

Immigrant Policy

36

Summary of the 36th Report

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**Netherlands Scientific Council
for Government Policy**




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Preface to the English version of the report

The original version of this report in Dutch was submitted to the government of the Netherlands on May 9, 1989 and published on June 12 of that year. It contains seven chapters. The first chapter includes the major elements of the Council's analysis of the immigrant situation in the Netherlands as well as its recommendations for future government policy. The other six chapters offer a detailed description of the position of immigrants in various sectors of Dutch society, largely based on research findings.

This version in English is not just a summary; it should rather be considered as a condensed version of the report in full. It contains the first and most important chapter of the report in Dutch. It also contains a selection of some descriptive sections from the remaining chapters. This will enable the reader to obtain a first impression of the immigrant situation in the Netherlands without having to go into too much detail.

In this version in English the order of the text in Dutch has been reversed. Part I contains the descriptive sections and Part II the Council's analysis of the situation and its views and recommendations. The two parts are preceded by a summary of the full report.

Summary of the report

This report forms the Council's response to a request for advice by the Government on future policy towards ethnic minorities. Compared with the situation ten years ago, when the Council previously submitted a report on the subject, two significant changes have taken place. In the first place – contrary to expectations and despite the restrictive admissions policy – immigration has remained at much the same level. This is reflected in the fact that the number of persons covered by the government's minorities policy has grown over the past ten years from 473,000 to 756,000, an increase of 60 percent. It is questionable whether government policy in its present form is capable of taking proper account of the implications of that growth and its likely continuation.

In the second place unemployment has risen dramatically among minorities during this period, reaching as much as 40 percent or more of the working population in some groups. This is a matter for extreme concern; a sense of futility is emerging, extending in some cases to succeeding generations. Education has not proved a sufficiently powerful tool to reverse this process, apart from which the low rate of employment among minorities has prevented the spontaneous development of inter-ethnic contacts.

The process of marginalization outlined above is in significant measure the result of general developments in Dutch society. General problems such as high unemployment and unequal education opportunities bear disproportionately on minorities. A minorities policy that fails to address these general developments can do no more than tackle the symptoms. As such the effectiveness of government policies specifically directed towards minorities depends not just on the soundness of those policies themselves but also on the circumstances in which they have to be implemented and on the government's overall policies in those sectors. Partly for this reason the Council would urge that any policies specifically directed towards minorities should be primarily conceived as an intensification of the general policies in the sector in question. This basic premise has implications for both government policy in general and for the present minorities policy.

As far as the latter are concerned, the Council believes that the government tends to view these groups too much in the light of welfare categories instead of providing them with opportunities to stand on their own feet. Many members of minority groups have become directly or indirectly dependent on the state in the form of social security benefits, welfare services and facilities and housing. This leaves them in a particularly vulnerable position when it comes to spending cuts. At the same time, one of the reasons for this dependence on the state consists of the comparative lack of accessibility that minorities tend to have to many agencies and facilities in sectors other than those just noted. In some cases this may reflect direct or indirect discrimination; in others it may be traced to cultural differences.

The Council considers furthermore that the government's current policies towards minorities have become caught up in a debate about objectives. Its policies also provide insufficient allowance for the fact that minorities tend to be concentrated in certain cities, while the criteria for identifying the target groups are unclear.

Points of departure for a new policy

The Council's recommendations for future government policies are based on the supposition that the level of migration to the Netherlands (and for that matter to Western Europe in general) will be sustained for the foreseeable future. Whereas the Council advised in 1979 that the presence of *immigrants* in Dutch society should be regarded as a permanent phenomenon, it now expects that *immigration* too will be a lasting feature, even given the current restrictive entry policy. This expectation renders it imperative to ensure that the consequences of immigration take a positive course, both for the individual immigrant and his or her descendants and for society in general.

Too many immigrants remain in a marginal position and fail to participate effectively in society. The Council considers the continuation of this situation to be unacceptable, not just in terms of social justice but also because immigrants represent potential human resources, from the development of which society can benefit. Participation in the labour system is an important precondition to this end, but this will require investment, especially in education, training and employment. Failure to undertake such investment will also exact a price, in the form of the further growth of an ethnic sub-proletariat, with rising crime and costly welfare facilities.

This report is concerned not just with the position of the groups towards which the government's current minorities policy is directed but with all immigrants in the Netherlands. Immigrants may broadly be defined as all those who have migrated to the Netherlands plus their descendants up to the third generation insofar as the latter wish to regard themselves as non-indigenous. Minorities may be regarded as non-indigenous groupings in a disadvantaged situation; the question as to which groups constitute minorities needs therefore to be periodically reviewed.

Immigrant policy may be divided into three main areas, each of which is discussed in the report:

1. *aliens policy*, which is concerned with the admission, residential status and expulsion of foreign citizens;
2. *integration policy*, which is concerned with improving the participation of minorities in vital social sectors and institutions;
3. *cultural policy*, reflecting the culturally mixed nature of Dutch society, and which is in principle directed towards all immigrant groups seeking to give expression to their own culture and identity.

In the Council's view, immigrant policy can be effective only given a more broadly-based system of registration of ethnic origin, based where possible on self-registration. The Council also considers that the effectiveness of government policy would be promoted by modest forms of output budgeting under which results were rewarded.

Aliens policy

The Council supports the broad lines of the Government's present restrictive admissions policy. Labour migration from outside the European Community should be kept to a minimum; employment permits should not be issued to non-Community residents for jobs requiring little or no training. On the other hand, the Netherlands should make efforts within the Community to ensure that citizens of other countries obtain the same rights of free movement as Member State citizens after five years of residence.

With respect to family reunion and the admission of refugees and those seeking

asylum the Council does not propose any radical changes. The Council does, however, consider that asylum-seekers should, under certain conditions, be permitted to take up employment after roughly two months in the Netherlands. It regards the speeding up of the asylum procedures as an urgent priority.

The process of European integration will have an increasing effect on aliens policy. The proposed abolition of immigration controls at the internal frontiers of the Community may, however, make less of a change to the present situation than the government is currently assuming. For these reasons the Council would not consider it advisable to introduce a compulsory national identity system. It does, however, support a system of compulsory identification for all – both Dutch and non-Dutch – when it comes to the use of certain public services and facilities and entering into employment (the latter in order to help prevent the employment of illegal immigrants). The Council also considers that the official records kept of aliens are in need of improvement.

Although the legal status of aliens has improved in various respects over the past decade the Council would once again urge the introduction of a new Act for the equal treatment of aliens. The procedures for obtaining Netherlands citizenship should also be speeded up.

In the case of return migration the Council supports the introduction of a re-return option during the first two years after leaving the Netherlands. The Council broadly endorses the present financial return regulations; the Council would also draw attention to a number of drawbacks in introducing a system whereby social security payments differed according to country of residence.

Integration policy

Integration policy should concentrate on the three main areas of employment, education and adult education, on the grounds that an effective integration policy in these fields would largely obviate the need for specific measures to assist immigrants in other fields. For this reason the report deals only briefly with other areas of policy, such as housing, justice, health care and welfare.

In the *labour market* the Council notes the existence of a structural discrepancy between demand and supply, with an excess of unskilled and semi-skilled labour – precisely the categories into which many immigrants fall. As in earlier reports, the Council would urge that economic growth be specially directed towards the achievement of employment objectives. Even this, however, would not generate sufficient jobs for those lacking skills and qualifications.

Government and industry should also make much greater efforts to work together in the field of training. This applies especially to immigrants, for whom the current measures to promote training and entry into the workforce have proved inadequate. In this respect an expansion of the system of work experience places is essential.

The Council considers that the forthcoming placement of the manpower services on a tripartite and regional basis will make it easier to take special account of minorities in the labour market. Extra incentives could be built into job placement to reward effective forms of positive action; in this respect the 'support agencies' funded by the Ministry of Welfare, Health and Cultural Affairs could play an important intermediary role.

In order to encourage a sense of responsibility in these matters on the part of

the social partners (including the government as employer), the Council would argue for the introduction of legislation to promote employment opportunities along the lines of the Canadian Employment Equity Act. Under this Act, employers are obliged, in consultation with employees, to draw up a plan each year setting out the goals and timetable for achieving greater equity in staffing and to issue a public report each year on the progress made. This will then make it evident to the general public what efforts companies are making in order to recruit greater numbers of people from minority groups and with what result. In addition the Council would argue in favour of contract compliance on the part of the government, i.e. only those companies that had demonstrably made serious efforts to engage immigrants would qualify for government contracts.

According to the Council the government's present policy intentions in the field of entrepreneurship affords good opportunities for immigrants. Care needs however to be taken to ensure that no unintended entry barriers are created.

In *education* the Council believes that better facilities should be created for the reception of non-Dutch-speaking pupils. The Council would support the large-scale reintroduction of reception classes for pupils arriving in the Netherlands at a later age and for the introduction of language classes for immigrant infants starting primary school with inadequate Dutch. Improved reception facilities are also required for immigrant children at the pre-school stage.

An improved knowledge of Dutch is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for improving the extent to which minorities benefit from education. Greater efforts should be made to ensure that immigrant children – not just boys, but also girls – actually attend school as required by law. Measures are also needed substantially to cut the number of early school-leavers and steps should be taken to encourage greater numbers of immigrant pupils to proceed to secondary and higher education. In this respect the Council would argue for a wide range of specific measures and facilities designed to improve the quality of education to immigrant children and which are consistent with the present educational priority policy. This will, however, depend on the ability of government policy to take greater account of the specific circumstances confronted by immigrants. Here again the Council would see scope for a modest form of output budgeting.

The Council considers that education in pupils' own language and culture should for the present be retained but that it should henceforth be provided outside the normal curriculum. According to the Council inter-cultural education should not be regarded as a separate subject but as a guiding principle in basic education in general.

Improved facilities are also needed for *adult education*. In this respect the Council attaches particular importance to adult basic education, which needs to be strongly expanded. The Council would advocate the introduction of an education right for adult members of minorities. At the least, they should be able to follow a basic course in Dutch and a course providing orientation in Dutch society. The introduction of an entitlement to education would make it clear that a given level of knowledge was regarded as so vital for people's ability to function in Dutch society that the government was prepared to provide free education not just to young people but also to adults.

Certain groups of immigrants would have to be compelled to make use of their educational entitlement. A requirement to pursue basic education should, in the Council's view, apply at least to recently arrived migrants (with the exception of asylum-seekers) for whom the government in any way bore responsibility and to unemployed immigrant benefit claimants who had not

completed the equivalent of Dutch primary schooling, including young female immigrants whose partner was drawing a social security benefit. As a closely related element of this requirement, a reception, support and counselling structure should be set up at regional level for recently arrived migrants.

Finally the Council would urge the setting up of much improved facilities for vocational training, not just by government but also by industry. Provided there is adequate support, this could provide a particularly valuable supplement to regular education for immigrants. It is essential that all forms of education and training for foreigners be tailored to their individual requirements.

Cultural policy

The government should respect cultural, ideological and denominational diversity – the origins of which can, in part, be traced back to immigration itself. In doing so the government should be guided by the constitutionally and legally enshrined right to self-organization and by the principle of material equality in the public funding of facilities, including those established by immigrants. The latter should neither be disadvantaged nor receive special privileges; if non-indigenous persons encounter barriers the government can help them overcome these until they achieve equality with the indigenous community. The de-linkage of integration and cultural policy as proposed by the Council means that the government's facilitative role would also apply to those immigrant groupings (e.g. Chinese or Indonesian Dutch) that do not at present form a target group in the government's minority policy.

Policy implementation

The proposed integration policy, which is at the heart of the proposed immigrant policy, should primarily be viewed as an intensification of the government's general policies in the relevant sectors. The primary responsibility for the implementation of integration policy should without question reside with the specialist departments in question. The role of the Minister for Home Affairs can in future be confined to the overall direction of policy and to ethnic monitoring.

Municipalities with a large immigrant community should be given greater resources to find solutions to the problems with which they are confronted. The central government's present deprived area policies can be replaced by more intensive sectoral policies; at municipal level sufficient funds must remain available for the coordination of concrete initiatives.

The Council would also advocate the setting up of an Immigrant Policy Council along the same lines as the Equal Rights Council and the Council for Youth Policy. The National Advisory and Consultative Council for Minorities (LAO) could evolve into a significant platform for representative immigrant organizations, although in this respect the close links with the Ministry of Home Affairs would have to be relaxed.

For various reasons it is not possible to calculate the overall costs and benefits of the immigrant policy proposed by the Council. The costs of a number of specific policy measures proposed by the Council for the reception of new immigrants and their children would probably be in the order of several hundred million guilders per year at present levels of immigration. These costs would be largely additional to those of the present minorities policy, which runs at around 800 million guilders per year. Specific efforts to improve the

marginal position of ethnic minorities would also be needed within the fields of employment and primary education. These could be financed by the more effective use of the funds currently allocated for these purposes. No allowance has been made for the benefits of integrating the immigrant community into the labour system that would be obtained in the form of economic production and savings in the field of social security and the provision of facilities.

The Council is aware that its proposals to bring about a structural improvement in the position of minorities in Dutch society will require a major effort on the part of all concerned – immigrants as well as non-immigrants and their organizations, the social partners and the government. Individuals' ability to exercise their rights on the one hand, and society's ability to enforce obligations on the other, are inextricably interrelated aspects of full citizenship.

Part I

The immigrant situation

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Demographic background

I.1 The number of immigrants

On 1 January 1979 there were 431,800 people in the Netherlands of non-Dutch citizenship, or 3.1 percent of the population. Ten years later, on 1 January 1989, the number of foreign residents had risen to 624,000 and their share of the population to 4.2 percent. Table 1.1 provides a survey of the principal non-indigenous groups in the Netherlands by nationality and origin*. The largest group of foreign residents is formed by the Turks (177,000), followed by the Moroccans (140,000), Germans (41,000) and British (37,000). Roughly one in four of the foreigners living in the Netherlands come from another Member State of the European Community. The number of foreigners living in the Netherlands is a little below the number of Netherlands citizens living abroad: on 1 January 1987 the latter totalled 643,600.

Table 1.1 Immigrant groups and groupings in the Netherlands according to country of nationality (I) and country of origin (II) on 1 January 1989 (>500)

I. Immigrants of non-Dutch citizenship		
1	Europe	364,460
	of which	
2	EC Member States	160,448
	namely	
3	FRG	40,657
4	United Kingdom	37,364
5	Belgium	23,324
6 *	Spain	17,439
7 *	Italy	16,090
8	France	8,083
9 *	Portugal	8,055
10 *	Greece	4,283
11	Ireland	3,382
12	Denmark	1,377
13	Luxembourg	394
14 v*	Turkey	177,297
15 *	Yugoslavia	12,174
16 v	Poland	3,110
17	Austria	2,934
18	Switzerland	1,910
19	Sweden	1,491
20	Norway	1,331
21 v	Hungary	843
22	Finland	687
23	Rumania	603
24	America	36,931
	of which	
25 v*	Surinam	15,811
26	U.S. of America	10,718
27	Canada	2,625
28 v	Chile	1,826

*] Section 4.1 of Part 1 discusses the use of terminology in the context of immigration

29		Colombia	1,277	
30		Brazil	1,092	
31	v	Argentina	595	
32		Asia		53,332
		of which		
33	v	Indonesia	9,454	
34		China	8,048	
35	v	Vietnam	6,380	
36	v	Pakistan	4,286	
37		Japan	3,477	
38	v	India	3,467	
39	v	Sri Lanka	2,555	
40		Israel	1,760	
41		Philippines	1,492	
42		Singapore	1,326	
43		South Korea	797	
44		Africa		161,836
		of which		
45	*	Morocco	139,749	
46	v	Ghana	4,235	
47		Egypt	3,461	
48	v	Ethiopia	2,669	
49	*	Tunisia	2,650	
50	*	Cape Verde	2,334	
51	v	Zaire	1,384	
52	v	Republic of South Africa	1,071	
53		Algeria	674	
54		Nigeria	564	
55		Oceania		2,752
		of which		
56		Australia	2,072	
57		New Zealand	653	
58		Stateless and citizenship unknown		4,226
		Total Section I:		<u><u>623,537</u></u>

II. Significant non-indigenous groups with Netherlands citizenship (estimates)

59	*	Surinamese	194,189	
60	*	Antilleans and Arubans	66,000	
61	*	Moluccans (incl. some Indonesians)	40,000	
62		Chinese	23,000	
63	*	Gypsies (incl. some non-Dutch)	3,700	
		Total Section II:		<u><u>326,889</u></u>

Note: The immigrant groups formally coming under the government's minorities policy have been indicated in the table with an*. Two further groups need to be added, namely:

Refugees; these form a group of 26,608 persons on whom there are no precise citizenship data. Countries from which large numbers of people are known to have taken refuge in the Netherlands are marked in the table with a 'v'. Other countries from which people have fled in significant numbers include Iran, Iraq, Somalia, Rumania,

Syrea and Lebanon (see also P.J. Muus, *Migration, minorities and policy in the Netherlands; recent trends and developments*; *Sopemi-report 1988*; Amsterdam, Institute for Social Geography, 1989, p.18; M.M.J. Aalberts, 'Asielbeleid cijfers' (Asylum policy figures), *Justitiële Verkenningen*, vol.13 no.8, 1987).

* Finally the current minorities policy also covers caravan dwellers. Although these do not form a non-indigenous group, the 30,000 people in question (source: Ministry of Welfare, Health and Cultural Affairs, estimate from previous years) are also the object of the government's minorities policy.

The number of persons coming under minorities policy as of 1 January 1989 is estimated at 756,379.

Sources:

1-58 CBS (provisional figures).

59-60 R.F.J. Tas, 'Surinaamse and Antilliaanse bevolking in Nederland neemt verder toe' (Surinamese and Antillean population in Netherlands continues to increase), *Maandstatistiek van de bevolking*; CBS, 1989, no.2, p.11. Tas estimates the number of persons of Surinamese origin at 210,000, but this number includes 15,811 persons of Surinaamse nationality.

61 Ministry of Home Affairs, estimate from previous years.

62 S.Y. Voets and J.J. Schoorl, *Demografische ontwikkeling en samenstelling van de Chinese bevolking in Nederland* (Demographic development and composition of the Chinese population in the Netherlands); The Hague, NIDI, 1988, internal report no. 54, p. 54. The figure is a WRR estimate for 1 January 1987 based on the average of the high and the low variant in the NIDI study.

63 Ministry of Welfare, Health and Cultural Affairs, estimate from previous years.

As may be seen from Table 1.2, the number of foreign residents in the Netherlands is low when compared with other northern EC countries. On the other hand, there is a comparatively high proportion of non-Community foreigners in the Netherlands. The table's value for comparative purposes is, however, limited. In certain Member States, such as the United Kingdom, a comparatively high proportion of immigrants already possess the passport of the receiving country upon arrival. There are also marked differences in legislation in this field, which – certainly in the long term – have a bearing on the percentage of immigrants who retain their original citizenship. Finally the table does not include illegally present immigrants, which could make a particular difference in southern Europe. The number of illegal immigrants in Italy is for example estimated at between 600,000 and one million, i.e. more than the number of legally present foreigners in that country¹.

Table 1.2 Legally present foreigners in selected European countries in 1982, in numbers and as a percentage of total population (estimate)

Country	Number	percent	Country	Number	percent
Belgium	886,000	9.0	Austria	291,000	4.2
F.R. Germany	4,667,000	7.6	Finland	12,000	0.3
Denmark	102,000	2.0	Liechtenstein	9,000	36.1
France	3,680,000	6.8	Norway	86,000	2.1
Greece	260,000	2.7	Sweden	406,000	4.9
Ireland	69,000	2.0	Switzerland	960,000	15.0
Italy	312,000	0.5			
Luxembourg	96,000	26.3	Total	14,494,000	4.3
Netherlands	538,000	3.8			
Portugal	64,000	0.6			
Spain	418,000	1.1			
United Kingdom	1,638,000	3.1			

Source: D. Maillat, 'Long term aspects of international migration flows; the experience of European receiving countries'; *The future of migration*; OECD, Paris, 1987, p.40.

¹] G. Simon, 'La nouvelle donne migratoire en Europe du Sud'; *Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales*; 1986, vol. 2 no. 1 pp. 9-35. See also: Y. Moulier-Boutang, J.P. Garson and R. Silbermann, *Economie politique des migrations clandestines de main-d'oeuvre; Comparaisons internationales et exemple français*; Paris, Publisud, 1986, p. 25 ff.

Apart from immigrants with foreign passports there are also immigrants living in the Netherlands who are Dutch citizens. Most of these come from existing or previous parts of the Kingdom of the Netherlands outside Europe. The figures included in the population registers permit no more than an estimate of their numbers to be made. Including children born in the Netherlands, the number of persons of Surinamese origin with Netherlands citizenship was estimated at 194,000 on 1 January 1989. If Surinamese citizens are added, the estimate rises to 210,000 persons, compared with 115,000 persons (of either Dutch or Surinamese citizenship) on 1 January 1976 and 165,000 on 1 January 1981. The number of Surinamese in the Netherlands has therefore been rising more slowly in recent years than in the early part of the decade. The number of people originating from the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba was estimated at 1 January 1989 as 66,000, compared with 26,000 at 1 January 1976 and 40,000 at 1 January 1981. The rise has therefore been fairly constant². The number of Moluccans is currently put at 40,000, and the number of Netherlands citizens of Chinese origin at 23,000. In addition there are 3,700 gypsies in the Netherlands. These groups of Netherlands citizens of non-indigenous origin thus comprise a total of around 327,000.

Adding together the categories of foreign residents non-indigenous Dutch persons, one arrives at a total of around 950,000 'immigrants' as at 1 January 1989. This figure does not include those who have become naturalized as Netherlands citizens, except for those of Surinamese, Moluccan or Chinese origin. The number of changes in citizenship, including by naturalization, between 1979 and 1988 was nearly 179,000, of which the Surinamese with 45,000 formed the largest category.

Nor do the figures include the 'Indonesian Dutch' and their descendants. During the 1940s and 1950s nearly 300,000 persons from Indonesia settled in the Netherlands; 100,000 of these were of European origin and nearly 200,000 predominantly of mixed European-Asian origin, the so-called Indonesian Dutch³. Recent data on the number of Indonesian Dutch are not available. A second and third generation have since emerged. Short of further research, the Council's definition of the concept 'immigrant' makes it impossible to indicate how many of these individuals would regard themselves as non-indigenous.

Nor is it possible to estimate the number of children of Netherlands citizenship with one non-Dutch parent. Between 1979 and 1987 there were over 50,000 marriages in the Netherlands between a Dutch and a non-Dutch partner. The incidence of such marriages among the largest groups of foreign residents is strikingly low. Of these 50,000-plus mixed marriages, 1,607 were Turkish-Dutch and 2,023 Moroccan-Dutch. Among the largest immigrant groups with Dutch citizenship, the number of ethnically mixed marriages is much higher. Several years ago 28 percent of the marriages in Amsterdam involving a Surinamese person were mixed. In the case of the Antilleans this applied to the majority of marriages. The corresponding figures for Turks and Moroccans were 5 and 9 percent respectively⁴.

From the above it will be evident that the number of immigrants in the Netherlands cannot be precisely determined. The figure may, however, be assumed to be well above one million. By no means all of these people belong to the target groups of the government's present minorities policy; these groups, as marked in Table 1.1, currently total around 726,000 immigrants. Similarly

²] CBS, *Monthly Population Statistics*, October 1986.

³] J.E. Ellemers and R.E.F. Vaillant, *Indische Nederlanders en gerepatrieerden* (Indonesian Dutch and Repatriates); Muiderberg, Coutinho, 1985, p. 55.

⁴] C.S. van Praag, 'Minderheden voor en na de nota' (Minorities before and after the Policy Document); *Migrantenstudies*; 1986, vol.2 no.4, p.11.

the integration policy that is to be proposed in Part II of this report will apply to only certain non-indigenous groups; cultural policy, by contrast, applies in principle to all groups.

1.2 The natural growth of the immigrant population

The immigrant population in the Netherlands has grown substantially in the past ten years. In part this reflects an excess of births over deaths and in part a net migration inflow.

The annual number of live births by non-Dutch women has hovered for many years now around the 12,000 mark; this corresponds with roughly 6 percent of all births in the Netherlands. During the 1980s a shift took place in the citizenship of the new-born: The share of EC countries fell by more than 50 percent while that of Turkey and Morocco rose from 56.9 percent in 1979 to 80.1 percent in 1988. The latter increase stems not from any rise in fertility but from an increase in the number of Turkish and Moroccan women. For some time now, the age-specific fertility rate of the total population of the Netherlands has been around 1.5; that for non-Dutch persons fell from 3.4 in 1979 to 2.4 in 1987. In the case of Turks and Moroccans the age-specific fertility rate in 1988 was 3.2 and 5.1 respectively, i.e. above average; but when compared with the respective fertility rates of 4.8 and 7.2 in 1979 it is evident that the trend is downwards. Since 1987, however, the rate has levelled out, possibly as a result of the arrival of greater numbers of young, recently married women from both countries.

At 1.9, the age-specific fertility rate of Surinamese women is slightly above the Dutch average; at 1.5 that for Antillean and Aruban women is slightly lower. It is estimated that in 1986 4,200 children were born in the Netherlands to a Surinamese mother and 900 to an Antillean or Aruban mother⁵.

The immigrant population in the Netherlands is on average younger than the Dutch population as a whole; not only is there a disproportionately high number of young immigrant people but there are also relatively few elderly people. Mortality among the immigrant community is not high therefore: the annual number of deaths of non-Dutch persons is around 1,500, so that the annual natural rate of growth of the foreign population may be put at over 10,000. With the exception of 1988, this number is below the number of naturalizations on the part of foreigners living in the Netherlands.

Because the number of naturalizations among the groups with the highest level of excess births (i.e. Moroccans and Turks) is low, these two groups form a rising proportion of the total number of non-Dutch persons living in the Netherlands. This process has been further accentuated by the relatively high net immigration among these groups. On 1 January 1979, 39.2 percent of all non-Dutch residents were Turkish or Moroccan; on 1 January 1989 the figure had risen to 50.8 percent. In absolute terms, the number of Turks rose in this period from 105,700 to 177,300 and the number of Moroccans from 63,300 to 139,700. By way of comparison, the number of persons from the Southern European countries of Greece, Italy, Yugoslavia, Portugal and Spain fell during the same period from 72,200 in 1979 to 58,000 in 1989. Both the rate of return migration and the number of naturalizations were comparatively high among these groups.

⁵] R.F.J. Tas, 'De Surinaamse en Antilliaanse bevolking in Nederland'. (The Surinamese and Antillean population in the Netherlands), *Maandstatistiek van de bevolking*, CBS, May 1988.

1.3 Migration trends

As may be seen from Tables 1.3 and 1.4, the pattern of migration over the past ten years forms a significant explanation for the differing growth rates of the various immigrant groupings noted above. Table 1.4 indicates that the immigration and emigration of Netherlands citizens are fairly constant and more or less in balance. Part of the figures shown in Table 1.3 relate to migration between the Netherlands and the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba. Net migration to the Netherlands from the Netherlands Antilles has risen in recent years to nearly 5,000; in the case of Aruba, by contrast, it has fallen to several hundred.

Table 1.4 indicates that the net migration of non-Dutch persons has followed a much more erratic path than that of Dutch passport holders, principally on account of marked fluctuations in the level of immigration. Around 1980, the level of immigration was very high, the main factors being migration from Surinam and family reunification among Turks and Moroccans. Thereafter immigration fell sharply, while emigration rose. The decline in immigration in this period is presumably attributable to a fall in primary family reunion and the introduction of visa requirements for citizens of various countries with a high level of migration to the Netherlands. The rising level of immigration may in part be viewed as a result of the extremely high level of immigration at the end of the 1970s: every migration wave produces its own counter-movement. Both these trends were reinforced by the recession in the Netherlands in the early 1980s⁶.

Table 1.3 Foreign migration by holders of Dutch passports, 1979-1988

	Immigration	Emigration	Net Migration
1979	32,381	35,396	-3,015
1980	32,684	35,837	-3,153
1981	29,767	38,216	-8,449
1982	29,810	39,413	-9,603
1983	30,321	32,810	-2,489
1984	29,616	31,824	-2,208
1985	33,196	31,009	2,187
1986	34,585	31,155	3,430
1987	35,080	31,139	3,941
1988	32,993	34,594	-1,601

Source: CBS (1988 provisional figures).

Table 1.4 Foreign Migration by holders of foreign passports, 1979-1988

	Immigration	Emigration	Net Migration
1979	72,172	24,383	47,789
1980	79,820	23,633	56,187
1981	50,416	24,979	25,437
1982	40,930	28,094	12,836
1983	36,441	27,974	8,467
1984	37,291	27,030	10,261
1985	46,166	24,206	21,960
1986	52,802	23,563	29,239
1987	60,855	20,872	39,983
1988	58,177	21,493	36,684

Source: CBS (1988: provisional figures)

⁶] H.B. Entzinger, *Het minderhedenbeleid* (Minorities Policy), Meppel, Boom, 1984, p. 104.

In recent years there has been a further rise in immigration, with a peak in 1987. In 1988 immigration eased back slightly while emigration picked up a little. Notably, immigration from Turkey and Morocco recorded a rise in 1988 ⁷. The number of asylum-seekers has fluctuated considerably: in 1986 it was 5,000, in 1987 13,500 and in 1988 8,000. The number of refugees admitted to the Netherlands was 1,111 in 1986 and 1,692 in 1987.

The pattern of migration of Turks and Moroccans may be seen from Table 1.5. In recent years there has been a steady rise in immigration, while emigration on the part of these groups has exhibited a downward trend. Among the Turks, in particular, there has been a striking increase in the number of immigrants who have lived in the Netherlands before. In 1986 and 1987 roughly a quarter of all Turks taking up residence in the Netherlands had lived here at an earlier point; in the case of the Moroccans this applied to an eighth ⁸.

Table 1.5 Foreign migration of Turkish and Moroccan citizens, 1979–1988

	Immigration		Emigration		Migration-surplus Turks & Moroccans
	Turks	Moroc- cans	Turks	Moroc- cans	
1979	14,043	7,727	2,819	1,126	17,825
1980	17,480	10,422	2,469	1,281	24,152
1981	8,552	8,499	3,254	1,522	12,275
1982	5,255	6,513	4,954	2,480	4,334
1983	3,860	4,999	5,689	2,812	358
1984	4,087	4,845	6,329	2,656	-53
1985	6,007	5,827	5,187	1,858	4,789
1986	8,556	6,751	5,324	1,746	8,237
1987	9,721	7,180	3,913	1,373	11,615
1988	10,349	8,178	3,504	1,477	13,546

Source: CBS (1988: provisional figures).

With a view to obtaining a better insight into recent trends and possible future developments, the Council has analyzed the recent migration figures for Turks and Moroccans in more detail. This analysis reveals an increase in the proportion of persons aged 21 and over among the migrants from these countries. Other trends include a reduction in the proportion of female immigration and - to some extent related to that - a reduction in the number of married people among the immigrants aged over 21. This indicates that where family reunion (the most important basis on which migrants from Turkey and Morocco enter the Netherlands) was once confined to the spouses and children of the original 'guest-workers', this has now turned into the immigration of marriage partners of those children. This does not, however, provide a clear explanation for the relative increase in the proportion of *unmarried* adult immigrants. It may be that there has been a rise in the number of residence permits for dependents; the increase may also reflect a rise in the number of initial employment permits issued to recently arrived foreigners. In the case of Turkey the rise in the number of asylum-seekers may play a role, but this

⁷] Actual emigration is presumably somewhat higher than recorded emigration. Part of the administrative corrections regularly made to the municipal population registers relate to persons who have left the Netherlands without having their names deleted from the register. The net downward adjustment in the figures is currently running at around 8,000 a year.

⁸] P.J. Muus, *Migration minorities and policy in the Netherlands; recent trends and developments; Sopemi-report 1988*; Amsterdam, Institute for Social Geography, 1989, p.7.

cannot be the sole explanation; the increase in unmarried adult immigrants applies also to Moroccans, among whom the number of asylum-seekers is particularly low.

The available data are too unclear to provide a basis for firm conclusions, let alone projections of the future. What is evident, is that the recent rise in migration from Turkey and Morocco cannot be explained solely in terms of family reunion in relation to the original guest-workers. A process of chain migration has now arisen between the two countries and the Netherlands – a phenomena well known in the literature. This provides the basis for the Council's assumption in Part II of this report that 'migration bridges' of a more or less permanent nature are being developed between certain non-indigenous groups in the Netherlands and the countries of origin.

A serious difficulty in interpreting the figures consists of the fact that the data can vary considerably depending on the source. The above analysis is almost entirely based on the figures provided by the Central Bureau of Statistics, which are in turn based on the municipal population registers. With respect to the settlement of foreigners in the Netherlands, the figures provided by the Ministry of Justice on the basis of information supplied by the aliens departments can differ appreciably. The latter figures moreover provide only a limited insight into the grounds on which residence permits are issued, thus preventing a more detailed analysis of the composition of migration to the Netherlands. The Research and Documentation Centre of the Ministry of Justice is currently conducting a study into the discrepancy between these two systems of registration. It is to be hoped that this study will lead to a substantial improvement in the registration of aliens in the Netherlands. As noted in Part II, an immigrant policy is not properly feasible in the absence of adequate quantitative data of good quality. Similarly the figures provided by the Directorate-General for Manpower Services do not enable definite conclusions to be drawn about employment trends among the recently arrived. What is known is that there has been a rise in recent years in the number of employment permits issued to (recently arrived) aliens for unskilled and semi-skilled work.

I.4 Projections

Population projections are always hedged about with considerable uncertainties because human behaviour simply cannot be predicted with any accuracy. This applies a fortiori to projections for the immigrant community. In the first place the fertility rates for these groups exhibit much greater fluctuations from year to year than those for the indigenous population. In due course the fertility rates may be expected to settle at a level close to that of the Dutch population, but the point at which this occurs will vary considerably from group to group⁹. Migration trends are even harder to predict. Until a few years ago it was generally assumed in the Netherlands that immigration would gradually fall. As recently as 1985, the CBS based its long-term population projections on the assumption that net immigration would ease within five years to around 5,000 (middle variant) and subsequently remain at this level¹⁰.

In the face of actual trends, especially those of immigration, a change in view appears to have set in¹¹. Since 1987 the CBS has been allowing for an annual

⁹] See for example J.J. Schoorl, 'Kindertal en geboortenregeling bij vrouwen uit Turkije en Marokko in Nederland: Assimilatie?' (Numbers of children and regulation of births among women from Turkey and Morocco in the Netherlands: Assimilation?), in: H.J. Heeren (ed.), *Migranten en minderheden*, The Hague, NIDI, 1988.

¹⁰] CBS, *Monthly Population Statistics*, March 1986.

¹¹] H.B. Entzinger, 'Een kleine wereld' (A small world); *Migrantenstudies*, 1987, vol. 3 no. 4, pp. 2-20.

appears to have set in ¹¹. Since 1987 the CBS has been allowing for an annual net immigration of between 23,000 (low variant) to 33,000 (high variant) – which figures are in fact lower than the actual outturns for 1987 (43,924) and 1988 (35,083). Studies by the OECD and by French demographers support the view that the Netherlands is likely to face a net migration inflow over the longer term ¹². According to these studies the marked worldwide differences in prosperity and the high rates of population growth in large parts of the Third World will lead to continuing migratory pressures from developing to developed countries. This certainly does not mean that everyone who wants to migrate will in fact do so. In many cases the resources will be lacking or entry will be denied by the potential receiving countries. To a limited extent, however, migration will take place, for example in the form of refugees or family reunion. As discussed in the previous section, the existence of large number of migrants in most Western countries means that 'migration bridges' could develop.

In addition there may be further labour migration in the future. The introduction of the internal market is likely to lead to a gradual growth in international labour mobility within the European Community, particularly on the part of skilled labour ¹³. Trends in labour migration from outside the Community are more difficult to predict. Among other things these will depend on economic trends. The recent rise in the number of employment permits issued could point to a growing demand for foreign workers. In the Federal Republic of Germany and Switzerland the demand on the part of employers for migrant workers – especially those with skills – has been rising again for sometime. OECD figures indicate that the rate of participation in the labour force among both the indigenous and non-indigenous population in these countries is much higher than in the Netherlands; the actual and potential labour reserve is therefore much more limited than in the Netherlands ¹⁴.

In 1987 the Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute (NIDI) and the Social and Cultural Planning Office drew up a demographic projection for the Turkish and Moroccan population in the Netherlands for the period up to 1997 ¹⁵. These are two large non-indigenous population groups that have grown rapidly in the past ten years. Both a high and a low variant were worked out. The low variant is characterized by comparatively little immigration, comparatively high emigration (especially among the elderly) and a relatively sharp decline in fertility, while the high variant assumes the opposite in each case. It was also assumed that the pattern of naturalization would remain broadly unchanged. The NIDI low variant gave a projected total of nearly 204,600 Turks and 183,900 Moroccans as at 1 January 1979; the comparable

¹²] Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, *The future of migration*, Paris 1987; Institut Français des Relations internationales, *Rapport Annuel Mondial sur le Système Economique et les Stratégies*; Paris, Atlas Economica, 1988;

J.C. Chesnais, *La revanche du tiers-monde*, Paris, Robert Laffont, 1987.

D. Papademetriou, 'International Migration in a changing world' and R. Tabbarah, 'Prospects for International Migration', both in: C. Stahl (ed.), *International Migration Today, Vol.2: Emerging Issues*, Paris, Unesco, 1988.

¹³] M.J.A. Penninx and P.J. Muus, *Internationale migratie en de Europese Gemeenschap in verleden en toekomst; een verkenning*; (International migration and the European Community in the past and future, a survey); paper delivered at NIDI-Symposium on 24 November 1988.

¹⁴] An indication is provided in: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, *SOPEMI; Continuous reporting system on migration*, 1987; Paris, 1988, pp. 58, 59. In terms of the total foreign population, the percentage of foreign workers in various Western European countries in 1986 was as follows: Switzerland 59.3; Sweden 55.0; Belgium 46.8; France 40.8 (1982 figures); Federal Republic of Germany 40.6; Netherlands 29.7.

¹⁵] J.F.M. Berkien and J.J. Schoorl, *Bevolkingsvoorberekening allochtonen in Nederland: Turken en Marokkanen 1987-1997* (Population projections for Turkish and Moroccan immigrants in the Netherlands, 1987-1997); Netherlands Interuniversity Demographic Institute, The Hague, 1987.

figures for the high variant were 220,900 and 197,500.

A number of much longer-term projections have been made by two Dutch researchers, Kuijsten and Van de Kaa. Assuming annual net immigration of 30,000 up to the year 2032, the 'immigrant' population of the Netherlands would then amount to 2.99 million and the total population to 17.11 million¹⁶. In this respect it has been assumed that the fertility of the indigenous population will rise gradually to the replacement level while that of the immigrant community will gradually fall to that level. If there were no immigration at all, other than to keep the size of the population at a constant level, the size of the immigrant community would – under the same assumptions – amount to 1.33 million in the year 2032 and the total population to 15.46 million. The first figure may be regarded as a maximum variant and the second as a minimum. On this basis the share of the immigrant community in the Dutch population would lie somewhere between nine and 17 percent in 2032. It needs, however, to be borne in mind that in 43 years' time the largest immigrant groups of today will presumably have entered upon their fourth generation. It is questionable to what extent they would then still regard themselves as non-indigenous or be regarded as such by the rest of the population¹⁷.

While bearing in mind all the uncertainties to which population projections are subject, it may be concluded that the immigrant community in the Netherlands will continue to grow in the coming decades, even if the level of immigration should slip from its present level. At the present level of migration and births a point will be reached around the middle of the next century at which the population will go into decline; this has already occurred in certain West European countries. The present level of migration cannot offset the process of ageing in the population, but can delay it¹⁸.

1.5 Settlement patterns

The immigrant population is spread very unevenly throughout the Netherlands. Of the largest groups, the Moluccans are the only ones to have settled in large numbers outside the urban areas, this in consequence of the housing policy conducted for this group in the 1960s, when the emphasis was on settlement in medium-sized and small communities outside the Western conurbation or Randstad. All the other groups are concentrated in the Western provinces, especially in the main cities.

The most detailed data are available for the 624,000 foreigners residing in the Netherlands. In national terms they account for 4.2 percent of the population; the provinces of North and South Holland and Utrecht are above average (North Holland, with 5.8 percent, tops the list) while the remaining nine provinces are below-average. In 1987 three quarters of net immigration into the Netherlands settled in the three Western provinces¹⁹. Of the

¹⁶] Zie D.J. Van de Kaa, *Europa 1992 en het vraagstuk van de internationale migratie*; (Europe 1992 and the question of international migration); Address to Planning Offices Seminar, 11 and 12 May 1989, Utrecht. It should be noted that Kuijsten and Van de Kaa define 'immigrant' as persons of foreign citizenship and their descendents.

¹⁷] In this respect it may be noted that one in every four French citizens has (or had) at least one parent or grandparent of non-French nationality. See R. Tabbarah, *op. cit.*, p. 256.

¹⁸] N. Keilman, 'Immigratie kan dalende bevolkingsomvang tegengaan' (Immigration can counter shrinking population); *Demos*; February 1987, Vol. 3 No. 2, pp. 14-16.

J. de Beer and R. Noordam, 'Effect van buitenlandse migratie op ontgroening en vergrijzing' (Effect of foreign migration on the ageing of the population); *Monthly Population Statistics*; CBS, September 1988.

R. Lesthaeghe, *Are Immigrants Substitutes for Births?*; paper presented to 'Symposium on Population Change in European Society', Florence, December 1988.e.

¹⁹] CBS, *Monthly Population Statistics*; July, 1988.

municipalities with over 100,000 inhabitants, Amsterdam and the highest number and proportion of foreign residents as at 1 January 1988: 95,000 persons or 13.7 percent of the total population of Amsterdam. If to this figure are added the over 50,000 Dutch of Surinamese and Antillean origin, this brings the 'immigrant' share in the population of the capital city to 21.4 percent. With the departure of indigenous persons from the city and the continuing influx of immigrants, the share is also rising. Another factor is the comparatively high number of births among immigrants, which reflects the high proportion of immigrants in the child-bearing years. One in every two births in Amsterdam is an immigrant child. Comparable processes are taking place in Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht, although the number of immigrants is lower than that in Amsterdam in both absolute and relative terms (see Table 2.6). Geographically, the immigrants are unevenly distributed in all four cities: in general they are over-represented in urban districts with cheap housing.

In 1985, 39.6 percent of immigrants lived in the four major cities; in 1988 this percentage had risen to 42.0. During the same period the percentage of the indigenous Dutch population living in the four main cities fell from 11.8 to 11.4 percent²⁰. As may be seen from Table 1.6, the Surinamese and Moroccans are the most urbanized of the major immigrant groups. To begin with, this pattern stemmed from historical and socio-economic factors. Since then the presence of large numbers of immigrants in the large cities and the facilities created for them have presumably acted as a 'pull' factor on other immigrants. The fact that the four leading cities contain a disproportionate amount of government housing also provides an explanation for the concentration of immigrants, as the latter are over-represented in the income groups qualifying for such housing²¹. It is fair to conclude that the immigrant question is to a large extent an urban problem; nearly two thirds of all immigrants live in the 20 largest municipalities.

Table 1.6 Immigrants in the four major cities at 1 January 1988

	Amsterdam	Rotterdam	The Hague	Utrecht*
Total	691,837	574,300	444,250	230,738
Foreign citizens	93,338	62,401	43,816	24,145
of which Turks	19,291	24,032	12,718	6,748
Moroccans	28,610	13,992	10,155	10,985
Surinamese (incl. Surinamese citizens)	50,425	32,514	30,603	5,415
Antilleans and Arubans	7,568	6,106	4,274	1,185
Foreigners, Surinamese, Antilleans and Arubans	147,832	98,789	76,830	30,398
Share of total	21.4%	17.2%	17.3%	13.2%

Source: P.J. Muus, *Migration, minorities and policy in the Netherlands; recent trends and developments*; SOPEMI report 1988; Amsterdam, Institute for Social Geography, p. 19.

* The figures for the number of Surinamese and Antilleans in Utrecht date from 1 January 1986.

^{20]} WRR calculations on the basis of P.J. Muus, op. cit., various issues. By immigrants are understood foreign passport holders, Surinamese, Antilleans and Arubans.

^{21]} See L. de Klerk and H. van Amersfoort, 'Surinamese settlement in Amsterdam 1973-'83'; in: *Lost illusions; Caribbean minorities in Britain and the Netherlands*; M. Cross and H. Entzinger (eds), London, Routledge, 1988 pp.147-163.

2.1 The position in the labour market and in the labour process

In its request for advice, the government specified employment as one of the fields in which - despite all the efforts - little progress had been made. As the analysis below indicates, the position of minorities in the labour market and the labour process is problematical and has clearly worsened in the 1980s.

Unemployment

Table 2.1 provides an impression of registered unemployment among certain target groups of the government's present minorities policy. The rate of unemployment varies considerably among immigrant groups, being much higher among Turks, Moroccans and citizens from other non-EC countries than it is among Surinamese and Antilleans - although unemployment among the latter two groups is again much higher than that among indigenous Dutch persons.

Compared with other immigrant groups, the rate of unemployment among persons of Italian, Greek, Spanish and Portuguese origin is notably lower, and indeed not much higher than that of the indigenous community. The figures are, however, not necessarily free from error: the estimates of the employed element of the Turkish and Moroccan community derives from CBS samples in which these population groups form only a very small part. By contrast the rate of participation among the Surinamese and Antilleans is unknown, and an estimate has had to be made. No recent estimates are available for the size of the Moluccan working population. On the basis of 1983 data, Veenman put unemployment at 41 percent of the working population (men 45 percent and women 39 percent)²². In total over 13 percent of the unemployed belonged to one of the non-EC immigrant groups at the end of 1988, whereas those groups formed just 5 percent of the total population.

As may be seen from Table 2.1, female unemployment is consistently higher, except in the case of the Surinamese. This is primarily on account of a substantially higher rate of unemployment among immigrant women aged over 45 and among Turkish and Moroccan women aged 15 to 25²³.

Unemployment is not just on a much larger scale among minorities, but - with the exception of the Antilleans - is also of longer *duration*, especially among Surinamese, Moluccans and Moroccans.

In his dissertation Penninx examines trends in unemployment among minorities. He notes that whereas total unemployment has fallen since 1984, the rate of unemployment among minorities has risen. Until 1975, the rate of unemployment among Mediterranean persons was lower than the average for the Dutch salaried population, but since then it has risen disproportionately fast. Initially it was often a matter of short-term unemployment, but in the 1980s this deteriorated rapidly. Such research as has been conducted into unemployment among Antilleans and Surinamese indicates a consistently

²²] J. Veenman, *De arbeidsmarktproblematiek van Molukkers* (The labour market issue among Moluccans); Erasmus University Rotterdam, 1985.

²³] See also Equal Rights Council, *Zwarte en migrantenvrouwen op de arbeidsmarkt* (Black and migrant women in the labour market); 1988.

Table 2.1 Registered unemployment by sex, in absolute numbers and as percentage of the working population per population group ^{a)}

	Absolute (x 1000)			As percentage of working population of population group ^{d)}		
	men	women	total	men	women	total
Indigenous Dutch ^{b)}	375.5	219.4	594.8	12	16	13
Surinamese ^{c)}	13.0	6.7	19.7	27	25	27
Antilleans ^{c)}	3.2	1.9	5.1	21	27	23
Turks ^{b)}	18.6	7.6	26.2	40	58	44
Moroccans ^{b)}	13.5	3.3	16.8	41	49	42
Foreigners from selected former recruitment countries excl. Turks and Moroccans ^{b) ^{e)}}	3.6	1.2	4.8	18	21	18
Other non-EC subjects (incl. refugees) ^{b)}	14.0	4.2	18.2	35	38	36

Source: Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment.

- a) The unemployment figures derive from the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, and the figures on the working population from the CBS.
- b) Unemployment in mid-1987 has been related to figures on the working population as at 31.3.1987.
- c) Situation as at 1.1.1988.
- d) In the case of Surinamese and Antilleans it has been assumed that the participation rates by age and sex are the same as those for the population as a whole.
- e) From Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain.

Table 2.2 Registered unemployment by length of registration as at 30.12.1987 as a percentage of total unemployment per population group

Number of months	<6	6-12	12-24	>24	%	Total
Indigenous Dutch	37	13	17	33	100	577,300
Surinamese	29	13	18	40	100	20,851
Antilleans	37	17	19	27	100	6,004
Moluccans	21	13	18	49	100	2,125
Turks	29	15	20	37	100	28,829
Moroccans	27	13	19	41	100	19,280
Foreigners from former recruitment countries excl. Turks and Moroccans ^{a)}	33	13	17	37	100	4,709
Other non-EC subjects (incl. refugees)	31	14	20	36	100	14,652

Source: Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment.

- a) From Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain.

more negative picture than for the indigenous population from 1979 onwards²⁴. Table 2.3 provides an impression of unemployment trends in the period 1983-1987.

Table 2.3 Registered unemployment by population group (index figures) as at 1.1.1987

	1983 = 100
Total unemployment	88
Antilleans/Arubans	138
Surinamese	137
Turks	114
Moroccans	126
Total Mediterranean	113
Indigenous Dutch	86

Source: T. Roelandt and J. Veenman, *Minderheden in Nederland; Achtergrondstudie 1987*; (Minorities in the Netherlands; background study 1987); Rotterdam, Institute for Sociological and Economic Research, 1987, p. 15.

- a) The figures have been adjusted for the abolition of the requirement for unemployed persons aged over 57 to register as from 1.1.1984.

The rise in this recent period has been particularly marked among Surinamese and Antilleans. In the case of persons of Mediterranean origin, unemployment had already risen sharply before 1983.

In terms of the *education level* of the registered unemployed, there are marked

Table 2.4 Registered unemployment by education level as at 30.12.1988 (in percentage)

	Indige- nous Dutch	Antil- leans	Surina- mese	Moroc- cans	Turks	Moluc- cans
primary education	17	21	27	73	68	7
drop-outs	17	27	24	13	13	22
intermediate						
secondary/						
junior vocational	35	40	38	11	15	56
senior secondary/						
pre-university/						
intermediate						
vocational	19	9	8	2	3	12
higher vocational						
and university	12	3	3	1	1	3
total						
%	100	100	100	100	100	100
n	577,809	6,004	20,851	19,280	28,829	2,125

Source: Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment.

^{24]} M.J.A. Penninx, *Minderheidsvorming en emancipatie; balans van kennisverwerving ten aanzien van immigranten-en waanwagenbewoners* (Minority formation and emancipation; knowledge acquired with respect to immigrants and caravan dwellers 1967-1987); Alphen aan den Rijn, Samsom, 1988, pp. 68-73.

differences between the various groups. Table 2.4 indicates that, in the case of Turks and Moroccans, unemployment is primarily concentrated among those with few if any skills, while the pattern for the Surinamese, Antilleans and, to a lesser extent, the Moluccans, is more like that for the indigenous Dutch population.

In recent years unemployment among immigrant *young people* has continued to rise, whereas among indigenous young people it has fallen. Proportionately more young than elderly immigrants are unemployed. In a recent report on the labour market position of ethnic young people, the Youth Policy Council claims that, depending on the ethnic group, unemployment in this category ranges between 35 and 60 percent. The latter figure relates to Moluccans, Surinamese and Antilleans. The national unemployment figure for young people in 1986 was 21.5 percent. With the exception of Antilleans, immigrant young people also tend to be unemployed for lengthier periods than indigenous Dutch young people ²⁵.

Employment position

In terms of industrial category, occupation and job level, the place of immigrants in the labour system is highly skewed, as may be seen from Tables 2.5 and 2.6. This applies especially to Turks.

Table 2.5 Total number of employed persons, and Turks and Moroccans in salaried employment by occupational category, 1979 and 1985 (in percentages)

Code ^{a)}	Total number of employees		Turks		Moroccans	
	1979	1985	1979	1985	1979	1985
0	2	5	2	1	2	5
1/4	25	21	70	64	68	60
5	11	8	3	3	4	3
6	16	18	5	7	10	12
7	7	6	8	7	7	3
8	8	9	1	1	1	2
9	31	33	11	16	8	16
total						
%	100	100	100	100	100	100
n (x 1000)	4312,4	5144	38,1	35,3	28,4	25

Source: CBS, *Labour Force Surveys 1979 and 1985*, and *Foreign Workers in the Netherlands 1979-1985*.

a) Key:

- 0 = Agriculture and fisheries.
- 1/4 = Mining, manufacturing and public utilities.
- 5 = Construction.
- 6 = Trade, hotel, restaurant and repair trade.
- 7 = Transport, storage and communications.
- 8 = Banking and insurance.
- 9 = Other services.

^{25]} Youth Policy Council, *Binnen plaats of buiten spel; Advies over de arbeidsmarktpositie van etnische jongeren* (Advisory report on the labour market position of ethnic young people); Rijswijk, WVC, 1987, pp. 28-31.

Table 2.6 Total number of employed persons and Turks and Moroccans in salaried employment by profession, 1979 and 1985 (in percentages)

Code ^{a)}	Total number of employees		Turks		Moroccans	
	1979	1985	1979	1985	1979	1985
0/1	20	22	1	3	0	4
2	2	3	0	0	0	0
3	21	19	1	2	1	2
4	8	11	1	1	1	1
5	11	12	13	16	15	16
6	3	6	2	2	2	5
7/8/9	35	27	82	76	81	72
total						
%	100	100	100	100	100	100
n (x 1000)	4210,0	5016,5	38,1	35,3	28,4	25,0

Source: CBS, *Labour Force Surveys 1979 and 1985*, and *Foreign Workers in the Netherlands 1979-1985*.

a) Key:

0/1 = Scientists and other specialists, artists.

2 = Managerial and executive.

3 = Clerical.

4 = Commercial.

5 = Service industry.

6 = Agricultural professions, fishermen, etc.

7/8/9 = Crafts, manufacturing, transport and related positions.

Compared with the indigenous labour force, there is a very marked concentration of Turks and Moroccans in crafts, industrial professions and manufacturing, although the proportion has declined somewhat since 1979. The 1985 Labour Force Survey also reveals that Turks and Moroccans are much less often self-employed than the indigenous population. Of the total employed population, 89 percent is in salaried employment and 9 percent is self employed; in the case of Turks and Moroccans the figures are 98 percent and 25 percent respectively. Penninx's dissertation makes it clear that minorities still work predominantly in the lowest status jobs, with a high proportion of disagreeable tasks. Young people fare little better than older people; most young people also work in craft industries and blue-collar jobs. Of these, 64 percent perform simple or very simple jobs. In the case of girls the figure is 80 percent: apart from manufacturing they often work in service professions, especially in laundries and as cleaning staff.

Both male and female Surinamese also work disproportionately often in blue-collar jobs, but a higher proportion are in clerical positions. Their occupational level is much lower than that of the indigenous population. In terms of level and occupation, the position of the Antilleans resembles that of indigenous Dutch persons, although Antilleans are less frequently employed in commerce and transport, while a relatively high proportion of Antillean girls work in medical and social fields. Moluccans in employment are primarily to be found in low status jobs. Older men, in particular, are chiefly employed in the manufacturing sector; young Moluccan men tend somewhat more towards the services. The distribution of Moluccan women over industrial sectors resembles that of the total female labour force more closely than does that of Moluccan men²⁶.

²⁶] M.J.A. Penninx, op. cit, pp. 73-76.

2.2 Participation in education

The rate of participation of immigrant pupils in education begins to decline at the age of twelve. This applies especially to Moroccans and Turks, most notably girls. Estimates of the proportion of school-age Turkish and Moroccan girls not in day-time education are around the 20 percent mark²⁷. In so far as such girls do participate in education the rate of truancy is higher than that among indigenous classmates²⁸.

Similarly a number of surveys have established that children from minority groups rapidly fall behind their Dutch contemporaries. In a survey in Amsterdam, Hooft found that Turkish and especially Moroccan infants were on average older than their Dutch classmates as early as the first stage of primary school²⁹. Later in primary education Antilleans, Surinamese and Chinese also began to lag behind, while the gap in the case of Turks and Moroccans widened further. Among the latter some pupils were as much as two years behind by the end of primary school. At secondary level, Hooft's findings showed that all immigrant groups lagged behind their indigenous contemporaries; the South Europeans and the Antilleans the least, the Surinamese and the Chinese somewhat more, and the Turks and especially the Moroccans much more. A survey conducted partly for the purposes of the Council's report showed that nearly 60 percent of the thirteen-year old Moroccans and 45 percent of their Turkish contemporaries were still at primary school. Among the Surinamese the figure was 34 percent, among the Antilleans and Arubans 17 percent and among indigenous pupils 16 percent³⁰.

Pupils from minority groups not only take longer to get through the education system than indigenous pupils (although there are significant differences between the groups) but also tend to move onto lower forms of secondary education than their indigenous counterparts. Of every ten pupils in the first stage of secondary education in 1986, seven were in the general education stream (AVO) and three in junior vocational education (LBO). Among Turks the ratio was four AVO as against six LBO, and for Moroccans three AVO versus seven LBO³¹. In the schools covered by her survey (which are not representative of all schools in the Netherlands), Luykx found that within the AVO stream, 47.5 percent of Turkish and 66 percent of Moroccan pupils were in lower general secondary education (MAVO), compared with 35 percent of all pupils. In the case of higher general secondary education (HAVO) the respective percentages were 24, 20 and 33; in the case of pre-university education the figures were 28.5 percent for Turks, 14 percent for Moroccans and 32 percent for all pupils³².

^{27]} M.J.A. Penninx, *op. cit.*, pp.104-105.

I. Vlug, *Schoolverzuim van Turkse en Marokkaanse meisjes; een studie naar de omvang en de redenen van schoolverzuim en schoolverlaten van 12 t/m 16-jarige Turkse en Marokkaanse meisjes en het tegengaan daarvan* (Truancy among Turkish and Moroccan girls; a study into the scale of and reasons for truancy and school-leavers among 12-16 year old Turkish and Moroccan girls and counter-measures); Rotterdam, Department of Educational Sociology and Educational Policy/Erasmus University Rotterdam, 1985.

^{28]} M.J.A. Penninx, *op.cit.*, p. 126.

^{29]} J. Hooft, *Het onderwijsnivo van migrantenkinderen; deel a. Samenvatting van de onderzoeksresultaten en beleidsconsequenties* (The educational level of migrant children; part a. summary of research findings and policy implications); Municipality of Amsterdam, 1987, p. 11 ff.

^{30]} T. Roelandt and J. Veenman, Internal WRR Memorandum; 1989.

^{31]} T. Roelandt and J. Veenman, 1988, *op. cit.*, Table 3.2.1.

^{32]} M. Luykx, *Schoolsucces van Turkse en Marokkaanse meisjes; een onderzoek naar Turkse en Marokkaanse meisjes in het mavo, hava en vwo* (School results among Turkish and Moroccan girls; a survey of Turkish and Moroccan girls in MAVO, HAVO and VWO); Utrecht, ISOR Department for Educational Research, 1988, p. 37.

Far fewer statistics are available on the participation and onward progression of Surinamese, Antillean, Aruban and Moluccan children in education than there are for the foreign citizens. The education statistics on Dutch children draw no distinction in terms of ethnic origin, so that it is difficult to make any soundly based statements on these groups. Various surveys indicate, however, that these groups generally occupy an intermediate position between indigenous Dutch children on the one hand and Turks and Moroccans on the other. In their study of further education counselling at a number of primary schools, Koot et al. found that 36 percent of Creole-Surinamese children were advised to proceed to junior vocational education, 57 percent to intermediate secondary education (MAVO) and 7 percent to higher secondary/pre-university education (HAVO/VWO). In the case of Hindu-Surinamese children the respective percentages were 57, 34 and 9. By contrast 40 percent of the indigenous pupils at the same schools were advised to proceed to junior vocational education, 34 percent to MAVO and 26 percent to HAVO/VWO³³. In Amsterdam, Hoolt discovered that the choice of further education among Chinese, Antilleans and Southern Europeans corresponded almost exactly with that of indigenous Dutch pupils. A slightly above average proportion of Surinamese went to junior vocational and MAVO schools but only half as many to HAVO/VWO³⁴. In a survey of three schools in municipalities with a high proportion of Moluccans, Molony and Pechler found that 5 percent of Moluccan pupils went on to HAVO/VWO as against 25 percent of indigenous pupils³⁵.

The previously referred to survey conducted partly for the purposes of this report provides an indication of the type of education pursued by pupils aged 13-18 in the various immigrant groups. In contrast to the normal statistics, a distinction has been drawn between junior vocational and general secondary (LBO/MAVO) on the one hand and intermediate vocational, senior secondary and pre-university education (MBO/VWO/HAVO) on the other. The breakdown is as follows:

Table 2.7 Pupils aged 13-18 according to level of education and immigrant group, 1988 (in percent per ethnic group)

	primary education	lbo/mavo	mbo/havo/vwo
Moroccans	19,8	69,4	10,8
Turks	12,1	70,7	17,2
Surinamese	8,6	61,7	29,7
Antilleans/Arubans	6,1	69,5	24,4
Indigenous	4,2	43,8	52,1

Source: WRR.

On average the educational attainment of ethnic minorities also lags behind that of indigenous pupils. In 1983 Van Esch compared the scores of 1,271 pupils from various ethnic groups for the CITO test at the end of primary school. In the first place it was notable that only 60 percent of the Turkish and Moroccan pupils eligible to take the test in fact did so. Among those who participated, the Turks had an average score of 90 and the Moroccans 101; given the lower participation rate it may be assumed that these figures are even on the high

^{33]} W. Koot, V. Tjon. A. Ten and P. Uniken Venema, *Surinaamse kinderen op school*; (Surinamese children at school); Muiderberg, Coutinho, 1985, p.79

^{34]} J. Hoolt, op. cit., pp. 14-15.

^{35]} C. Molony and H. Pechler, *Molukse leerlingen in het Nederlandse basisonderwijs; samenvattend rapport*; (Moluccan pupils in Dutch primary education, a summary report); Leiden, LICOR/University of Leiden, 1982.

side. The Moluccans scored an average of 104, Surinamese and Antilleans 107 and Southern Europeans 108. The indigenous classmates of these children scored an average 129, while the national average in that year was 132³⁶. A number of surveys have indicated that the difference in attainment between indigenous and non-indigenous pupils is greatest in the verbal, linguistic areas; the differences become smaller in the numerical field and are lowest of all when it comes to solving spatial problems. Once again the differences are the most pronounced for Moroccans and Turks, smaller for the Surinamese and smallest of all for the Southern Europeans³⁷.

Extensive attention has been paid in recent research into the position of ethnic minorities in education to the level of participation, achievement, choice of secondary school and report grades. These aspects do of course provide a certain indication of differences between indigenous and non-indigenous pupils, but what really counts in society, and especially the labour market, is the final stage of schooling and, still more importantly, whether a certificate was obtained. Curiously enough there is virtually no statistical material on this aspect, for which reason an additional analysis was conducted specially for this report into the results of the survey referred to previously³⁸.

Table 2.8 Final stage of education in the Netherlands of persons aged over 12 no longer in education, by ethnic group (in percent of those to have received at least some education in the Netherlands)

	Turks	Moroccans	Surinamese	Antilleans/ Arubans	Dutch
primary	18	13	2	3	13
jun.vocat.	55	56	31	26	28
gen. sec.	9	15	18	13	12
interm. vocat.	10	9	27	23	20
higher sec./ pre-univ	4	3	8	9	6
senior vocat.	4	4	10	18	11
univ.	1	1	4	8	9
total	100	100	100	100	100
not educated in Netherlands (in percent of group)	66	69	38	34	0

Source: WRR.

Table 2.8 shows, for each ethnic group, the final level of education in the Netherlands attained by persons aged 12 and over currently no longer in education. Those who received no education in the Netherlands have not been included in the table. Of all Moroccans living in the Netherlands 69 percent never received Dutch education, compared with 66 percent of Turks, 38 percent of Surinamese and 34 percent of Antilleans and Arubans.

^{36]} W. van Esch, *Toetsprestaties en doorstroomadviezen van allochtone leerlingen in de zesde klas van lagere scholen* (Test performance and further education counselling of immigrant pupils in the sixth form of primary schools); Nijmegen, Institute for Applied Social Sciences, 1983, pp. 10 and 34.

^{37]} E.g. M.J. de Jong and T.A. van Batenburg, 'Etnische herkomst, intelligentie en schoolkeuzeadvies' (Ethnic origin, intelligence and further education counselling); *Pedagogische studiën*; 1984, vol. 61 no. 9, p. 363.

^{38]} T. Roelandt and J. Veenman, 1989, op. cit.

Table 2.8 indicates that there are only slight differences in the final level of education between Surinamese, Antilleans and Arubans and indigenous Dutch. In the case of those Turks and Moroccans to have received education in the Netherlands, the level is considerably lower than that of the other groups. The contrast becomes even more pronounced if it is examined whether or not a certificate was obtained. In this respect not insignificant differences emerge between Surinamese and Antilleans and Arubans on the one hand and indigenous pupils on the other, as may be seen from Table 2.9.

Table 2.9 Percentage of pupils aged 12 and over awarded a certificate at their final stage of education in the Netherlands, by type of school and ethnic group

	Turks	Moroccans	Surinamese	Antilleans/ Arubans	Dutch
jun. vocat.	43	34	69	64	70
gen. sec.	41	#	53	64	72
interm. vocat.	64	#	60	52	84
higher sec./ pre-univ.	#	#	65	52	74
senior vocat.	#	#	75	71	84
univ.	#	#	77	74	87

= number of observations too small

Source: WRR.

The figures on the final level of education and the numbers receiving certificates among immigrant groups provides a clear indication of the problems they experience upon entering the labour market. The levels of education attained by Turks and Moroccans, in particular, tend to afford few professional prospects. In all groups the proportion obtaining certificates is lower than that among Dutch pupils.

It is sometimes argued that pupils from minority groups tend to opt to more than their indigenous counterparts for training courses for which there is little demand in the labour market. Such pupils, it is maintained, are poorly informed about prospects and opportunities and therefore make wrong choices. Figures are available on this score for the non-Dutch element among ethnic minorities, which, as far as vocational education is concerned, refute this superstition³⁹. At both junior and intermediate vocational level, Turkish and Moroccan men display a marked preference for technical education, where the risk of unemployment is low. Although women from both these groups tend to opt for courses with poor labour market prospects (e.g. domestic science) the same applies to indigenous women. Only at senior vocational level is there a higher across-the-board risk of unemployment among immigrants as a result of the selected courses of study. This stems from the above-average interest in higher social welfare education among minority groups, even though in absolute terms the numbers are fairly small.

Allowing for all the necessary nuances and qualifications, the picture of deprivation in education emerges with greater clarity if the time factor is taken into account and developments examined over a period of years. Between 1979 and 1986 there was a slow but unmistakable growth in the level of participation in secondary education by Turks and Moroccans, the two groups where the gap is greatest. Even allowing for the sharp rise in the number of young people in these groups during this period there is a discernible rise in

^{39]} Ibid, p. 56.

participation, apart from which, as may be seen from Table 2.10, there has been a shift away from junior vocational towards general secondary education. In line with the general trend evident in this field for sometime, the number of Turkish pupils in junior vocational education (LBO) has even been declining in an absolute sense since 1984.

Table 2.10 Distribution of Turkish and Moroccan pupils in various kinds of secondary education, 1979-1985 (in percent of all pupils of that nationality)

		jun.voc.	gen.sec.	int.voc./sen.voc./ univ.
Turks	1979	72.4	25.5	2.1
	1982	69.6	26.9	4.0
	1985	60.7	31.7	7.6
Moroccans	1979	81.0	17.8	1.2
	1982	73.8	24.2	1.9
	1985	68.9	26.5	4.7
Dutch				
Total	1985	21.5	46.3	32.1

Source: M.J.A. Penninx, *Minderheidsvorming en emancipatie; balans van kennisverwerving ten aanzien van immigranten en woonwagenbewoners 1967-1987* (Minority formation and emancipation; knowledge acquired with respect to immigrants and caravan dwellers 1967-1987); Alphen aan den Rijn, Samsom, 1988, p. 110.

The above figures provide only a very general indication of shifts within education. They relate to all pupils of the same nationality and take no account of whether a pupil completed his or her entire school career in the Netherlands or only began at a later age. In educational jargon the former category is described as 'base entrants' and the second as 'lateral entrants'. Clearly, the proportion of base entrants rises the further the migration goes back. Conversely, the continuing inflow of migrants means that there is a steady inflow of lateral entrants in Dutch education. The Turks and Moroccans are particularly heavily represented among these lateral entrants. The survey conducted partly for the purposes of this report indicated that 63.6 percent of all 13-19 year old immigrant pupils had been exclusively educated in the Netherlands, i.e. 36.4 percent were lateral entrants. In their study of a number of schools in the western conurbation with a high proportion of immigrant children, Everts and his colleagues found that 57.4 percent were base entrants and 42.6 percent lateral entrants⁴⁰

The difference between the two types of pupils suggests that there may be a correlation between length of residence and school achievement. A certain amount of research has been conducted into this aspect⁴¹. In his comparison of the CITO scores for various ethnic groups, Van Esch found that immigrant pupils who had been receiving education in the Netherlands for 4.5 years or

⁴⁰] H. Everts, A. Gollhof, P. Stassen et. al, *De cultureel-etnische situatie op OVB-scholen*; (The cultural/ethnic situation at schools in educational priority areas); Utrecht, Department of Educational Science, Utrecht University, 1987, p.20.

⁴¹] Various explanations for these differences are described in L. Eldering, 'Ethnic minority children in Dutch schools; Underachievement and its explanations'; *Different cultures, same schools; Ethnic minority children in Europe*; L. Eldering and J. Kloprogge (eds.), Lisse, Swets and Zeitlinger, 1989 (being printed).

more had a significantly higher total score (105) than pupils who had been in the Dutch education system for 2.5 or 3.5 years (90), eighteen months (85) or six months (78). On the basis of these findings Van Esch concluded that school achievement and further education counselling improved the longer that pupils had been in the Netherlands. According to Van Esch the improvement is particularly marked in relation to subjects where language plays a large part; the correlation with mathematical ability was less pronounced⁴².

Van Praag and Muus have analysed the impact of length of residence on participation in education on the basis of the Survey of Living Conditions conducted by the CBS in 1984 among Turks and Moroccans. The authors drew a fairly crude distinction between Turkish and Moroccan pupils who had been living in the Netherlands for less than or more than ten years. As they only analyse data for pupils aged 12 and over, those born in the Netherlands necessarily belong to the latter category. Van Praag and Muus concluded that 'The group that had been in the country for longer had a clear lead in terms of the level of education. The differences between the two groups were consistently significant statistically, with the exception of females aged 15-17, although here too the differences were in the expected direction'⁴³. The differences between long-term residents and more recent arrivals are less pronounced when it comes to the proportion actually going to school and the choice between junior vocational or general secondary education.

The survey drawn up with a view to this report also indicated that lateral entrants had progressed less far in the education system than base entrants, and that the difference was statistically significant. The most pronounced differences relate to Surinamese and Moroccans.

In her survey in Amsterdam, Hooft concentrated on immigrant pupils born in the Netherlands. Penninx describes the results of her survey as 'spectacular'⁴⁴. Hooft found that immigrant pupils born in the Netherlands were no older on average than their indigenous classmates. In general the age gap between immigrant and non-immigrant classmates widened the older the immigrant children were when they started education in the Netherlands. Controlling for the variables of neighbourhood and family composition, Hooft also found that differences in the progression to secondary education had disappeared entirely among Surinamese children born in the Netherlands⁴⁵. Chinese and Southern European pupils even went onto higher levels of further education than indigenous Amsterdam children⁴⁶. In the case of Turks and Moroccans her conclusions are more cautious. The number of children born in this country and now in secondary education is still too small, and many come from mixed marriages. She notes that 'compared with Dutch persons, far fewer Turks and Moroccans who came to the Netherlands in infancy proceed to higher secondary/pre-university education, instead favouring lower general secondary education (Turks) or junior and intermediate vocational education (Moroccans)'⁴⁷.

⁴²] W. van Esch, op. cit., p. 29.

⁴³] C.S. van Praag and P.J. Muus, 'Achterstand maar geen stagnatie; etnische groepen in het onderwijs' (Deprivation but not stagnation; ethnic groups in education) *Migrantenstudies*, 1987, vol. 3, no. 2, p. 20 ff.

⁴⁴] M.J.A. Penninx, op. cit., p.116.

⁴⁵] Fifty percent of the Surinamese pupils come from a one-parent family.

⁴⁶] This is consistent with foreign research, which has produced evidence of a notable rise in educational performance in the second generation. This rise does not however apply to all immigrant groups. See: Committee of Inquiry into the Education of Children from Ethnic Minority Groups, *Education for all*; London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1985, p. 3, and: Commissariat Général du Plan, *Immigration: le devoir d'insertion*; Paris, La Documentation Française, 1988, p. 41.

⁴⁷] J. Hooft, op. cit., p. 20.

The research findings suggest that the position of immigrant pupils in education is linked to their length of residence in the Netherlands, but there are also significant differences between the various ethnic groups. The positive effect of longer residence on school careers among Turks and Moroccans, for example, appears to be less pronounced than that among the other groups.

To sum up, it is evident that the participation of minorities in education leaves something to be desired in a number of areas. One important factor is that many have incomplete school careers, either because they do not start until a later age, as lateral entrants, or because they leave school prematurely without a certificate – or in many cases both. In addition some pupils – especially those from Turkey and Morocco – do alternate spells in the Dutch education system and that of their country or origin ⁴⁸, although no figures are available.

It is also evident that pupils from minority groups generally proceed to lower forms of secondary education, especially junior vocational education, and that this is not to the benefit of their prospects in the labour market. In recent times greater interest has been displayed in general secondary education (MAVO), but the prospects for those with MAVO education are also limited. There are also marked differences between the various groups, which may be summed up as follows. The Moroccans, and to a somewhat lesser extent the Turks, are at the lowest education level. The Southern Europeans, Antilleans, Arubans and Chinese are broadly at the same level as indigenous Dutch pupils, while the Surinamese and Moluccans are somewhere in between.

The education level attained by immigrant groups appears to improve the longer they have been in the country. The rate of improvement differs, however, from group to group and in certain instances is not high. A more detailed understanding is required before ways can be found of improving the educational attainment of immigrant pupils.

⁴⁸] S. Risvanoglu-Bilgin, L. Brouwer and M. Priester, *Verschillend als de vingers van een hand; een onderzoek naar het intergratieproces van Turkse gezinnen in Nederland*; (As different as the fingers of one hand; a survey of the integration process of Turkish families in the Netherlands); Leiden, Centre for Research and Social Conflict, Leiden University, 1986, p. 218.

In its report *Ethnic Minorities* (1979) the Council recommended an intensification of government policy in order to prevent 'forces at work tending to perpetuate the social backwardness and cultural isolation of the ethnic minorities'⁴⁹. In its reaction to the report of March 1980 the government broadly adopted the Council's recommendations. The Government subsequently issued its Draft Minorities Policy Document and in September 1983, after extensive public consultation, its Minorities Policy Document⁵⁰. This section provides a brief description of the government's minorities policy as presented in the policy document and as it has evolved since then⁵¹. Strictly speaking any form of government action that has implications for the position of ethnic minorities can be assessed in terms of the objectives of minorities policy. In practice, however, minorities policy highlights certain areas; not all fields of government policy are equally emphasized. The government's minorities policy is discussed in broader outline below.

The Minorities Policy Document sums up the groups towards which the minorities policy is directed, without however defining the concept of 'minorities' as such. Minorities are regarded as 'caravan dwellers and legally resident members of ethnic minority groups, including Moluccans, residents of Antillean and Surinamese origin, migrant workers and their family members, gypsies and refugees'⁵². The main objective of minorities policy is described in the report as follows: 'Minorities policy is directed towards the achievement of a society in which the members of minority groups living in the Netherlands are given an equal place in society and full opportunities for development, both as individuals and as a group'⁵³. This principal objective may be divided into three further objectives, namely:

- a. the reduction of social and economic deprivation (the so-called *anti-deprivation policy*);
- b. the prevention and combatting of discrimination and – where necessary – improvement in legal status (the so-called *anti-discrimination policy*);
- c. the creation of conditions in which minorities can emancipate themselves and participate in society (policies concerning *participation, emancipation and cultural identity*).

The government's anti-deprivation policy is designed to improve the position of minorities in leading social sectors such as education, employment, housing, welfare and health care. This is primarily to be achieved by adapting general facilities and measures so as to enable members of minority groups to benefit to the same extent as other residents. This goal has become generally known as improving the *accessibility* of the government's general policies for minorities. The touchstone for determining whether there is sufficient accessibility is *proportionality*. If a minority group participates proportionately in a particular sector of social life, the government assumes that that sector is sufficiently accessible. Where participation is not proportionate the causes are investigated and measures taken as appropriate. This philosophy marked a significant change in approach: until that point the emphasis had been on

^{49]} WRR, *Ethnic Minorities*; Report to the Government no. 17, 1979, page XXXIX.

^{50]} Ministry of Home Affairs, *Draft Minorities Policy Document*; The Hague, 1981; Ministry of Home Affairs, *Minorities Policy Document*; The Hague, Staatsuitgeverij (Lower House 1982/1983, 16 102, no. 21), 1983.

^{51]} For a detailed account see H.B. Entzinger, 1984, op. cit.; C.S. van Praag, op. cit.; H.B. Entzinger, 'Overheid en minderheden' (Government and minorities); in: *Etnische minderheden; deel 3, kernthema's in de multi-etnische samenleving*; P.J.J. Stijnen and H.G.W. Münstermann (eds.), Heerlen, Open University, 1988, pp. 106-124.

^{52]} *Ministry of Home Affairs, 1983, op. cit.*, p. 11.

^{53]} *Ibid.*, p. 10.

policies specially tailored towards the needs of the minorities; now the emphasis is on devoting special attention to minorities in the government's overall policies ⁵⁴.

Under its anti-discrimination policy, the government aims as far as possible at the equal treatment of minorities and the rest of the population. In concrete terms this means an improved legal status for aliens, the elimination wherever possible of distinctions in legislation and official regulations between minorities and indigenous persons and combatting discrimination and prejudice. Among the most prominent of these measures have been the permission granted in 1985 to aliens resident in the Netherlands for at least five years to vote or stand in elections to the municipal council as well as the new Netherlands Citizenship Act, under which the naturalization procedures for certain categories of aliens have been relaxed.

Among other things the government's policies in relation to emancipation, participation and cultural identity are designed to create conditions under which members of minority groups can experience their own culture. These include measures to make it easier for minorities to set up their own organizations, the modification of statutory regulations to meet the needs of adherents of non-Christian religions, and policies in the field of the media and the arts. A significant element in these policies consist of improving the extent to which minority groups are drawn into the formulation of government policy. At national level, the National Advisory and Consultative Council for Minorities (LAO) has been set up, in which all minority groups are represented. The LAO is chaired by the Minister for Home Affairs, in the latter's capacity as coordinating minister for minorities policy. At official level minorities policy is prepared by the Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee on Minorities Policy (ICM), in which the departments most concerned are represented.

In recent years a number of changes of emphasis have taken place in minorities policy. According to Entzinger, the latter objective – namely that of participation, emancipation and cultural identity - has gradually become less prominent while *anti-deprivation and anti-discrimination policies have become steadily more central* ⁵⁵. To begin with, until the early 1980s, 'government policy centered around the desire to recognise and honour cultural differences and to provide separate facilities for the various groups, especially in the fields of welfare and culture. This approach was based on the notion that it was first of all necessary to create the conditions in which a group could develop its own identity, after which, at some later stage, it might be regarded as strong enough to participate in society along regular channels.' ⁵⁶ Van Praag notes that it is unclear where the foreign origin or deprivation is the primary criterion in selecting the groups to which minorities policy applies. In origin minorities policy is a migrant policy concerned with the temporary accommodation of a number of groups. Since then the need to combat deprivation has assumed a more important place, but the criteria on the basis of which a group is selected as the object of minorities policy have not become any clearer ⁵⁷.

Entzinger refers to the swift deterioration in the position of minorities that took place in the early 1980s (especially with respect to employment) as the most important reason for the greater emphasis placed on combatting

⁵⁴] Ibid., p. 18.

⁵⁵] H.B. Entzinger, 1988, op. cit., p. 120.

⁵⁶] Ibid.

⁵⁷] C.S. van Praag, op. cit., p. 40.

deprivation. It had also become evident at that time that a second generation was emerging whose position was to a significant extent comparable with that of the first generation. Another possible explanation in Entzinger's view is that the group-specific approach initially adopted by the government required extensive facilities for which there was only limited support, and which were also costly. 'Precisely in the early 1980s anti-minority feelings emerged more clearly into the open in the Netherlands than hitherto. It will be clear that this did not form an appropriate climate for a more generous minorities policy on the part of the government'⁵⁸.

A second trend has consisted of the *gradual departure from a group-specific approach* in minorities policy. This has manifested itself in various sectors, most notably perhaps the abolition of first-contact welfare work for minorities. Also in the field of education, significant elements of the more specific policies for minorities have gradually been absorbed into general pro-education policies; similarly a number of group-specific instruments in the field of manpower services (e.g. the Centres for Occupational Orientation and Training) have been placed on a general footing. This trend reflects the view that general facilities should be opened up to minorities. In principle this will almost always be the case but in practice the use made by minorities of general facilities tends to remain dis-proportionately low.

A third significant development in minorities policy has been its gradual *decentralization*. Responsibilities have increasingly been transferred to local government. Once again the most prominent example is in the field of welfare policy. The State Minorities Welfare Regulation was abolished as from 1 January 1989 and the funds released transferred to the Municipalities Fund without being specifically earmarked for minorities. The imminent placement of the manpower services system on a tripartite basis will involve not only a reduction in public sector powers but will also a shift within government from central to municipal level.

Decentralization is subject to both advantages and dis-advantages. One advantage is that municipalities – especially those with high concentrations of immigrants – obtain greater elbow room for developing policies for these groups. A disadvantage is the fact that policies at central level tend to lose coherence. This development has certainly played a part in the Council's recommendation to view immigrant policy in the first place as a refinement of sectoral policy and only in the second place to aim at inter-sectoral coordination.

A final element of minorities policy that has not so far been discussed is the deprived areas policy. This particular element of policy is primarily geographical in nature. It is not solely concerned with immigrants but with all the residents in particular (generally old) urban districts. These policies are based on the belief that the living environment in these districts can be improved by means of effective understanding between the various population groups. Administratively, the deprived areas policy is based on special agreements between the central government and 16 municipalities. Among other things these agreements cover proposals for activities and projects which the municipalities are anxious to realise, generally with state funds. The majority of these funds are supplied by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment (Fl.214 million out of a total of Fl.307 million in the period 1985-1988)⁵⁹. Home Affairs also makes a significant contribution (Fl.38 million

^{58]} H.B. Entzinger, 1988, op. cit., p. 120-121.

^{59]} Union of Netherlands Municipalities, *Wijken in achterstand; Een beschrijving van het PCG-beleid in 18 gemeenten* (Depressed urban areas; a description of depressed areas policy in 18 municipalities); The Hague, 1989; p. 17.

over the same four years), but the contribution of the remaining departments has been very limited.

A characteristic feature of most of the projects carried out in the framework of the deprived areas policy has been the fact that they overarch individual areas of policy. In many cases this has led to closer cooperation between various bodies operating in the same geographical area, for example between the Local Employment Office and local welfare and/or training bodies. In the light of the financial input, the emphasis of the deprived area policies has been on labour-market related activities (e.g. vocational education, work experience and job creation); there are also projects in the fields of training and welfare. The local nature of the deprived areas policy creates greater opportunity than normal employment policies for activities specifically tailored to local circumstances. In a recent evaluation of the deprived areas policy, the Union of Netherlands Municipalities (VNG) concludes that virtually all the municipalities involved are full of praise for the scheme⁶⁰. It has enabled them to inject greater coordination into their local policies, while the scope of the various instruments and facilities that have been developed in the framework of the deprived areas policy is considerable; nearly half all those participating in projects belong to a minority group. Given the inadequacies of the registration system, the VNG felt unable to draw any conclusions from its survey at this point concerning the effectiveness of the deprived areas policy. It notes that the involvement of residents in deprived areas – especially immigrants – could be improved in various municipalities.

By contrast the VNG report notes little if any enthusiasm on the part of most of the government departments concerned (with the possible exception of Home Affairs)⁶¹. The VNG researchers note a lack of coordination between policy initiatives at departmental level, with adverse consequences for the implementation of policy at municipal level. In addition there is a certain tension between the municipalities' territorial approach and the group-specific approach characteristic of central government policy towards minorities.

⁶⁰] Union of Netherlands Municipalities, *op. cit.*, p. 125.

⁶¹] *Ibid.*

4.1 Immigrants

The Council has opted in favour of the term *immigrants* as the most all-encompassing designation of the category of residents in the Netherlands of non-Dutch origin. In doing so the Council has departed from the terminology used in its 1979 report on the same subject and from the general practice in official circles, in which *ethnic minorities* has become adopted as the standard term.

In line with Van Amersfoort, the Minorities Research Advisory Committee and Penninx, an ethnic minority may be regarded as a group in society 'whose culture is of foreign origin' and which 'objectively occupies a low social position'. This low position extends over several generations⁶². The term 'ethnic minority' does not, however, cover those whose culture is of foreign origin but who no longer occupy a low social position. 'Ethnic minority' is therefore too limited a concept for analysing the consequences of migration to the Netherlands and the dynamism so often characteristic of the social position of migrant groups. This is a point to which the authors noted above draw particular attention, apart from which the word 'minority' carries the risk of stigmatization.

One possibility would be to use the legal term *aliens (or foreigners)*. This has the advantage of precision, in that it is easy to determine who does and does not have a Dutch passport. The term suffers, however, from being too narrow; roughly half those who came from elsewhere to the Netherlands in the past decade possessed Netherlands citizenship on arrival or have acquired it subsequently. These persons were therefore never foreigners, or have ceased to be so, but their integration into Dutch society may nevertheless be incomplete on account of their immigrant status.

The term *migrant or immigrant* is widely used in other countries to designate persons who have come from elsewhere to settle in the country in question and the Council has decided in favour of the term *immigrant* as a collective term. By *immigrants* the Council means all aliens resident in the Netherlands, all former aliens who have become naturalized and all Netherlands citizens originating from the former (or present) overseas territories. The Council also counts as immigrants the descendants up to the third generation in so far as they still identify themselves with the origins of their parents or grandparents⁶³. The question as to whether both parents or only one parent was of immigrant origin is not at issue. By the 'third generation' is understood the children of the children born in the Netherlands to persons who came to this

^{62]} J.M.M. van Amersfoort, *Immigratie en minderheidsvorming, een analyse van de Nederlandse situatie 1945-1973*; (Immigration and minority formation; an analysis of the Dutch situation 1945-1973); Alphen aan den Rijn, Samsom, 1974, p. 37;

Minorities Research Advisory Committee (ACOM), *Advies onderzoek minderheden*, (Advisory report on research into minorities), The Hague, Staatsuitgeverij, 1979, p. 9;

M.J.A. Penninx, *Minderheidsvorming en emancipatie; balans van kennisverwerving ten aanzien van immigranten en woonwagenbewoners 1967-1987*; (Minority formation and emancipation; knowledge acquired with respect to immigrants and caravan dwellers 1967-1987); Alphen aan den Rijn, Samsom, 1988.

None of these works indicates precisely what is to be understood by 'objectively a low social position', but relevant indicators include income, property, education, employment status and occupational prestige, etc. The aspect 'whose culture is of foreign origin' is discussed in the definition provided by the ACOM.

^{63]} This definition is partly based on J.E. Ellemers and R.E.F. Vaillant, *Indische Nederlanders en gerepatrieerden* (The Indonesian and repatriated Dutch); Muiderberg, Coutinho, 1985, p. 55.

country from elsewhere⁶⁴. The term ethnic group is interpreted more broadly in this report than an immigrant group in the sense that indigenous Dutch persons may also be regarded as an ethnic group.

The Council is aware that the above definition of 'immigrants' is to some extent clumsy, and open to objection. The term implies that residence is permanent, whereas in practice this is by no means always the case. The term 'immigrant' may also not be thought of as including children born in the country of settlement, although the latter often find themselves in a similar position and subject to similar barriers as their immigrant parents. The term 'immigrant' is, therefore, used in the sense of 'non-indigenous'. A further objection is the fact that the extension of the term to the second and third generation entails a mixture of objective and subjective factors.

This does, however, reflect precisely the sorts of questions with which these generations are confronted and takes account of the phenomenon of divided loyalties. Many migrants and their descendants identify culturally both with their country of residence and their country of origin, even though they may never have lived there. A second advantage of the definition as formulated by the Council is that it gives rise logically to the Council's proposal for the introduction wherever possible of a system of self-registration when it comes to the use of publicly provided facilities. It is therefore up to the individual concerned to decide – in the case of the second or third generations – whether he or she wishes to be regarded as an 'immigrant', for which the above definition provides every scope.

Where aliens policy is at issue, immigrants of non-Dutch citizenship are obviously designated in the report as *foreigners*. Immigrant groups which, in Van Amersfoort's sense, occupy a low social position in objective terms, are designated in the report as *minorities*. The integration policy proposed by the Council concentrates on those members of these minorities who are in fact in a low social position, i.e. those who find themselves in a position of disadvantage. To this extent the use of the term minorities corresponds to a significant extent with the way the meaning of the term has evolved in the Netherlands since the publication of the Minorities Policy Document in 1983, although it should be noted that some of the groups explicitly referred to in that report can no longer be said to be in a position of significant disadvantage. This point is examined elsewhere in the report. By contrast there are other groups – especially recent arrivals – who do find themselves at a disadvantage even though they are not covered by the government's present minorities policy.

The present minorities policy does, however, apply to caravan dwellers. Although this group is in a position of disadvantage, the Council considers that it should not form the target of the integration policy proposed in this report since that policy is exclusively directed towards minorities of *non-indigenous* origin. Caravan dwellers form a minority, but an indigenous one⁶⁵. In contrast to gypsies, who do constitute a (small) non-indigenous minority, their situation is in no way linked to international migratory flows. The position of caravan dwellers differs so markedly from that of the immigrant minorities in so many respects that the Council has decided to exclude them from the scope of this report.

⁶⁴] The extent to which members of the third generation regard themselves as immigrants will vary markedly from group to group. Young Moluccans often form part of the third generation and sometimes identify strongly with the Moluccan community. In the case of grandchildren of Belgians who settled in the Netherlands during the First World War the identification with Belgium will generally be less strong.

⁶⁵] M.J.A. Penninx, *op. cit.*, p. 159.

4.2 Integration, ethno-cultural aspects and discrimination

A second key term in this report is that of *integration*. Even within the context under discussion in this report, highly divergent meanings are attached to this term in the literature⁶⁶.

A relevant distinction in that context is that between the cultural and the structural dimension of integration. The cultural dimension consists of the mutual coordination of behaviour, values and preferences by the members of various ethnic groups. This process may be either unilateral or multilateral, although – in the latter case – it will not necessarily be symmetrical. It does not necessarily lead to assimilation: even after lengthy periods there may still be differences in culture between the indigenous and immigrant communities, or new differences may be opened up.

By the structural dimension of integration is meant the inclusion of immigrants into the institutions of the host society. Van Amersfoort refers to ‘contacts at institutional level between the migrant and society’⁶⁷. Of particular relevance in this context are central social institutions such as those in the sectors of employment and education. The term integration is primarily used in this report in the latter meaning, in the sense of ‘equivalent participation in the leading social sectors and institutions’.

In his recent dissertation, Penninx draws a distinction between the social and the ethno-cultural position of minorities⁶⁸. By social position Penninx understands the place that a minority group as a whole occupies in the social structure. Penninx establishes that the social position of the most important minority groups in the Netherlands is low; this is something which the integration policy proposed by the Council is designed to improve.

The *ethno-cultural position* is determined by two aspects. On the one hand there is the intra-ethnic aspect, i.e. the way in which the group in question regards itself as separate or different. On the other hand there is the inter-ethnic aspect, i.e. the extent to which the group in question is regarded as separate or different by the rest of society. These two aspects are not divorced from one another: the way in which an ethnic group views itself depends in part on the treatment it receives in society, and the other way round.

A closer examination of the *intra-ethnic* aspect of the ethno-cultural position reveals that the cultural identity of each group – particularly that of an immigrant group – has its own dynamics, depending in part on the impact of the surrounding society. In the Netherlands there are marked differences within but also between the various immigrant groups, and certainly between the generations. Penninx notes that ‘most first-generation immigrants remain strongly oriented towards their country of origin or are at least ambivalent. At group level this manifests itself in the fact that most of their organizations have a political or cultural frame of reference from the country of origin, as a result of which a separate migrant community, with its own social infrastructure, is created in the Netherlands, acting as a psychological source of identity.’ This phenomenon may be regarded ‘as the recreation of the familiar life situation left behind as a result of migration. It does not necessarily mean that most first-generation immigrants are negative towards Dutch society: the majority are neutral or positive in attitude’⁶⁹.

⁶⁶] See J.M.M. van Amersfoort op. cit.; H.B. Entzinger, *Het minderhedenbeleid* (Minorities policy), Meppel, Boom, 1984, and M.J.A. Penninx, op. cit.

⁶⁷] See J.M.M. van Amersfoort op. cit., p. 46.

⁶⁸] M.J.A. Penninx, op. cit., p. 49 ff.

⁶⁹] *Ibid.*, p. 189.

With respect to group formation on the part of immigrant youth and the second generation, by contrast, 'Dutch society, or elements thereof (such as the youth culture), tend instead to be taken as the frame of reference. The group then sets itself apart within that society. In many cases this is done by drawing – often selectively – on symbols and elements from the country of culture of their parents. This process of ethnicization leads to a marked diversity in group formation. It manifests itself primarily in the fields of recreation and leisure and in the ideological field. In addition there are groups of ethnic young people – especially, it would appear, those from the intermediate generation – who develop alternative life styles. In some cases these appear to follow a separate ethnic pattern; often they are also general life-styles of for example marginalized young people'⁷⁰.

The arrival of immigrants has unquestionably led to greater ethnic and cultural diversity in the Netherlands. The Council will discuss this point in Part II in its examination of cultural policy. As far as the subjective aspect of the ethno-cultural position is concerned, it goes without saying that a group itself determines whether and to what extent it considers itself as separate or different and itself determines whether it wishes for those reasons to create separate facilities. In the Council's view the government's task does not go beyond that of creating conditions in cases where immigrant groups experience material obstacles in fulfilling their needs in the social and cultural field. In principle the same rules apply to indigenous and non-indigenous persons alike in such cases. In addition the Council argues in Part II for the elimination of barriers to certain publicly funded facilities designed to enable immigrant groups to experience their own cultural identity. In general it is advisable for the government to take a cautious stance in respect of this aspect of the ethnic/cultural position; in principle it is up to the groups themselves to give expression to their cultural identity.

The second, *inter-ethnic* aspect of Penninx's definition of the concept of ethno-cultural position relates to the contacts between ethnic groups. Penninx notes that 'at individual level, opinion polls and attitudinal surveys conducted in the 1970s suggest that an increasing element of the indigenous Dutch population became more conscious of the social gap between themselves and immigrants and was more inclined to regard immigrants as unequal'⁷¹. According to Penninx these negative trends did not persist into the 1980s. The anti-immigrant political mobilization was succeeded by a mobilization of counterforces. More in general, he claims, 'public opinion in the Netherlands increasingly accepted the formal equalization of indigenous persons and immigrants'⁷². Even in neighbourhoods with a high proportion of immigrants, Penninx concluded on the basis of the available research material, there was no evidence of any deterioration in relations or stronger group formation on both sides. These conclusions are supported by the figures provided by the Social and Cultural Planning Office, which noted a gradual decline in

⁷⁰] Ibid, p. 190; See also: L. Sansone and R. Heukels, *Onder Surinaamse jongeren; Creoolse tieners en twintigers in Amsterdam in hun vrije tijd op school, in jongerencentra, discotheken en koffiешops in confrontatie met hun ambities en de belemmeringen die ze daarbij ondervinden*; (Among Surinamese youth; Creole teenagers and young adults in Amsterdam at leisure, at school, in youth centres, discotheques and coffee shops in confrontation with their ambitions and the obstacles they experience); Amsterdam, Stadsdrukkerij, 1986;

E. Roosens, *Micronationalisme; een antropologie van het etnisch reveil* (Micronationalism; an anthropology of the ethnic revival); Louvain, Acco, 1986; W. Koot and J. Rath, 'Ethnicity and emancipation'; *International migration*; 1987, vol.25 no. 4, pp. 427-440;

M. van Niekerk, T. Sunier and H. Vermeulen, *Complex 240; interetnische relaties in een Haarlemse wijk*; (Complex 240; inter-ethnic relations in a Harlem district); Amsterdam, University of Amsterdam, Euromed Department, undated (1988).

⁷¹] M.J.A. Penninx, op. cit., p. 188.

⁷²] Ibid, p. 189.

prejudice on the part of indigenous persons towards immigrants during the 1980s, levelling out in recent years ⁷³.

Prejudice is not the same thing as discrimination; the former refers to attitudes and the latter to actual behaviour. Opinions differ as to whether the two are linked and, assuming they are, what the nature of that link is. Nor do the more positive trends just noted mean that there is no discrimination in the Netherlands on the basis of race or ethnic origin ⁷⁴. Penninx concludes from his survey that there are 'indications that a significant element of the unequal treatment of members of minority groups – in comparison with indigenous persons with the same relevant characteristics – arises as a result of unintended effects of rules and procedures formulated in essentially neutral terms'.

This form of unequal treatment is generally designated as indirect discrimination and may be distinguished from direct discrimination, i.e. the conscious and deliberate drawing of distinctions based on racist thinking and attitudes. Penninx concedes that there is certainly direct discrimination in the Netherlands, but that it forms only a small element in those cases where a distinction can be drawn – an element which is, however, the most difficult to combat ⁷⁵.

Preventing and combatting these two forms of discrimination is a major government responsibility. The available legal instruments in the Netherlands have been tightened up in recent years. The problem remains, however, that it is not always easy to substantiate separate, concrete instances of discrimination. The phenomenon of discrimination in the labour market, which is touched on in the report, is an aspect of inter-ethnic relations that will continue to require close attention on the part of government and society. Discrimination on the grounds of race or ethnic origin is not merely objectionable but damages immigrants' prospects of integration and hence the effectiveness of integration policy.

Although the government should play an active role in preventing and combatting negative outgrowths of inter-ethnic contacts, the direct scope for encouraging such contacts is comparatively limited. At the same time, a successful integration policy directed towards promoting participation in vital sectors of society will undoubtedly lead to more, and more intensive, contacts between the indigenous and immigrant communities. Integration policy provides a particularly effective means of improving mutual understanding

^{73]} Social and Cultural Report 1988, p. 341.

^{74]} See inter alia F. Bovenkerk (ed.), *Omdat zij anders zijn; patronen van rasdiscriminatie in Nederland* (Because they are different: patterns of racial discrimination in the Netherlands); Meppel, Boom, 1978;

J.H. Elich and B. Maso, 'Discriminatie, vooroordeel en racisme in Nederland' (Discrimination, prejudice and racism in the Netherlands); Minorities Research Advisory Committee, *Discriminatie, vooroordeel en racisme in Nederland*; The Hague, Ministry of Home Affairs, 1984;

R. den Uyl, C. Choenni and F. Bovenkerk, *Mag het ook een buitenlander wezen?; discriminatie bij uitzendbureaus* (May it also be a foreigner? discrimination at temporary employment agencies); LBR series no. 2, Utrecht, National Bureau against Racial Discrimination, 1986;

C. Biegel and K. Tjoen-Tak-Sen, *Klachten over rassendiscriminatie* (Complaints about racial discrimination); The Hague, Vuga, 1986;

C.B. Biegel, A. Bocker, K. Tjoen-Tak-Sen, *Rassendiscriminatie... tenslotte is het verboden bij de wet* (Racial discrimination... forbidden by law), Zwolle, W.E.J. Tjeenk Willing, 1987.

^{75]} M.J.A. Penninx, op. cit., p. 120.

and good relations between residents of different ethnic origin. Such understanding forms a highly important pre-condition for the evolution of a culturally diverse but non-segmented society ⁷⁶.

⁷⁶] See also: W. de Jong, *Inter-etnische verhoudingen in een oude stadswijk* (Inter-ethnic relations in an old urban area); Delft, Eburon, 1986 and M. Verkuyten, 'Inter-etnische oordelen en relaties onder middelbare scholieren', (Inter-ethnic views and relations among secondary-school pupils); *Migrantenstudies*, 1988, vol. 4, no. 3, pp. 2-15.

Part II
Towards an immigrant policy

Introduction

In examining the position of immigrants in Dutch society, the Council notes that a number of general problems, such as high unemployment and unequal education opportunities, bear more heavily on such persons. This observation has implications for the policies required, where two broad approaches may be distinguished.

The first and most elementary approach is that of general policy. To a significant extent, the problems facing immigrants are accentuations of those facing society in general. This means that policies specifically tailored to the immigrant community, in which the overall problems are not addressed, will necessarily remain confined to the treatment of symptoms. General measures, extending to all residents, to promote employment, education opportunities and suitable housing form the basis for conducting *specifically targeted* policies where these are required. Put differently, an effective overall employment policy may not in itself eliminate the difference in the level of unemployment among indigenous and non-indigenous persons, but it does form a precondition for conducting the second line of policies – namely more specific, targeted measures – with any prospect of success. In other words, the scope for ‘solutions’ is limited by the conditions created by the government’s general policies.

Clearly, this report is not the place in which to make detailed recommendations in relation to the government’s general policies. At the same time, however, it would emphasise that the effectiveness of policies specifically targeted on selected minority groups depends not just on the soundness of those policies but also on the circumstances in which they have to be implemented and the general policies in those sectors.

In this report the term ‘immigrant’ has been used in the sense of non-indigenous (i.e. non-Dutch) origin. ‘Immigrants’ therefore include aliens in a legal sense; former aliens who have become naturalized; Netherlands citizens from the (former) overseas dependencies; and their descendants up to the third generation in so far as they regard themselves as non-indigenous. Thus, in some cases, the term ‘immigrant’ may also apply to people who have been born in the Netherlands, and who, for that matter, are not immigrants in the strict sense. ‘Immigrant policy’ refers to the government’s measures specifically directed towards the immigrant (non-indigenous) communities. A ‘minority’ is an immigrant grouping in a disadvantaged position. The term ‘integration’ is used below in the sense of participation on equal terms in the most significant social sectors and institutions.

2.1 Position of immigrants in the Netherlands

Two developments with particular consequences for the position of immigrants in Dutch society have taken place in the past ten years. Despite a restrictive admissions policy, the level of immigration has remained almost unchanged, which has contributed towards the sharp rise in the number of immigrants in the Netherlands. Secondly, the dramatic rise in unemployment has hit the largest immigrant groups particularly severely. Whereas the process of integration should have taken place primarily in the fields of employment and education, it has been precisely in these sectors that the results have so far lagged behind expectations. Although a number of successes have been recorded in the field of education for minorities – especially encouraging a higher rate of participation in secondary education – progress has been too slow and has remained confined to certain groups. The average level of education of non-indigenous persons lags far behind that of indigenous pupils. In vocational training there is a high wastage rate and too few immigrants complete their courses. At the same time the demand for qualifications is rising rapidly while those lacking qualifications increasingly find themselves frozen out. For these (and other) reasons no improvement has taken place in the field of employment. Particularly where minorities are concerned, demand and supply tend to be out of line in the labour market. The level of participation in the labour market by immigrants continues to slip behind that of the population as a whole in the Netherlands – whose rate of participation is itself low in European terms.

Are these developments indicative of a growing gap in society between the indigenous and non-indigenous communities? The answer to this question varies according to the indicators one uses, the group in question and the selected time-frame. It may be assumed that the longer they stay in the Netherlands, the more that immigrants will be likely to orient themselves towards Dutch society. This will apply even more to the generation born in this country than to non-indigenous persons who arrived in the Netherlands as migrants. In this sense the gap is becoming narrower. It is also evident that the Netherlands has increasingly geared itself over the past decade to the continuing presence of a significant number of non-indigenous persons.

At the same time, however, a number of developments have taken place in certain vital sectors of Dutch society – especially the socio-economic sector – that cut across the integration process. Among some minority groups the rate of unemployment is as high as 40%. High unemployment has particularly adverse consequences for social relations within immigrant communities, family relations and stability, individual identity, crime and drug abuse.

A protracted or even permanent state of high unemployment in a particular population group tends to be passed on to succeeding generations, especially when that group is geographically concentrated. Individual efforts to get ahead, for example through education, can suffer markedly if there is a general climate of hopelessness in the home and the local community.

These negative effects extend beyond the non-indigenous groups themselves. Immigrants come into contact with the indigenous community in the workplace, which provides an opportunity for the mutual adjustment of values and norms. Outside the sphere of employment intensive contacts of this kind occur only to any significant extent in education. Studies have shown that certain immigrants – especially those who are unemployed – have little if any contact with Dutch persons after leaving school.

If nearly 50 per cent of a particular population group – especially one that is readily identifiable visually – is dependent on social security and other forms of public assistance and has little contact with the indigenous community, this can have a negative effect on their self-image as fully-fledged citizens and can lead to tensions between indigenous and non-indigenous persons. This in turn impedes meaningful participation by immigrants in Dutch society and can lead to a climate in which their rights become subject to challenge.

2.2 Current policy

Are the government's current policies capable of bridging the socio-economic gap between the indigenous and non-indigenous communities? In examining this question a distinction needs once again to be drawn between minorities policy and general government policy.

As noted in section 1.1, immigrants in the Netherlands are affected by many aspects of the government's general policies. In a number of important respects the effects of the government's general policies come into conflict with the objectives of its policies specifically directed towards immigrant minorities. In some cases, especially the employment sector, the realization of those objectives has if anything receded rather than drawn closer. Although developments in this field have in themselves little to do with the presence of immigrants in the Netherlands, their effect is to undermine and paralyze minorities policy.

As a result of the restructuring of the economy over the past ten years, traditional industries such as ship-building, textiles and heavy metals have suffered severely, eliminating many jobs for semi-skilled and unskilled labour in the process. Various groups of non-indigenous persons were heavily represented in these industries and jobs, and this has been one reason for the extremely high rate of unemployment now faced by these groups. By contrast, the leading growth industries in the Dutch economy increasingly require highly skilled labour. Among the non-indigenous community, however (including the second generation), the level of education and training tends to be low, leaving them unable to exploit the available opportunities.

Certain policies of a general nature impose particular constraints on the ability to integrate foreigners into Dutch society. In primary education, for example, recent changes in the rules for the admission of four-year-olds means that many infants of non-indigenous origin now come into contact with the Dutch language some six months later than they used to. In the field of housing, notwithstanding measures to promote the non-discriminatory allocation of housing a process of segregation has become manifest, especially in the principal agglomerations, whereby the inner city areas have become increasingly inhabited by immigrants, while indigenous Dutch persons and employment – especially the better-paid jobs – have migrated to the outskirts.

These general developments and policy measures obstruct the process of integration and can easily lead to the immigrants' marginalization. In order to avert the risk of social polarization along ethnic lines, steps would be needed to modify these general trends in society. The ability, however, to influence these processes by means of general government policies is often limited.

The debate about minorities in the Netherlands has gone hand in hand with the evolution of the welfare state. To begin with, the growth of immigration and that of the welfare state ran virtually in harness. As the limits of the welfare state have been reached, however, it has become clear how much individual citizens – especially those in a disadvantaged position – have been regarded, in

terms of both political philosophy and government policy, as *dependent categories* rather than being given opportunities to fend for themselves. The consequences of this debate have emerged clearly in recent years: many foreigners have become dependant on government support (e.g. in the form of social security benefits) and are consequently particularly vulnerable to government cut-backs. A good example of this state of affairs is the recurrent debate as to whether the level of certain social security benefits should vary according to country of domicile.

The welfare state also sets limits on human behaviour. In the complex body of legislation and regulations making up the welfare state, and in all its institutions and the selection mechanisms applied by them, indigenous values and behavioural norms set the tone. In many cases this will be inevitable, but for those who were socialized in a totally different cultural climate from that of the Netherlands, it does not always come easily or as a matter of course to satisfy expectations based on Dutch values. Precisely when vigorous efforts are being made by the government on behalf of the immigrant community, it is easy to overlook the fact that genuine integration can only be said to have taken place if institutions both within and outside the sphere of government influence are in fact open to these people. This realization is only just beginning to penetrate in the Netherlands, and then especially in those areas with high concentrations of immigrants. The pace at which Dutch institutions and facilities are in fact being opened up to minorities is often slower than the government is apt to assume. Very few facilities in the Netherlands are formally barred to people of non-indigenous origin, as they do not wish to lay themselves open to the charge of discrimination; but in practice immigrants do not use many of these facilities anyway.

For immigrants, there is the additional factor that, in relation to the indigenous community, they benefit less from general policy measures designed to reduce socio-economic disadvantage. Although the symptoms of such deprivation may be much the same among non-indigenous and indigenous Dutch persons, the causes may differ widely, and general policies to combat deprivation will not always be able to take these adequately into account.

These factors formed one of the reasons for the introduction of a specific minorities policy. In a number of vital areas, however, these policies have been caught up in a debate about objectives. In some cases the policies appear to be primarily of symbolic value. In itself this is not without significance; debate and discussion about immigrants in Dutch policy circles has generally been friendlier and more tolerant than elsewhere in Western Europe. The same applies to the officially laid-down policy objectives, while a serious effort has also been made to underpin policy with scientific research.

In practice, however, matters are often rather different. Nowhere else in Western Europe, for example, is unemployment as high among immigrants as it is in the Netherlands. To some extent this is because the government has taken a fairly relaxed stance on the expulsion of foreigners who have lost their jobs (in contrast for example to the practice in West Germany). This does not, however, explain the comparatively high rate of unemployment among the second generation. Similarly the level of educational attainment among immigrants in the Netherlands lags behind that in neighbouring countries.

In this respect the debate about minorities in the Netherlands, with its marked emphasis on cultural and moral questions, is symptomatic. For years now there has been a debate about the merits of providing education in pupils' own language and culture, while at the same time a second generation of non-indigenous children at school in the Netherlands threatens to remain largely

marginalized on account of poor educational performance. There is a long-standing debate about the objections towards registering people in terms of ethnic origin, while in the meantime the lack of data is making it ever more difficult to identify the target groups of the present minorities policy. Without denying the importance of these issues, it needs to be acknowledged that they tend to by-pass the key issues. Greater attention is required into the ways in which the position of minorities – especially that of individual members of minority groups – can be effectively and practically improved.

The present minorities policy would appear to over-estimate the speed with which immigrants are being integrated. On the basis of the underlying policy considerations set out in the Minorities Policy Document, the speed with which facilities specifically tailored to the needs of minorities have disappeared in recent years should mean that these minorities are now integrated to the point that specific policies are no longer necessary, at least in the fields in question. The notion that general facilities should be accessible to minorities and that they should ultimately participate in them on an equal footing has led in recent years to the ‘generalization’ of official measures and instruments. This is evident for example in education, employment policy and social welfare. Participation in general facilities depends, however, on a certain degree of integration and the possession of skills such as linguistic ability, plus an ability to cope in a more general sense. For many members of minority groups resident in the Netherlands for some time this does not hold true, let alone in the case of more recently arrived immigrants. For these reasons it would be mistaken to put a stop to each and every form of policy specifically tailored to ethnic minorities on the grounds that such policies had failed to achieve adequate results in the past.

For understandable reasons, the government is inclined to place its policies in a national perspective and to formulate its policy priorities on that basis. Since it concerns just five percent of the population, minorities policy can in consequence find itself downgraded. As a result a situation can easily arise in which the minorities issue fails to receive the kind of attention it deserves at national level when looking to the future.

In large areas of the country there is little if any realization that the Netherlands has become a multi-ethnic society, since the immigrant communities are largely concentrated in the western conurbation and a number of other towns. Nearly two-thirds of the ethnic minorities in the Netherlands live in just 20 municipalities. No less than 47 percent of the Surinamese, Turkish, Moroccan and Antillean population live in the four largest cities, compared with 11 percent of the rest of the population. This concentration is important not just for the immigrants themselves but also for the cities in question: over 18 percent of the inhabitants of the four major cities are now of non-indigenous origin. The minorities issue has, accordingly, become essentially an urban problem, and there are parallels between the government’s policies towards minorities and those directed towards the leading cities (a subject on which the Council will shortly be reporting separately). As such it is hardly surprising that the ‘concentration’ municipalities – especially the four biggest cities – should complain of a lack of resources in implementing minorities policies at local level. The coordination of such policies has been entrusted to the Minister of Home Affairs, on the grounds that the latter is the ‘natural discussion partner’ of the municipalities. In practice, however, there tends to be considerable disagreement about the delimitation of central and local government responsibilities and powers.

Finally there is also a fundamental ambiguity in the government’s current minorities policy, in that the criteria for identifying target groups tend to be arbitrary and prompted more by historical than by social considerations.

As such they are apt to lose touch with reality, while at the same time to make proper allowance for the marked variations within and between the various groups. As time has passed these differences have if anything grown rather than diminished. The government's current minorities policy finds its primary legitimation in its blanket, group-oriented approach: 'The Netherlands as a multi-ethnic society'. In doing so, however, ethnic origin tends to be linked over-readily and broadly with social deprivation, while insufficient account is taken of the inherent dynamics of the integration process. Rather than a coarse-meshed, group-oriented approach towards combatting deprivation, based on ethnic variations, what is required is a fine-meshed approach focussing on individual integration, in which allowance is made for the differences between and within the immigrant groups.

3.1 Background considerations

It is safe to assume that immigration will continue for the present and that the share of the non-indigenous communities in the total population will continue to grow. Whereas the Council advised in 1979 that the presence of *immigrants* should in principle be regarded as permanent, it now expects that *immigration* itself will be lasting. This applies not just to the Netherlands but to Western Europe as a whole and indeed to the entire Western world.

There are a number of reasons for this change, which tend moreover to be mutually reinforcing. In the first place developing countries have a much lower standard of living, have less political freedom and are subject to growing population pressures. Migration is also stimulated by better and cheaper transport, by greater familiarity in the Third World with the West and above all by the large numbers of migrants already in many Western countries.

By means of family reunification and formation, the presence of these migrants has led to the creation of more or less permanent migration 'bridges' between countries with widely differing living standards. This means that migration is, at least in part, self-sustaining in nature. In the case of the Netherlands the main countries of origin will for the present remain Morocco, Turkey and Surinam. Greater numbers of migrants may, however, be expected to start arriving from other countries. This applies especially to Africa, which is comparatively nearby and where there are strong 'push' factors in the form of population pressures and poor living conditions. Political and economic trends are also likely to increase the level of immigration from Eastern Europe. These new migration flows will also lead to follow-up migration in the form of family reunification. The completion of the European internal market may also be expected to lead to a gradual increase in intra-EC migration.

As in 1979, the Council advocates a restrictive admissions policy. The restrictive nature of the admissions policy is however subject to limits, not just from a humanitarian but also from a practical viewpoint. On the basis of the experience over the past ten years, the Council considers it unrealistic to assume that the migratory pressures outlined above can be fully resisted. An open society such as the Netherlands is unable to isolate itself from the rest of the world; but at the same time practical circumstances set limits on the capacity for absorption, even though it may be difficult to lay down those limits. Although migration to the Netherlands in recent years has been high in relation to Western Europe as a whole, the number of immigrants in the country is still low when compared with its neighbours.

Looking to the long term, a worldwide trend towards greater interdependence is in evidence, of which international migration is a logical consequence. It is consequently more realistic to examine how immigration might be regulated than how it might be stopped. Future policies towards minorities will therefore need to start from the premise that the Netherlands has become a *de facto* immigration country and will remain so for the time being, even though it has never sought that status.

3.2 A new approach

If it is accepted that immigration is set to continue, there is every reason for attempting to channel its effects positively, both for the individual immigrant

and his or her descendants and for society in general. As it stands, many members of the immigrant minorities feel they have few if any prospects. This is reflected in the high level of unemployment, the high dropout rate in education, the high crime rate and the dependence on social security and welfare facilities. Their marginal position leaves many immigrants poorly placed to contribute effectively towards Dutch society, while recent arrivals run a substantial risk of ending up in the same marginal situation.

The Council regards the continuation of this situation as unacceptable. More effective efforts to integrate immigrants into Dutch society is therefore a matter of the utmost urgency.

Participation in employment by immigrants forming part of the labour force may be regarded as an essential precondition for social integration. Employment is not just the most important means of earning an income but also forms a significant part of an individual's contribution to social development. Active employment depends on two factors: the commitment on the part of the immigrants in question, and the availability of genuine employment opportunities. While it is up to immigrants themselves to acquire the necessary knowledge and skills, it is up to the government to create the kinds of conditions and opportunities in which integration can flourish. Such efforts depend critically on cooperation on the part of the indigenous element of the population, industry and a wide variety of social institutions and organizations.

The Council would emphasize that the primary legitimation for this approach derives from considerations of social justice. At the same time, however, it is important to recognize that immigrants represent potential human resources, the development of which is in society's interests. This means that government policy should not be solely concerned with the undeniably problematical aspects of immigration, but that more vigorous efforts should be made to mobilize the potential of the immigrant community on behalf of society in general. Classical immigration countries such as Canada, the United States and Australia realized this long ago, regarding their immigrants as an asset rather than a burden.

In the case of the Netherlands immigration has a special potential in a demographic sense, in that the relatively large number of young migrants and the comparatively high birth rate in the first generation of immigrants can help slow the ageing in Dutch society. Immigration helps prevent an excessively rapid and unbalanced fall in the population, which could in turn impose a heavy burden on society. But it can only help alleviate that burden if immigrants participate properly in society, or in other words if their potential is used more effectively. This will require changes, on both the demand and the supply side of the labour market.

On the *demand side* better use needs to be made of the presence of immigrants in order to prevent incipient labour shortages. Despite the high level of unemployment, demand may well come to exceed supply in certain sectors of the labour market, including that for unskilled labour. One answer would be to mobilize the immigrant minorities for the labour market, including those members born in the Netherlands. This would demand a realization on the part of all concerned that short-term investment in higher labour participation by immigrants would pay for itself in the longer term. This may be seen in terms of 'loss limitation': in the absence of such investment a price will also have to be paid, in the form of crime and the expensive public facilities associated with the continuing growth of an ethnic sub-proletariat. The alternative is a policy geared to the development of human resources, especially by means of education and training. A policy of this kind calls for initiatives now in order to

based on criteria reflecting the extent of (or lack of) social participation, especially in employment and education. Such a review might be carried out once every five years.

3.3.2 Relationship between deprivation and cultural policy

Apart from facilities to combat deprivation, the government's present minorities policy also provides cultural facilities. This combination has drawbacks, in that migrant groups who are not in a position of socio-economic deprivation and which do not therefore constitute target group for minorities policy have no entitlement to generate cultural facilities, whatever their needs.

make participation by non-indigenous persons equally as normal as participation by indigenous persons in the shortest possible space of time.

Another consideration is the fact that big cities – which find themselves increasingly drawn into international competition, and which depend in part on internationally-oriented industry – stand to benefit from the existence of a well-developed, internationally-minded labour force. The advantages of having such a labour force should not be under-estimated. A city such as New York owes its attractiveness as an economic and cultural centre in part to its ethnically mixed population and cosmopolitan living conditions (although there are also social contrasts that would not be acceptable in the Dutch context). Developments within the European Community and other factors are producing a much more internationally-oriented business community in Europe. Many large companies now operate on a worldwide basis, while smaller companies are increasingly developing international contacts. Company success in international markets depends heavily on the quality of their work-force. The more that big cities evolve into nodal points in international networks the more that services and cultural facilities will need to be directed towards an international public – to which end the ethnic community can make a serious contribution, provided it is employable.

A new approach towards immigration is also required on the *supply side* of the labour market. Upon arrival many immigrants lack the command of Dutch and other knowledge and the training required in the highly-developed Dutch economy. Even immigrants of longer standing and many of their children born in the Netherlands lack the requisite skills and knowledge. As things stand, there are often no opportunities for changing this state of affairs. The result is that even where there is a strong desire to participate fully in Dutch society, many immigrants are unable to convert that will into action and so develop their potential. More and improved education and vocational training facilities are thus required for immigrants, including those past school leaving-age upon arrival in the Netherlands. Above all there is the need to learn the Dutch language – a vital prerequisite for coping properly in the Netherlands. The Council would emphasize that this applies to both men and women.

An approach designed to exploit the benefits of immigration should not confine itself to material aspects. International migratory movements provide a source of contact with widely differing cultures and are enriching for the exposure they bring to unfamiliar concepts and cultures. Society becomes more diversified and hence interesting. The stimulatory effect of such processes will be greater the more that non-indigenous persons have been incorporated into society and the more that mutual understanding is generated for each other's fundamental norms and values.

At the same time it has to be recognized that such diversity can be a source of tension. The confrontation of cultures inevitably leads to a clash of attitudes that are not readily reconciled, but which are also regarded as inalienable elements of those cultures. As a result, freedoms enshrined in the Dutch legal order can sometimes be subjected to militant attack. Clearly, the rules laid down for the conduct of society in that legal order have to be respected by all concerned. This does not mean that the convictions of the majority have to be imposed on a minority: respect for divergent religious and ideological viewpoints is a fundamental principle of the Dutch legal order.

This constitutionally enshrined respect for people with different views also implies a protection of fundamental attitudes on the part of groups of foreign origin. For the peaceful co-existence of groups with divergent views, limits have to be imposed on *everyone's* behaviour; this is a basic condition for a plural society. The transgression of those limits cannot therefore be tolerated.

It should be recognized that this is particularly in the interests of weaker groups in society, of which the minority groups may be regarded as part.

3.3 Selected aspects of future policies

It will be evident from the above that the Council considers that government policy should attach greater priority to the integration of immigrants. This has implications for the types of policies required.

3.3.1 Relationship between general and specific policies

As discussed in section 1. of Part II, *general* policy forms the framework for the realization of the objectives formulated for specific categories like immigrants. As such these policies go beyond the scope of this report. Only in section 4. are various aspects of general policy examined, especially in relation to employment, education and adult education.

Specific policies, it was argued, can succeed only if they are not at variance with general policies. The justification for specific policies resides in the exceptional problems faced by a particular group. Membership of a non-indigenous group is therefore the first pre-condition for qualifying for specific policies. The logical imperative of specific policies – concern with deprivation – also means however that the facilities provided under those policies should be directed not to all the members of the group but only to those *individuals* in fact confronted with the problems in question. Many individuals will in fact possess the education, cultural background, knowledge of Dutch, experience, length of residence and legal status for them to find their own way. It is not for them that the specific policies are intended. This also means that the legitimation of specific policies must be regarded as having lapsed when the exceptional problems no longer exist at group level. In this sense specific policies are in principle temporary, however long they may last in practice.

The Council is proceeding on the assumption that specific policies promote integration and indeed that this forms their justification. At present, however, the aim of promoting integration is not always the prime consideration in specific measures and facilities. In addition, the government's present minorities policy, which is largely based on identified socio-economic deprivation, tends to promote rigidities over time, in the sense that the policies continue to apply to certain groups that are already integrated to the point of participating adequately in various vital institutions of society. At the same time other groups have emerged for whom no specific policies exist, even though, given the problems they face, such policies might be justified.

In view of the fact that specific policies should be directed towards the elimination of obstacles preventing individual members of migrant groups from taking part in society on an equal footing, those policies will not be the same for all groups. The fact that the measures are intended to be 'custom-made' means that they may also vary from policy area to policy area. A particular group may, for example, be participating in the education system so satisfactorily that specific educational policies are no longer required, whereas unemployment among this group may be so great that special measures for individuals are required. By implication this approach also means that, in contrast to the present practice, facilities should be distributed to individuals in each policy area on the basis of need.

In those cases where membership of an immigrant group forms a precondition for specific policies the selection of those groups is of course a matter of particular importance. The Council therefore considers it desirable for a periodic review to be conducted of the target groups to which the policy relates,

based on criteria reflecting the extent of (or lack of) social participation, especially in employment and education. Such a review might be carried out once every five years.

3.3.2 Relationship between deprivation and cultural policy

Apart from facilities to combat deprivation, the government's present minorities policy also provides cultural facilities. This combination has drawbacks, in that migrant groups who are not in a position of socio-economic deprivation and which do not therefore constitute target group for minorities policy have no entitlement to separate cultural facilities, whatever their needs in this respect might be. The combination in question has also placed excessive emphasis on the creation and maintenance of facilities designed to promote a multi-cultural society. One result has been that too little has been achieved in reducing inequalities in the fields of education and employment.

In the Council's view, the institutionalization of ethnic pluralism need not be regarded as an independent objective of government policy. A multi-ethnic society should be regarded as a social datum, and hence as a starting point for policies leaving room for cultural diversity in various fields. Institutionally, ethnic pluralism may manifest itself in the form of cultural diversity, but this need not always be the case. The extent to which the government provides room for such diversity may differ from sector to sector.

Immigrants who so wish should be able to maintain and develop their own cultural identity: integration certainly does not imply cultural assimilation. To an even greater extent than institutional integration, however, this forms part of the responsibility of the individual groups. The initiative to obtain certain facilities should therefore come from these groups themselves. The government's task is confined to helping eliminate the barriers experienced by ethnic groupings as a result of their non-indigenous origins, with a view to enabling them to participate on an equal footing with indigenous persons in a culturally diverse society. Another, related task for government is to ensure that the legal order is respected in inter-ethnic contacts at both group and individual level.

3.3.3 From input to output goals

One of the objectives of the government's present minorities policy is to increase the accessibility of the so-called general facilities for immigrants. Under this policy, extra money is injected to help improve the effectiveness with which these facilities are used. In order to qualify for additional funding, the various actors (municipalities, the governing bodies of general institutions, or schools) often need do no more than indicate how many members of minority groups form part of their target group. These funds are made available as part of minorities policy. Other actors need simply indicate the percentage of their regular budget allocated to or accruing to the benefit of immigrants. The extent to which this financial input in fact improves the position of the individuals concerned is not always clear.

According to the Council, results are more likely to be obtained with certain forms of output financing. Under such a system, the output has to be rendered visible, while rewards to organizations that help to integrate immigrants can act as an incentive to obtain the best possible results. On these grounds the Council would propose that the provision of extra funding should be based not just on simple involvement with a problem category, as at present, but also on *identified success*. The amount of extra funding should not just depend on the number of members of minority groups which a particular organization can count among its pupils, unemployed persons, course participants or clients, but also on the result achieved.

Needless to say, a result-oriented system of intervention and support is possible to a limited extent only. Public provision cannot simply be abolished if the achieved results lag behind the expectations. A system whereby funding was based in part on results could, however, help increase the effectiveness of the activities in question, especially when those facilities are provided from multiple sources. A number of concrete proposals are elaborated in the following sections.

3.3.4 Registration

It is impossible to conduct effective policies if the categories to which they are directed cannot be properly identified. The need for specific policies directed towards individuals has to be weighed in terms of the social position and size of the group to which they belong. The current registration systems do not always permit this to be done.

The longer that immigrant groups have been in the Netherlands, the harder it becomes to determine who should be classified as non-indigenous and where they live. As long as these are non-Dutch persons, the problem does not arise. In contrast, many registration systems do not permit immigrants of Dutch nationality to be identified as non-indigenous, especially if they were also born in the Netherlands. The existing registration systems, for example, provide no means whatever of determining the present scale of the Moluccan community in the Netherlands. In addition questions arise such as: how should children with one indigenous and one non-indigenous parent be classified? or: for how many generations do immigrants remain non-indigenous?

Many multi-ethnic societies are confronted with this issue. In the United States, Canada and Great Britain, for example, their periodic censuses contain a question into the respondent's ethnic background, enabling the person in question to choose from a number of alternatives (i.e. self-identification). Censuses are no longer conducted in the Netherlands; comparably reliable information on the size of non-indigenous groups could only be derived from the population register, but this provides no indications of ethnic origin. As it stands the population register contains details on nationality, place of birth, place of birth of the parents and year of arrival in the Netherlands. For the first 20 to 30 years after arrival in the Netherlands these details generally provide sufficient indications for determining the size of a particular group. Thereafter the base data rapidly become less usable. Objections would be likely to the reintroduction of censuses on both practical grounds and on principle. If these obstacles proved insuperable, efforts would need to be made to fill the gaps in question by means of advanced statistical techniques.

Apart from figures on the total size of minority groups, effective and regulable policies depend on the availability of figures on the use made of facilities by minorities and the results obtained. There are a number of cases where this already occurs, such as job placement and the provision of legal aid. The Council is aware that indicating whether a particular individual does or does not belong to a target group of government policy – and if so, which group – can arouse sensitivities. Although it would entail certain disadvantages, the Council would therefore urge that the use of facilities be based as far as possible on a system of self-identification under which the individual concerned can indicate the group to which he or she wishes to be assigned.

3.3.5 Policy categories

Government policies directed towards the migrant community fall into three categories, namely:

- *aliens policy*: this is concerned with the admission, residential status and expulsion of non-indigenous persons of non-Dutch nationality;

- *integration policy*: this is concerned with improving the participation of minorities in vital social sectors and institutions. The criterion for determining the target groups for such policy is social deprivation;
- *cultural policy*: reflecting the multi-cultural nature of Dutch society. In principle this is concerned with all immigrant groups wishing to give expression to their own culture and identity but who encounter barriers in doing so on account of their non-indigenous origins. It is up to the groups themselves whether or not they take advantage of the facilities offered under this policy. Cultural policy is also concerned with promoting good relations between the indigenous and non-indigenous communities and among non-indigenous groups themselves.

These three categories together form *immigrant policy*. The concept of 'immigrants' is used here as an umbrella concept. It refers to individuals' origins but is otherwise neutral with respect to the remaining characteristics of the groups in question and covers both those who moved to the Netherlands and their descendants up the third of generation in so far as they regard themselves as non-indigenous.

The Council believes that this charts the way towards a policy that would do greater justice to the problems and needs of non-indigenous persons living in the Netherlands.

This section provides a survey of the main elements of immigrant policy as advocated by the Council. In certain cases this entails little if any adjustment to present policies, while in other cases radical changes would be required. Clearly, this section has more to say about proposed changes than about areas where little or no adjustment is proposed. More detailed examination is also devoted to policy measures specifically directed towards immigrants than to elements of general policy that also affect the position of these people.

The section examines in turn the three main elements of immigrant policy, namely: aliens policy (section 4.1), integration policy (section 4.2) and cultural policy (section 4.3).

4.1 Aliens policy

Various aspects of government policy are examined below that are related to the arrival and residence in and the departure of aliens and other migrants from the Netherlands, especially in relation to their legal status. The concern is therefore broader than that of government policy in the framework of aliens legislation alone (the latter is largely discussed in sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2). Although aliens policy is not a substantive policy aimed at integration it is of relevance in this context on account of the indirect impact it exerts: it helps to determine the numbers of non-indigenous persons and has consequences for the social climate in which they live.

4.1.1 Admissions policy

As noted previously, the Council's policy proposals are – in contrast to its recommendations in 1979 – based on the assumption that there will continue to be a substantial level of migration to the Netherlands.

Such migration falls into three categories:

- migration for employment purposes;
- migration for purposes of family reunification or formation;
- migration by refugees and asylum-seekers.

In terms of the future (restrictive) admissions policy it is useful to examine each of these categories in turn.

In the case of non-Dutch nationals who come to the Netherlands for *employment* purposes, a distinction needs to be drawn between European Community nationals and others. The former are covered by the free movement of employees and services within the Community. Practitioners of a profession with the necessary permit are at liberty to establish themselves in the Netherlands. Intra-EC migration for reasons other than employment or the provision of services will (apart from the family reunification) not be unlimited for the present. For the time being it will not be permissible for nationals from one EC country to move to another on account of superior social security regulations.

Community residents who are not nationals of one of the Member States do not come under the rules of free movement; nor will they do so once the internal market is in place. This could have the result that companies employing a large number of aliens in the European market could find themselves at a competitive disadvantage when operating outside the Member State of

establishment, in that their non-Community staff would not be permitted to move elsewhere in the Community. It would, therefore, be appropriate for the Community to examine whether nationals from third countries might not be given the same rights of free movement as the nationals of one of the Member States after a period of legal residence (e.g. five years). This would also improve the integration prospects for aliens already resident in the Community for some time.

In order to keep labour migration from outside the European Community to a minimum (even if the labour market were to pick up further in the future) a more thorough examination should be made upon each application for an employment permit as to whether that work could be performed by Community residents, if necessary after re-training or further training and/or relocation. In those cases where employment permits are at present required under the Foreign Workers Employment Act, these should, in the Council's view, no longer be issued for work of an unskilled or semi-skilled nature, as these requirements might be met from the existing pool of unemployment. (An exception would be the category of workers referred to in the previous paragraph.) In principle, then, it would only be permissible to recruit specialized personnel in short supply from outside the Community, although there would of course remain instances in which importing workers from outside the Community would clearly be in the Netherlands' interest. A final category would consist of researchers and students from outside the Community undergoing training and education in this country. In its report *Culture and Diplomacy* (1987) the Council emphasised the importance of strengthening the international orientation of higher education in the Netherlands.

Strict measures should also be taken after the completion of the internal market to prevent the employment within the European Community of illegal residents. In view of the fact that there are already a large number of aliens in illegal employment in the southern European Member States, the possibility cannot be excluded that this problem will also increase in scale in the more northern parts of the Community after '1992', particularly if appropriate measures are not taken in the European context within good time. At any event checks on workers should be tightened and violations penalized more severely than at present. Suggestions elsewhere in this chapter for making the employment of legally resident poorly qualified staff more attractive could help ease the situation, both for employers and for minority-group members, a relatively high proportion of whom are poorly skilled.

Family reunion in the broad sense – i.e. including the arrival of partners of migrants resident for some time or even born in the Netherlands – has for a considerable period formed the most common ground for the admission of aliens. Cutting down the scope for family reunion could therefore lead to a significant reduction in the level of immigration. For a number of reasons, however, the Council would be against tightening up the present policy. The policy is – quite correctly – based on humanitarian considerations, while the Netherlands' international treaty obligations leave it little room for tightening up the present arrangements. The most important reason for caution in this field, however, consists of the negative impact that restrictions might have on migrants already resident in the country and hence on integration policy. The effect of preventing the admission of under-age children or partners and spouses needs no further explanation.

If a further tightening in admissions policy were still felt necessary, this would then apply to the right of residence of other family members, namely children of age and others dependent on the family head. The regulations governing these categories are already fairly strict, but their application could perhaps be tightened.

Even if the policy were to be tightened up in this way, the Netherlands would still have a family reunion policy in which integration potential did not form a yardstick – in contrast for example to the United States, where the existence of close relatives forms a precondition for immigration but does not always carry an automatic entitlement to residence. Admission in the U.S. depends in part on whether the immigrant in question, or his or her relatives already established in the U.S., are able to support themselves without the need for state support. In the Dutch situation, few migrants arriving for purposes of family reunion possess sufficient qualifications to be readily employable.

Considerable publicity has surrounded *refugees and asylum-seekers* in recent years, not least because the present regulations enable persons to enter the Netherlands even if they have no jobs to come to, lack relatives in the country and have insufficient personal means.

This type of migration would appear less easily controlled than the two other forms. Legal rulings suggest that many individuals make improper use of the asylum provisions. A number of those who have been legally debarred from remaining in the country and who fail to obtain refugee status or a residence permit nevertheless remain in the Netherlands, from which it must be concluded that the asylum procedures have been abused. Nevertheless the Council takes the view that the right of asylum should be preserved in its present form as a fundamental aspect of the Dutch constitutional state. Nor should obstacles be placed in the way of the entry of asylum-seekers to the point that it becomes impossible in practice to apply for asylum. Abuses of the existing regulations should be countered by more efficient government action. The success of the Asylum-Seekers Reception Regulation introduced at the end of 1987 indicates that the government has the necessary resources.

At the present time one of the main sources of concern is the fact that the asylum procedure often takes so long. As long as asylum status is being sought, the individual in question is not permitted to work, since this might go too far towards integrating him or her in Dutch society. At first sight this might seem a reasonable standpoint: no more than one in ten asylum-seekers ultimately obtains the status of refugee. In practice, however, roughly half of all asylum-seekers end up staying in the Netherlands, of whom no more than about half legally. The marginal existence led by asylum-seekers, often for many years, later frequently impedes the adequate integration of such individuals into Dutch society, even once their legal status has been sorted out.

The dilemma thus arises that the asylum procedure should not be allowed to lead to disguised labour migration but that at the same time it is in the interests of Dutch society to integrate newcomers as quickly as possible. In this respect a speeding up of the asylum application procedure would be the best solution. Even accelerated procedures could, however, take a year or more. In order to limit the integration problems at a later stage, the Council proposes that asylum-seekers should be permitted under certain circumstances to take up employment, for example in specially designated projects. Such permission should be granted after it had been determined that their request for asylum in the Netherlands was to be examined, i.e. roughly two months after arrival in the Netherlands. This would then prevent this regulation from being used as a hidden means of labour migration. Rejection of an application for asylum would mean that employment had to cease forthwith. The policy of allowing asylum-seekers to take up employment – a practice permitted in various Western European countries and in Canada – would help prevent idleness and boredom and would also enable those concerned to support themselves during the application process, thus reducing the costs of reception.

In recent years various Western European countries have cut down on the

number of refugees admitted. This does not apply in the case of the Netherlands, although in European terms, the number of refugees invited to or otherwise admitted to the Netherlands has been fairly low for some time. It is not inconceivable that the Netherlands could come under pressure to fall into line with its European partners. The Council considers that the government should not seek to limit the number of invited refugees but that the present level should at the least be sustained.

4.1.2 Supervision of aliens

The process of European integration is likely to have an increasingly marked impact on aliens policy in the coming years. The ever-closer links between the Member States demands the harmonization of legislation and policy, a process that may be expected to extend even to aliens policy – for many years the firm preserve of national sovereignty. A number of efforts towards harmonization have already been made in recent years, especially in the framework of the Schengen Agreement and in relation to the reception of asylum-seekers. The abolition of immigration controls at the Community's internal frontiers, as proposed for 1991 for the 'Schengen Five' and for 1 January 1993 for the EC as a whole, will deprive the Dutch government of one means of directly controlling the admission of aliens to Dutch territory. In practice, however, the difference from the present situation will be less marked than it appears, as much cross-border traffic already goes uncontrolled. Thus 90% of asylum seekers report not at a border crossing point but at a local police station.

Certain Member States have established a clear link between aliens policy and crime control (such as drug trafficking and terrorism). In these countries, the need to control crime is used as an argument for tightening the admission criteria for and supervision of aliens. Undeniably there is a need for improved coordination between the Member States in the policing and legal fields and for the effective coordination of asylum policy, but care must also be taken to prevent supervision from taking a form that would undermine the basic premises of immigrant policy.

Efforts to compensate for the abolition of immigration controls at the European Community's internal frontiers by the introduction of a national identity system based on the Aliens Act needs to be assessed in this light. The Council takes the view that the introduction of such an identity system is indeed inescapable but that it should be based on different considerations and take a different form from that just noted. In the Council's view, the present plans entail major drawbacks both for indigenous and non-indigenous persons. The system should instead take as its starting point the fact that illegally present aliens are often able to find work without undue difficulty and are able to draw on state-funded services. The appropriate solution would appear to be a compulsory identity system for all people, both Dutch and aliens, accepting work and for all persons making use of services provided by government and semi-government agencies (with the exception of emergencies, such as hospital admission). Such obligations already exist in certain instances, e.g. for social security benefit claimants. In practice, however, it is evident that mistakes are frequently made, not least because the registration of aliens is far from reliable. The latter needs therefore to be improved in the short term, for example by cross-checking the lists of aliens in receipt of government facilities against the register of birth, deaths and marriages. A compulsory identity system for all persons accepting work in the Netherlands and/or availing themselves of state-funded services should not be designed to establish a person's nationality, as envisaged in the government's present plans, but to determine whether a person applying for certain facilities is in fact entitled to them.

4.1.3 Legal status and naturalization

As early as its report *Ethnic Minorities* in 1979, the Council argued that the differences in legal status between foreigners with and without Netherlands citizenship should be minimised. An improvement in the legal status of the foreigners among the migrant community was classified as a necessary if not sufficient condition for combatting deprivation. Among other things it was proposed that foreigners be given a practically incontestable right of residence after five years' legal residence. In addition the Council supported measures to promote naturalization and the introduction of legislation providing for the equal treatment of foreigners. Apart from a few inevitable exceptions, the latter would be designed to solve the problem of directly or indirectly discriminatory legal provisions in the case of foreigners residing permanently in the Netherlands but not (yet) qualifying for Dutch citizenship.

Although the government endorsed the Council's diagnosis, for example in its *Minorities Policy Document*, it opted instead for rather different remedies. Apart from the introduction of a more flexible Netherlands Citizenship Act (1985), an as yet uncompleted programme of legislation was ushered in with a view to eliminating unjustified discrimination in individual regulations and pieces of legislation. The introduction of voting rights for all representative bodies, as supported by the Council in the longer term, was rejected in the Constitutional review of 1983, while the potential for deportation – even if severely limited in the case of those resident for some time – has been retained in recent proposals for revising the Aliens Act.

Despite the developments over the past ten years, the Council considers that the introduction of an Equal Opportunities (Aliens) Act would still be useful and desirable. Such an Act would not be primarily concerned with eliminating differences based on citizenship in formal legislation; where such differences persist they are generally well-founded exceptions or alternatively of no substantive importance. Nor should the Act be primarily concerned with 'correcting' indirect discrimination, which necessarily depends on amending the legislation in question. The Act should, instead, contain the following elements:

- an in principle incontestable residence permit for immigrants for whom the Netherlands has been their principal (and legal) place of abode for five years and after a shorter period (e.g. one year) for their partners and family members;
- a prohibition on the unequal treatment of such immigrants in the fields of government administration and private law.

With respect to the practical form that such an Act might take, proposals were made in non-governmental circles a number of years ago.

The Council does not attach excessive weight to the objection that an Equal Opportunities Act would reduce the incentive for naturalization: the comparable Facilities Act introduced for Moluccans resident in the Netherlands was followed by an increase in the level of naturalization. Nor should the pull-factor that some see as being exerted on potential immigrants be exaggerated. In only a very few cases is the prospect of acquiring a strong legal position after a few years likely to play a decisive part in the choice of a migration country.

Equally, it cannot be maintained that the prohibition on unequal treatment would be superfluous on account of the existing possibilities for legal action based on equal opportunities legislation or contravention of the anti-racial discrimination provisions in the Criminal Code. In addition the possibility of going to the civil courts in the case of private-law disputes provides foreigners with the ability to obtain their legal rights independently and to remove the dispute from the criminal sphere. The principal effect of an Equal

Opportunities (Aliens) Act would lie outside the formal sphere in that the government would be making it clear that any person legally resident in the Netherlands for any length of time enjoyed full rights but without Netherlands citizenship. This would increase the potential for integration on the part of the aliens among those persons and could help encourage others to adopt the principle of equality of treatment.

Apart from the above, the possibilities for acquiring Netherlands citizenship continue to merit attention. The introduction of the new Netherlands Citizenship Act has been followed by increased interest in the acquisition of citizenship. Now that a number of options have been closed off it is true that the total number of naturalizations fell (temporarily?) in 1988, but in the case of major groups such as Moroccans and Turks the level of naturalization is still significantly above that in 1985. Further improvements are desirable. The average time taken to process applications - around two years - is far too long, and the relevant departmental resources clearly need to be increased. The improved provision of information and advice could also lead to an increase in the number of applications.

Account needs in principle to be taken of genuine objections on the part of individuals from various Mediterranean countries towards giving up their citizenship. To the extent that the Strasbourg Convention on multiple nationality acts as an obstacle to naturalization, a reconsideration of the Dutch position vis-a-vis this agreement should not be ruled out.

4.1.4 Return migration policy

Some immigrants wish to return to their country of origin, especially as they grow older. This desire is generally confined to first-generation migrants; their children usually have no such desire. Return may often be to the advantage of the migrant, for reasons of physical or psychological health, and also to Dutch society, which is spared certain costs. The countries of origin have mixed feelings: return brings in foreign exchange but can also be socio-economically and politically disruptive. In a policy based on the assumption of long-term residence in the Netherlands and that concentrates on improving the quality of such residence, the only acceptable form of return migration policy is one that creates the appropriate conditions and eliminates obstacles. From the beginning, Dutch return migration policy has been based on the premise that the desire on the part of the person concerned to return to their country of origin should be treated with equal respect as the desire to remain here, and this should remain the case.

Within these limits return migration may be encouraged. Consultation with the countries of origin, which can sometimes be required in order to alleviate fears that socio-economic and political equilibrium might be disturbed, and the provision of information to those thinking about returning, are compatible with the basic principle of voluntariness. Each can be of significance for a person considering the idea of return migration. One obstacle in the way of return migration is the fact that, under Dutch aliens legislation, it is treated as irreversible: other than on pressing humanitarian grounds, it is not possible to return to the Netherlands after shifting one's principal place of residence to another country.

In line with the views of the Socio-Economic Council's Emigration Committee and various migrant bodies, the Council considers that the regulations in this area need to be relaxed. One way of doing so would be to enable individuals to opt for return to the Netherlands in the first two years after departure. Use could be made of this entitlement, which would apply to all immigrants who have lived in the Netherlands for at least five years, on one occasion. In view of the small number of people who do in fact attempt to return to the Netherlands,

it is highly likely that the introduction of this measure would see a rise in a net return migration, even though this would not be an aim in itself.

In some cases financial considerations form an obstacle to return migration. In broad terms the system of contributions introduced to this end may be endorsed. The 'basic regulation', under which a contribution is made towards relocation costs and maintenance costs during the first three months, is particularly significant for those who have been unable to put together any savings but who can, after a certain interval, be expected to support themselves. A special regulation for the elderly, which provides for periodic payments to benefit claimants, compensates to some extent for the 'non-exportability' of certain social security benefits.

The proposed extension of the regulation to Surinamese individuals with Netherlands citizenship is to be welcomed. Matters differ in relation to an extension of the scheme to persons in employment, as proposed for example by the Socio-Economic Council; this would not only introduce an element of free choice between working and not working but would also entail such a pronounced incentive for return migration as no longer to be compatible with the principle of free choice. The Interdepartmental Committee to Review Social Security Provisions for Non-Dutch Nationals recently floated the idea of a 'country-of-domicile principle', under which social security benefits would be adjusted in line with the cost of living in the recipient's country of residence, as a possible economy measure. A change along these lines would, however, create a financial barrier to return migration, while a substantial reduction in social security benefits could have the effect of choking off return migration to the point that the net financial effect back-fired. If applied to family allowances it could also lead to greater immigration of dependent children to the Netherlands. Calculations by the Social and Cultural Planning Office indicate that it is by no means certain that the introduction of the country-of-domicile principle for family allowances would lead to net savings for the government. It could, moreover, have the effect of legitimising distinctions in all sorts of other areas.

4.2 Integration Policy

4.2.1 Employment

A vital element in the integration policy advocated by the Council consists of participation in formal employment by immigrant minorities. Because this is a field in which there is a particular need for general and specific policies to be closely coordinated, the general policy context is first examined below. This is followed by an examination of targeted policy measures.

In recent years, the government's policies in this field have centered on the promotion of economic growth. The growth achieved has, however, been sufficient to absorb the growing supply of labour. The restructuring of the economy has, moreover, led to a sharp reduction in employment at unskilled and semi-skilled level. This has been further accentuated by the displacement of poorly by better educated and trained people, reflecting the general rise in educational standards in the labour force. While economic growth is needed to generate employment, it is not a sufficient condition. This point has been examined by the Council in its report *Scope for Growth* (1987). Model calculations revealed that the structure of the Dutch economy was in fact capable of generating economic growth coupled with a substantial rise in employment. Among other things this would require an increase in investment. A particular area of opportunity for the government – in collaboration with the private sector – lies in bringing the infrastructure up to standard.

In addition the report made it clear that a high growth in sales and employment in labour-intensive services (both commercial and non-profit) was both feasible and desirable. Examples include the hotel and catering trade, the repair of consumer goods, sport and recreation, care of the elderly and home help, socio-cultural work and health care. In this respect the Council noted that the encouragement of labour-intensive services by holding down relative price rises was possible to only a limited extent. In special cases, it might be possible to narrow the gap between gross wage costs and net pay, particularly where market forces are being distorted by the informal economy. In a prosperous society, the Council argued, a higher price will have to be paid for traditional government functions. The same applies to the broad field of social services and health care, although in these cases there is scope for a certain degree of privatization, thereby permitting a less restrictive link with tax rates and social insurance charges. Matters such as training and child care could, for example, be provided as fringe benefits, while more individual facilities could be defrayed through private insurance.

The Council believes that these earlier recommendations have lost none of their relevance. Now that the prospects for the economy are somewhat brighter than they were when *Scope for Growth* appeared (1987), the government has greater elbow room to channel economic growth towards employment objectives. The employment generated as a result is not just of direct importance on account of the reduction in unemployment, including that among minorities. It can also help alleviate the displacement of those lacking training and education and hence create greater room in the labour market for these categories of workers. In those areas where general employment policy is unlikely to create sufficient jobs at the lower levels, more specific measures will be required. With a view to creating structural jobs for the long-term unemployed, including immigrants.

The possibility cannot be ruled out that renewed growth would be coupled with strains in the labour market. As noted earlier, and as also argued in the *Multi-Year Framework 1989-1992* issued by the Directorate-General for Manpower, the renewed recruitment of non-EC subjects is unacceptable in a situation where suitable labour is available or can be mobilized within a reasonable period. Certainly at lower levels, it should be possible to bridge regional or qualitative discrepancies by means of labour-market policy. On the one hand this would call for a willingness on the part of unemployed persons living in the Netherlands to undergo the necessary training, to commute or to move. On the other hand, employers would be expected to anticipate staffing needs by collaborating with relevant bodies to develop education or training programmes, to provide work experience places and to examine whether in the event of skill shortages, certain straightforward activities for which there was an adequate supply of labour could be separated out from other jobs.

Sustained economic growth directed more towards the provision of labour-intensive services is highly important. These sectors also depend heavily on comparatively unskilled labour. An expansion of employment at these levels by means of general employment measures or employment packages forms a precondition for a successful labour-market policy. In the absence of such an expansion, many will remain unemployed whatever the measures the government takes to generate employment.

The scale of employment required will depend heavily on the extent to which unemployed persons can obtain the requisite qualifications for the market once such measures have been taken. Even simple activities nowadays often require a certain degree of education or training. It is difficult to put a figure on the costs and benefits of such employment and training. Needless to say the concern is broader than that of generating employment for unemployed

immigrants alone, while the costs need to be juxtaposed against the benefits in the form of lower benefit payments and the utility of the services themselves.

The Council has previously reported on the education and training of unemployed persons in its report *An Active Labour-Market Policy* published in December 1987. Improving the employability of the unemployed, including immigrants, is a necessary condition for finding and holding down a job. A better qualified labour force can, moreover, have a positive effect on the available level of employment. Even if this effect were only limited, a permanent improvement in the employability of the unemployed labour force is highly important: it will lead to greater mobility in the labour market and help reduce the selectivity of which minorities are at present often the victim.

The new manpower services structure in the process of being set up could help bring about the kind of active labour-market policy sought by the Council. The possibilities for conducting policies adapted to regional needs could also help alleviate the employment problems faced by the migrant community in that (as noted earlier) these problems tend to be concentrated in certain regions. The system of shared responsibility on the part of employers and employees could also have the effect of opening up the private sector to immigrants. The new structure is characterized by the fact that Parliament has deliberately left the tripartite structure with freedom to formulate and implement policies. That freedom is based on the assumption that the social partners are prepared to accept the responsibility for solving the labour-market problems faced by certain groups – a responsibility which would undoubtedly have been left to Parliament under the 'old' system.

The seriousness of the problems that will arise if immigrants are unable to establish or re-establish themselves more securely in the labour market renders it imperative for these responsibilities to be properly discharged by the parties concerned. As such the way in which manpower services operate in practice under the new system needs to be monitored closely. In the Council's view the new tripartite structure holds out opportunities as decisions will be taken on a joint basis and therefore stand a good chance of being implemented. This does however presuppose that decisions will not remain confined to comparatively straightforward matters where impressive results can be obtained in the short term. Extending the participation of immigrants in the labour market does not fall into that category. As such the Council considers that it will be virtually imperative, and indeed in accordance with the principles of the Netherlands Constitution, for the government and Parliament to retain certain reserve powers which it can then bring into play if the new manpower services structure fails to measure up in practice.

As is to be expected, the Bill on the tripartization of the manpower services provides the government with the ability to influence the Central Board with a view to guiding developments along a particular path at either national or regional level. Such initiatives might take the form of direct incentives to industry, such as a system of rewards for vocational training or the recruitment of members of minorities. The incentives could also be aimed at the manpower services structure itself, and especially on the regionalized target organizations, with a view to encouraging certain initiatives or rewarding outstanding achievements in relation to the integration/reintegration of immigrant minorities in the labour market.

Although such forms of output financing are as yet uncommon in the public sector in the Netherlands, the seriousness and scale of the problems at issue demand a willingness to explore less orthodox remedies. Such solutions are also consonant with the shift in thinking on such subjects as privatization and the individual responsibility of organizations charged with the implementation of public policies.

The tripartite structure means that responsibility for manpower policy is jointly shared by the government and the social partners. This forms just one element of labour-market policy; apart from manpower policy there are also the general employment policies and the regulation of many institutional aspects of the labour market. The government's responsibility for the statutory conditions under which the labour market operates will, accordingly, remain undiminished. In this context the Council makes proposals later in this section for legislation to promote the labour-market prospects of minorities.

The structure for the implementation of manpower policy on a tripartite basis as laid down in the Bill does not provide for an institutionalized relationship between the regional boards and organizations representing migrant groups. Given the wide diversity of both indigenous and non-indigenous 'target groups', such an arrangement would be difficult in practice. The Municipal Executives are rightly deemed to represent the entire population in their municipalities, while the social partners also count migrants among their members. At the same time, effective cooperation with these organizations is highly important in order to induce immigrants to make use of the available facilities. Conversely it is equally important that these organizations critically monitor the activities of employment offices in order to ensure that sufficient and adequate initiatives are being taken to put immigrants to work. In this respect the so-called 'support agencies' funded by the Ministry of Welfare, Health and Cultural Affairs play an important intermediary role. These facilities specifically directed towards the immigrant communities are, in the Council's view, indispensable for the time being. In order to avoid duplication of effort, however, steps need to be taken to ensure that the activities take place in close collaboration with the employment offices.

The government's present labour-market policy is extremely cautious when it comes to specific measures for sub-categories of the unemployed, including minorities. In practice it has become clear that minorities make little use of those instruments most directly designed to draw them into the labour process. It would appear that these instruments are inadequately geared to the specific circumstances of these groups, for which reason the Council would argue for the introduction of a number of measures falling under the category of specific policies. A leading priority in this respect is of course to reduce the disproportionately high rate of unemployment among certain ethnic groups. In this respect some of the general measures as recommended by the Council in its report *An Active Labour Market Policy* (1987) are relevant, but these would need to be elaborated specifically with minorities in mind.

The question of education and training is discussed separately in section 4.2.3. In addition the (provisional) Central Manpower Services Board recently reached an agreement concerning a system of work experience places. An integrated scheme has been agreed based on the formula underpinning the *Vermeend/Moor Act* directed towards the long-term unemployed. The scheme provides for an extension of this Act and for the gradual development of a system of work experience places. The possibility has also been created for unemployed persons to be placed in a regular job after a year's work experience. Minorities will receive special attention: in their case the *Vermeend/Moor Act* will apply after just 12 months' rather than two year's unemployment, while steps will also be taken to ensure that minorities are not discriminated against when it comes to the allocation of work experience places. Some 5,500 work experience places are to be created in 1989, rising to a figure four times that level in the years ahead.

Given the previous resistance to such a system of work experience places, this agreement can certainly be regarded as a breakthrough. As a stepping stone towards regular employment, the work experience places could be particularly

important for immigrants, who are handicapped by a lack of job experience and a lack of familiarity on the part of employers with their potential. These factors often create a very high threshold to admission to the labour market, which a work experience place might help reduce. In this respect there would therefore be a sound case for using the period of twelve months unemployment not just as a criterion for the application of the Vermeend/Moor Act, as agreed with the Central Manpower Services Board, but also for admission to a work experience place.

Training and work experience are not, however, in themselves sufficient to ensure employment. The recruitment mechanisms as described elsewhere in this report mean that immigrants, even if well qualified for the jobs in question, are often not taken into consideration.

Continuing efforts must be made to combat direct discrimination by individual employers, but will be insufficient to overcome the existing barriers to entry into active employment. In order to improve the accessibility to employment for minorities the Council would not argue in favour of the imposition on employers of unspecified equity formulae or quotas or, for that matter, for any other forms of coercion to employ foreigners. The experience with the application of the Handicapped Workers Act indicates just how difficult it is to enforce compulsory minimum quotas, while the consequences of such a system can vary widely from employer to employer. Public coercion has proved a poor substitute for the spontaneous acceptance of responsibility and accountability. It is also clear that when the social partners are unprepared to accept such responsibility the barriers for minorities remain insuperable. It is, therefore, a matter of officially creating a framework for the personnel policies of employers in which encouragement is provided to remove these barriers.

The Council considers that an original approach to this problem has been taken in the Canadian Employment Equity Act, which combines public and private responsibilities in a complementary manner. The main elements of this Act are:

1. a *non-punishable* obligation on the part of employers to implement employment equity in consultation with employees' representatives by:
 - identifying and eliminating each of the employer's employment practices that results in employment barriers against 'visible minorities', indigenous minorities, women and persons with disabilities;
 - instituting positive policies and practices to ensure that such persons achieve an at least proportionate degree of representation on the employer's staff;
- b. the again *non-punishable* obligation to prepare a plan setting out the goals that the employer intends to achieve in implementing employment equity, and the timetable for the implementation of those goals;
- c. an obligation *liable to punishment* to file an annual report to the Minister of Employment and Immigration concerning the extent to which members of 'visible' and indigenous minorities, women and persons with disabilities are represented in the various positions of employment with the employer. These reports are available for public inspection, while a consolidation of the reports received is drawn up each year and submitted to the Canadian Parliament on the progress made towards employment equity.

The at once striking and attractive aspect of this type of legislation is that, with very little intervention on the part of the government, it induces employers to acknowledge and account for their co-responsibility for the equitable employment of women and members of minority groups. The only obligation in terms of public accountability consists of indicating why the individual or organization in question gives more or less weight in their personnel policy to their responsibility towards the under-represented groups. In this way direct

government coercion is replaced by indirect social pressure. Whereas the former approach, in Dutch experience, is likely very rapidly to reach its practical limits, there is every reason for exploring the effectiveness of the latter - particularly since an increased rate of participation by members of non-indigenous minority groups, women and handicapped persons may be an objective of government policy but can by nature never be an exclusive government responsibility.

In the light of these considerations the Council believes that there is much to be said for the introduction of a statutory scheme to promote employment opportunities for ethnic minorities along the lines of the Canadian model. A scheme would fit in well with existing Dutch legislation, especially the Works Council Act. In terms of their position and function, the works councils would form an almost ideal discussion partner for companies in discharging their responsibilities in this field, in that the Act provides them with powers of approval with respect to regulations relating to appointments, dismissal and promotion. In addition entrepreneurs are obliged to provide particulars to the works council concerning the numbers and different groups of individuals employed by the company, as well as the social policies pursued in the previous year in relation to those employees. These particulars need to be sufficiently detailed to reveal what impact the company's social policies have had on the various elements and function groups within the company. In the light of this situation it would be a logical step to provide the works councils with powers in relation to the obligations imposed on employers within the framework of a statutory employment opportunities promotion scheme. Whether such a scheme should cover a similar range of employees, and whether in that case it should both comprise women and replace the Handicapped Workers Act, are matters that go beyond the scope of this report.

Under the Canadian Act, the obligation for minorities to be at least proportionately represented among employees is assessed in terms of the situation in that sector of the labour-market in which the employer in question may be said to operate in recruiting staff. This too opens up the possibility of improving the accessibility for immigrants of higher and 'visible' positions and of a freer circulation of non-indigenous personnel, which would contribute significantly to the equal opportunities of the groups in question. Thus the multi-ethnic nature of society can also be reflected in the labour force and it becomes clear that immigrants are capable of more than just relatively unskilled work. The government should set a lead by promoting employment opportunities in its own staffing policy and by reaching agreements with the state-funded sector. Services in contact with a multi-ethnic public, such as the police, the health system and education, have a direct interest in a multi-ethnic workforce and should make serious efforts to that end. Similarly the armed forces can provide a framework for the integration of Netherlands citizens of foreign origin. Among others things this might necessitate making existing selection procedures as culturally fair as possible.

Measures to improve the accessibility of private organizations by means of legislation along the lines of the Canadian Employment Equity Act demand a comparable effort throughout the apparatus of government. For the central government this involves the systematic continuation of current activities such as its Ethnic Minorities in the Public Service scheme (EMO) and its special Thousand-jobs scheme for Moluccans. The government could also help employing organizations to comply with the statutory obligations outlined above by the provision of information and advice on the Act and the kinds of positive action that might be taken. Such information would best be provided by the employment offices. The Central Manpower Services Board could usefully distil the lessons to be learned from its experience and pass these on to the Regional Manpower Services Boards and the employment offices.

One further measure which the Council would advocate in this respect is that of contract compliance, whereby the extent to which companies had made serious efforts to employ immigrants would be made a criterion in awarding government contracts. The introduction of an Employment Equity Act would furnish the necessary information for the government to draw distinctions between individual employers. Companies that measured up to the requirements could be designated as equal-opportunity employers and be given preference in the awarding of government contracts, a system which has proved effective in the United States and Great Britain. The measure would not be at variance with current legislation and could also be squared with the demands of the European internal market in so far as contract compliance did not entail discrimination against companies based elsewhere in the Community.

These proposals are all designed to promote the participation of foreign workers in formal employment. Also of major importance for Dutch society, however, is the promotion of entrepreneurship on the part of non-indigenous persons. As noted recently in a government policy document on the entrepreneurship of members of ethnic minorities: 'The Dutch economy stands to benefit from the further commercial success of immigrant entrepreneurs and from the proper utilization of the entrepreneurial potential among ethnic minorities.' Entrepreneurs of foreign origin also fulfil important social functions. Insofar as they have a non-indigenous clientele they help meet specific group and religious needs. More generally the successful immigrant entrepreneur helps contribute towards a positive image of the ethnic group in question.

One of the key aspects of the policy intentions set out in the government document referred to above is that of promoting the prospects of success. A knowledge of Dutch is particularly important for successful entrepreneurship, especially where there is a multi-ethnic clientele. Such knowledge is also important for the ability to make use of general facilities for new and existing entrepreneurs. The specific facilities for immigrant entrepreneurs as proposed by the government in the field of information, advice, support and entrepreneurial training are, in the Council's view, essential for lowering the barriers to entrepreneurship by immigrants.

A number of changes are taking place in the government's general policies towards small and medium-sized business that are also of relevance for entrepreneurship on the part of immigrants. In its report 'Tailoring Policy to the Needs of the Small and Medium-sized Business' issued in 1987, the Council made a number of recommendations for encouraging small and medium-sized business. One of those recommendations related to the simplification of the existing system of regulation, while the Council also urged that the scope for moving into and out of business should be increased.

A significant barrier to entrepreneurship in the field of small and medium-sized business is formed by the regulations on establishment, which lay down requirements with respect to professional expertise, commercial knowledge and credit-worthiness. In a sector such as that of small and medium-sized business, dominated as it is by the operation of free market forces, the conditions for entry should be the same for all. Any differentiation of these conditions in terms of the characteristics of certain groups would interfere with market forces. Such differentiation does however take place in relation to subjects from other EC countries wishing to provide commercial services in the Netherlands. These people are permitted to set up in the Netherlands if they have satisfied the requirements of the establishment regulations in the country of origin or, in the absence of such legislation, have been active in the industry in question as an entrepreneur in their own country for a certain

number of years. This raises the question of the desirability of relaxing the establishment regulations in the Netherlands. According to the policy document 'Freeing the path for commercial activity: policy towards small and medium-sized business in a new perspective', in which, among other things, the government sets out its reaction to the aforementioned report of the Council, the government is working towards such a simplification. A bill submitted to the Lower House, for example, proposes scrapping the credit-worthiness requirement. This would mean that the evaluation of credit-worthiness would – in line with practice – become solely a matter for the bank from which the entrepreneur/would-be entrepreneur is raising funds.

In addition the government is conducting a survey into three possibilities: the maintenance, simplification and abolition of the legislation on business establishment. In the case of the 'simplification' option, the requirements laid down by the Act would be confined to commercial knowledge; it would be assumed that major consumer interests were already sufficiently protected under other laws.

This report is not the place for an examination of this general problem. The Council does, however, consider that, in devising policies in this general area, the ease with which immigrant entrepreneurs or would-be entrepreneurs can enter the field of small and medium-sized business should be a factor that is taken into account. According to the Council, a system under which entry depended solely on the quality of the business plan would be fair to immigrant would-be entrepreneurs who had practical knowledge but lacked any form of business diploma. If it were decided that the requirement of professional skills should be retained, steps would need to be taken to ensure that qualified newcomers did not – as can sometimes happen under the present application of the Business Establishment Act – encounter difficulty in setting up business in certain industries. While guaranteeing equal conditions of competition is of course an important feature of any new legislation, these should not be such as to throw up unintended barriers to entry.

4.2.2 Education

Apart from employment, one of the main focal points of integration policy is education. The growing need for better-trained people makes it essential for the education system to be opened up to those for whom the language and cultural barriers are too high. Failure to do so will mean a wastage of talent.

This section examines the education of school-age immigrant children, while the next section deals with the role of education and training, among other things as these affect the entry of immigrants into the labour market. In both cases the Council advocates measures to promote integration that are more specifically tailored to the needs of the immigrants than at present. Effective monitoring of the progress being made under those policies would form an indispensable part.

The Council considers that greater attention should be devoted to the reception in education of recently arrived immigrants who are still of school age: over a third of the Turkish and Moroccan pupils at Dutch schools arrived after the age of four and therefore first came into contact with the Dutch language at primary school. Many immigrant children born in the Netherlands also lack sufficient Dutch when they commence primary education. An adequate knowledge of Dutch is an essential precondition for a successful school career among immigrant children. Top priority should therefore be accorded to improving the facilities for bringing the knowledge of Dutch among these children up to the desired standard in a short space of time and for maintaining those standards.

In this respect the Council would propose that new life be breathed into the regulations for reception education, which have rather gone into abeyance in recent years. In each school, or combination of schools, reception classes should be set up for young immigrants whose knowledge of Dutch is inadequate. This should be done at both primary and secondary level and the classes should be differentiated by age. The classes would be designed to provide the recent arrivals as quickly as possible with a sufficient knowledge of Dutch and the Netherlands for them to take part fruitfully in regular education. Admission to regular education would depend on passing a test. The incorporation of such reception classes in regular schools would create possibilities from the inception for informal contact with native Dutch speakers. Similarly in the case of migrant infants born in the Netherlands any linguistic deficiencies should rapidly be remedied before children were taught how to read and write. More and improved forms of day care at the pre-school stage could also help reduce linguistic deficiencies. In addition the Council will recommend that, where necessary, special language classes are set up for migrant children starting primary school. These children could spend part of their day in such classes and the rest of their time in ordinary classes with their contemporaries who were familiar with Dutch. Once again it would be necessary to pass a test to leave the language class. In both cases – i.e. those starting school at the earliest age and those arriving at a later point – linguistic skills should be carefully monitored throughout their school careers, with supplementary courses for those who were falling behind.

If this strategy is to succeed, new methods of teaching Dutch as a second language need to be introduced on a wide scale. Which method is the most effective in which circumstances will have to be established by research. The question as to whether the mother tongue will need to play a role in the teaching of Dutch and, if so which one, can also be looked at. The provision of education in Dutch as a second language will require specialized expertise, not just for older but also for young children. To this end special teacher training courses will need to be set up, in anticipation of which refresher training should be provided in existing courses. The proposed intensive language and reception policy should apply to all children for whom Dutch (or Frisian) is not their first language, i.e. not just for children from minorities.

The Council attaches great importance to improving the ‘return’ on education to minorities in other ways as well. A critical factor here will be to ensure that boys and girls do in fact go to school, that there is an adequate system of supervision and that penalties exist where children fail to go to school. Efforts must be made to promote a higher rate of continuation to senior secondary education and above all to reduce the number of migrant children who leave school without a certificate.

Rather than tampering with school-leaving standards, consideration could be given to a range of measures and facilities making it easier for immigrant children to benefit from education. Such facilities might range from homework classes to teacher re-training, from making examinations culturally ‘fair’ to enlarging the involvement of immigrant parents in the education of their children; and from the introduction of day-schools with longer hours to encouraging immigrants to take teacher training courses. The latter, it has been shown in practice, is particularly important.

The effectiveness of these and similar facilities and measures will vary from situation to situation. It will generally be up to the school in question to decide which are most needed in a particular situation. To this end it might be possible to set up a national information centre, which could collate the available knowledge and experience on education to ethnic children for provision to schools.

In principle these measures and facilities would fit in logically with the governments educational priority policy. Provisional evaluations of that policy indicates, however, that it lacks effectiveness in its present form, at least as far as immigrant children are concerned. Schools currently receive extra funding for each pupil from a minority group, but it is unclear to what extent these funds are in fact used for extra facilities on behalf of these pupils. The Council would recommend that in future these funds be specifically set aside for measures and facilities destined for minorities. Not just for this purpose, but also for the reception and language classes for non-native Dutch speakers referred to earlier, new financing methods need to be devised in which both 'input' and 'output' are taken into account. In other words, not just the number of pupils from minority groups/non-native Dutch speakers but the results obtained should play a part in deciding the funds that schools receive in the framework of integration policy.

There will of course need to be sufficient scope for differentiation. As in the labour market, the application of simple equity formulae is unlikely to be of real practical use in education. One possibility would be to create a requirement for the activities plan annually submitted by each school to the Schools Inspectorate to contain specific, quantified objectives in relation to immigrant pupils. If these objectives are achieved the school would then qualify for supplementary funding for use as it saw fit. This strategy is analogous to that in the Employment Equity Act proposed by the Council; once again it would call for the publication of activities plans and plan evaluations.

The measures proposed here would apply to both primary and secondary education, especially first-stage secondary schooling. Participation by certain minority groups in higher forms of education remains very limited. The Council considers it essential for this to change: this would then increase the chances for immigrants to hold down key positions in society and would encourage the formation of an immigrant leadership. Institutes of higher education whose graduates included members of minority groups could be specially rewarded. Students in higher education with an insufficient command of Dutch should follow Dutch language courses at advanced level, if necessary being given extra time to do so.

Many of the measures described above are designed to improve the quality of education provided to non-indigenous children. Despite the dedication of many of the teachers, it is precisely in schools with many ethnic pupils that educational standards have left something to be desired. The so-called 'concentration' schools are generally in deprived areas. Traditionally, few pupils have gone on from such schools to higher forms of education. Surveys have, however, failed to provide evidence to support the contention that the poor quality of education in concentration schools is a *result* of the large number of non-indigenous children at those schools. Some indigenous Dutch parents nevertheless consider that such a link does exist and therefore send their children to different schools, sometimes at a considerable distance. The arguments advanced in this report in favour of improving the standard of education could mean that, precisely at concentration schools, the opposite occurred. As an additional factor, the introduction of the system of basic education in the Netherlands with standardised course objectives would make it easier to compare the educational attainment of each school, at least at secondary level. This would therefore provide an additional means of monitoring the standard of education at schools with a high proportion of immigrant pupils.

At the present time the Council sees no need for measures explicitly designed to bring about a redistribution of indigenous and non-indigenous pupils among the schools in a particular region. The Council regards the establishment of

schools on a religious basis by certain immigrant groups as a logical extension of the fact that the Netherlands has become a multi-ethnic society, apart from which the educational legislation explicitly provides for just such differentiation. Needless to say it is important for the standard of education at such schools to be carefully monitored, as they are at other denominational schools.

It will be clear that the Council regards education as an important instrument for stimulating the integration of minorities and promoting their social chances. This will only succeed if education takes sufficient account of the fact that immigrant pupils have a non-Dutch cultural background, which is why the Council has put forward a number of specific measures designed to bridge the marked difference between the home and school environment with which some immigrant children are confronted. This raises the question as to whether schools should also be expected to teach the language and culture which its pupils bring from home.

Education in minorities' own language and culture has come in for more debate in recent years than its comparatively modest place in school timetables would justify. The practical elaboration of this form of education deserves no special plaudits; the objectives are vague and little is known about the effectiveness of such instruction. The debate about this form of education has, however, become emotionally charged, which has consistently had the effect of distracting attention from the real problems of education to minorities. In this respect it is often forgotten that education in individuals' own language and culture is voluntary (and not compulsory!).

Despite these objections and ambiguities, many teachers in this field form an important link between the school and the migrant family, to the benefit of integration. Although the latter is a 'by-product', the Council attaches sufficient weight to this consideration to justify the retention of instruction in pupils' own language and culture. It does, however, consider that the voluntary nature of education in own language and culture should receive greater emphasis. The Council would therefore recommend that education in own language and culture henceforth be provided outside the regular curriculum, but within the school. A further advantage is the fact that, in this way, migrant pupils would not have to miss other lessons. The Council would also urge restraint in relation to the introduction of education in own language and culture for groups to whom such instruction is not yet being offered. The non-indigenous community in the Netherlands is likely not just to continue growing but also to become more diversified, so that the development of good teaching material is almost bound to run into problems. As a separate question it may be asked whether the provision of education in own language and culture is not primarily the responsibility of the migrant groups themselves rather than that of the educational authorities. This point is examined in more detail in section 4.3.

So far efforts to get intercultural education off the ground have had little success. The introduction of this form of education was probably not sufficiently thought through; a great deal of ambiguity could have been avoided if the objectives had been spelt out more clearly. The basic idea behind intercultural education is that familiarity with other cultures is essential in order to function in a multi-racial society. In the absence of such insight there will be a natural tendency to elevate one's own culture into a universal yardstick and to regard anything else as alien and inferior. Intercultural education should help promote unity despite the diversity: a basic precondition for living together in the same society.

Precisely with a view to such unity, however, it is important for pupils all to receive one and the same basic education. As such, intercultural education is of

greater relevance in terms of setting the tone for education as a whole rather than as a separate subject. In its report 'Basic Education' (1986) the Council suggested that in each subject three elements consistently play a role:

- a knowledge of basic structures, often of an analytical and abstract nature;
- the ability to do something with that knowledge;
- insight into the cultural environment, i.e. the ability to orient oneself in a complex society.

If these three elements all come into their own in basic education, for example in history and geography, this can then generate the kind of understanding with which intercultural education is concerned. A separate subject runs the risk of being unable to impart the basic knowledge, so that insight into the 'complex' society necessarily remains superficial. This in turn creates the risk that the transfer of knowledge will remain confined to the realm of folklore. The Council considers that intercultural education, viewed as a perspective for basic education as a whole, can indeed make a contribution to the process of acculturation as pursued by the government. In the Council's view the contribution of the measures proposed earlier in this section, especially with respect to the teaching of Dutch and improving the quality of education, are, however, more significant.

4.2.3 **Adult Education**

In many cases the fact that so many immigrants are poorly placed in the labour market is closely related to their lack of education and/or inadequate knowledge of Dutch. Many adult immigrants lack initial and/or vocational training; a high proportion start vocational training courses in the Netherlands but fail to complete them. Many recently arrived migrants have not completed the equivalent of primary education in the Netherlands, let alone had any vocational training. Those who have completed vocational training in their country of origin often find that their qualifications do not correspond with those sought in the Netherlands. For many immigrants, therefore, adult education in the form of primary schooling, orientation, bridging courses and vocational training can act as an important means of improving their prospects in the labour market. In addition courses in Dutch and/or knowledge of Dutch society can help immigrants to find their way. This does, however, demand an adult education infrastructure consistent with the characteristics and educational potential of the target immigrant participants.

One of the basic features of this report is the view that minorities and future immigrants should be enabled in due course to play an economically valuable and socio-culturally enriching part in Dutch society. This basic premise has many features in common with the approach outlined in the Council's report *An Active Labour-Market Policy* (1987), which centred on the creation of training facilities and participation in a work experience place. In relation to the policy of integration advocated in the present report, two qualifications are in order.

The first of these is that apart from vocational training and work experience, the other forms of adult education are also necessary for many immigrants (certainly more so than for indigenous Dutch people) to find their way in Dutch society and to improve their prospects in the labour market. These forms of education cover primary education and day/evening classes. The primary education syllabus is directed towards linguistic skills (reading and writing, Dutch as a second language and elementary English), numeracy, social skills and (sometimes) vocational orientation. In day/evening classes adults are given a second chance to obtain a general non-vocational educational certificate or credit (e.g. to enable them to proceed to vocational training).

The second qualification is the fact that an 'active educational policy' should be

of relevance not just for the unemployed and women returners to the labour market but also for all other immigrants lacking a proper adult basic education or whose knowledge of Dutch society contains gaps: the aim, in other words, is broader than the integration of the unemployed into the labour system. At stake is the integration of immigrant minorities in Dutch society, irrespective of whether they are seeking employment or not.

In the Council's view, an active educational policy for adult immigrants should rest on three pillars: *compulsory basic education*, a *right to education* and *custom-made* schooling. The compulsory basic education and right to education should relate to elementary knowledge of Dutch and Dutch society and where necessary also to elementary numeracy and social skills. The introduction of compulsory education would, of course, depend on the availability of adequate educational facilities.

The basic education requirement may in part be regarded as a negative formulation of the right to education. The Council would advocate that all adult members of minorities (with the exception of asylum-seekers) be given a right to education. This would make it clear that a certain level of knowledge was regarded as so indispensable for the ability to function in Dutch society that the government was prepared to provide education free not just to young people but also to adults. At the least, the right to education should extend to taking part free of charge in various specified courses at basic education level. It should also extend to participation in courses in 'functional/vocationally oriented Dutch'. The latter would be particularly important for those immigrants who had at least completed primary education and who had also mastered everyday Dutch but were not sufficiently fluent in terms of their actual or intended profession.

The basic education requirement – that is, the obligation to make use of the right to education - should at any event apply to recently arrived migrants in some way dependent on the government and unemployed immigrant benefit claimants whose level of education was below the equivalent of Dutch primary schooling, including young female immigrants whose husbands are drawing social security benefits. It would appear advisable to set a maximum age of perhaps fifty years for the compulsory education component. (The question as to whether, given the non-discrimination principle, a basic education requirement should also be imposed on other grounds of residents - e.g. illiterate members of the indigenous population - all residents dependent on unemployment benefits goes beyond the scope of this report.)

Recently arrived immigrants should be provided with facilities to acquire the knowledge and skills required to help find their way in the Netherlands. Steps should be taken to ensure that children of school age, including girls, do in fact go to school. During the early stages priority should be accorded to learning Dutch. The facilities required for this purpose were discussed in section 4.2.2.

Better reception facilities should also be developed for new immigrants of above school age. Within the basic education system, introductory courses on Dutch and orientation in Dutch society should be offered on a broad scale. The courses should be intensive, should if necessary impart basic literacy skills and should be differentiated in terms of the abilities and characteristics of the participants. Participation in such courses, which should last at least six months, should be made compulsory for all persons, irrespective of sex or religion, who are dependent on the government after arrival and who have not been educated beyond the equivalent of Dutch primary schooling. Failure to participate in such courses would entail a cut in benefit. The Council considers it fair to make the courses compulsory since the skills and knowledge which many immigrants have on arrival often leave them without prospects in the

labour market if they wish to stay in the Netherlands and also make it difficult for Dutch institutions to help them. As an ancillary argument, it is not without reason that the period of compulsory education in the Netherlands is twelve years – considerably longer than the period that most immigrants will have received in their country of origin. In the case of those not dependent upon the government after arrival there would be no such obligation; instead they would have the proposed right to education (i.e. basic education and functional Dutch).

The reception facilities for recently arrived immigrants proposed above would require a reception and counselling structure. To this end the Council would propose the establishment of special advisory centres in the large and medium-sized municipalities. These centres would be responsible for receiving recently arrived immigrants, for directing them to the either compulsory or non-compulsory educational facilities, for support and counselling and for directing them to an employment office or to a joint local employment office/Municipal Social Services Department (GAB-GSD) scheme. The centres would therefore be concerned not with one-off reception but with regular contact until the point that the immigrant had established himself of herself in the Netherlands, up to a maximum of say five years.

In the case of immigrants of more than school age and who have been *resident in the Netherlands for some time* the right to education would be offered (consisting of basic education and functional Dutch) as well as opportunities for further vocational training. Such training should be primarily geared to the needs of the Dutch labour market and, where possible, should build on the knowledge and skills of those concerned. This can be particularly important for the many immigrant young people who left regular education prematurely in the recent past. The training should be designed to provide those concerned with the necessary equipment to function effectively in Dutch society. Once again it is worth noting the importance of the support centres subsidised by the Ministry of Welfare, Health and Cultural Affairs. These bodies are not just able to inform immigrants about the possibilities open to them in the fields of training and basic education, and to recruit course participants, but can also fulfil a function by identifying the existence of cultural ‘prejudice’ in the organization and form of adult education or particular elements of such education.

The recommendations below are, in the first place, designed to bring about a universal ‘active education policy’ although, given the large number of unemployed immigrants, this will be of particular importance for the integration of minorities. One feature of this active education policy is that it is custom-made: the schooling should build on the existing knowledge and potential of the participants. This also implies that where this is not already the case, adult education should make allowance for participants with a non-Dutch cultural background, with particular emphasis on eliminating cultural bias in the classroom, teaching materials and examinations.

As it stands, however, the basic education system lacks the necessary capacity, especially for courses in Dutch as a second language. Extra capacity would also be needed for literacy courses and for the support and counselling of teachers and the intake. If the basic education requirement and the complementary right to education are to be introduced, the capacity of the basic education system would need to be greatly expanded. At present no certificates are awarded to those who complete basic education in the Netherlands. The Council considers that such certificates might be introduced to advantage in the case of linguistic and numeracy skills. A system of certificates would provide course participants with extra motivation, as evidence of having attained a certain standard. Certificates could also be useful as a qualification for further training and for job applications.

The present system of day/evening classes lacks the resources to bring immigrant pupils up to the required level for regular diplomas and certificates. The same applies to the bridging courses for further vocational training. These courses – especially crash courses in Dutch and courses in functional Dutch – can be particularly valuable in helping immigrants who have already completed a certain degree of training in their countries of origin to adapt quickly to Dutch ways of learning and working. Greater resources should be allocated to day/evening classes with a view to providing more extensive facilities in these areas.

There are various ways in which the involvement of industry in vocational training could be enlarged. One way would be to open up internal and external vocational training courses to those seeking work. Legislative provisions already exist for the necessary funding. A second method, which would also have the effect of reinforcing the former, would be the provision of some form of job guarantee to participants who successfully completed a training course. This could form a particularly attractive alternative for the many immigrant early school-leavers. A job guarantee could take many forms: it could be offered to all or just a fixed proportion of course participants; the jobs in question could be either permanent or temporary; and a guarantee could apply to a particular company or undertaking or to an industry in a given region. Job guarantees could be provided by companies or industry associations, negotiated by an employment office or form part of a collective labour agreement. A job guarantee has been shown to act as a powerful incentive to participate in and complete vocational training. With the placement of the manpower services on a tripartite basis, these kinds of industry initiatives could achieve a considerable scale.

In combination with some form of job guarantee, the introduction as called for earlier of a statutory regulation to promote job prospects could provide a significant impulse to vocational training. As an extension of the system of compulsory annual reporting on the degree of representation of immigrant persons among employees, consultations between employers and employees could promote the development of this kind of longitudinal training and the employment of specific groups.

An important fact, evident for example from discussions with individuals seeking to re-orient themselves in the labour market, is that training for the long-term unemployed has to be on an individual, custom-made basis. Participating in a single course is seldom sufficient to generate genuine prospects in the labour market. In many cases, the long-term unemployed require highly specialized and in some cases lengthy training, preferably in combination with a work-experience place. Initial experience with longitudinal training courses of this kind is being acquired in the case of persons returning to the labour market and in certain adult education courses. Given the obstinate nature of long-term unemployment and the permanent nature of immigration, the non-existence of institutionalized longitudinal training is a clear lack. Longitudinal training packages (including work experience) should not just be devised in consultation with those concerned, but provision should also be made to assist participants through the various stages of the training in the form of a set person to whom they can turn in time of difficulty. The counsellor can help prevent an individual from getting stuck in a certain institution or from failing to move on to a subsequent institution. He or she can also intervene if progress is unsatisfactory or if the training is prematurely terminated. Institutionalized programme counselling of this kind is unknown in the Netherlands. In the context of an active training policy, this function would appropriately be handled by an employment office or a local employment exchange/Municipal Social Services Department partnership scheme. The Council considers that 'custom-made training', consisting of

course programme development and counselling, deserves high priority on the agenda of the forthcoming Central and Regional Manpower Services Bureaus.

The final element of the 'active training policy' would be the actual imposition of penalties where individuals refused to accept suitable training, suitable basic education and/or suitable work experience. The active training policy implies that bodies responsible for supervising social security benefits would in fact exercise their powers. In terms of combatting unemployment, this would underline the belief that unemployment is not just a matter of a shortage of jobs but also reflects skill shortages. Efforts to redress these imbalances will be required not just on the part of the employed and those in education but also on the part of the unemployed. Those failing to avail themselves of the available opportunities would face a substantial reduction in their unemployment benefits. The rationale for compulsory basic education – which applies more widely than to just the unemployed – is that certain skills are essential for an effective functioning in Dutch society and for participating in the work-force. The latter would apply not just to men – leaving aside the elderly and the infirm – but to all indigenous and non-indigenous women aged 18 or above in 1990 or turning 18 at some later date.

It may be noted that the introduction of the right to education will, in practice, be more important for many people than the policing of compulsory basic education for social-security benefit purposes. For many, the compulsory nature of education will be secondary: the prime consideration will be that they are being granted a right to education up to basic level and to the acquisition of functional Dutch.

4.2.4 Other policy areas

The integration policy advocated by the Council focusses primarily on the fields of employment, education and adult education. At the same time, other areas of policy are of course confronted with the existence of immigrants. A successful integration policy in these three areas may, however, be expected to reduce the need for specific policies in other fields.

Partly as a result of vigorous public involvement in the field of *housing*, the living conditions of immigrants have improved in various respects during the 1980s. These conditions are slowly but surely becoming comparable with those of indigenous persons in the same socio-economic position, so that, in terms of the philosophy underlying this report, there is a steadily decreasing need for housing policies specifically directed towards immigrants. At the same time, it has to be recognized that many immigrants remain dependant on the bottom end of the housing stock, i.e. poor quality dwellings in run-down urban areas. As a result they are to a large and increasing extent dependent on public services.

The new policy intentions as laid down in the Draft Policy Document Housing in the 1990s could result in a growing shortage of the cheapest kinds of subsidized housing. The planned changes could also lead to a further rise in housing costs, especially for tenants in the subsidised sector. This subject properly forms part of general housing policy, however, and does not lend itself to detailed comment in this report. In so far as this report is confined to specific immigrant policies, it is relevant to ask to what extent immigrants are disproportionately affected by the proposed housing policies, thereby making it necessary to consider specific measures. The Council does not rule out the possibility that this might be necessary at some point in the future. At this stage, however, it considers it would be premature to conclude that the effects of the Policy Document will be such as to create a need for housing policies specifically tailored to immigrants.

In an effort to respond to developments in urban areas with a high proportion of immigrants, the government has introduced policies to deal with *deprived or cumulative problem areas*. These policies are designed to approach the complex problems of generally old urban areas as a coordinated whole. The Council considers that there is only limited justification for regarding the policies to deal with deprived areas as part of minorities policy. These policies are after all concerned with both indigenous and non-indigenous persons; their point of departure is place of residence rather than a lack of integration based on immigrant origin.

As such the deprived areas policy fits in poorly with a new policy philosophy which is sectoral rather than geographical. Many activities currently taking place under the aegis of the deprived areas policy certainly deserve to be stimulated, but then as part of employment or education policy, etc. Care should also be taken to ensure that the 'regular' urban renewal policy does not work systematically to the disadvantage of immigrants. The deprived areas policy, which is highly complex administratively, could in the Council's view disappear as a separate element of national government policy. Local, successful initiatives and projects set up in this framework could be continued as a municipal responsibility. For the purposes of coordination the municipalities in question will need sufficient financial resources (see section 5.2).

Even in the event of policies that are considerably more effective than those at present, some immigrants will remain on the margins of society. In comparison with the Dutch population as a whole, it may even be assumed that this will be a large proportion of the immigrants. The reality unfortunately is that aborted education courses, lack of fluency in Dutch, drug abuse and crime, combined with the repeated evidence of discrimination on the part of indigenous persons, will continue to exert a highly adverse effect on the future prospects of young immigrants for many years to come. The Council believes that a major effort is required to contain these problems and their consequences and above all to prevent them from recurring in future non-indigenous generations.

The dead-end situation in which some immigrants find themselves can manifest itself in various ways. Older people often suffer from health problems, particularly of a psychological nature. The treatment of psychological problems among persons from cultural backgrounds widely different from that of the Netherlands calls for specialist expertise. The health care system is not always up to the task; a greater number of specialist facilities are required in this field. Among young people, cultural differences can lead to tensions with their parents; in other cases there is a lack of proper parental control. These phenomena tend to be a good deal more common among certain immigrant groups than others. The young people in question may decide to leave home and can then find themselves in a downward spiral of problem and criminal behaviour. The police, courts, prison system, social work for young people, welfare work and rehabilitation are then left to pick up the pieces, but are generally ill-equipped to do anything about the underlying causes.

The agencies and institutions with which immigrant youth with problems comes into contact needs to be adequately equipped for the task. Not only does this call for specialist expertise; dealing with immigrants is generally also more time-consuming, a factor that needs to be reflected in the staffing-levels of these bodies. In certain cases the expertise required to provide proper help to immigrants is so specialized as to warrant the setting up of special bodies. This applies not just in the field of *justice and crime prevention* but also in the fields of *welfare and health care*. Examples include facilities in the fields of mental health care, the control of drug abuse, facilities for runaway wives, youth welfare services or problems closely related to migration. Given the

demographic structure of the non-indigenous community, the need for specialist facilities for the elderly from these groups could also grow in the foreseeable future.

More generally the Council has the impression that it was decided too lightly several years ago to abolish the first-contact welfare services for immigrants and that the consequences have not been adequately absorbed within regular welfare work. At the time this switch in policy was justified on the grounds that immigration was likely to come to an end and that the general institutions would also be opened up to immigrants. The first of these assumptions has since proved to be ill-founded; the second has taken place on paper, but in practice far too little has been achieved. In addition the sector has suffered from drastic spending cuts which, apart from obstructing the development of new activities, have had a marked effect on labour-intensive tasks such as welfare work for immigrants.

One complication in this respect is the fact that welfare policy has since been decentralized to municipal level, including recently welfare policy for minorities. The possibility can certainly not be ruled out that certain municipalities – particularly those with high numbers of immigrants – will sooner or later revert to the setting up or subsidization of first-contact welfare facilities specifically directed towards the immigrant community. In order to stimulate this development, the Ministry of Welfare, Health and Cultural Affairs could make additional funds available on the basis of output financing to organizations specifically and successfully concerned with first-contact welfare work. Provision exists in principle for such funding under the Welfare Act.

4.3 Cultural policy

In a cultural sense Dutch society has traditionally been plural. As early as the 17th century the wide diversity in religious and philosophical views induced a spirit tolerance for beliefs other than the politically dominant ones. Long before the French Revolution, this forbearance towards those of differing persuasion made the Netherlands into a refuge for people persecuted for their beliefs. This comparative liberality may be said to have contributed appreciably to the cultural and material prosperity of Dutch society in the 17th and early 18th century.

In the first half of the 19th century the principle of forbearance was affirmed in the form of the constitutionally enshrined rights of freedom of belief, freedom of the press and freedom of association and assembly. The evolution towards a more active role for government, dating to the start of the last century, led ultimately to the acceptance of two principles. In those cases where educational and socio-cultural facilities were provided by the state or were wholly or partly publicly funded, the government should respect the cultural and philosophical diversity within Dutch society by:

- permitting the facilities to organize themselves and take whatever form they saw fit; and
- ensuring material equality where these facilities were financed or co-financed by the government.

This constitutionally enshrined solution initially appeared to provide a guarantee for the preservation of the existing cultural and religious diversity in the Netherlands. After the Second World War and especially in the last three decades it also permitted a comparatively rapid change in attitudes and insights within the main religious, ideological and cultural pillars of Dutch society.

Immigration has, in the past, contributed significantly towards greater cultural diversity in the Netherlands. To take just a few examples, there was the arrival of Portuguese Jews in the 17th century, of the Huguenots in the early 18th century and of East-European Jews and Westphalian Germans in the 19th century. Given the established principles of tolerance and – later – the constitutionally enshrined freedom of self-organization and equality of treatment, these inflows did not produce any major problems.

When it comes to freedom to experience an independent cultural identity and outlook on life and to the creation and maintenance of the necessary material conditions, there are no grounds for placing more recent arrivals, either individually or collectively, in a special position; the principles outlined above apply with equal force.

The latter is self-evident in so far as a special position in society entails being placed at a disadvantage in relation to the indigenous population. But the reverse also applies: preferential treatment by the government with a view to protecting cultural or philosophical identity is no more permitted! Such preferential treatment would be at variance with the equality principle and would inevitably imply a public judgement as to the substantive value of the identity in question: a judgement not assigned to the government under the Dutch system. However well-intentioned the aspirations and recommendations for the selective preferential treatment of weaker ethnic groups to enable them to enjoy their own identity may be, they by-pass the fact that the government is obliged to maintain substantive neutrality in preserving the freedom of self-organization and – in a positive sense – providing resources for that purpose.

In those cases where members of immigrant groupings lack the necessary means to experience their own cultural identity and outlook on life, the government should seek where possible to reduce those barriers to much the same level as those confronting indigenous groupings. The experience in the United States suggests that the cultural and religious identity of minorities tends to be eroded if individual members of those minorities fail to bridge the socio-economic gap between themselves and the majority of the population and find themselves permanently at a disadvantage. Seen in these terms the need for integration in a socio-economic sense, as urged in this report, also provides a significant precondition for the ability to preserve and sustain a separate cultural identity.

The role of the government may take two different forms. In those cases where the existing arrangements in the socio-cultural field pre-suppose a basic self-organizing capacity within the various groups having a separate culture or outlook on life, it can provide general facilities to help eliminate material obstacles. At first sight such facilitative measures may appear wholly unexceptionable, but caution is in fact in order if the government is not to find itself inadvertently involved in exercising power against individuals within immigrant groups who break the law (in the past, for example, government facilities have been abused by the Turkish 'grey wolves' or the Moroccan *Amicales*).

The second option open to the government is likely to yield greater results and to involve fewer risks. This consists of a reappraisal of the existing quantitative and qualitative criteria for access to certain publicly funded facilities designed to promote the ability to experience a separate cultural identity. These, generally more or less objectified, criteria date from a period in which the 'new' minorities did not exist on the present scale. Given the growth in cultural and philosophical diversity that has taken place since then, there may be grounds for reviewing the existing entry barriers. An example would be the facilities for worship in the armed forces or the prison system.

The above implies that cultural policy towards immigrant groupings can also apply even where there is no evidence of a socio-economic gap. In principle the facilitative role of the government can also be activated on behalf of an immigrant grouping which is not (or no longer) the object of integration policy (e.g. Chinese or Indonesian Dutch nationals). In contrast to the present minorities policy, therefore, cultural policy should form an independent element of policy towards the non-indigenous community.

In so far as cultural policy may be regarded as part of immigrant policy, the Council would distinguish two aspects: the intra and the inter-group aspect. This division is inspired by the definition provided by the Dutch social scientist Penninx of 'ethno-cultural position'.

As far as the intra-group aspect of cultural policy is concerned, the aim should be to enable members of immigrant groupings if they so wish to experience their own cultural identity and to pass it on to succeeding generations. In the light of the principles formulated above in respect of immigrant groups seeking to establish facilities or organizations based on their particular outlook on life, this means in concrete terms that the same subsidy conditions should apply as for indigenous groups. Reference was previously made in this context to the establishment of Moslem and Hindu schools.

Within non-indigenous groups, language teaching and education in their own religion and/or culture play an important role. In practice such education assumes widely differing forms. In certain Moslem communities the teaching of the Koran takes up a great deal of time and attention. Such instruction forms part of extra-curricular religious education, which does not qualify for government support. The Council does, however, consider that government schools should provide facilities for religious education (on a voluntary basis) in non-Christian religions. Education in own language and culture has already been discussed. Some groups already receive such instruction as part of primary education while others organize it themselves, in some cases with Embassy support.

In section 4.2.2 the Council advised that in so far as it is at present provided at primary level, education in own language and culture should be continued but be provided outside the normal curriculum. In this way the responsibility for this kind of instruction would lie more clearly than at present with the immigrant groups themselves. It would also mean that the present difference in treatment between immigrant groups would diminish. Immigrant groups lacking such facilities as part of primary education could on request qualify for funding towards the costs of education in own language and culture, in so far as the latter was not at the expense of ordinary (Dutch) education.

Immigrant cultures have not so far made much of a mark in the Dutch media: the entry barriers are often too high. Even after recent expansions, the transmission time allocated to immigrant groups remains very limited. Local stations have proved to meet an important need for such groups and should therefore be provided with greater resources for immigrant people. A more distinct media presence on the part of immigrant groups could help promote a sense of cultural solidarity and greater familiarity with the habits and customs of other groups. Caution is, however, in order: well-intentioned information and education campaigns can sometimes have an unintended effect.

As far as the inter-group aspect of cultural policy is concerned, the main issue is to ensure that the groups in question can if they wish make their voice sufficiently heard for their wishes to be taken into account in a wider context. The improvement of inter-ethnic relations in a more general sense, i.e. independent of group interests, also comes under this heading.

For a considerable period now, the interests of certain immigrant groups in the Netherlands have been promoted through welfare work and by other organizations in which indigenous persons have been dominant. Only in recent years have these activities gradually been taken over by independent immigrant bodies, which have gradually become better structured. While welcoming this development, the Council considers that many such organizations concentrate excessively on lobbying the government: other sectors too, such as the social partners, might take greater and more effective account of the increasingly multi-ethnic nature of society. At national level this might be achieved by linking the representation of group interests less rigorously to the government apparatus. The fact that the National Advisory and Consultative Council on Minorities (LAO) is chaired by the Minister of Home Affairs while the secretariat of this body comes under his own Department acts as a brake on its ability to evolve into the principal platform for ethnic organizations in the country. The effectiveness and credibility of the LAO and the bodies represented in it would benefit if the LAO were to be given greater autonomy. Such a change would not, in the Council's view, necessarily have any implications for funding: public funds are also provided to independent representative organizations in other fields.

The way in which many of the so-called support centres operate could be improved. Their virtue resides primarily in the fact that they act as a professional intermediary between immigrant groups, ethnic organizations and the remainder of society. The tasks carried out by these bodies do not always appear properly tailored to the requirements and the way in which they operate depends excessively on accidental factors. Cooperation between the support centres working on behalf of various groups within the same region deserves to be strongly stimulated. Ultimately, a single information, welfare and executive training centre for immigrants and their organizations should be set up in each agglomeration or region. Such organizations would also be available for companies, schools or other bodies concerned with immigrants and their organizations, for example with a view to staff recruitment or approaching participants for training courses. These support centres need to play an activating role; once again the output financing model could usefully be applied.

In addition indigenous and non-indigenous people come into contact with one another through sport, in neighbourhood and community centres, in libraries and through other leisure activities. Most of these personal contacts of course take place without any government involvement in the home environment, at work, at school or in clubs and associations. The government's role is necessarily a modest one, being confined to the provision of facilities for activities helping to familiarize indigenous and non-indigenous persons with each other's culture, customs and habits, in the same way that public funding is provided for other events and exhibitions. Of much greater importance in the Council's view, however, is the provision of more and improved opportunities for indigenous and non-indigenous persons to come into contact with one another at work, at school, in the neighbourhood or in the course of their leisure activities. The integration policy as proposed in section 4.2 is designed to provide a framework for such contact.

5.1 The central government

To a greater extent than at present, the strategy proposed by the Council calls for specific measures in leading areas of government policy. This applies particularly in those cases where the integration of minorities is being pursued in the leading social institutions. These measures should mesh in as closely as possible with the regular policies in the sector in question. This means that the prime responsibility at national level should in all cases reside with the department most closely concerned. Doing so would mean that the coordination between general and specific measures within the one sector would receive higher priority than at present, while lower priority would be attached to the coordination of specific measures in the various sectors.

The latter means that policy coordination at national level can be adapted, in the sense that the overall direction from a single central point need weigh less heavily. Such direction will need to be primarily concerned with promoting the coordination within and monitoring the progress of overall government policy towards immigrants, i.e. aliens policy, integration policy and cultural policy. The evaluation of divergent policy intentions, and identifying the absence of such intentions, in the light of the principle objectives of immigrant policy would also be desirable in the future. The objectives themselves will also need to be regularly assessed in terms of the actual situation, while a periodic 'rating' of the target groups of integration policy will also be needed. This will require various forms of ethnic monitoring, conducted preferably by an independent institution.

According to the Council all this could best be handled by a central point within the government apparatus combining the functions of 'gad fly' and 'think tank' and which also made it its concern to keep immigrant policy on the political agenda. Continuation of the present system of periodic reporting to Parliament, along the lines of the annual Minorities Policy Action Programme, could also contribute to this process. Actual policy implementation, by contrast, should be entirely left to the departments concerned. The responsibilities of the coordinating minister would be confined to the aspects noted previously. Where coordination is required between departments or within a particular area of policy, this could be handled on an ad hoc basis.

In order to minimize jurisdictional conflicts, it would be advisable for the coordinating minister not to have any significant sectoral responsibilities as well. The same applies to the Ministers of Justice, Social Affairs and Employment, Education and Science, and Welfare, Health and Cultural Affairs. The Minister of General Affairs does not at present bear any responsibility for specific elements of government policy. Thus, in the Council's view, there is no reason to depart from this practice, which implies that the Minister of Home Affairs should remain responsible for monitoring the coordination and progress of government policy. Over the course of the years, the current Minorities Policy Directorate has assumed various responsibilities that go beyond those outlined earlier. These should be terminated or alternatively transferred to other departments. In the new situation a small, high-quality staff division is all that is required.

5.2 Relationship between central and local government

The division of responsibilities between the central government and local government in respect of immigrant policy is not always satisfactory. Those municipalities with large numbers of minorities tend especially to complain of a lack of resources. To a greater extent than the central government, the municipalities are directly confronted with certain problems and maintain that the existing regulations do not permit them to come up with adequate solutions.

In municipalities with a large immigrant community, certain problems can manifest themselves on such a scale as to change their character. A high local concentration of immigrants does not of course mean that the necessary policies should be entirely left to local government. A number of aspects lend themselves barely if at all to decentralized regulation, such as aliens policy, return migration policy and anti-discrimination policy. The role of municipal government is also limited in other significant fields. This applies for example to manpower services – although this is shortly to change – and to education, where the municipal executive acts not so much as the government as the competent authority.

Given such a varying allocation of responsibilities, municipal immigrant policy will of necessity not always be strictly coherent. In addition the Council takes the view that the municipalities should also conceive of their immigrant policy primarily as an adaptation of sectoral policy. At municipal level too, higher priority should be attached to the coordination of measures within a given sector than to the intersectoral coordination of policy. Nevertheless this can lead to problems, particularly where sectors abut and where policy responsibilities are differently organized in each of the sectors. This applies for example in the case of training.

The Council considers that 'concentration' municipalities should be in a position to find effective solutions, tailored to the local situation, for problems arising from the large immigrant population with which they have to deal. On the basis of the current division of responsibilities between the central government and the municipalities, the Council would make the following suggestions:

- a. continuation and if necessary intensification of the consultations between the concentration municipalities and the State, both with the Ministry of Home Affairs and with specialist departments;
- b. the concentration of specific (state) measures in particular fields, such as supplementary training and special educational facilities, within which the municipalities are given a certain freedom to make adjustments;
- c. an increase in the minorities loading currently paid to concentration municipalities in the general disbursements from the Municipalities Fund.

The latter proposal would enable supplementary facilities to be provided in line with local needs. In order to target these funds more effectively, it would be desirable to raise the minimum immigrant share required under the scheme from the present level of one percent. Apart from a structural increase, consideration might also be given to allocating to concentration municipalities the 'general sum' of Fl.11.5 million available until 1 January 1990 as part of the deprived areas policy, together with any other funds released from this source. Combined with the funds available under the former 'Minorities Welfare Regulation' (Fl.52.3 million), a municipal 'minorities pot' of over Fl.100 million could be built up in this way. It may not be in the interests of the immigrants for the allocation of these funds to left solely to intra-municipal political control; an evaluation such as that already decided upon for the welfare sector might indicate that preference should be given to a broad specific-purpose grant.

5.3 Policy implementation

A number of the proposals made by the Council in this report call for new or adapted governmental agencies or arrangements. With respect to aliens policy, there is a need for closer coordination, especially at local level, between the Aliens Registration Bureaus and the authorities responsible for drawing up the population registers. More radical will be the organizational consequences of the introduction of an Employment Equity Act. The Council proposes that the Regional Manpower Services Bureaus should be charged with the responsibility of implementing this Act, including the necessary monitoring at company level. For this they will require the necessary expertise, e.g. to advise companies how their statutory obligations should be discharged, and on forms of positive action. At national level the required expertise could also be developed by such bodies as the National Bureau to Combat Racism and the Netherlands Centre for Foreigners. The Regional and Central Manpower Services Bureaus would be required to report to the government and the social partners annually on the implementation of the Act.

In the field of education and training, the establishment would be required of a national information centre bringing together all the available knowledge and experience in relation to the education of immigrant persons. This institute could also be involved in the development and dissemination of courses in Dutch as a second language, among other things as part of primary schooling and vocational training. There is likely to be a marked increase in the need for such courses, not just on account of the introduction of Dutch language and reception classes in regular education but also on account of the introduction of the right to education and a primary education requirement for certain immigrant persons, including those recently arrived. The primary education agencies responsible for the organization of the latter courses will need to be greatly expanded.

With respect to the representation of the interests of immigrant groups, greater emphasis than before will need to be placed on their own organizations. In this regard the support centres subsidised by the Ministry of Welfare, Health and Cultural Affairs can help develop the necessary expertise. In addition these support centres should form more of an intermediary between immigrants and their organizations on the one hand and employers and educational establishments on the other.

Finally the Council would urge the establishment – by law – of an Immigrant Policy Council, along the same lines as the Council for Youth Policy or the Equal Rights Council. The Immigrant Policy Council would be charged with advising the government, either on request or at its own initiative, on the three elements of immigrant policy, including their inter-relationships with other areas of policy. The proposed Council should be broadly based, including ethnically: members could for example be appointed from employers associations and the trade unions, from the field of education, immigrant organizations and local government. A number of independent experts could also be appointed to the Council.

5.4 Financial aspects

The immigrant policy as proposed in this chapter is ambitious. In various respects the proposed policies are more intensive and comprehensive than the present minorities policy. The analysis on which the proposals in this chapter are based indicates that solutions to the problems identified often depend on more than just money alone. The groups to which immigrant policy is addressed will need to find their own way in Dutch society. The central and

local governments, and, in various areas, the social partners, can only provide facilities to improve the prospects for integrating the immigrant community. Various proposals have been made to this end, especially in the fields of employment, education and adult education. The implementation of these proposals will, however, also require a financial input which, at least in the short and medium term, will exceed the cost of the present minorities policy. This section provides an indication of the likely cost of the proposals in this report for policies specifically geared to the immigrant community.

Not all the proposals in this report would be costly. The introduction of an Employment Equity Act, for example, would require little extra funding. Other proposals again could even lead to direct savings, such as the introduction of the return option for returned migrants, or permitting asylum-seekers to take up employment.

To some extent the costs of the proposals in this report will depend on the as yet unknown number of immigrants arriving in the Netherlands in the years ahead. In addition precise data are lacking on the degree of participation by immigrants in certain facilities. It is not, consequently, known to what extent the proposals will take some of the burden off general policies; as such it is not possible to specify the financial implications of various of the proposals with any precision. The proposed new combination of general and specific policies makes it equally difficult to provide a comparison of the costs of the proposed immigrant policy with that of the current minorities policy.

The proposals in this report will also bring benefits to society. The most important aim, the value of which is difficult to quantify, is the prevention of an ethnically segregated society. Nor is it possible accurately to estimate the scale of other second-order effects, such as savings in the field of social security and welfare facilities, or higher economic growth based on the greater immigrant participation in the labour force.

The following analysis is confined to an indication of the financial implications of a number of new proposals for specific government policies, based on the material provided by the departments in question. The calculations relate to the proposals with respect to the reception of new immigrants and proposals for improving the system of education.

With respect to recently arrived immigrants past school-leaving age, reception facilities were proposed in section 4.2.3 in the form of introductory courses in Dutch (if necessary teaching people how to read and write) and orientation in Dutch society. Those here at public expense would be obliged to follow such courses; for others participation would be voluntary. This, and the fact that the scale of future immigration is of course unknown, makes it difficult to estimate the number of course participants. On the basis of the number of immigrants of more than school age in recent years falling into one of the target groups of the present minorities policy, a total of some 13,000 course participants per year could be expected. Depending on the actual number and intensity of the courses that prove the most effective in practice, the course costs (including counselling and child-care facilities) would come to around 230 million guilders.

The proposed reception facilities will take some of the pressure off the present system of basic education for adults. As it stands, some 40 percent of the participants in basic education are immigrants; an unknown but presumably large proportion of these are recent arrivals and would therefore be able in the future to make use of the proposed reception facilities. Although the adult basic education places released as a result might not be sufficient in number, they would provide a first step towards enabling immigrants resident in the

Netherlands for some time to make use of the proposed entitlement to education if they so desired. Further places might have to be added at a later stage.

Following the initial reception stage, some of the adult new immigrants would move on to training courses provided by the manpower services. This will certainly be the case if the manpower services policy comes to concentrate more on minorities and if the recommended active training policy gets off the ground. Since the latter will need to be tailored to individual requirements, the costs of the various training stages required per participant will vary widely. In some cases a course at a vocational training centre for adults (CVV) will suffice, while others will need a lengthier training sequence, consisting for example of a one-year course at a Centre for Occupational Orientation and Training (CBB) followed by an apprenticeship course and/or a work experience place. The funding of these training stages and the necessary counselling does not form part of the government's specific policies but is a matter for the manpower services agencies.

In the light of the allocation of budgetary resources in recent years and the increase in the manpower services budget for 1989 and beyond, a lack of resources is not the primary problem in providing longitudinal training, although this would of course change if the Central Manpower Services Board were to decide in favour of an activist policy. Perfectly feasible alternatives to government funding moreover exist, for example if industry were to offer a greater number of apprenticeship and/or work experience places, e.g. in the framework of collective labour agreements. There is no point in making a separate estimate of the proportion of training expenditure that will flow to the benefit of minorities since these are general policies that are not confined to immigrants remaining for lengthier or shorter periods in the Netherlands. Similar considerations apply with respect to the job-placement and job-creation measures forming part of employment policy and the creation by the government of jobs for people lacking skills. At the same time, this does not remove the necessity for introducing measures specially targeted to immigrants in the framework of an overall policy of this kind.

The education for school-age immigrants comes partly under specific policy. At present the system of budget financing in education is unable to allow for the increasing inflow of newcomers in education. Since the effective absorption of these newcomers is comparatively expensive, this imposes an additional burden on the education budget each year. The proposal to breathe new life into the system of reception classes for recently arrived school-age immigrants would cost an estimated 120 million guilders per year. This estimate is based on an influx of 8,000 pupils per year, spending an average of 18 months in a reception class of 10 pupils, at a cost of 10,000 guilders per pupil per year.

The proposal to provide language classes for non-indigenous pupils at the start of their school careers relates primarily to children who have already been in the Netherlands for some time. Some 20,000 pupils fall into this category, and if half of them were to spend a year in a language class, the cost would come to around 100 million guilders per year.

The total cost of the proposed reception in regular education of 220 million guilders may be pitched too high since the implementation of these proposals would also lead to a reclassification of pupils.

On the basis of the minorities weighting regulation, an additional sum of nearly 200 million guilders is allocated each year to schools with pupils of immigrant origin. Effective reception and language instruction as proposed in this report would not render the weighting regulation superfluous, although it

is possible that the current multiplier of 1.9 for the facilities in question could be reduced somewhat. The sum released as a result could be used to fund various other measures proposed by the Council, such as the introduction of a longitudinal immigrant pupils monitoring system, an extended day school and generous training facilities for those teaching Dutch to non-Dutch speakers. The latter measure could also entail a savings if it led to a fall in the numbers of teachers on retaining pay. On balance the proposed measures in the field of education to school-age immigrant pupils would involve an additional sum of around 220 million guilders on an annual basis.

Another proposal concerns facilities in the pre-school period for children with poor Dutch. If half the 20,000 children of immigrant origin were to make use of such facilities, the costs would come to around 120 million guilders a year.

On the basis of the figures provided above, the reception of new, non-school-age immigrants along the lines proposed by the Council would cost around 300 million guilders per year. In addition a sum of around 120 million guilders would need to be set aside for reception classes for recently arrived school-age immigrants. In the case of education for school-age pupils already in the Netherlands for sometime, proposals have been made which would cost an additional 220 million guilders a year.

In a number of respects, the total cost of the specific government policies outlined in this section has certainly been set too high. A number of the proposals will lead to a reclassification of pupils, thereby entailing lower costs elsewhere. The proposed immigrant policy could also result in savings in relation to various elements of the present minorities policy, the budget for which runs at around 800 million guilders. On balance the Council recommends setting aside an additional sum of several hundred million guilders for specific government policies targeted on immigrants.

Specific government policies cover only a proportion of the proposals put forward by the Council in this report. In the field of manpower services an active policy has been urged. The funding of such a policy need not be left to the government, or at least not in its entirety. Particular reference should be made to the shortage of jobs for those lacking skills, which could be alleviated by an expansion of this kind of employment in the public sector.

The measures proposed in this report would improve the prospects of integration and would enable new immigrants to find their footing in Dutch society. Failure to provide such opportunities will mean that immigration imposes an increasing financial burden on Dutch society. The lack of an adequate integration policy will, therefore, also come at a price, in the form of expensive social and other facilities and social segregation.

The proposals in this report can only be realised if a major effort is made to improve the position of the immigrant community in Dutch society in structural terms. This will have to be a collective effort: none of the parties involved can permit itself to stand on the sidelines.

The ability to make use of an entitlement and to enforce obligations are inextricably interwoven aspects of full citizenship. On the part of government, a major expansion is required in the measures taken to promote integration. These include the reception of immigrants, the provision of language tuition, training facilities, an expansion in the number of unskilled and semi-skilled jobs and improving the accessibility of companies and other institutions.

The state can provide facilities, eliminate barriers to employment and combat discrimination. It cannot, however, provide guarantees for successful integration. Those to whom the facilities are offered must take advantage of them. Equal opportunities must essentially be converted into reality by those concerned; all the state can do is to help ensure that the right conditions exist.

On the part of immigrants, a commitment is required to make full use of the facilities on offer. Provided that adequate facilities for integration are in place, it is therefore open to the government to impose penalties where those opportunities are not exploited.

This overall strategy has been converted into more specific proposals in the report in relation to a number of areas. The proposals in relation to compulsory primary education and an entitlement to education are prompted by the conviction that the ability to function in Dutch society pre-supposes a certain level of knowledge. The education *entitlement* entails an *obligation* on the part of the government to provide adequate facilities free of charge, but the basic education *requirement* provides the government with the right to demand of immigrants in the Netherlands at public expense that they acquire the necessary skills to function in Dutch society and to impose penalties where people fail to cooperate. The present labour-market instruments play only a limited role in the labour market. The proposal to introduce an enforceable obligation on the part of non-indigenous (and indigenous) persons to accept suitable employment or a work experience place or suitable training is similarly designed to remove these instruments from the present sphere of voluntary cooperation.

The Council's proposals to attach greater weight to rewarding success in the funding of institutions concerned with improving the position of immigrants, needs to be seen in the same light. Selected forms of output financing can help encourage these institutions to obtain good results or to target their activities more effectively.

Needless to say the need for a concerted effort is not confined to the government, state-funded agencies and the immigrants themselves. Organized industry may justifiably be expected to convert any agreements reached in the Socio-Economic Council and the Central Manpower Services Board on employment equity, combating discrimination and a system of work experience places into concrete action as quickly as possible.

The Council's proposal for an Employment Equity Act would help underpin such an agreement of intent reached between the social partners. The proposed system will also help ensure that it takes place on more than just a voluntary

basis. The extent to which employers comply with the obligation for employment equity as laid down in the Act will depend in part on social control as exerted by immigrant organizations, the National Bureau to Combat Racism, industry organizations, works councils and the media. The proposal is predicated upon sensitivity to public opinion on the part of employing organizations – including government agencies – and also upon the activities of bodies concerned with mobilizing such opinion.

Finally it may be noted that immigrant associations need no persuasion of the need for greater effort, as this is precisely what they have been arguing for for some time. The Council's proposals focus especially on opportunities for better integration in the sense of equal participation in the most important sectors and institutions of society. In doing so a marked emphasis has been placed on improving the socio-economic status of immigrants, not because the Council in any way discounts the importance of experiencing and developing ethnic minorities' own culture, but because the question of socio-economic integration has acquired real urgency and therefore calls for a major effort. Immigrant associations are particularly important in this respect. It is up to them critically and constructively to monitor the intentions and deeds of both government and industry. In addition they are uniquely placed to mobilize their rank and file to make an effective contribution to the further development of a multi-ethnic Dutch society.

The Council has published the following Reports to the Government

First term of office

- 1 Europese Unie (European Union), 1974.
- 2 Structuur van de Nederlandse economie (Structure of the Netherlands Economy), 1974.
- 3 Energiebeleid op langere termijn (Long-term Energy Policy), 1974. Reports 1 to 3 are published in one volume.
- 4 Milieubeleid (Environment Policy), 1974.
- 5 Bevolkingsprognoses (Population Forecasis), 1974.
- 6 De organisatie van het openbaar bestuur (The Organization of Publics Administration), 1975.
- 7 Buitenlandse invloeden op Nederland: Internationale migratie (Foreign Influence on the Netherlands: International Migration), 1976.
- 8 Buitenlandse invloeden op Nederland: Beschikbaarheid van wetenschappelijke en technische kennis (Foreign Influence on the Netherlands: Availability of Scientific and Technical Knowledge), 1976.
- 9 Commentaar op de Discussienota Sectorraden Wetenschapsbeleid (Comments on the discussion Paper on Sectoral Council of Science Policy), 1976.
- 10 Commentaar op de nota Contouren van een toekomstig onderwijsbestel (Comments on the White Paper on the Contours of the Future Education System), 1976.
- 11 Overzicht externe adviesorganen van de centrale overheid (Survey of external Advisory Bodies of the Central Government), 1976.
- 12 Externe adviesorganen van de centrale overheid, beschrijving, ontwikkelingen, aanbevelingen (External Advisory Bodies of the Central Government: Description, Developments, Recommendations), 1977.
- 13 'Maken wij er werk van?' Verkenningen omtrent de verhouding tussen actieven en niet-actieven 'Do we make Work our Business?' An Exploratory Study of the Relations between Economically Active and Inactive Persons), 1977.
- 14 Overzicht interne adviesorganen van de centrale overheid (Survey of Internal Advisory Bodies of the Central Government), 1977.
- 15 De Komende vijftig jaar, een toekomstverkenning voor Nederland (The Next Twenty-Five Years: a Survey of Future Developments in the Netherlands), 1977.
- 16 Over sociale ongelijkheid, een beleidsgerichte probleemverkenning (On Social Inequality: a Policy-oriented Study), 1977.

Second term of office

- 17 Etnische minderheden – A. Rapport aan de regering; B. Naar een algemeen etnisch minderhedenbeleid? (Ethnic minorities – A. Report to the Government; B. Towards on Overall Ethnic Minorities Policy?), 1979.
- 18 Plaats en toekomst van de Nederlandse industrie (Industry in the Netherlands: its Place and Future), 1980.
- 19 Beleidsgerichte toekomstverkenning: deel I. Een poging tot uitlokking (A Policy-oriented Survey of the Future: Part I. An Attempt to Challenge), 1980.
- 20 Democratie en geweld – Probleemanalyse naar aanleiding van de gebeurtenissen in Amsterdam op 30 april 1980 (Democracy and Violence – an Analysis of Problems in Connection with the Events in Amsterdam on April 30, 1980), 1980.

- 21 Vernieuwing in het arbeidsbestel (Prospects for Reforming the Labour System), 1981.
- 22 Herwaardering van welzijnsbeleid (A Reappraisal of Welfare Policy), 1982.
- 23 Onder invloed van Duitsland. Een onderzoek naar gevoeligheid en kwetsbaarheid in de betrekkingen tussen Nederland en de Bondsrepubliek (The German Factor, A Survey of Sensitivity and Vulnerability in the Relationship between the Netherlands and the Federal Republic), 1982.
- 24 Samenhangend mediabeleid (A Coherent Media Policy), 1982.

Third term of office

- 25 Beleidsgerichte toekomstverkenning: deel 2; Een verruiming van perspectief (A Policy-oriented Survey of the Future: Part 2: Towards a Broader Perspective), 1983.
- 26 Waarborgen voor zekerheid; een nieuw stelsel van sociale zekerheid in hoofdlijnen (Safeguarding Social Security), 1985.
- 27 Basisvorming in het onderwijs (Basic Education), 1986.
- 28 De onvoltooide Europese integratie (The Unfinished European Integration), 1986.
- 29 Ruimte voor Groei (Scope for Growth), 1987.
- 30 Op maat van het midden- en kleinbedrijf (Tailoring Policy to the Needs of the Small and Medium-sized Business), 1987.
- 31 Cultuur zonder grenzen (Culture and Diplomacy), 1987.
- 32 De financiering van de Europese Gemeenschap (Financing the European Community), 1987
- 33 Activerend arbeidsmarktbeleid (An Active Labour Market Policy), 1987.
- 34 Overheid en toekomstonderzoek (Government and Future Research), 1988

Fourth term of office

- 35 Rechtshandhaving (Maintenance of the Law), 1989
- 36 Allochtonenbeleid (Immigrant Policy), 1989

Reports nos. 13, 15, 17, 18, 28, 31 and 32 have been translated into English; English summaries are available of Reports nos. 16, 18, 19, 20, 25, 26, 27, 29, 30, 33, 34 and 36; Report no 23 has been translated into German.

The Council has published the following Preliminary and Background Studies (in Dutch)

First term of office

- V 1 W.A.W. van Walstijn, Kansen op onderwijs; een literatuurstudie over ongelijkheid in het Nederlandse onderwijs (Educational Opportunities: a Literature Study of Inequality in the Netherlands Educational System) (1975)
- V 2 I.J. Schoonenboom en H.M. In 't Veld-Langeveld, De emancipatie van de vrouw (Women's Emancipation) (1976)
- V 3 G.R. Muster, Van dubbeltjes en kwartjes, een literatuurstudie over ongelijkheid in de Nederlandse inkomstenverdeling (Dimes and Quarters: a Literature Study on Inequality in the Distribution of Income in the Netherlands) (1976)
- V 4 J.A.M. van Weezel a.o., De verdeling en de waardering van arbeid (The Distribution and Appreciation of Work) (1976)
- V 5 A.Ch.M. Rijnen a.o., Adviseren aan de overheid (Advising the Government) (1977)
- V 6 Verslag Eerste Raadsperiode 1972-1977 (Report on the First Term of Office) (1972-1977)*

Second term of office

- V 7 J.J.C. Voorhoeve, Internationale Macht en Interne Autonomie International Power and Internal Autonomy) (1978)
- V 8 W.M. de Jong, Techniek en wetenschap als basis voor industriële innovatie – Verslag van een reeks van interviews (Technology and Science as a base for Industrial Innovation) (1978)
- V 9 R. Gerritse, Instituut voor Onderzoek van Oveheidsuitgaven: De publieke sector: ontwikkeling en waardevorming – Een vooronderzoek (The Public Sector: Development and Valuation) (1979)
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