Memorandum of Reply (1974). An increasing number of social scientists and welfare workers are, however, convinced that the majority of foreigners residing in the Netherlands will remain there permanently. For this reason, they consider it essential for there to be more far-reaching long-term integration policies; they believe that active policies are required in all areas in order to eliminate the underprivileged position of foreign workers and to prevent them from becoming a minority in Van Amersfoort's sense (1974, p. 37).

(iv) An additional complicating factor in the discussion is the way in which far-reaching policies of this kind should be implemented. Two approaches may be discerned, each of which is in the process of developing its own terminology. On the one hand there is a group which wishes to realize the objective of integration by means of the central concept of

'participation': i.e. foreign workers and their families must have far more opportunity of participating in all areas (rather than just the labour market); they must be made aware of the possibilities, and be encouraged to use them; and a policy of positive discrimination, as pursued for other under-privileged groups, is called for.

Against this there is the view that the objective of integration would, in the long term, be achieved more quickly by means of 'emancipation policies', i.e. it is first of all necessary to work from the base upwards within the groups of foreigners themselves in order to get internal organization and representation of group interests under way, after which the foreigner will be able to carve out a place for himself in Dutch society in the group context, and integration will proceed more effectively through the medium of the collective.

It is clear that these two approaches expect and seek different things from official intervention. The former approach is largely directed towards the individual and wishes the government to open up the Dutch social and political system to foreigners; the second approach is more geared towards the collective and seeks greater support from the government for group-work and organizational activity among and by the foreigners themselves.

(v) Finally, among a number of foreigners' organizations (see various reactions in *Motief* 1977, nos. 10/11) there exists to my way of thinking a mis-apprehension about the scope for official policy. The authorities are accused of conducting an 'assimilation policy' that would force the foreigner to become a 'brown Dutchman'. In my view it has been sufficiently demonstrated above that there is no question of a policy aimed at assimilation (if anything the reverse applies); and it may be asked how the government could enforce assimilation if that were its objective. At the most, the government could create the conditions for encouraging a process of assimilation. The explanation for these groups' statements needs to be seen in their conviction that the government currently does too little in support of activities directed towards the preservation of separate identity and organization within these groups.

Recently, the Ministry of CRM reacted to the rumblings from 'the fields' described above. To date it remains the only Ministry to do so among those with responsibilities in this area, but the reaction would appear sufficiently significant to warrant attention here. The address by Director-General G. Hendriks of the Ministry of CRM at the seminar on 'Integration and welfare policy for Mediterranean migrants' held on 19 April 1978 contained a number of statements that departed clearly from the previous official line. The approach towards Mediterranean migratory labour had altered: 'The figures are incontestable: we are in the midst of a period in which the Netherlands has become an immigration country (...). The change in the nature of the migration, from labour to family migration, raises the question whether the policies we currently have at our disposal are able to cope with the new problems that have arisen; the Mediterranean migrant has become a permanent citizen of this country.' The conflict between norm and fact as it has existed previously is thus recognized and resolved, at least by the Ministry of CRM. What implications does this new assumption have for the question of 'integration' and 'preservation of separate identity'? Equal opportunities and equivalent treatment have now become central to policy: 'The past has indicated only too clearly that a policy of integration can often only be effective if the under-privileged group of migrants is deliberately accorded preferential treatment in a number of areas. Only in this manner can equal treatment in practice be achieved. If there is no preferential treatment, differences in knowledge, income and power between the various groups in the community will persist or become more pronounced. The encouragement of equivalent treatment for migrants is a highly important function of integration policy.'

A second important aspect of such a policy is the improvement of mutual understanding and relations between the Dutch community and ethnic minorities.'

The preservation of separate identity recedes further into the background: 'To opt for a policy of integration is not to deny the cultural identity of the migrant. Nevertheless I believe it is difficult to make cultural identity the object of policy at the institutional level. It has been suggested in the past that welfare work should be partly directed towards the preservation of separate cultural identity. This has never been government policy; it has merely been emphasized that cultural identity is a fact and that it has to be taken into account. Bi-cultural education is a laudable aim, but the means of achieving this goal raise many questions. For that reason I believe that such policies need to be conducted with restraint. In my view active government intervention in this private sphere is inconsistent with human dignity.' The question is whether the attitudes of the Director-General for Community Development of the Ministry of CRM will become the basis for new government policies in the short term, and when and how the range of policy instruments can be adapted to the new underlying principles.

### **Group-specific or territorial approach to the problem?**

The discussion as to whether the problem of foreign workers and their families should be handled by separate institutions or general welfare bodies partly parallels the discussion about 'integration' versus 'preservation of separate identity'. In practice a situation had evolved in which the Foreign Workers Welfare Foundations or units were devoting the bulk of their time and energies to representing foreigners' personal interests and interceding on their behalf. General welfare bodies referred foreigners to 'their' welfare units and made no arrangements for assisting them themselves.

Within the welfare units and the Ministry of CRM (see Popa-Radix 1971; Nota Buitenlandse Werknemers 1970, p. 12), the view gained ground that 'in the long term' ordinary welfare bodies should handle relevant problems of foreign workers, so that the Foreign Workers Welfare Units could concentrate to a greater extent on their 'real' task of improvement of the social environment, relations with the rest of the community, and information activities. This development parallels that in welfare work for the Moluccans as described above (see II.2.5), and is placed in a broader context in the 'Memorandum on more detailed policy considerations with reference to community development (Nota Nadere beleidsbepaling...)' of December 1975. This intention has been frequently reiterated since then (see for example: Memorandum with reference to the Lower House's final report 1974-1975 (Nota n.a.v. het eindverslag...), 10 504, no. 12, p. 39; Fragmenten uit ... 1976, p. 90; Fragmenten uit ... 1977, p. 53). In practice, however, there appears to have been little change in the Welfare Units' activities.

The report by the Social and Cultural Planning Office (1976, p. 223) interprets the organizational framework within the Ministry of CRM as follows: 'Until recently (February 1976), responsibility for social assistance for foreign groups lay with the Community Development Department of the Ministry of CRM. Since then it has been made an independent division within the Ministry. This reorganisation would appear to reflect a change in underlying philosophy. Up to that point both the welfare units for foreigners and the government, which provided subsidies, persistently dissociated themselves from the activities that had proved to be the most important and demanding in practice, i.e. those concerned with providing assistance to individuals.

Instead they claimed that their real objectives consisted of influencing group outlook and social consciousness, and the improvement of the social environment and relations with the rest of the community.

At present, more realistic notions of their own functions appear to be gaining ground. The idea of transferring responsibility for assistance to individuals to the relevant Dutch bodies has been cautiously deferred to the long term. The gulf between the rather abstract and tendentious objectives

and the actual 'grass-roots' activities has to some extent been bridged. That there is a more realistic appreciation of the facts is also evident from Director-General Hendriks' address: 'The provision of community services, social and cultural activity, amateur art and the sporting sector are a few examples of areas where provisions for foreigners and other minorities will need to be built up in sufficient quantity. But this building-up process is not an easy one, due to a whole complex of factors. Often there is a lack of familiarity with the habits and behaviour of foreigners. In addition, there is a certain amount of resistance towards taking on more problems in these sectors. Even if general welfare bodies were to function optimally on behalf of minority groups, group-specific institutions would remain necessary, particularly if we develop into a plural society. They will continue to fulfil an important role in mediation, the representation of interests and information activity. They will, however, need to adjust to a different set of functions.'

It is, therefore, likely that as far as the duties of staff of the Foreign Workers Welfare units are concerned, there will for the present continue to be a conflict between acting as a community worker and being a 'jack-of-all-trades'. In attempting to find a greater role for general welfare institutions, the question arises whether the government would not do better to turn to them direct rather than leaving matters to the Foreign Workers Welfare Units.

### **4.3. Administrative policy structure**

The administrative lines of responsibility have already been outlined under the various headings in part 2 of this chapter. This section seeks briefly to outline the relevant framework for policy formulation and coordination.

The Ministry of CRM was the first to draw on an external advisory body; in September 1964, the 'Liaison and Consultative Committee for Foreign Workers' was appointed, whose functions were to advise the Minister on appropriate policies with regard to the reception of and community assistance for foreign workers living and working in the Netherlands, as well as the coordination of activities in that field. The Committee ceased to function several years ago and (partly on its own advice) was replaced by the Interministerial Committee for Policy on Foreign Workers.

In 1969, the Minister for Social Affairs also appointed an external advisory body, namely the Advisory Committee on Foreign Manpower, a subsidiary body of the Labour Market Council. Its mandate was defined as being to prepare recommendations for policy formulating and executive bodies, with a view to keeping them informed – either on request or at the Committee's own initiative – of industry's views on appropriate labour market policies.

In 1972, the Consultative Body on the Provision of Medical Care to Foreign Workers took up its activities at the request of the Minister for Health and Environmental Protection. This external advisory body's task was to draw up an inventory of problem areas in health care for foreigners and to recommend solutions to the Minister.

The task of the Interministerial Working Group on Foreign Workers, which was set up by the Minister for Development Cooperation in 1975, was to provide the Minister with policy recommendations concerning the promotion of job opportunities in the region where foreign workers had come from. The majority of the members of this working group were civil servants. The working group was not convened again after the REMPLD survey had been completed.

The most important committee is the Interministerial Committee for Policy on Foreign Workers (ICBBW). This is an internal advisory body, chaired by the Ministry of Social Affairs. This Committee was intended as an equivalent to what the ICBM is for the Surinamese and Antilleans: it has a coordinating role for policy on foreign workers and their families and for issues that may arise in this context. The ICBBW adopts a far more passive role than the ICBM, however; its chairman explains that it sees its function exclusively as a coordinating one, within the confines of policy as laid down in official memoranda and given the allocation of administrative

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
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responsibilities among the ministries concerned (Motief 1978, no. 5). The practical effect of this coordination is not yet clear, but it is apparent that the ICBBW is much less active than the ICBM (see Motief 1978, nos. 4 and 5).

Finally, the Advisory Committee for Research into Cultural Minorities (ACOM) was appointed by the Minister for CRM in May 1978. The functions of this advisory committee were described earlier (see II, 3). The advisory and coordinating structure for policy on foreign workers is shown in the following diagram:

**Policy advisory and coordinating structure**



#### 4.4. Conclusions with reference to current policy

On the basis of the most recent official policy papers (the Memorandum on Foreign Workers; the Memorandum of Reply and the Memorandum on the final report), one is forced to conclude that the government's approach to the problem is one-sided and limited: the foreign worker problem is largely seen in terms of the Dutch economy and labour requirements; social implications are completely ignored, particularly in the long term. This is related to the assumption that labour migration is a 'temporary' phenomenon: temporary both in terms of the requirements of the Dutch economy and as far as the individual migrant is concerned. Many arguments based on surveys and drawn from the literature have been presented in this chapter in refutation of these two assumptions. In practice (or at least with the kind of policies adopted up to the present) it does not appear possible for labour migration to be controlled in the short and medium term. On the one hand, it does not appear possible to influence the demand for foreign manpower within such a time-frame because this demand has its origins in fundamental and not easily influenced processes in the Dutch economy and labour market; and on the other, it does not appear possible adequately to control processes connected with and arising out of labour migration (such as the increasing length of residence and family reunification, and the tendency for large groups of foreign workers to settle down permanently) without interfering with the fundamental rights of this category.

The objectives of current policy reflect the government's approach to the problem as outlined above. The first objective is 'the fullest possible and

most balanced employment, including policies for the provision of labour to help ensure that jobs will be adequately filled, if necessary by the recruitment of foreign labour' (Memorie van Antwoord 1974, p. 3). In the long term, however, the government anticipates that labour migration will have unfavourable consequences, for which reason it has set itself the objective of limiting recruitment to the absolute minimum and of attempting to eliminate the need for international labour migration. On the one hand it is seeking to bring about a reduction in the demand in the Netherlands for foreign workers, while on the other it is attempting to reduce the supply of foreign labour by means of development cooperation programmes and the encouragement of international efforts to promote an international redistribution of labour. In themselves the latter two are consistent long-term objectives, but they have not been worked out in any practical detail in official policy papers and doubts may certainly be raised as to their feasibility.

The objectives relating to the social position of foreign workers in Dutch society stem directly from the point of view that labour migration is and should be temporary in nature. Limiting the number of foreign workers and the length of their stay is therefore a major objective. As long as foreign workers and their families remain in the Netherlands the government aims at 'integration with the preservation of separate identity', but the two concepts are scarcely defined, and in practice the content of these aims is coloured by the expectation of temporary residence. There is no question of there being any long-term conception and objectives, or of these objectives being broken down into specific phases.

A number of discrepancies and inherent conflicts become apparent when the activities of the various ministries in their respective fields of responsibility are compared with official policy as formulated in the government papers referred to previously. In the Ministry of CRM, in particular, the idea has taken root that the majority of foreign workers and families have in fact become, or will become, permanent immigrants, and to permit this category to assume an acceptable place in future Dutch society, policies are required to eliminate this group's under-privileged position, thereby preventing minority group formation in the second and subsequent generations from having undesirable consequences for Dutch society. Great importance is therefore attached to placing more emphasis where possible on integration-promoting activities and on creating an equivalent legal status and equal opportunities.

As regards education and health, official policy towards the problem appears to be directed towards integration. To the extent they exist, official activities are geared towards the provision of services within the existing Dutch system, and there is only limited attention to special arrangements for foreign workers and members of their families. It would, however, appear that official efforts in these areas are influenced more by considerations of efficiency (i.e. separate facilities for this category would be too expensive) than by any official philosophy concerning under-privileged groups. This is confirmed by the scope of these activities and the size of the funds allocated.

Housing policy, with its clear emphasis on unattached persons and the lack of active housing policies for the families of foreign workers, would appear to follow the official line of 'reasonably satisfactory, temporary' acceptance.

Finally, the Ministries of Social Affairs and of Justice most obviously adhere to the official line as laid down in the Memorandum on Foreign Workers and the Memorandum of Reply: these Ministries remain concerned with encouraging the temporary nature of labour migration and of employing foreign labour only in those instances where no other labour is available. There are no policies based on the 'philosophy of under-privilege' which assume that the majority of foreign workers and their families will remain in the Netherlands for a long period; nor are there any facilities for foreign workers such as those that exist for Moluccans, Surinamese and Antilleans in order to improve their competitive position in the labour market.

It must be concluded that there is a lack of consistency in the policies pursued in various fields. In the section on legal status it was seen how this leads to contradictory and conflicting tendencies in the legislation concerning the legal status of the foreign workers and his family.

Although it was not possible systematically to compare policies at the national and local levels, discrepancies were apparent in a number of places.

In particular, the considerable license given to local authorities under the present aliens legislation means that different standards can be applied at the local level. The inconsistency of national policies in various fields has undoubtedly contributed towards these differences.

There is also a good deal of variation in local practices with regard to housing, and initiatives are taken that are not always in line with the policies established at national level. Contributory factors towards the lack of clarity that has developed in this area include the fact that the Ministry of Housing and Physical Planning did not undertake any activities until late in the piece and that the municipalities have primary responsibility for housing. In particular, the large municipalities in the Randstad (the western conurbation), which generally have the greatest housing problems and the greatest influx of foreigners, have in a number of cases developed local policies that bear little relation to official policy at national level.

Local experiments also occur in the field of public health, such as the recruitment in a number of places of doctors from migration countries, that are at variance with the policies officially directed towards integration.

If it is accepted that the majority of nationals of recruitment countries currently living in the Netherlands have settled in the country for a long time or permanently, one must conclude that the policies adopted to date have been inadequate. The evolution of the social position of the foreign worker in the Netherlands and his family offers little hope for the future; serious problems may be foreseen if policy remains unchanged; and the problems associated with the second and subsequent generation descendants of the present batch of foreign workers – which are all too evident as it is – will assume more distinct contours. The only possibility for undoing or slowing down the processes that have been set in motion lies in strongly interventionist policies in all major social areas, based on the recognition that this group's social gap must be bridged.

Official policy has, up to the present, been more inspired by economic and political expediency than based on factual data, research and literature. There is no constant well-organised flow of fundamental data on foreign workers and their families. There is only an irregular flow of incidental data such as temporary residence permits, work permits and unemployment figures; and even these appear scarcely to be used. It is, for example, significant that the Ministry of Education and Science should not anticipate any (further) increase in the number of foreign children at Dutch schools, although the figures provided by the Central Bureau of Statistics clearly indicate otherwise.

Up to the present little research work has been commissioned by the government. However, the appointment by the Minister for CRM of an Advisory Committee for Research into Cultural Minorities (ACOM) in May 1978 reflects that Ministry's desire for its administration to be more solidly underpinned.

Up to the present day the foreign worker and members of his family have not been extended any means of influencing policy or any form of co-determination. As a result of their legal status they are denied any form of political participation; because they have no right to vote they constitute a group of no interest in the Dutch political system; and there is still a lack of bodies through which they can make their views known at municipal level. Political pressure on behalf of foreign workers come mainly from the welfare-units subsidized by the Ministry of CRM and from action groups, but neither can be said to 'represent' foreigners. For the present the degree of internal organization among foreigners must be regarded as weak.

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The foregoing chapters have had to be confined to a description of the social position of and official Dutch policy towards the three largest categories of ethnic minorities within Dutch borders: foreign workers from the Mediterranean region and their families, Surinamese and Antillean Dutch, and Moluccans. Taken together these three categories comprise an estimated 380,000 persons residing in the Netherlands. Other, less sizeable categories, of which some (refugees and caravan-dwellers) are catered for by special government policies while others (e.g. Chinese) are not, had to be left out of consideration. The same applies to the large number of foreign employees from non-Mediterranean countries (Germans, Belgians, etc.). The conclusions in this chapter consequently apply primarily to the categories covered in this study.

### **Characteristics of post-war policy towards ethnic minorities**

#### *1. The fiction of temporariness and the lack of long-term policy perspective*

At first glance there would appear to be a lack of any common denominator in post-war official policy towards ethnic minorities in the Netherlands. There is a diversity of official activities and these were often carried out by different ministries for different groups which had come to the Netherlands at different points of time for varying reasons and motives.

A closer examination, however, reveals that hidden behind these differences there is quite clearly a common denominator.

One of the most important principles underlying Dutch policy since the Second World War has been that the Netherlands is an over-populated country and that it could not afford to become an immigration country. While, therefore, it could in retrospect scarcely be claimed that there has been a consistent policy, this theoretical notion – or, more accurately, norm – has played an important role. Two consequences were the active promotion of emigration and concerted efforts to restrict political migration from Indonesia after it became independent – the actual prevention of migration to the Netherlands being politically unfeasible. (See Surie 1973, pp. 47–110; Van Amersfoort 1974, pp. 86–100). To the extent that groups did come to the Netherlands (repatriates and Moluccans), their arrival was regarded and labelled as temporary. As far as the Moluccans were concerned, the concept of temporary residence fitted in with the wishes of the majority of the group and resulted in the fiction of temporary residence being retained in policy for a very long time, as described in chapter 2. But consideration was initially given to a final destination 'elsewhere' for all or some of the repatriates too, and possibilities were explored. In the event, however, most of the repatriates identified their aspirations and future so closely with the Netherlands that the authorities opted for a policy of active integration (Surie 1973, pp. 47–110; Van Amersfoort 1974, pp. 86–100).

The ties between this group of repatriates and other groups in the Netherlands proved to be sufficiently strong to form a source of political pressure in favour of integration policies supported by a considerable input of official funds. That this policy of integration should have managed to succeed in a relatively brief space of time may be attributed to the relatively favourable starting-position this group had in many respects, their close identification with Dutch society and the scale of official activity on their behalf. At the same time it is important to note that this process of integration was greatly facilitated by a period of virtually uninterrupted prosperity and economic expansion in the Netherlands.

The same prosperity and expansion and the evolution of the welfare state in the Netherlands saw the advent of foreign workers in the Netherlands in the nineteen-sixties. The Dutch economy's need for these foreign workers could only be reconciled with the central principle that the Netherlands was not and could not afford to become an immigration country by assuming that these workers would be remaining in the Netherlands only temporarily. This fitted in with the initial plans of the migrants themselves and the interests of the countries of origin and therefore became a basic premise on which policy was founded – and on which it has remained founded up to the present. This assumption would, however, appear to have been overtaken by events.

The migration from Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles gave rise to yet another form of the temporary residence concept. For a long time (until 1965) there was no question of any sort of policy; before 1960, the small-scale migration amounted to the simple comings and goings of students and a small elite, and as such did not form a subject for concern. When the stream of migrants swelled and the proportion of migrants of low socio-economic status grew, there was still little disposition to depart from familiar ways. To the extent that policies were developed they were located in the welfare sector – and only there – and the strategy and funds allocated in this field did not differ from those in the case of foreign workers, for example: a certain degree of absorption, but with the preservation of separate identity with a view to eventual return to the country of origin. Not until after 1974, when the government introduced a package of measures geared towards the reception of the large flow of migrants from Surinam before independence, does one encounter cautious suggestions in official documents that it was no longer possible for policy to be based on the unquestioned expectation that these migrants would be staying in the Netherlands only temporarily.

The basic premise that the Netherlands is not and must not become an immigration country and the associated fiction of the temporary nature of residence of various minority groups has had many consequences both for the content of the policies adopted and for the organizational arrangements for their implementation, and the means officially provided for the purpose.

In substantive terms, the concept of temporary residence led to an ambivalent policy. A certain degree of acceptance and co-participation in Dutch society was held essential for as long as the members of these categories remained in the Netherlands. This acceptance or integration was not, however, seen in the perspective of long-term or even conceivably permanent residence in the Netherlands, and did not therefore necessitate official efforts and funds on a similar scale to those provided for repatriates. Policies directed towards members of these minority groups in the Netherlands were largely confined to reception and follow-up assistance in the welfare sector.

The attitude of the authorities was passive and policy planning was strongly ad-hoc in nature: i.e. introducing measures in those areas where problems had manifested themselves.

Only in recent years has the realization begun to gain ground – separately for each group – that it is necessary to think in terms of long stays or even permanent settlement by the majority of the members of minority groups, and that a long-term policy is therefore needed geared to the future position of these minorities in Dutch society. In the case of the Moluccans, the authorities admittedly reached the conclusion nearly 20 years ago that they would be staying in the Netherlands for longer than originally envisaged. The curious thing is that in the very period following the recognition of this fact (i.e. during the sixties), the government took far less action except in the housing sphere. The recent memorandum on the Moluccan problem marks a return to a period of more intensive and coordinated official effort in many areas – assuming that the government's intentions as expressed in the memorandum are carried out.

With regard to Surinamese and Antillean migrants too, policy after 1974 and the government paper of 1977 devoted somewhat more attention to

how these groups should be accorded a place in Dutch society, based on the cautious supposition that 'many' will settle permanently in the Netherlands.

The discrepancy between the premises on which policy is officially based and the actual trend towards longer residence, increasing family reunification and permanent settlement is at its most marked with respect to the largest category, foreign workers and their families. For some time now there have been calls within welfare circles and the Ministry responsible for welfare matters for policy to be adjusted in line with current realities, but as yet the Interministerial Committee for Coordination of Policy on Foreign Workers, and the Minister for Social Affairs (as coordinating Minister) have not responded.

## *2. Coordination of policy formulation and implementation*

Several categories of immigrants have come to the Netherlands since the Second World War at various times, for various reasons and in various waves. Migration that was more or less clearly of political origin (repatriates, Moluccans, and Surinamese in the last period prior to independence) tended to be unexpected. Migration of this kind could not be prevented since that would have been neither politically feasible nor responsible. Migrant flows based on economic factors (guest-work) arose at the express wish of the Netherlands, in response to Dutch needs.

No connexion was ever established between these various migration flows; an immigration policy did not, and still does not exist as part of population policy. The policy on admission of foreign workers to the country was based almost entirely upon labour market criteria. Little or no account was taken of the social consequences for population development.

Responsibility for policy and its coordination with regard to each category of immigrants was allocated as the occasion arose, to whichever ministry was considered to have the most direct involvement with the immigrants in question. In the case of foreign workers this was the Ministry of Social Affairs, while the Ministry of Social Work, now CRM (Cultural Affairs, Recreation and Social Work) acquired coordinating responsibility for the problems associated with the Surinamese, Antilleans and Moluccans. The coordination of policy for Moluccans was recently transferred from that Ministry to the Ministry of Home Affairs; and, as a further indication of the fragmentation of responsibility, the coordination of policy on refugees resides with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The coordination of the various ministries' policies on any one minority category is in itself a relatively recent phenomenon. The Interministerial Committee for Coordination of Policy on Migrants from Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles (ICBM) was the first interministerial coordinating body, and its activities and working methods certainly merit attention. The Interministerial Committee for Policy on Foreign Workers (ICBBW), which was set up along the lines of the ICBM to coordinate policy on foreign workers, has until now led little more than a paper existence.

In consequence, policy formulation and implementation is least consistent and coordinated in the case of this category. With regard to policies on the Moluccans, a policy coordinating organ – the Interministerial Committee for Coordination of Policy on Moluccan Affairs (ICOM) – was recently set up, with the Minister for Home Affairs as coordinating Minister.

Achieving consistency of policy between the national and local levels and coordination of activities at these levels is a difficult matter for all groups. The major cause would appear to be the fact that policy formulation remained passive for such a long time at the national level; the central government only drew up policies and initiated activities when significant problems arose in one or more of the municipalities and regions. The local authorities also often found themselves burdened with responsibilities they were unable to cope with without assistance from the central government. Housing policy for foreign workers is an outstanding example of this, but considerable problems have also arisen for particular categories at regional and/or municipal level in the areas of education and health.

### *3. Role of research in policy formulation and evaluation*

In general it is fair to say that in recent years, less and less systematic data have been available for the groups covered in this report, their social position and the way in which matters are developing. This is most marked in the case of the Moluccans; since the Ambonese Welfare Office was disbanded in 1970 scarcely any new data covering the group as a whole have been available. The result is that the estimates used today – even those which are essential for policy purposes – are in fact based on data some ten years old. The flow of data on foreign workers and their families, and especially the reliability of the data, is declining in inverse proportion to the increased length of residence in the Netherlands. The size of the category of foreign workers with temporary work and/or residence permits is falling sharply, while data for the category with permanent work and/or residence permits are much less reliable, being checked a good deal less frequently.

Nothing is known officially about 'illegals', of whom there are thought to be thousands.

As far as immigrants from Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles are concerned, the flow of data has always been meagre. The basis for these data was and remains the statistics on migration between the Netherlands and these two countries. But here too, the longer the immigrants remain in the Netherlands, the less reliable this statistical basis becomes. No proper data are available on the number of children of Surinamese and Netherlands-Antillean migrants born in the Netherlands, or on intermarriage between these migrants and indigenous Dutch people, and so forth.

There is still little research being conducted among the minorities in the Netherlands. During the last ten years, in particular, there has been virtually no research on any scale among Moluccans in the Netherlands which would lend itself to generalization, although undoubtedly the attitude of the survey group in question is partly responsible for this. A number of survey findings have been published in recent years on foreign workers and their families, but given the size of the category the sum total of these findings is still fragmentary. As far as migration from Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles is concerned research has up till now concentrated on the migration itself and on push-factors, with little attention being devoted to the position and problems of immigrants in the Netherlands.

Official interest in research among minorities in the interests of sounder policies is concentrated within a few ministries. The Ministry of CRM, in particular, commissioned a number of surveys, since it was confronted with the social implications and problems of immigration. This Ministry also felt the need for research into minorities to be better programmed, important aspects of such research including the evaluation of policy in general and of policy instruments in particular. The appointment of the Advisory Committee on Research into Cultural Minorities stemmed from this need.

### *4. Scope for participation by minorities in policy formulation*

The recent trend towards democratization associated with the establishment and growth of consultative and co-determination bodies and procedures in nearly all sectors of Dutch society has all but passed the minorities by. The assumption that these minorities would be in the Netherlands only temporarily was probably a contributory factor. The majority of the Moluccans, and nearly all Mediterranean workers, were moreover aliens or stateless, which gave them a more vulnerable legal status than Dutch citizens. In the case of foreign workers, this combination of the assumptions on which policy were based and their status as aliens has led to the lack of any reference to the concept of political participation in official policy papers.

We should however recognize at the outset that the question of participation and co-determination by minorities is far from straightforward. Only among the Moluccan minority is there any degree of internal organization; and as a result it was for this minority that an

advisory/consultative body was first set up, albeit of limited scope. In the case of Surinamese and Antillean Dutch people and Mediterranean workers, the subsidized welfare units and action groups have projected themselves as interpreters of these categories' interests. The ICBM has allocated a number of places for paid representatives of the minorities in its advisory working-groups. There are no formal participatory channels whatever for foreign workers, with the exception of ad hoc hearings connected with the preparation of new policy documents.

### **Relevant factors for a new minorities policy**

#### **5. *Less favourable economic circumstances as a factor for future policy***

To a large extent, the ability of migrants to turn their new situation to advantage, and the social position they occupy, are determined by economic conditions and prospects in the receiving country. In the Netherlands there is the recent example of Chinese seamen who were left stranded in the country as a result of the shipping collapse between the two world wars, and who formed the pathetic '*pinda-chinees*' ('peanut-vendor' Chinese). After the Second World War, however, this same group re-emerged as respected restaurateurs in the wake of economic recovery (see Van Heek 1936 and Vellinga and Wolters 1966). As all writers note, the rapid integration of the large group of repatriates from Netherlands Indies was due not least of all to the powerful expansion of the Dutch economy in the period after they arrived.

Since 1972, the phase of almost continuous expansion of the Dutch economy appears (temporarily?) to have come to an end. The rate of economic growth has fallen sharply and, even more importantly, there is greater unemployment. The labour market has unquestionably become more selective, and the least qualified are the first to suffer. As outlined in some detail in the preceding chapters, the members of ethnic minorities are in a weaker competitive position, and are among the weaker groups. An additional factor for foreign workers is that their legal status in the Netherlands is particularly weak.

A substantial weakening of the competitive position of these minorities in such basic areas as the labour market at a time of excess labour supply has implications in other areas. The spiral processes also apparent in better times become accentuated; the weak starting-position places them in a marginal situation in the labour market or even leads to chronic unemployment. The low income they derive from their work or from unemployment benefits means they are forced to take the cheapest form of accommodation, leading to concentration in old town-quarters. There is a strong concentration of foreign and Dutch problem-children in schools in these neighbourhoods, which almost inevitably means a drop in educational standards and that the chances for the second generation to rise socially by means of education are minimal. This is a formalized example, but many elements of this spiral process were noted in the preceding chapters. This leads to increased segregation and accelerated minority-group formation in the sense given to it by Van Amersfoort (Van Amersfoort 1974, p. 37).

Politically, the only conclusion to be drawn from the above is particularly unwelcome. The weaker the state of the Dutch economy, and consequently of the opportunities and prospects for members of minority groups, the more interventionist official policy needs to be and, hence, the more funds that will need to be set aside if the government wishes to counteract minority-group formation. Up to the present time, however, there is little indication in official policy of the urgency of the problem being recognized. If anything, policy towards foreign workers indicates the reverse.

#### **6. *Size of ethnic minorities***

The foregoing cannot be seen in isolation from the current size and likely growth of ethnic minorities in the Netherlands. Although little can be said

with certainty about the way in which a minority group becomes stigmatized and the relationship between physically-recognizable minorities and the majority of the indigenous population, it is generally assumed that the actual size of the group plays an important role. This survey is based on the fact that the rate of return to the country of origin is low among all the groups concerned, and on the supposition that the majority of members of minority groups now living in the Netherlands will remain there. The question then arises whether an increase in present numbers is to be expected and, if so, how it will occur. At any event, a relatively high rate of fertility may be anticipated during the next decade among immigrant families from Mediterranean countries and from Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles. This will have perceptible numerical consequences, since at least in the case of foreign workers the fertile age-groups are over-represented in the Netherlands. It may also be anticipated that family reunification will continue among foreign workers for the time being; the rate will depend partly on the scope for reunification in the Netherlands and hence partly on the policies adopted.

Finally the question arises of the possibility of new waves of immigration which could lead to the formation of new minorities or to the strengthening of existing ones. A major factor will be the policies adopted towards the recruitment of foreign workers in response to developments in the Dutch economy and the Dutch labour market. One can do no more than to speculate about these trends.

The obligations accepted by the Netherlands within the framework of the European Communities (the free movement of labour) could possibly lead to fresh migratory movements. At the time of the UK's admission to the EEC there was some discussion of the possibility that members of minority groups from that country might move to the Netherlands. The resumption of migration to the north from Italy must also be counted a theoretical possibility. Whether such migratory movements get under way, and their scale, will depend on economic developments and the labour-market outlook within the European Economic Community.

In the short term, a more probable source of greater minority-group formation in the Netherlands is provided by the Netherlands Antilles. Between 1975 and the end of 1977 net migration to the Netherlands from the Netherlands Antilles stood at approximately 2,300 per annum. The ICBM-memorandum of 1977 referred to an estimate of 18,500 Antilleans in the Netherlands; a supplementary letter of 30 May 1978 by the Minister for CRM gives a figure of over 25,500 in a statistical annex Information paper no. 11, 1978). On the basis of net migration figures since 1970 can only conclude this migration to be growing strongly. As we have seen, the literature tends to treat rather lightly the possibility of a growth in this migration flow and a repetition of what happened in Surinam prior to independence. An important argument in this connexion is the assumption that Antillean society is strongly oriented towards countries other than the Netherlands.

The question remains however whether opportunities and prospects in other countries could be exploited quite so easily at a time of sluggish economic growth. The less this proves to be the case the more the Antilleans will presumably be inclined to turn to the Netherlands, where they at least enjoy the status of citizens with full rights.

The following recommendations for further research have been drawn up in the light of the social position of minorities in the Netherlands and the policies conducted to date by the authorities, and take into account a number of basic factors with which future policies will have to deal. These recommendations have been formulated less as concrete research proposals than as indication of those areas in which further study is required before recommendations for new policies can be made.

## *7. Migration, population and minorities policies*

The lesson to be learned from post-war immigration (as summarized in 1) is that the authorities can no longer afford to be taken unawares by new

migratory flows or by a strengthening of existing movements which might in retrospect prove to be new immigration flows. There would seem an obvious need for the coordination of policies with respect to migratory flows (i.e. both their restriction and encouragement), population policy, for which there are the recommendations of the Muntendam Committee report (*Bevolking en Welzijn* 1976), and policy towards ethnic minorities.\* This would for example mean that policies with regard to the recruitment and admission of foreign labour should no longer be based largely or exclusively on the state and outlook of the labour market, but that factors of relevance for population and minorities policies should also be taken into account. In the case of migratory flows which could not be prevented because of international commitments entered into by the Netherlands, this could mean foreseeing these inflows in good time and taking appropriate action to ensure they are handled properly.

#### 8. *Need for long-term policies regarding the social position of minorities in the Netherlands*

If the supposition that the majority of the members of minority groups now residing in the Netherlands will remain there in the long term and will settle down permanently should be correct (and a good deal of evidence has been adduced in this survey in support of that contention), it will no longer suffice for the government to conduct short-term policies, such as those pursued towards foreign workers, or policies taking only the short and medium term into account. On the basis of proper analytical research, the government will have to indicate which developments it considers desirable for these minorities and for Dutch society in the long term, and which it does not.

But the clarification of long-term objectives for minorities policy and basing it properly on research is not a simple matter; among other things it requires properly thought-out responses to such key questions as:

- How does the government envisage Dutch society in the future in which an increasing percentage is non-indigenous and differs physically and culturally (at least for the present) from the rest of society? Theoretically, the answer may be said to lie somewhere between complete assimilation and absolute segregation (apartheid), assuming for the sake of convenience that neither extreme would be considered acceptable. Up to the present, the precept of 'integration with the preservation of separate identity' has been upheld, but we have seen that a vague 'golden mean' of this kind is very difficult to apply in practice; when seen in the perspective of long-term or permanent residence, the two concepts collide.

- But this long-term perspective itself raises the questions of (i) the extent to which a society can tolerate (additional) cultural diversity without doing violence to itself, and (ii) how far and how rapidly immigrants can be expected to adjust to the new society without doing violence to themselves.

- Assuming that the questions posed above can be answered, the question arises as to how far the government is able in practice to shape developments in the direction it desires.

Answering this question necessitates a sound insight into the factors (and their respective weight) that affect the process of absorption of foreign groups into the new society.

\* In a previous report by the Provisional Scientific Council on Government policy (*International Migration* 1976) it was recommended that a number of tasks that would need to be carried out in preparation for coordinated policy formulation and administration of this kind be referred to a new 'migration division' to be established within the Social and Cultural Planning Office. This recommendation was not, however, taken up. The three functions of this migration division would need to comprise:

<sup>1</sup> the analysis of current migration and the preparation of forecasts of migration developments in the immediate future;

<sup>2</sup> research into long-term migration and the emergence of new migratory movements;

<sup>3</sup> helping ensure the selection of sound policies.

*9. Need for strategy-determination in official policy concerning minorities and the relationship between minorities and the majority*

Assuming that the government accepts as a basic premise for its policies that most members of minority groups currently living in the Netherlands will settle there permanently, and assuming that it were taken as the objective that these minorities should be accorded a position of equality in Dutch society in the future there would then be various conceivable strategies for realizing such an objective. Two abstract models may be distinguished:

a. policies geared towards emancipation, taking as their basis separate identity and its further development, and the development of internal organization and group representation of its own interests.

This would be emancipation based essentially on the collective; if emancipation of this kind were to succeed the collective would then be integrated at the institutional level (rather than at the individual level) into the overall framework of Dutch institutions;

b. policies geared towards emancipation, taking as their basis the integration of the individual. In operational terms, the concept of integration would amount to the government's opening up existing Dutch systems in the interests of individual members of minority groups, at least in 'hard sectors' of society (legal status, employment, housing, education and health), so as to provide equal opportunities for the individual members of minority groups; in other words, the creation by the government of appropriate conditions. On the other hand, the government would need to conduct policies aimed at eliminating the under-privilege and unfavourable starting position of individual members of minority groups, so that these equal opportunities and prospects would in fact be made use of.

The selection of a particular strategy and the extent to which one of the above approaches is preferred to the other are closely related to the way in which the questions posed under 8 are answered. Experience of past policies would tend to suggest the second strategy to be the more desirable. The question would then remain which elements from the first approach might still be useful or even essential for the implementation of the second.

The above applies mainly to that aspect of policy which seeks directly to influence the social position of minorities. A strategy to improve the relationship between foreigners and indigenous people deserves equal consideration. Up to the present, the authorities have assumed that the provision to the majority and minorities of information about each other could only be in the interests of mutual relations. In the meantime, this assumption has become seriously open to question. It remains to be decided what means the authorities do have at their disposal to help improve relations between the indigenous community and foreigners, apart from policies designed to eliminate the under-privilege of minority groups. This too is a fallow but possibly fertile field for further research.

*10. Need for coordinated action in various policy areas and at various levels*

The question whether long-term policies should be devised for each individual minority group, or whether preference should be given to an overall ethnic minority policy, is closely connected with the developments the government considers most desirable in the long term and with the strategy selected. It has been noted at many points in the present survey that comparable problems exist for the various minorities in various policy areas. The act of migrating to the Netherlands and living in and coming to terms with Dutch society appear to constitute a common problem for members of various ethnic and cultural groups greater than any problems stemming from internal differences of language, race and culture. This explains why there has never been any mention of a Moroccan or Turkish or Portuguese minority but of a minority of 'guest-workers' or foreign employees. Even in the few fields where government policy does recognize cultural differences, the nationalities are very much regarded as subdivisions of the umbrella category of foreign workers.

If the government should opt for a strategy such as that outlined under b in section 9 above, this ought preferably to lead towards an overall ethnic minority policy. Within such a general minority policy there would of course still be room for taking account of specific cultural differences, to the extent these were of relevance in the various areas of policy.

But there is not only a need for more detailed research into the merits of an overall minority policy; attention also needs to be paid within the overall policy context to effective coordination between the various ministries that each have responsibility for a specific aspect of policy.

The present survey has indicated that this aspect has hitherto been unsatisfactory, most clearly so in the case of foreign workers.

It has not been possible to pay equal attention in this survey to the coordination of policy between the national and regional and/or local levels. A number of problem areas have, however, been noted in passing, and there is obvious room for research here. The desirability and feasibility of far-reaching decentralization should also be studied.

A number of suggestions have been made recently concerning the organizational framework for the coordination of new long-term policies. If the government should decide in favour of an overall ethnic minority policy, the obvious course would be for coordination to be centralized under one minister. Molleman (1978) would like to see this coordination undertaken by the Minister for CRM, basing this on the argument that problems of community development are at issue. In my view there are both substantive and historical arguments in favour of placing the responsibility for coordination with a 'weightier' ministry than CRM; for an overall ethnic minority policy to make real headway, it will need to work through the 'hard' sectors of society. In this respect the Ministry of Home Affairs would seem a better alternative. This would also ensure a direct line between the national and the municipal level, which, in the light of the considerations noted above, would be an important additional factor in favour of this Ministry.

In my view it would be distinctly undesirable for there to be a separate Ministry for ethnic minorities, since this would only serve to underline the 'special' position of these minorities and would imply a high-level institutionalization of a group-specific approach.

#### *11. Need for channels to be opened up providing minorities with political and social influence*

It is in the nature of a minority that it lacks effective means and channels for exerting influence in the society in which it finds itself. Van Amersfoort (1974) cites this as one of the criteria in the definition of a minority. Nor does the minority have adequate and effective means for participating in policy formulation.

With the exception of the Surinamese and Antillean Dutch, minorities in the Netherlands are prevented from exercising power within the existing Dutch political system on the grounds of their legal status as stateless citizens and aliens. Since they do not have the right to vote they are not of interest to Dutch political parties.

Minorities have virtually no scope for making their voice heard within the economic power structure. In general they are in a weak socio-economic position, while those Dutch institutions that claim to represent the interests of wage earners in general and the socially weak in particular – the trade unions – have so far made little effort to include immigrants in their ranks and to take up their cause.

In addition there is little internal organization among minority groups (with the exception of the Moluccans). Different minority groups do not join forces to represent their own interests, or only incidentally. In practice, virtually the only bodies acting as channels for participation and political pressure are the welfare units staffed by members of the minorities themselves or by Dutch persons on their behalf; there are no other official channels.

There would seem a need in the short term for consideration to be given to the ways in which the government could change this situation or could encourage change. At the least a reconsideration of the legal status of minority groups appears essential. In the context of long-term or permanent residence it would seem desirable to look into other ways and means of ensuring that minorities have an effective say in society. In doing so, however, the government will probably add a complicating element to the process of policy formulation and implementation.

If nothing else, the apparent conflict between the wish of many members of minority groups to return to their country of origin and the increasing trend towards longer residence in the Netherlands, is a sure source of complications.

#### *12. Need for a statistical and analytical basis for policy*

A proper statistical and analytical foundation will be essential if a coordinated, overall ethnic minority policy be considered desirable and feasible. It has, however, been noted in this survey that the flow of basic statistical data on each of the three categories examined has declined in recent years in terms of quantity or of quality, or both.

For this reason it would seem of the utmost importance that the scope be examined for building up a proper statistical basis and for coordinating research into ethnic minorities. Cooperation between ministries will be essential for this.

It is not, however, possible to wait until adequate data and research are available before formulating policy; the problems are too pressing.

One particular point of relevance in the examination of this problem is the need for protection of the privacy of persons in general and of vulnerable groups such as ethnic minorities in particular. If the case for protecting the privacy of members of minorities should prevent basic data from being properly assembled, this would undermine the scope for properly-based policies. At the same time the protection of privacy, especially that of vulnerable groups, is something to be taken very seriously. It would therefore appear essential to examine in depth the scope for optimum protection of privacy.

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## **Appendix 1**

### **List of publications of the Council**

#### **I. Rapporten aan de Regering (Reports to the Government) \*)**

Introductie, taak, plaats en werkwijze (Introduction, responsibilities, position and working methods) (1974)

1. Europese Unie (European Union) (1974)
2. Structuur van de Nederlandse economie (Structure of the Netherlands Economy) (1974)
3. Energiebeleid op langere termijn (Long-term Energy Policy) (1974) 1 to 3 published in one volume
4. Milieubeleid (Environment Policy) (1974)
5. Bevolkingsprognoses (Population Forecasts) (1974)
6. De organisatie van het openbaar bestuur (The Organization of Public Administration) (1975)
7. Buitenlandse invloeden op Nederland: Internationale migratie (Foreign Influence on the Netherlands: International Migration) (1976)
8. Buitenlandse invloeden op Nederland: Beschikbaarheid van wetenschappelijke en technische kennis (Foreign Influence on the Netherlands: Availability of Scientific and Technical Knowledge) (1967)
9. Commentaar op de Discussienota Sectorraden Wetenschapsbeleid (Comments on the Discussion Paper on Sectoral Councils for Science Policy) (1976)
10. Commentaar op de nota Contouren van een toekomstig onderwijsstelsel (Comments on the White Paper on the Contours of the Future Educational System) (1976)
11. Overzicht externe adviesorganen van de centrale overheid (Survey of External Advisory Bodies of the Central Government) (1976)
12. Externe adviesorganen van de centrale overheid, beschrijving, ontwikkelingen, aanbevelingen (External Bodies of the Central Government: Description, Developments, Recommendations) (1977)
13. 'Maken wij er werk van?' Verkenningen omtrent de verhouding tussen actieven en niet-actieven ('Do we make Work our Business?' An Exploratory Study of the Relations between the Economically Active and Inactive Persons) (1977)
14. Overzicht interne adviesorganen van de centrale overheid (Survey of Internal Advisory Bodies of the Central Government) (1977)
15. De komende vijfentwintig jaar, een toekomstverkenning voor Nederland (The Next Twenty-Five Years: a Survey of Future Developments in the Netherlands) (1977)
16. Over sociale ongelijkheid, een beleidsgerichte probleemverkenning (On Social Inequality: a Policy-oriented Study) (1977)

#### **II. Voorstudies en Achtergronden (Preliminary and Background Studies)**

W. A. W. van Walstijn, Kansen op onderwijs, een literatuurstudie over ongelijkheid in het Nederlands onderwijs (Educational Opportunities: A Literature Study on Inequality in the Netherlands Educational System) (1975)

I. J. Schoonenboom and H. M. In 't Veld-Langeveld, De Emancipatie van de vrouw (Women's Emancipation) (1976)

G. R. Mustert, Van dubbeltjes en kwartjes, een literatuurstudie over ongelijkheid in de Nederlandse inkomensverdeling (Dimes and Quarters: a Literature Study on Inequality in the Distribution of Income in the Netherlands) (1976)

J. A. M. van Weezel a.o., De verdeling en de waardering van arbeid (The Distribution and Appreciation of Work) (1976)

A. Ch. M. Rijnen a.o., Adviseren aan de Overheid (Advising the Government) (1977)

J. J. C. Voorhoeve, Internationale Macht en Interne Autonomie (International Power and Internal Autonomy) (1978)

\*) The Reports nos. 13 and 15 have been translated into English.